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Brazil-The Internal Security Mission, 1964-85 From Moderator to Director, 1930-85





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A central feature of military government during the 1964-85 period was tension between external and internal defense roles. After World War II, an internal orientation became respectable as a result of the bipolar division of the world into Soviet and Western camps, the peacekeeping procedures of the Organization of American States (OAS; see Glossary), and the study programs of the ESG and the Army General Staff School (Escola de Comando de Estado-Maior do Exército--ECEME). In the 1950s, the ESG expanded on the doctrines of the French Military Mission (1919-39) and the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission (1942-77), which emphasized the need for officers to study elements of the society and economy that contributed to socioeconomic and political stability. The ESG's military-civilian student body studied inflation, banking reform, agrarian reform, voting systems, transportation, and education, as well as counterinsurgency. Because of the interlocking of the ESG and ECEME, by the mid-1960s the ESG's doctrines were mirrored in the ECEME's and thus had been extended to the officer corps as a whole.

As Brazil's crisis deepened in the early 1960s, the military perceived the country as entering an era of subversive warfare. Military officers had studied this type of unconventional warfare in ECEME courses on internal security and irregular warfare. The ECEME played a key role in convincing officers to support the movement of 1964. In the months prior to March 1964, the staff and student officers distributed newsletters throughout the army, arguing the necessity of intervention. They had come to believe that internal security and rational economic development would occur only if various aspects of the economic and political structure were altered. They also believed that the civilian leaders were unwilling or unable to make the required changes.

For a military organization, mission and identity are tightly intertwined. It can therefore be argued that in seeking to clarify its mission, the Brazilian military was attempting to resolve its identity. Military analyst Edmundo Campos Coelho saw the military in the post-World War II era as suffering from a severe identity crisis. In his view, this crisis had its origin in the identity crisis of the Brazilian state, which lacked a focal institution that everyone could accept as the "incorporation of national authority."

In 1963 and early 1964, there was widespread acceptance in the officer corps of the need to act against the Goulart government. However, there was less of a consensus for maintaining military control once a stable government was established. Even though the hard-liners were able to impose authoritarian rule, an underlying sense of malaise followed. The military's organizational structure, field training, and weapon systems were geared for use against conventional forces or, to a lesser extent, guerrilla forces. Although the military was not structured to govern the country, military institutions adapted themselves to their assignments after 1964 (and especially after 1968). Nevertheless, many officers were ill at ease in their police-like internal security roles, and officers reacted angrily when names such as milicia (militia) were applied to them.

A power struggle in late 1965 and early 1966 led to the defeat of the Castelo Branco faction at the hands of the hard-line officers clustered around Minister of Army Arthur da Costa e Silva. It represented a victory for those who favored defining the military's mission as primarily one of internal security. In effect, this struggle may have produced two competing ideas of military professionalism: Stepan's "new professionalism" of internal security versus the other that sees the essence of the military profession as one in which troops are trained and equipped to fight foreign conventional forces as the essence of their profession. Some officers questioned the legitimacy of the internal security activities of their colleagues, even though they may have acknowledged the need for such activities. These officers regarded troop commands and normal staff assignments as being more "military" than internal security assignments.

The officer corps has split in a variety of ways over the years. After the rise of Geisel, if not before, some officers worried that a high level of political involvement was bad and distracted the corps from its main responsibility of protecting the country against foreign enemies. They argued in favor of a narrow definition of the military's mission, limiting it to external defense. They argued further that to mount a secure external defense, internal support and cohesion were necessary. Officers could not be seen imposing an unpopular government one day and appealing to the population's patriotism the next. Those who had long argued this way were nearly jubilant in pointing to the disastrous results of the failed Argentine invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982.

Officers whose hands were tainted during the Military Republic (1964-85) were fearful of reprisals once civilian government returned. In August 1979, Congress approved Figueiredo's proposal for amnesty, for both the agents of repression and those who took up arms against the regime. The amnesty facilitated the military's return to the barracks but did not resolve the moral or legal issues involved. With the return of full democracy in 1985, the victims began seeking redress in the courts, while some officers with tarnished reputations were coming up for promotion to general. Many active and retired officers who were not involved directly in repression or torture tended to defend colleagues who were. The cleavages that the repression caused within the military and between the military and society have posed major problems for the army.

