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Afghanistan Index
Afghanistan's ethnic mosaic has no precise boundaries; nor is
its national culture uniform. Few of its ethnic groups are
indigenous; few maintain racial homogeneity. Many zones overlap
and interactions broadened as the economic infrastructure
improved and educational opportunities widened.
Resentment rising out of wars and conquests remains long after
the power of conquerors dissipates. This is true with regard to
the Uzbeks. The distrust and discrimination between Hazara and
Pushtun set during late nineteenth century confrontations is
still abundantly present. The causes of prejudice against the
Qizilbash go back to the eighteenth century.
Kabul's political policies also had long-term effects in
aggravating ethnic tensions. This is most evident in the
successive movements of thousands of Pushtun into the northern
areas, beginning with the forced relocations of Amir Abdur
Rahman's Pushtun opponents in the late nineteenth century and
again employed as late as 1947-1949 following revolts among the
Safi Pushtun in eastern Afghanistan. Competition with local
populations occasioned considerable stress.
Equally significant were the effects of successful land
reclamation projects, beginning in the 1930s, which offered
attractive incentives to new settlers. These invariably favored
the Pushtun over local populations. The land settlement schemes
in the Hilmand in the southwest, begun in 1910 and massively
extended after 1946, were similarly disruptive. Settlers from all
parts of Afghanistan were recruited into this predominantly
Pushtun and Baluch area, creating new tensions not only among the
new disparate groups, but also among new and old Pushtun
groups.
Local conflicts in all areas, within all groups, most often
erupt over disputes concerning property or access to resources,
whether it be land, water, money, business or government
opportunities, bridewealth or inheritance. Naturally evolving
demographic pressures accompanied by competition form the basis
of other conflicts. Also, the tendency of past governments to
initiate policies enhancing Pushtun prominence, increased the
traditional Pushtun military and numerical dominance which
allowed them to assert their will over other ethnic groups and
maintain their status as the nation's most prestigious group.
Thus, there have always been tensions between groups, from
petty squabbles to feuds lasting for generations, rising from a
variety of causes but rarely from intrinsic attitudes of ethnic
discrimination. Considering the disparate and volatile
ingredients that exist, Afghanistan's history records remarkably
few internal explosions that are specifically focussed on
ethnicity.
During the Soviet-Afghan War, the shared goals of the
mujahidin--opposition to nonbelieving atheist invaders
and group solidarity--were reminiscent of familial, tribal, and
ethnic group construction. As such, the appeal of the
mujahidin was a strong and familiar rallying cry and
source of solidarity for Afghans in their struggle for national
liberation.
Afghan ethnic identities emerged more clearly during the
Soviet-Afghan War. Five groups could be easily distinguished:
Tajik, including all Sunni Dari speakers; Hazara; Uzbek; Durrani
Pushtun; Ghilzai Pushtun and Eastern Pushtun. Fighting among
Afghans in the years following the fall of Najibullah's
government in 1992 exceeded levels of violence experienced even
during the wars of Amir Abdur Rahman against the Hazara and the
Nuristani between 1891 and 1896. Some would say that these
conflicts are evidence that Afghan society must now be fragmented
between groups identified by religious, ethnic, or regional
labels. There is no doubt that the Soviet-Afghan War severely
disturbed the delicate social infrastructure constructed over
many centuries, yet according to many Afghans the present turmoil
is driven more by political greed and external interference than
by ethnic, religious or regional considerations. While
traditional structures were not equitable for all Afghan
citizens, they did permit extended periods of civic stability.
Even in the mid-1990s, there was ample evidence in a number of
areas outside the present arenas of conflict to suggest that a
return to the old order could occur.
Elements of material culture are used by all ethnic groups to
build pride and a sense of social superiority, particularly in
mixed ethnic zones. The Nuristani are the most unique in dress,
diet and architecture. In other areas distinctions have softened
over the years as the improved infrastructure encouraged greater
mobility.
The most striking differences are noted in dress, particularly
in headgear. Turbans are characteristic of the Pashtun. The shape
of caps, round, conical or peaked, their material and decoration
are distinctive indicators between and within many groups.
Chapan, loose sometimes quilted coats of cotton or silk
with stripes of varied colors to indicate specific regions, are
worn in the north; pattu, shawls, are preferred in the
south. For women, color, the width of the skirt, and the type of
embroidery are meaningful distinctions.
