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Afghanistan Index
With Muhammad Daud's death, the government of Afghanistan was
run by a divided, dilettante Marxist clique that launched a train
of events eventually leading to the disintegration of the state.
They named their regime the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
(DRA).
The "Saur Revolution," as the new government grandiloquently
labeled its coup d'etat (after the month in the Islamic calendar
in which it occurred), was almost entirely the achievement of the
Khalq faction of the PDPA. This success gave it effective control
over the armed forces, a great advantage over its Parchami rival.
Khalq's victory was partially due to Daud's miscalculation that
Parcham was the more serious threat. Parcham's leaders had
enjoyed widespread connections within the senior bureaucracy and
even the royal family and the most privileged elite. These
linkages also tended to make their movements easy to trace.
Khalq, on the other hand ,had not been involved in Daud's
government, had little connection with Kabul's Persian speaking
elite, and a rustic reputation based on recruitment of students
from the provinces. Most of them were Pushtuns, especially the
Ghilzais. They had few apparent connections in the senior
bureaucracy, many had taken jobs as school teachers. Khalq's
influence at Kabul University was also limited.
These newcomers to Kabul had seemed poorly positioned to
penetrate the government. Moreover, they were led by the erratic
Muhammad Taraki, a poet, sometime minor official, and a publicly
notorious radical. Confident that his military officers were
reliable, Daud must have discounted the diligence of Taraki's
lieutenant, Hafizullah Amin, who had sought out dissident Pushtun
officers. The bungling of Amin's arrest, which enabled him to
trigger the coup ahead of its planned date, also suggests Khalq's
penetration of Daud's security police.
The plotters carried out a bold and sophisticated plan. It
employed the shock effect of a combined armored and air assault
on the Arg or palace, the seat of Daud's highly centralized
government. Seizure of the initiative demoralized the larger
loyal or uncommitted forces nearby. Quick capture of
telecommunications, the defense ministry and other strategic
centers of authority isolated Daud's stubbornly resisting palace
guard.
The coup was by far Khalq's most successful achievement. So
much so, that a considerable literature has accumulated arguing
that it must have been planned and executed by the KGB, or some
special branch of the Soviet military. Given the friction that
soon developed between Khalq and Soviet officials, especially
over the purging of Parcham, Soviet control of the coup seems
unlikely. Prior knowledge of it does appear to have been highly
likely. Claims that Soviet pilots bombed the palace overlook the
availability of seasoned Afghan pilots.
Political leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
was asserted within three days of the military takeover. After
thirteen years of conspiratorial activity, the two factions of
the PDPA emerged in public, refusing at first, to admit their
Marxist credentials. Khalq's dominance was quickly apparent.
Taraki became president, prime minister and General Secretary of
the PDPA. Parcham's leader, Babrak Karmal, and Amin were named
deputy prime ministers. Cabinet membership was split eleven to
ten , with Khalq in the majority. Khalq dominated the
Revolutionary Council, which was to serve as the ruling body of
the government. Within weeks purges of Parcham began, and by
summer Khalq's somewhat bewildered Soviet patrons became aware of
how difficult it would be temper its radicalism. The destruction
of Afghanistan's former ruling elite had begun immediately after
the seizure of power. Execution (Parcham leaders later claimed at
least 11,000 during the Taraki/Amin period), flight into exile,
and later the devastation of Kabul itself would literally remove
the great majority of the some 100,000 who had come to form
Afghanistan's elite and middle class. Their loss has almost
completely broken the continuity of Afghanistan's leadership,
political institutions and their social foundation.
The Khalq leadership proved incapable of filling this vacuum.
Its brutal and clumsy attempts to introduce radical changes in
control over agricultural land holding and credit, rural social
relations, marriage and family arrangements, and education led to
scattered protests and uprisings among all major communities in
the Afghan countryside. Taraki and Amin left a legacy of turmoil
and resentment which gravely compromised later Marxist attempts
to win popular acceptance.
Data as of 1997
The April 1978 Coup d'etat and the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan
With Muhammad Daud's death, the government of Afghanistan was
run by a divided, dilettante Marxist clique that launched a train
of events eventually leading to the disintegration of the state.