The hard-liners usually are very nationalistic and argue for stronger stances in foreign policy, for stronger controls over multinationals, and especially for stronger positions against the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF--see Glossary). On October 7, 1987, a group of retired hard-line generals and their civilian allies formed the Brazilian Association for the Defense of Democracy (Associação Brasileira de Defesa da Democracia--ABDD). The ABDD argued for a new military intervention "if the politicians did not turn back the chaos." The ABDD and similar groups, although populated by disgruntled retirees, have virtually no political influence.

The military has an elaborate ideology of nationalism and development, much of which has been incorporated into the thinking of civilian opinion makers and politicians. Essentially, this ideology holds that Brazil can be, and should be, a great power. The military sees its primary function as contributing to that objective.

Data as of April 1997

There is a debate over whether the military appropriated the moderating power during the Old Republic (1889-1930). Many historians emphasize the moderating role as early as 1889, with the argument that the army claimed the emperor's moderating power, which had allowed him to intervene in and resolve political conflicts. Some argue that the military did not assume a moderating role until after 1930, primarily during the 1937-45 period of the quasi-fascist New State (Estado Novo) of Getúlio Vargas (president, 1930-45, 1951-54). According to the revisionist view, the army in 1889 did not intend to play a moderating role. However, after the collapse of the army in 1930 and its subsequent rebuilding, the military accepted the ideology of the poder moderador . The debate is important because the revisionist view suggests a more grudging acceptance by the military of the moderating role.

According to political scientist Alfred C. Stepan, the military played a moderating role in civil-military relations during the coups of 1930, 1945, 1954, and 1964; during the abortive intervention of 1961; and in 1953, when the minister of war, General Henrique Teixeira Lott, guaranteed President Juscelino Kubitschek's inauguration as the democratically elected president (1956-61) on January 31, 1956. The pro-Kubitschek faction within the military was actually the largest and most influential. The military viewed itself as "the people in uniform" (o povo fardado ), inextricably a part of the political system. Civilians, in turn, generally accepted the military's moderating function as legitimate.

In the 1930 coup, military officers of a reformist bent supported Vargas after he declared the previous elections fraudulent and assumed the presidency. As the army reorganized itself, discipline was shaky. During the decade, there were sixteen barracks revolts and seventy-two other instances of agitation, conspiracy, and protest. Between 1931 and 1938, at least 624 officers and 1,875 soldiers were expelled from the army. Thus, one of the principal reasons for General Góes Monteiro and General Eurico Gaspar Dutra's support of the dictatorial Estado Novo in November 1937 was to reestablish control and discipline in the army. Whereas the turmoil of the 1890s had ended in the "politics of the governors," that of the 1930s ended in the imposition of Brazil's first long-lived authoritarian regime (1937-45).

Ironically, the second coup in 1945 was against Vargas. The military moved to intervene a third time in 1954, again to remove Vargas from office, an action that led to his suicide. In its fourth intervention, in 1955, an anti-Kubitschek faction of the military, defeated by the larger pro-Kubitschek military faction led by General Lott, failed to stop Kubitschek from assuming the presidency. In the fifth intervention, in 1961, three military ministers were unable to block João Goulart (president, 1961-64) from succeeding Jânio Quadros (president, January-August 1961). The sixth intervention came on March 31, 1964, when the military overthrew left-of-center Goulart. By that action, the military shifted from the moderator model of civil-military relations to direct military government.

The 1964 military coup was clearly different from that of the previous five military interventions. For the first time in the twentieth century, the Brazilian military assumed political power. As Stepan has noted, the military became the director and not the moderator of politics. Instead of maintaining the status quo, the military sought to transform the system. That transformation required a new professionalism (profissionalismo novo ) for the military, which had no experience in long-term governing. The major vehicle for that new role was the War College (Escola Superior de Guerra--ESG). Emphasizing internal security and national development, the ESG is an advanced training program for senior officers and civilians.