Diet also changes from group to group, although bread and tea
are dietary staples everywhere. Some bread is round, some oval;
some prefer black tea, others green. The Uzbek include many pasta
dishes in their cuisine. Dwellings of sedentary groups, mostly
made from pressed mud or sun-dried brick, may be domed or
flat-roofed, modestly enclosed behind walls or hidden within
towering fortress-like enclosures, although open villages do
exist in the Hazarajat. Tents used by the nomads vary in shape,
material and structure from group to group.
Each group uses folktales to reinforce the uniqueness and
superiority of the one over the other, as well as to describe
their individual ideals.
Data as of 1997
Hindus and Sikhs live mostly in urban centers throughout
Afghanistan. They are merchants and moneylenders. In 1978 they
numbered about 30,000. Many left in 1992, but are slowly
returning to such cities as Ghazni and Jalalabad. The Jewish
community of Kabul is totally depleted. One family remains in
1996 to care for the synagogue which partially remains in an area
otherwise pulverized.
Interethnic Relations
Afghanistan's ethnic mosaic has no precise boundaries; nor is
its national culture uniform. Few of its ethnic groups are
indigenous; few maintain racial homogeneity. Many zones overlap
and interactions broadened as the economic infrastructure
improved and educational opportunities widened.
Resentment rising out of wars and conquests remains long after
the power of conquerors dissipates. This is true with regard to
the Uzbeks. The distrust and discrimination between Hazara and
Pushtun set during late nineteenth century confrontations is
still abundantly present. The causes of prejudice against the
Qizilbash go back to the eighteenth century.
Kabul's political policies also had long-term effects in
aggravating ethnic tensions. This is most evident in the
successive movements of thousands of Pushtun into the northern
areas, beginning with the forced relocations of Amir Abdur
Rahman's Pushtun opponents in the late nineteenth century and
again employed as late as 1947-1949 following revolts among the
Safi Pushtun in eastern Afghanistan. Competition with local
populations occasioned considerable stress.
Equally significant were the effects of successful land
reclamation projects, beginning in the 1930s, which offered
attractive incentives to new settlers. These invariably favored
the Pushtun over local populations. The land settlement schemes
in the Hilmand in the southwest, begun in 1910 and massively
extended after 1946, were similarly disruptive. Settlers from all
parts of Afghanistan were recruited into this predominantly
Pushtun and Baluch area, creating new tensions not only among the
new disparate groups, but also among new and old Pushtun
groups.
Local conflicts in all areas, within all groups, most often
erupt over disputes concerning property or access to resources,
whether it be land, water, money, business or government
opportunities, bridewealth or inheritance. Naturally evolving
demographic pressures accompanied by competition form the basis
of other conflicts. Also, the tendency of past governments to
initiate policies enhancing Pushtun prominence, increased the
traditional Pushtun military and numerical dominance which
allowed them to assert their will over other ethnic groups and
maintain their status as the nation's most prestigious group.
Thus, there have always been tensions between groups, from
petty squabbles to feuds lasting for generations, rising from a
variety of causes but rarely from intrinsic attitudes of ethnic
discrimination. Considering the disparate and volatile
ingredients that exist, Afghanistan's history records remarkably
few internal explosions that are specifically focussed on
ethnicity.
During the Soviet-Afghan War, the shared goals of the
mujahidin--opposition to nonbelieving atheist invaders
and group solidarity--were reminiscent of familial, tribal, and
ethnic group construction. As such, the appeal of the
mujahidin was a strong and familiar rallying cry and
source of solidarity for Afghans in their struggle for national
liberation.
Afghan ethnic identities emerged more clearly during the
Soviet-Afghan War. Five groups could be easily distinguished:
Tajik, including all Sunni Dari speakers; Hazara; Uzbek; Durrani
Pushtun; Ghilzai Pushtun and Eastern Pushtun. Fighting among
Afghans in the years following the fall of Najibullah's
government in 1992 exceeded levels of violence experienced even
during the wars of Amir Abdur Rahman against the Hazara and the
Nuristani between 1891 and 1896. Some would say that these
conflicts are evidence that Afghan society must now be fragmented
between groups identified by religious, ethnic, or regional
labels. There is no doubt that the Soviet-Afghan War severely
disturbed the delicate social infrastructure constructed over
many centuries, yet according to many Afghans the present turmoil
is driven more by political greed and external interference than
by ethnic, religious or regional considerations. While
traditional structures were not equitable for all Afghan
citizens, they did permit extended periods of civic stability.