They named their regime the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
(DRA).
The "Saur Revolution," as the new government grandiloquently
labeled its coup d'etat (after the month in the Islamic calendar
in which it occurred), was almost entirely the achievement of the
Khalq faction of the PDPA. This success gave it effective control
over the armed forces, a great advantage over its Parchami rival.
Khalq's victory was partially due to Daud's miscalculation that
Parcham was the more serious threat. Parcham's leaders had
enjoyed widespread connections within the senior bureaucracy and
even the royal family and the most privileged elite. These
linkages also tended to make their movements easy to trace.
Khalq, on the other hand ,had not been involved in Daud's
government, had little connection with Kabul's Persian speaking
elite, and a rustic reputation based on recruitment of students
from the provinces. Most of them were Pushtuns, especially the
Ghilzais. They had few apparent connections in the senior
bureaucracy, many had taken jobs as school teachers. Khalq's
influence at Kabul University was also limited.
These newcomers to Kabul had seemed poorly positioned to
penetrate the government. Moreover, they were led by the erratic
Muhammad Taraki, a poet, sometime minor official, and a publicly
notorious radical. Confident that his military officers were
reliable, Daud must have discounted the diligence of Taraki's
lieutenant, Hafizullah Amin, who had sought out dissident Pushtun
officers. The bungling of Amin's arrest, which enabled him to
trigger the coup ahead of its planned date, also suggests Khalq's
penetration of Daud's security police.
The plotters carried out a bold and sophisticated plan. It
employed the shock effect of a combined armored and air assault
on the Arg or palace, the seat of Daud's highly centralized
government. Seizure of the initiative demoralized the larger
loyal or uncommitted forces nearby. Quick capture of
telecommunications, the defense ministry and other strategic
centers of authority isolated Daud's stubbornly resisting palace
guard.
The coup was by far Khalq's most successful achievement. So
much so, that a considerable literature has accumulated arguing
that it must have been planned and executed by the KGB, or some
special branch of the Soviet military. Given the friction that
soon developed between Khalq and Soviet officials, especially
over the purging of Parcham, Soviet control of the coup seems
unlikely. Prior knowledge of it does appear to have been highly
likely. Claims that Soviet pilots bombed the palace overlook the
availability of seasoned Afghan pilots.
Political leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
was asserted within three days of the military takeover. After
thirteen years of conspiratorial activity, the two factions of
the PDPA emerged in public, refusing at first, to admit their
Marxist credentials. Khalq's dominance was quickly apparent.
Taraki became president, prime minister and General Secretary of
the PDPA. Parcham's leader, Babrak Karmal, and Amin were named
deputy prime ministers. Cabinet membership was split eleven to
ten , with Khalq in the majority. Khalq dominated the
Revolutionary Council, which was to serve as the ruling body of
the government. Within weeks purges of Parcham began, and by
summer Khalq's somewhat bewildered Soviet patrons became aware of
how difficult it would be temper its radicalism. The destruction
of Afghanistan's former ruling elite had begun immediately after
the seizure of power. Execution (Parcham leaders later claimed at
least 11,000 during the Taraki/Amin period), flight into exile,
and later the devastation of Kabul itself would literally remove
the great majority of the some 100,000 who had come to form
Afghanistan's elite and middle class. Their loss has almost
completely broken the continuity of Afghanistan's leadership,
political institutions and their social foundation.
The Khalq leadership proved incapable of filling this vacuum.
Its brutal and clumsy attempts to introduce radical changes in
control over agricultural land holding and credit, rural social
relations, marriage and family arrangements, and education led to
scattered protests and uprisings among all major communities in
the Afghan countryside. Taraki and Amin left a legacy of turmoil
and resentment which gravely compromised later Marxist attempts
to win popular acceptance.