Political scientist David V. Fleischer, referring to the security and development ideology of the military regime from 1964 to 1985, points out the continuity in the evolution of civil-military relations that can be traced to the nineteenth-century positivism of the military activists who founded the republic under the slogan of "Order and Progress." This continuity extends, Fleischer notes, through the growing economic nationalism in the 1930s and the Estado Novo to the Kubitschek era. In the latter era, autonomous development became a priority to ensure national security.

From 1964 to 1985, the military dominated the presidency. The army imposed its candidates for president and governor, and a docile Congress or an electoral college approved them. These candidates included Humberto Castelo Branco (president, 1964-67), Artur da Costa e Silva (president, 1967-69), Emílio Garrastazú Médici (president, 1969-74), Ernesto Geisel (president, 1974-79), and João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo (president, 1979-85). Both Médici and Figueiredo were former intelligence chiefs.

The military based its original plan of government on a moderate degree of civilian support and complete military unity. With time, military government exacerbated factionalism within the military. That division centered on adherents to and dissenters from the ESG ideology. The pro-ESG members of the military, the so-called Sorbonnists, were politically moderate and wanted to maintain democratic forms and institutions. They aided in returning the presidency to civilian government. Presidents Castelo Branco and Geisel best represented this faction. In contrast, the hard-liners within the military favored suspension of democratic processes and were more nationalistic. They argued against a high degree of foreign political and economic dependence in attaining the goals of security and development. The hard-liners were hesitant to return political power to civilians. Presidents Costa e Silva and Médici best represented this faction within the military.

The Internal Security Mission, 1964-85

A central feature of military government during the 1964-85 period was tension between external and internal defense roles. After World War II, an internal orientation became respectable as a result of the bipolar division of the world into Soviet and Western camps, the peacekeeping procedures of the Organization of American States (OAS; see Glossary), and the study programs of the ESG and the Army General Staff School (Escola de Comando de Estado-Maior do Exército--ECEME). In the 1950s, the ESG expanded on the doctrines of the French Military Mission (1919-39) and the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission (1942-77), which emphasized the need for officers to study elements of the society and economy that contributed to socioeconomic and political stability. The ESG's military-civilian student body studied inflation, banking reform, agrarian reform, voting systems, transportation, and education, as well as counterinsurgency. Because of the interlocking of the ESG and ECEME, by the mid-1960s the ESG's doctrines were mirrored in the ECEME's and thus had been extended to the officer corps as a whole.

As Brazil's crisis deepened in the early 1960s, the military perceived the country as entering an era of subversive warfare. Military officers had studied this type of unconventional warfare in ECEME courses on internal security and irregular warfare. The ECEME played a key role in convincing officers to support the movement of 1964. In the months prior to March 1964, the staff and student officers distributed newsletters throughout the army, arguing the necessity of intervention. They had come to believe that internal security and rational economic development would occur only if various aspects of the economic and political structure were altered. They also believed that the civilian leaders were unwilling or unable to make the required changes.

For a military organization, mission and identity are tightly intertwined. It can therefore be argued that in seeking to clarify its mission, the Brazilian military was attempting to resolve its identity. Military analyst Edmundo Campos Coelho saw the military in the post-World War II era as suffering from a severe identity crisis. In his view, this crisis had its origin in the identity crisis of the Brazilian state, which lacked a focal institution that everyone could accept as the "incorporation of national authority."

In 1963 and early 1964, there was widespread acceptance in the officer corps of the need to act against the Goulart government. However, there was less of a consensus for maintaining military control once a stable government was established. Even though the hard-liners were able to impose authoritarian rule, an underlying sense of malaise followed. The military's organizational structure, field training, and weapon systems were geared for use against conventional forces or, to a lesser extent, guerrilla forces. Although the military was not structured to govern the country, military institutions adapted themselves to their assignments after 1964 (and especially after 1968). Nevertheless, many officers were ill at ease in their police-like internal security roles, and officers reacted angrily when names such as milicia (militia) were applied to them.