Even in the mid-1990s, there was ample evidence in a number of
areas outside the present arenas of conflict to suggest that a
return to the old order could occur.
Elements of material culture are used by all ethnic groups to
build pride and a sense of social superiority, particularly in
mixed ethnic zones. The Nuristani are the most unique in dress,
diet and architecture. In other areas distinctions have softened
over the years as the improved infrastructure encouraged greater
mobility.
The most striking differences are noted in dress, particularly
in headgear. Turbans are characteristic of the Pashtun. The shape
of caps, round, conical or peaked, their material and decoration
are distinctive indicators between and within many groups.
Chapan, loose sometimes quilted coats of cotton or silk
with stripes of varied colors to indicate specific regions, are
worn in the north; pattu, shawls, are preferred in the
south. For women, color, the width of the skirt, and the type of
embroidery are meaningful distinctions.
Diet also changes from group to group, although bread and tea
are dietary staples everywhere. Some bread is round, some oval;
some prefer black tea, others green. The Uzbek include many pasta
dishes in their cuisine. Dwellings of sedentary groups, mostly
made from pressed mud or sun-dried brick, may be domed or
flat-roofed, modestly enclosed behind walls or hidden within
towering fortress-like enclosures, although open villages do
exist in the Hazarajat. Tents used by the nomads vary in shape,
material and structure from group to group.
Each group uses folktales to reinforce the uniqueness and
superiority of the one over the other, as well as to describe
their individual ideals.
Data as of 1997
- Afghanistan-Jat
- Afghanistan-Pakistan's Policies and Misperceptions
- Afghanistan-The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Since 1992
- Afghanistan-Early Development of Islam
- Afghanistan-AFGHANISTAN'S PROSPECTS
- Afghanistan-Nuristani
- Afghanistan-Disenchantment with the Reforms
- Afghanistan-Literacy
- Afghanistan-POPULATION
- Afghanistan-THE ATTEMPT TO MODERNIZE: 1953-73
- Afghanistan-Regions
- Afghanistan-Modernization and Development of Institutions
- Afghanistan-Tribes
- Afghanistan-Current Activities Adult Literacy
- Afghanistan-Enrollment
- Afghanistan-The Search for Popular Support
- Afghanistan-Mughal-Safavid Rivalry, ca - 1500-1747
- Afghanistan-Ethnic Groups
- Afghanistan-Tajik
- Afghanistan-The Rise of Dost Mohammad THE GREAT GAME
- Afghanistan-The Council of Commanders, 1990-92
- Afghanistan-The Role of Islam
- Afghanistan-Stalemate: The Civil War, 1989-92
- Afghanistan-Ghaznavid and Ghorid Rule
- Afghanistan-Arab
- Afghanistan-Emergence of Modern Islamic Thought in Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Neighboring Governments: Involvements and Interference
- Afghanistan-Sunnis of the Hanafi School
- Afghanistan-GENDER ROLES
- Afghanistan-The Struggle for Kabul
- Afghanistan-Teacher Training
- Afghanistan-The Second Anglo-Afghan War
- Afghanistan-RELIGION
- Afghanistan-Tenets of Islam
- Afghanistan-Administrative Structure
- Afghanistan-Pakistan's Support of Afghan Islamists, 1975-79
- Afghanistan-Kabuli
- Afghanistan-CHAPTER 4 - GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
- Afghanistan-Factionalism
- Afghanistan-Reform, Popular Reaction, and Forced Abdication
- Afghanistan-The Controversy Over Weapons Distribution
- Afghanistan-The Constitutional Period, 1964-73
- Afghanistan-Curriculum
- Afghanistan-Turkmen
- Afghanistan-Internal Refugees: Flight to the Cities
- Afghanistan-SOCIAL STRUCTURE
- Afghanistan-FAMILY
- Afghanistan-MUHAMMAD NADIR SHAH, 1929-33
- Afghanistan-Mongol Rule, 1220-1506
- Afghanistan-Daoud as Prime Minister, 1953-63