Data as of 1997
- Afghanistan-Jat
- Afghanistan-Pakistan's Policies and Misperceptions
- Afghanistan-The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Since 1992
- Afghanistan-Early Development of Islam
- Afghanistan-AFGHANISTAN'S PROSPECTS
- Afghanistan-Nuristani
- Afghanistan-Disenchantment with the Reforms
- Afghanistan-Literacy
- Afghanistan-POPULATION
- Afghanistan-THE ATTEMPT TO MODERNIZE: 1953-73
- Afghanistan-Regions
- Afghanistan-Modernization and Development of Institutions
- Afghanistan-Tribes
- Afghanistan-Current Activities Adult Literacy
- Afghanistan-Enrollment
- Afghanistan-The Search for Popular Support
- Afghanistan-Mughal-Safavid Rivalry, ca - 1500-1747
- Afghanistan-Ethnic Groups
- Afghanistan-Tajik
- Afghanistan-The Rise of Dost Mohammad THE GREAT GAME
- Afghanistan-The Council of Commanders, 1990-92
- Afghanistan-The Role of Islam
- Afghanistan-Stalemate: The Civil War, 1989-92
- Afghanistan-Ghaznavid and Ghorid Rule
- Afghanistan-Arab
- Afghanistan-Emergence of Modern Islamic Thought in Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Neighboring Governments: Involvements and Interference
- Afghanistan-Sunnis of the Hanafi School
- Afghanistan-GENDER ROLES
- Afghanistan-The Struggle for Kabul
- Afghanistan-Teacher Training
- Afghanistan-The Second Anglo-Afghan War
- Afghanistan-RELIGION
- Afghanistan-Tenets of Islam
- Afghanistan-Administrative Structure
- Afghanistan-Pakistan's Support of Afghan Islamists, 1975-79
- Afghanistan-Kabuli
- Afghanistan-CHAPTER 4 - GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
- Afghanistan-Factionalism
- Afghanistan-Reform, Popular Reaction, and Forced Abdication
- Afghanistan-The Controversy Over Weapons Distribution
- Afghanistan-The Constitutional Period, 1964-73
- Afghanistan-Curriculum
- Afghanistan-Turkmen
- Afghanistan-Internal Refugees: Flight to the Cities
- Afghanistan-SOCIAL STRUCTURE
- Afghanistan-FAMILY
- Afghanistan-MUHAMMAD NADIR SHAH, 1929-33
- Afghanistan-Mongol Rule, 1220-1506
- Afghanistan-Daoud as Prime Minister, 1953-63
- Afghanistan-CHAPTER 1 - HISTORICAL SETTING
- Afghanistan-The Path to Victory and Chaos: 1979-92
- Afghanistan-Saudi Arabia
- Afghanistan-The Islamabad and Jalalabad Accords, March-April 1993
- Afghanistan-Meaning and Practice
- Afghanistan-Rivers
- Afghanistan-WARFARE AND CIVIC CULTURE
- Afghanistan-Early Links with the Soviet Union
- Afghanistan-THE REIGN OF KING HABIBULLAH, 1901-1919
- Afghanistan-Politicized Islam
- Afghanistan-Islamic Expression in Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Consolidation of the Modern State ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, "THE IRON AMIR," 1880-1901
- Afghanistan-Mountains
- Afghanistan-THE PRE-ISLAMIC PERIOD
- Afghanistan-The Failure to Bring Peace
- Afghanistan-Its Social Basis, A Segmented Society THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE
- Afghanistan-The Islamic Youth Movement
- Afghanistan-The United Nations Plan for Political Accommodation
- Afghanistan-The Fall of Kabul, April 1992
- Afghanistan-Government Organization
- Afghanistan-Disinterest in Unity
- Afghanistan-Uzbek
- Afghanistan-The Ghilzai Factor
- Afghanistan-REFUGEES AND REPATRIATION
- Afghanistan-DAOUD'S REPUBLIC, JULY 1973- APRIL 1978
- Afghanistan-DAUD'S REPUBLIC: 1973-78
- Afghanistan-Ismailis
- Afghanistan-The Islamist Factor
- Afghanistan-Interethnic Relations Non-Muslims
- Afghanistan-The Shafiq Government: A Last Attempt at Reform
- Afghanistan-Central Asian and Sassanian Rule, ca - 150 B.C.-700 A.D.