A power struggle in late 1965 and early 1966 led to the defeat of the Castelo Branco faction at the hands of the hard-line officers clustered around Minister of Army Arthur da Costa e Silva. It represented a victory for those who favored defining the military's mission as primarily one of internal security. In effect, this struggle may have produced two competing ideas of military professionalism: Stepan's "new professionalism" of internal security versus the other that sees the essence of the military profession as one in which troops are trained and equipped to fight foreign conventional forces as the essence of their profession. Some officers questioned the legitimacy of the internal security activities of their colleagues, even though they may have acknowledged the need for such activities. These officers regarded troop commands and normal staff assignments as being more "military" than internal security assignments.

The officer corps has split in a variety of ways over the years. After the rise of Geisel, if not before, some officers worried that a high level of political involvement was bad and distracted the corps from its main responsibility of protecting the country against foreign enemies. They argued in favor of a narrow definition of the military's mission, limiting it to external defense. They argued further that to mount a secure external defense, internal support and cohesion were necessary. Officers could not be seen imposing an unpopular government one day and appealing to the population's patriotism the next. Those who had long argued this way were nearly jubilant in pointing to the disastrous results of the failed Argentine invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982.

Officers whose hands were tainted during the Military Republic (1964-85) were fearful of reprisals once civilian government returned. In August 1979, Congress approved Figueiredo's proposal for amnesty, for both the agents of repression and those who took up arms against the regime. The amnesty facilitated the military's return to the barracks but did not resolve the moral or legal issues involved. With the return of full democracy in 1985, the victims began seeking redress in the courts, while some officers with tarnished reputations were coming up for promotion to general. Many active and retired officers who were not involved directly in repression or torture tended to defend colleagues who were. The cleavages that the repression caused within the military and between the military and society have posed major problems for the army.

The hard-liners usually are very nationalistic and argue for stronger stances in foreign policy, for stronger controls over multinationals, and especially for stronger positions against the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF--see Glossary). On October 7, 1987, a group of retired hard-line generals and their civilian allies formed the Brazilian Association for the Defense of Democracy (Associação Brasileira de Defesa da Democracia--ABDD). The ABDD argued for a new military intervention "if the politicians did not turn back the chaos." The ABDD and similar groups, although populated by disgruntled retirees, have virtually no political influence.

The military has an elaborate ideology of nationalism and development, much of which has been incorporated into the thinking of civilian opinion makers and politicians. Essentially, this ideology holds that Brazil can be, and should be, a great power. The military sees its primary function as contributing to that objective.

Data as of April 1997



BackgroundFollowing more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil peacefully gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getulio VARGAS rose to power in 1930. By far the largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil underwent more than half a century of populist and military government until 1985, when the military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers. Brazil continues to pursue industrial and agricultural growth and development of its interior. Exploiting vast natural resources and a large labor pool, it is today South America's leading economic power and a regional leader. Highly unequal income distribution and crime remain pressing problems.
LocationEastern South America, bordering the Atlantic Ocean
Area(sq km)total: 8,514,877 sq km
land: 8,459,417 sq km
water: 55,460 sq km
note: includes Arquipelago de Fernando de Noronha, Atol das Rocas, Ilha da Trindade, Ilhas Martin Vaz, and Penedos de Sao Pedro e Sao Paulo
Geographic coordinates10 00 S, 55 00 W
Land boundaries(km)total: 16,885 km
border countries: Argentina 1,261 km, Bolivia 3,423 km, Colombia 1,644 km, French Guiana 730 km, Guyana 1,606 km, Paraguay 1,365 km, Peru 2,995 km, Suriname 593 km, Uruguay 1,068 km, Venezuela 2,200 km

Coastline(km)7,491 km

Climatemostly tropical, but temperate in south

Elevation extremes(m)lowest point: Atlantic Ocean 0 m
highest point: Pico da Neblina 3,014 m
Natural resourcesbauxite, gold, iron ore, manganese, nickel, phosphates, platinum, tin, uranium, petroleum, hydropower, timber
Land use(%)arable land: 6.93%
permanent crops: 0.89%
other: 92.18% (2005)

Irrigated land(sq km)29,200 sq km (2003)
Total renewable water resources(cu km)8,233 cu km (2000)
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural)total: 59.3 cu km/yr (20%/18%/62%)
per capita: 318 cu m/yr (2000)
Natural hazardsrecurring droughts in northeast; floods and occasional frost in south
Environment - current issuesdeforestation in Amazon Basin destroys the habitat and endangers a multitude of plant and animal species indigenous to the area; there is a lucrative illegal wildlife trade; air and water pollution in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and several other large cities; land degradation and water pollution caused by improper mining activities; wetland degradation; severe oil spills
Environment - international agreementsparty to: Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic-Marine Living Resources, Antarctic Seals, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands, Whaling
signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
Geography - notelargest country in South America; shares common boundaries with every South American country except Chile and Ecuador
Population198,739,269
note: Brazil conducted a census in August 2000, which reported a population of 169,872,855; that figure was about 3.8% lower than projections by the US Census Bureau, and is close to the implied underenumeration of 4.6% for the 1991 census (July 2009 est.)
Age structure(%)0-14 years: 26.7% (male 27,092,880/female 26,062,244)
15-64 years: 66.8% (male 65,804,108/female 67,047,725)
65 years and over: 6.4% (male 5,374,230/female 7,358,082) (2009 est.)
Median age(years)total: 28.6 years
male: 27.8 years
female: 29.3 years (2009 est.)
Population growth rate(%)1.199% (2009 est.)
Birth rate(births/1,000 population)18.43 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Death rate(deaths/1,000 population)6.35 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)

Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population)-0.09 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Urbanization(%)urban population: 86% of total population (2008)
rate of urbanization: 1.8% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
Sex ratio(male(s)/female)at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female
under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female
15-64 years: 0.98 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 0.73 male(s)/female
total population: 0.98 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births)total: 22.58 deaths/1,000 live births
male: 26.16 deaths/1,000 live births
female: 18.83 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)

Life expectancy at birth(years)total population: 71.99 years
male: 68.43 years
female: 75.73 years (2009 est.)

Total fertility rate(children born/woman)2.21 children born/woman (2009 est.)
Nationalitynoun: Brazilian(s)
adjective: Brazilian
Ethnic groups(%)white 53.7%, mulatto (mixed white and black) 38.5%, black 6.2%, other (includes Japanese, Arab, Amerindian) 0.9%, unspecified 0.7% (2000 census)

Religions(%)Roman Catholic (nominal) 73.6%, Protestant 15.4%, Spiritualist 1.3%, Bantu/voodoo 0.3%, other 1.8%, unspecified 0.2%, none 7.4% (2000 census)
Languages(%)Portuguese (official and most widely spoken language); note - less common languages include Spanish (border areas and schools), German, Italian, Japanese, English, and a large number of minor Amerindian languages

Country nameconventional long form: Federative Republic of Brazil
conventional short form: Brazil
local long form: Republica Federativa do Brasil
local short form: Brasil
Government typefederal republic
Capitalname: Brasilia
geographic coordinates: 15 47 S, 47 55 W
time difference: UTC-3 (2 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
daylight saving time: +1hr, begins third Sunday in October; ends third Sunday in February
note: Brazil is divided into four time zones, including one for the Fernando de Noronha Islands
Administrative divisions26 states (estados, singular - estado) and 1 federal district* (distrito federal); Acre, Alagoas, Amapa, Amazonas, Bahia, Ceara, Distrito Federal*, Espirito Santo, Goias, Maranhao, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Para, Paraiba, Parana, Pernambuco, Piaui, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, Rondonia, Roraima, Santa Catarina, Sao Paulo, Sergipe, Tocantins
Constitution5-Oct-88