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Internecine Violence
- Afghanistan-Expatriate Misperceptions
- Afghanistan-Sunni and Shia Islam
- Afghanistan-1995: A Changed Situation
- Afghanistan-Third Anglo-Afghan War and Independence THE REIGN OF KING AMANULLAH, 1919-29
- Afghanistan-The Pashtunistan Issue
- Afghanistan-The Demise of the Soviet Union, 1991 MUJAHIDIN VICTORY: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
- Afghanistan-AFGHANISTAN
- Afghanistan-ISLAMIC CONQUEST
- Afghanistan-The King Reigns: The Last Decade of the Monarchy, 1963-73
- Afghanistan-Mixed Subsistence Patterns
- Afghanistan-Alexander and Greek Rule, 330-ca - 150 B.C.
- Afghanistan-THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Pastoralism MODES OF SUBSISTENCE
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Sufis
- Afghanistan-Achaemenid Rule, ca - 550-331 B.C.
- Afghanistan-EDUCATION
- Afghanistan-CHAPTER 2 - THE SOCIETY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
- Afghanistan-The Peshawar Accord, April 25, 1992
- Afghanistan-Pakistan's Attempt at a Political Solution, 1987-88
- Afghanistan-Mujahidin Attempts to Govern, 1992-95
- Afghanistan-Climate
- Afghanistan-Baluch
- Afghanistan-The Mujahidin Parties
- Afghanistan-Qizilbash
- Afghanistan-Najibullah's Leadership, 1986-92
- Afghanistan-AHMAD SHAH AND THE DURRANI EMPIRE
- Afghanistan-The Soviet Decision to Withdraw, 1986-88
- Afghanistan-Other Groups
- Afghanistan-Higher Education
- Afghanistan-TAJIK RULE, JANUARY-OCTOBER 1929
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-The April 1978 Coup d'etat and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan USURPATION, INVASION AND WAR: 1978-92
- Afghanistan-Brahui
- Afghanistan-The Decision to Accept Soviet Economic and Military Assistance
- Afghanistan-Experiment with Liberalized Politics
- Afghanistan-Hazara
- Afghanistan-Sufism
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Khalis and the Moderate Parties
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Iran
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-The First Anglo-Afghan War
- Afghanistan-Abdul Rasul Sayyaf
Background | | Ahmad Shah DURRANI unified the Pashtun tribes and founded Afghanistan in 1747. The country served as a buffer between the British and Russian empires until it won independence from notional British control in 1919. A brief experiment in democracy ended in a 1973 coup and a 1978 Communist counter-coup. The Soviet Union invaded in 1979 to support the tottering Afghan Communist regime, touching off a long and destructive war. The USSR withdrew in 1989 under relentless pressure by internationally supported anti-Communist mujahedin rebels. A series of subsequent civil wars saw Kabul finally fall in 1996 to the Taliban, a hardline Pakistani-sponsored movement that emerged in 1994 to end the country's civil war and anarchy. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City, a US, Allied, and anti-Taliban Northern Alliance military action toppled the Taliban for sheltering Osama BIN LADIN. The UN-sponsored Bonn Conference in 2001 established a process for political reconstruction that included the adoption of a new constitution, a presidential election in 2004, and National Assembly elections in 2005. In December 2004, Hamid KARZAI became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan and the National Assembly was inaugurated the following December. Despite gains toward building a stable central government, a resurgent Taliban and continuing provincial instability - particularly in the south and the east - remain serious challenges for the Afghan Government.