Legal systembased on Roman codes; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Suffragevoluntary between 16 and 18 years of age and over 70; compulsory over 18 and under 70 years of age; note - military conscripts do not vote
Executive branchchief of state: President Luiz Inacio LULA da Silva (since 1 January 2003); Vice President Jose ALENCAR Gomes da Silva (since 1 January 2003); note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government
head of government: President Luiz Inacio LULA da Silva (since 1 January 2003); Vice President Jose ALENCAR Gomes da Silva (since 1 January 2003)
cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the president
elections: president and vice president elected on the same ticket by popular vote for a single four-year term; election last held 1 October 2006 with runoff 29 October 2006 (next to be held 3 October 2010 and, if necessary, 31 October 2010)
election results: Luiz Inacio LULA da Silva (PT) reelected president - 60.83%, Geraldo ALCKMIN (PSDB) 39.17%

Legislative branchbicameral National Congress or Congresso Nacional consists of the Federal Senate or Senado Federal (81 seats; 3 members from each state and federal district elected according to the principle of majority to serve eight-year terms; one-third and two-thirds elected every four years, alternately) and the Chamber of Deputies or Camara dos Deputados (513 seats; members are elected by proportional representation to serve four-year terms)
elections: Federal Senate - last held 1 October 2006 for one-third of the Senate (next to be held in October 2010 for two-thirds of the Senate); Chamber of Deputies - last held 1 October 2006 (next to be held in October 2010)
election results: Federal Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PFL 6, PSDB 5, PMDB 4, PTB 3, PT 2, PDT 1, PSB 1, PL 1, PPS 1, PRTB 1, PP 1, PCdoB 1; Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PMDB 89, PT 83, PFL 65, PSDB 65, PP 42, PSB 27, PDT 24, PL 23, PTB 22, PPS 21, PCdoB 13, PV 13, PSC 9, other 17; note - as of 1 January 2009, the composition of the entire legislature is as follows: Federal Senate - seats by party - PMDB 21, DEM (formerly PFL) 12, PSDB 13, PT 12, PTB 7, PDT 5, PR 4, PSB 2, PCdoB 1, PRB 1, PP 1, PSC 1, PSOL 1; Chamber of Deputies - seats by party - PMDB 95, PT 79, PSDB 59, DEM (formerly PFL) 53, PR 44, PP 40, PSB 29, PDT 25, PTB 19, PPS 14, PV 14, PCdoB 13, PSC 11, PMN 5, PRB 4, PHS 3, PSOL 3, PTC 1, PTdoB 1

Judicial branchSupreme Federal Tribunal or STF (11 ministers are appointed for life by the president and confirmed by the Senate); Higher Tribunal of Justice; Regional Federal Tribunals (judges are appointed for life); note - though appointed "for life," judges, like all federal employees, have a mandatory retirement age of 70

Political pressure groups and leadersLandless Workers' Movement or MST
other: labor unions and federations; large farmers' associations; religious groups including evangelical Christian churches and the Catholic Church
International organization participationAfDB (nonregional member), BIS, CAN (associate), CPLP, FAO, G-15, G-20, G-24, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, LAES, LAIA, LAS (observer), Mercosur, MIGA, MINURCAT, MINURSO, MINUSTAH, NAM (observer), NSG, OAS, OPANAL, OPCW, Paris Club (associate), PCA, RG, SICA (observer), UN, UN Security Council (temporary), UNASUR, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNFICYP, UNHCR, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNITAR, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMIT, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCL, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
Flag descriptiongreen with a large yellow diamond in the center bearing a blue celestial globe with 27 white five-pointed stars (one for each state and the Federal District) arranged in the same pattern as the night sky over Brazil; the globe has a white equatorial band with the motto ORDEM E PROGRESSO (Order and Progress)

Economy - overviewCharacterized by large and well-developed agricultural, mining, manufacturing, and service sectors, Brazil's economy outweighs that of all other South American countries and Brazil is expanding its presence in world markets. From 2003 to 2007, Brazil ran record trade surpluses and recorded its first current account surpluses since 1992. Productivity gains coupled with high commodity prices contributed to the surge in exports. Brazil improved its debt profile in 2006 by shifting its debt burden toward real denominated and domestically held instruments. LULA da Silva restated his commitment to fiscal responsibility by maintaining the country's primary surplus during the 2006 election. Following his second inauguration in October of that year, LULA da Silva announced a package of further economic reforms to reduce taxes and increase investment in infrastructure. Brazil's debt achieved investment grade status early in 2008, but the government's attempt to achieve strong growth while reducing the debt burden created inflationary pressures. For most of 2008, the Central Bank embarked on a restrictive monetary policy to stem these pressures. Since the onset of the global financial crisis in September, Brazil's currency and its stock market - Bovespa - have significantly lost value, -41% for Bovespa for the year ending 30 December 2008. Brazil incurred another current account deficit in 2008, as world demand and prices for commodities dropped in the second-half of the year.
GDP (purchasing power parity)$1.998 trillion (2008 est.)
$1.901 trillion (2007 est.)
$1.798 trillion (2006 est.)
note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP (official exchange rate)$1.573 trillion (2008 est.)
GDP - real growth rate(%)5.1% (2008 est.)
5.7% (2007 est.)
4% (2006 est.)
GDP - per capita (PPP)$10,200 (2008 est.)
$9,800 (2007 est.)
$9,400 (2006 est.)
note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP - composition by sector(%)agriculture: 6.7%
industry: 28%
services: 65.3% (2008 est.)
Labor force93.65 million (2008 est.)

Labor force - by occupation(%)agriculture: 20%
industry: 14%
services: 66% (2003 est.)
Unemployment rate(%)7.9% (2008 est.)
9.3% (2007 est.)
Population below poverty line(%)31% (2005)
Household income or consumption by percentage share(%)lowest 10%: 1.1%
highest 10%: 43% (2007)
Distribution of family income - Gini index56.7 (2005)
60.7 (1998)
Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP)19% of GDP (2008 est.)
Budgetrevenues: NA
expenditures: NA
Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%)5.7% (2008 est.)
3.6% (2007 est.)

Stock of money$95.03 billion (31 December 2008)
$131.1 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of quasi money$724.5 billion (31 December 2008)
$792.8 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of domestic credit$1.249 trillion (31 December 2008)
$1.377 trillion (31 December 2007)
Market value of publicly traded shares$589.4 billion (31 December 2008)
$1.37 trillion (31 December 2007)
$711.1 billion (31 December 2006)
Economic aid - recipient$191.9 million (2005)

Public debt(% of GDP)38.8% of GDP (2008 est.)
52% of GDP (2004 est.)
Agriculture - productscoffee, soybeans, wheat, rice, corn, sugarcane, cocoa, citrus; beef
Industriestextiles, shoes, chemicals, cement, lumber, iron ore, tin, steel, aircraft, motor vehicles and parts, other machinery and equipment

Industrial production growth rate(%)4.3% (2008 est.)

Current account balance-$28.19 billion (2008 est.)
$1.551 billion (2007 est.)
Exports$197.9 billion (2008 est.)
$160.6 billion (2007 est.)

Exports - commodities(%)transport equipment, iron ore, soybeans, footwear, coffee, autos
Exports - partners(%)US 14.4%, China 12.4%, Argentina 8.4%, Netherlands 5%, Germany 4.5% (2008)
Imports$173.1 billion (2008 est.)
$120.6 billion (2007 est.)

Imports - commodities(%)machinery, electrical and transport equipment, chemical products, oil, automotive parts, electronics
Imports - partners(%)US 14.9%, China 11.6%, Argentina 7.9%, Germany 7% (2008)

Reserves of foreign exchange and gold$193.8 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$180.3 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Debt - external$262.9 billion (31 December 2008)
$240.5 billion (31 December 2007)

Stock of direct foreign investment - at home$294 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$248.9 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad$127.5 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$107.1 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Exchange ratesreals (BRL) per US dollar - 1.8644 (2008 est.), 1.85 (2007 est.), 2.1761 (2006), 2.4344 (2005), 2.9251 (2004)

Currency (code)real (BRL)