|
Location | | Southern Asia, north and west of Pakistan, east of Iran
|
Area(sq km) | | total: 652,230 sq km land: 652,230 sq km water: 0 sq km
|
Geographic coordinates | | 33 00 N, 65 00 E
|
Land boundaries(km) | | total: 5,529 km border countries: China 76 km, Iran 936 km, Pakistan 2,430 km, Tajikistan 1,206 km, Turkmenistan 744 km, Uzbekistan 137 km
|
Coastline(km) | | 0 km (landlocked)
|
Climate | | arid to semiarid; cold winters and hot summers
|
Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Amu Darya 258 m highest point: Noshak 7,485 m
|
Natural resources | | natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chromite, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious and semiprecious stones
|
Land use(%) | | arable land: 12.13% permanent crops: 0.21% other: 87.66% (2005)
|
Irrigated land(sq km) | | 27,200 sq km (2003)
|
Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 65 cu km (1997)
|
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 23.26 cu km/yr (2%/0%/98%) per capita: 779 cu m/yr (2000)
|
Natural hazards | | damaging earthquakes occur in Hindu Kush mountains; flooding; droughts
|
Environment - current issues | | limited natural fresh water resources; inadequate supplies of potable water; soil degradation; overgrazing; deforestation (much of the remaining forests are being cut down for fuel and building materials); desertification; air and water pollution
|
Environment - international agreements | | party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection signed, but not ratified: Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Life Conservation
|
Geography - note | | landlocked; the Hindu Kush mountains that run northeast to southwest divide the northern provinces from the rest of the country; the highest peaks are in the northern Vakhan (Wakhan Corridor)
|
Population | | 28.396 million (July 2009 est.) note: this is a significantly revised figure; the previous estimate of 33,609,937 was extrapolated from the last Afghan census held in 1979, which was never completed because of the Soviet invasion; a new Afghan census is scheduled to take place in 2010
|
Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 44.5% (male 7,664,670/female 7,300,446) 15-64 years: 53% (male 9,147,846/female 8,679,800) 65 years and over: 2.4% (male 394,572/female 422,603) (2009 est.)
|
Median age(years) | | total: 17.6 years male: 17.6 years female: 17.6 years (2009 est.)
|
Population growth rate(%) | | 2.629% (2009 est.)
|
Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 45.46 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
|
Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 19.18 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
|
Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | 21 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
|
Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 24% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 5.4% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
|
Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.05 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.05 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.93 male(s)/female total population: 1.05 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
|
Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 151.95 deaths/1,000 live births male: 156.01 deaths/1,000 live births female: 147.7 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
|
Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 44.64 years male: 44.47 years female: 44.81 years (2009 est.)
|
Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 6.53 children born/woman (2009 est.)
|
Nationality | | noun: Afghan(s) adjective: Afghan
|
Ethnic groups(%) | | Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
|
Religions(%) | | Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%
|
Languages(%) | | Afghan Persian or Dari (official) 50%, Pashto (official) 35%, Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) 11%, 30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashai) 4%, much bilingualism
|
Country name | | conventional long form: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan conventional short form: Afghanistan local long form: Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Afghanestan local short form: Afghanestan former: Republic of Afghanistan
|
Government type | | Islamic republic
|
Capital | | name: Kabul geographic coordinates: 34 31 N, 69 11 E time difference: UTC+4.5 (9.5 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
|
Administrative divisions | | 34 provinces (welayat, singular - welayat); Badakhshan, Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh, Bamyan, Daykundi, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghor, Helmand, Herat, Jowzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Kunduz, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Nimroz, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktiya, Panjshir, Parwan, Samangan, Sar-e Pul, Takhar, Uruzgan, Wardak, Zabul
|
Constitution | | new constitution drafted 14 December 2003-4 January 2004; signed 16 January 2004; ratified 26 January 2004
|
Legal system | | based on mixed civil and sharia law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
|
Suffrage | | 18 years of age; universal
|
Executive branch | | chief of state: President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Hamid KARZAI (since 7 December 2004); First Vice President Fahim KHAN (since 19 November 2009); Second Vice President Abdul Karim KHALILI (since 7 December 2004) note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government; former King ZAHIR Shah held the honorific, "Father of the Country," and presided symbolically over certain occasions but lacked any governing authority; the honorific is not hereditary; King ZAHIR Shah died on 23 July 2007 head of government: President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Hamid KARZAI (since 7 December 2004); First Vice President Fahim KHAN (since 19 November 2009); Second Vice President Abdul Karim KHALILI (since 7 December 2004) cabinet: 25 ministers; note - under the new constitution, ministers are appointed by the president and approved by the National Assembly elections: the president and two vice presidents are elected by direct vote for a five-year term (eligible for a second term); if no candidate receives 50% or more of the vote in the first round of voting, the two candidates with the most votes will participate in a second round; a president can only be elected for two terms; election last held 20 August 2009 (next to be held in 2014) election results: Hamid KARZAI reelected president; percent of vote - Hamid KARZAI 49.67%, Abdullah ABDULLAH 30.59%, Ramazan BASHARDOST 10.46%, Ashraf GHANI 2.94%; other 6.34%