Telephones - main lines in use41.141 million (2008)
Telephones - mobile cellular150.641 million (2008)
Telephone systemgeneral assessment: good working system; fixed-line connections have remained relatively stable in recent years and stand at about 20 per 100 persons; less expensive mobile cellular technology is a major driver in expanding telephone service to the low-income segment of the population with mobile-cellular telephone density reaching 80 per 100 persons
domestic: extensive microwave radio relay system and a domestic satellite system with 64 earth stations; mobile-cellular usage has more than tripled in the past 5 years
international: country code - 55; landing point for a number of submarine cables, including Atlantis 2, that provide direct links to South and Central America, the Caribbean, the US, Africa, and Europe; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean), 1 Inmarsat (Atlantic Ocean region east), connected by microwave relay system to Mercosur Brazilsat B3 satellite earth station (2008)
Internet country code.br
Internet users64.948 million (2008)
Airports4,000 (2009)
Pipelines(km)condensate/gas 62 km; gas 9,892 km; liquid petroleum gas 353 km; oil 4,517 km; refined products 4,465 km (2008)
Roadways(km)total: 1,751,868 km
paved: 96,353 km
unpaved: 1,655,515 km (2004)

Ports and terminalsGuaiba, Ilha Grande, Paranagua, Rio Grande, Santos, Sao Sebastiao, Tubarao
Military branchesBrazilian Army (Exercito Brasileiro, EB), Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil (MB), includes Naval Air and Marine Corps (Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais)), Brazilian Air Force (Forca Aerea Brasileira, FAB) (2009)
Military service age and obligation(years of age)21-45 years of age for compulsory military service; conscript service obligation - 9 to 12 months; 17-45 years of age for voluntary service; an increasing percentage of the ranks are "long-service" volunteer professionals; women were allowed to serve in the armed forces beginning in early 1980s when the Brazilian Army became the first army in South America to accept women into career ranks; women serve in Navy and Air Force only in Women's Reserve Corps (2001)
Manpower available for military servicemales age 16-49: 52,523,552
females age 16-49: 52,628,945 (2009 est.)
Manpower fit for military servicemales age 16-49: 38,043,555
females age 16-49: 44,267,520 (2009 est.)
Manpower reaching militarily significant age annuallymale: 1,690,031
female: 1,630,851 (2009 est.)
Military expenditures(% of GDP)2.6% of GDP (2006 est.)
Disputes - internationalunruly region at convergence of Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay borders is locus of money laundering, smuggling, arms and illegal narcotics trafficking, and fundraising for extremist organizations; uncontested boundary dispute with Uruguay over Isla Brasilera at the confluence of the Quarai/Cuareim and Invernada rivers, that form a tripoint with Argentina; the Itaipu Dam reservoir covers over a once contested section of Brazil-Paraguay boundary west of Guaira Falls on the Rio Parana; an accord placed the long-disputed Isla Suarez/Ilha de Guajara-Mirim, a fluvial island on the Rio Mamore, under Bolivian administration in 1958, but sovereignty remains in dispute

Electricity - production(kWh)438.8 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - production by source(%)fossil fuel: 8.3%
hydro: 82.7%
nuclear: 4.4%
other: 4.6% (2001)
Electricity - consumption(kWh)404.3 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - exports(kWh)2.034 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - imports(kWh)42.06 billion kWh; note - supplied by Paraguay (2008 est.)
Oil - production(bbl/day)2.422 million bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - consumption(bbl/day)2.52 million bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - exports(bbl/day)570,100 bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - imports(bbl/day)632,900 bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - proved reserves(bbl)12.62 billion bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
Natural gas - production(cu m)12.62 billion cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - consumption(cu m)23.65 billion cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - exports(cu m)0 cu m (2008)
Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m)365 billion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%)0.6% (2007 est.)
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS730,000 (2007 est.)
HIV/AIDS - deaths15,000 (2007 est.)
Literacy(%)definition: age 15 and over can read and write
total population: 88.6%
male: 88.4%
female: 88.8% (2004 est.)

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years)total: 14 years
male: 14 years
female: 15 years (2005)
Education expenditures(% of GDP)4% of GDP (2004)








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