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Legislative branch | | the bicameral National Assembly consists of the Meshrano Jirga or House of Elders (102 seats, one-third elected from provincial councils for four-year terms, one-third elected from local district councils for three-year terms, and one-third nominated by the president for five-year terms) and the Wolesi Jirga or House of People (no more than 249 seats), directly elected for five-year terms note: on rare occasions the government may convene a Loya Jirga (Grand Council) on issues of independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity; it can amend the provisions of the constitution and prosecute the president; it is made up of members of the National Assembly and chairpersons of the provincial and district councils elections: last held 18 September 2005 (next election expected in 2010) election results: the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system used in the election did not make use of political party slates; most candidates ran as independents
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Judicial branch | | the constitution establishes a nine-member Stera Mahkama or Supreme Court (its nine justices are appointed for 10-year terms by the president with approval of the Wolesi Jirga) and subordinate High Courts and Appeals Courts; there is also a minister of justice; a separate Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission established by the Bonn Agreement is charged with investigating human rights abuses and war crimes
|
Political pressure groups and leaders | | other: religious groups; tribal leaders; ethnically based groups; Taliban
|
International organization participation | | ADB, CP, ECO, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OSCE (partner), SAARC, SACEP, SCO (guest), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)
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Flag description | | three equal vertical bands of black (hoist side), red, and green, with the national emblem in white centered on the red band and slightly overlapping the other two bands; the center of the emblem features a mosque with pulpit and flags on either side, below the mosque are numerals for the solar year 1298 (1919 in the Gregorian calendar, the year of Afghan independence from the UK); this central image is circled by a border consisting of sheaves of wheat on the left and right, in the upper-center is an Arabic inscription of the Shahada (Muslim creed) below which are rays of the rising sun over the Takbir (Arabic expression meaning "God is great"), and at bottom center is a scroll bearing the name Afghanistan
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Economy - overview | | Afghanistan's economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 largely because of the infusion of international assistance, the recovery of the agricultural sector, and service sector growth. Despite the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade with neighboring countries. Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. Criminality, insecurity, and the Afghan Government's inability to extend rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic growth. It will probably take the remainder of the decade and continuing donor aid and attention to significantly raise Afghanistan's living standards from its current level, among the lowest in the world. International pledges made by more than 60 countries and international financial institutions at the Berlin Donors Conference for Afghan reconstruction in March 2004 reached $8.9 billion for 2004-09. While the international community remains committed to Afghanistan's development, pledging over $57 billion at three donors' conferences since 2002, Kabul will need to overcome a number of challenges. Expanding poppy cultivation and a growing opium trade generate roughly $3 billion in illicit economic activity and looms as one of Kabul's most serious policy concerns. Other long-term challenges include: budget sustainability, job creation, corruption, government capacity, and rebuilding war torn infrastructure.
|
GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $22.32 billion (2008 est.) $21.58 billion (2007 est.) $19.25 billion (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
|
GDP (official exchange rate) | | $11.71 billion (2008 est.)
|
GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 3.4% (2008 est.) 12.1% (2007 est.) 8.2% (2006 est.)
|
GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $800 (2008 est.) $800 (2007 est.) $700 (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
|
GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 31% industry: 26% services: 43% note: data exclude opium production (2008 est.)
|
Labor force | | 15 million (2004 est.)
|
Labor force - by occupation(%) | | agriculture: 80% industry: 10% services: 10% (2004 est.)
|
Unemployment rate(%) | | 40% (2008 est.) 40% (2005 est.)
|
Population below poverty line(%) | | 53% (2003)
|
Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: NA% highest 10%: NA%
|
Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP) | | NA% of GDP
|
Budget | | revenues: $890 million expenditures: $2.7 billion note: Afghanistan has also received $2.6 billion from the Reconstruction Trust Fund and $63 million from the Law and Order Trust Fund (2007 est.)
|
Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | 13% (2007 est.)
|
Stock of money | | $1.688 billion (31 December 2008) $1.426 billion (31 December 2007)
|
Stock of quasi money | | $1.219 billion (31 December 2008) $958.6 million (31 December 2007)
|
Stock of domestic credit | | $363.6 million (31 December 2008) $12.04 million (31 December 2007)
|
Market value of publicly traded shares | | $NA
|
Economic aid - recipient | | $2.775 billion (2005)
|
Public debt(% of GDP) | | NA% of GDP
|
Agriculture - products | | opium, wheat, fruits, nuts; wool, mutton, sheepskins, lambskins
|
Industries | | small-scale production of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, cement; handwoven carpets; natural gas, coal, copper
|
Industrial production growth rate(%) | | NA%
|
Current account balance | | -$67 million (2007 est.)
|
Exports | | $327 million (2007) $274 million (2006); note - not including illicit exports or reexports
|
Exports - commodities(%) | | opium, fruits and nuts, handwoven carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, precious and semi-precious gems
|
Exports - partners(%) | | India 20.5%, Pakistan 18.5%, US 17.2%, Tajikistan 13.3%, Netherlands 7.2% (2008)
|
Imports | | $4.85 billion (2007) $3.823 billion (2006)
|
Imports - commodities(%) | | capital goods, food, textiles, petroleum products
|
Imports - partners(%) | | Pakistan 36.9%, US 9.5%, Germany 7.7%, India 5.2% (2008)
|
Reserves of foreign exchange and gold | | $NA
|
Debt - external | | $8 billion (2004)
|
Exchange rates | | afghanis (AFA) per US dollar - 50 (2007), 46 (2006), 47.7 (2005), 48 (2004), 49 (2003)
|
Currency (code) | | afghani (AFA)
|
Telephones - main lines in use | | 460,000 (2008)
|
Telephones - mobile cellular | | 8.45 million (2008)
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Telephone system | | general assessment: limited landline telephone service; an increasing number of Afghans utilize mobile-cellular phone networks domestic: aided by the presence of multiple providers, mobile-cellular telephone service is improving rapidly international: country code - 93; five VSAT's installed in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad provide international and domestic voice and data connectivity (2007)
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Internet country code | | .af
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Internet users | | 500,000 (2008)
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Airports | | 51 (2009)
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Pipelines(km) | | gas 466 km (2008)
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Roadways(km) | | total: 42,150 km paved: 12,350 km unpaved: 29,800 km (2006)
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Ports and terminals | | Kheyrabad, Shir Khan
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Military branches | | Afghan Armed Forces: Afghan National Army (ANA, includes Afghan National Army Air Corps) (2009)
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Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | 22 years of age; inductees are contracted into service for a 4-year term (2005)
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Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 7,431,147 females age 16-49: 7,004,819 (2008 est.)
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Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 4,371,193 females age 16-49: 4,072,945 (2009 est.)
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Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 382,720 female: 361,733 (2009 est.)
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Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | 1.9% of GDP (2006 est.)
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Disputes - international | | Pakistan has built fences in some portions of its border with Afghanistan which remains open in some areas to foreign terrorists and other illegal activities
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Refugees and internally displaced persons | | IDPs: 132,246 (mostly Pashtuns and Kuchis displaced in south and west due to drought and instability) (2007)
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Electricity - production(kWh) | | 839 million kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 36.3% hydro: 63.7% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
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Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 1.01 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 230 million kWh (2007 est.)
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Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 0 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 5,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 0 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 4,404 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 0 bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
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Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 30 million cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 30 million cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008)
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Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 49.55 billion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | 0.01% (2001 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | NA
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HIV/AIDS - deaths | | NA
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Major infectious diseases | | degree of risk: high food or waterborne diseases: bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever vectorborne disease: malaria animal contact disease: rabies note: highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has been identified in this country; it poses a negligible risk with extremely rare cases possible among US citizens who have close contact with birds (2009)
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Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 28.1% male: 43.1% female: 12.6% (2000 est.)
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School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years) | | total: 8 years male: 11 years female: 4 years (2004)
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Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | NA
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