- Afghanistan-CHAPTER 1 - HISTORICAL SETTING
- Afghanistan-The Path to Victory and Chaos: 1979-92
- Afghanistan-Saudi Arabia
- Afghanistan-The Islamabad and Jalalabad Accords, March-April 1993
- Afghanistan-Meaning and Practice
- Afghanistan-Rivers
- Afghanistan-WARFARE AND CIVIC CULTURE
- Afghanistan-Early Links with the Soviet Union
- Afghanistan-THE REIGN OF KING HABIBULLAH, 1901-1919
- Afghanistan-Politicized Islam
- Afghanistan-Islamic Expression in Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Consolidation of the Modern State ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, "THE IRON AMIR," 1880-1901
- Afghanistan-Mountains
- Afghanistan-THE PRE-ISLAMIC PERIOD
- Afghanistan-The Failure to Bring Peace
- Afghanistan-Its Social Basis, A Segmented Society THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE
- Afghanistan-The Islamic Youth Movement
- Afghanistan-The United Nations Plan for Political Accommodation
- Afghanistan-The Fall of Kabul, April 1992
- Afghanistan-Government Organization
- Afghanistan-Disinterest in Unity
- Afghanistan-Uzbek
- Afghanistan-The Ghilzai Factor
- Afghanistan-REFUGEES AND REPATRIATION
- Afghanistan-DAOUD'S REPUBLIC, JULY 1973- APRIL 1978
- Afghanistan-DAUD'S REPUBLIC: 1973-78
- Afghanistan-Ismailis
- Afghanistan-The Islamist Factor
- Afghanistan-Interethnic Relations Non-Muslims
- Afghanistan-The Shafiq Government: A Last Attempt at Reform
- Afghanistan-Central Asian and Sassanian Rule, ca - 150 B.C.-700 A.D.
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Internecine Violence
- Afghanistan-Expatriate Misperceptions
- Afghanistan-Sunni and Shia Islam
- Afghanistan-1995: A Changed Situation
- Afghanistan-Third Anglo-Afghan War and Independence THE REIGN OF KING AMANULLAH, 1919-29
- Afghanistan-The Pashtunistan Issue
- Afghanistan-The Demise of the Soviet Union, 1991 MUJAHIDIN VICTORY: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
- Afghanistan-AFGHANISTAN
- Afghanistan-ISLAMIC CONQUEST
- Afghanistan-The King Reigns: The Last Decade of the Monarchy, 1963-73
- Afghanistan-Mixed Subsistence Patterns
- Afghanistan-Alexander and Greek Rule, 330-ca - 150 B.C.
- Afghanistan-THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Pastoralism MODES OF SUBSISTENCE
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Sufis
- Afghanistan-Achaemenid Rule, ca - 550-331 B.C.
- Afghanistan-EDUCATION
- Afghanistan-CHAPTER 2 - THE SOCIETY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
- Afghanistan-The Peshawar Accord, April 25, 1992
- Afghanistan-Pakistan's Attempt at a Political Solution, 1987-88
- Afghanistan-Mujahidin Attempts to Govern, 1992-95
- Afghanistan-Climate
- Afghanistan-Baluch
- Afghanistan-The Mujahidin Parties
- Afghanistan-Qizilbash
- Afghanistan-Najibullah's Leadership, 1986-92
- Afghanistan-AHMAD SHAH AND THE DURRANI EMPIRE
- Afghanistan-The Soviet Decision to Withdraw, 1986-88
- Afghanistan-Other Groups
- Afghanistan-Higher Education
- Afghanistan-TAJIK RULE, JANUARY-OCTOBER 1929
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-The April 1978 Coup d'etat and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan USURPATION, INVASION AND WAR: 1978-92
- Afghanistan-Brahui
- Afghanistan-The Decision to Accept Soviet Economic and Military Assistance
- Afghanistan-Experiment with Liberalized Politics
- Afghanistan-Hazara
- Afghanistan-Sufism
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Khalis and the Moderate Parties
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-Iran
- Afghanistan
- Afghanistan-The First Anglo-Afghan War
- Afghanistan-Abdul Rasul Sayyaf
Background | | Ahmad Shah DURRANI unified the Pashtun tribes and founded Afghanistan in 1747. The country served as a buffer between the British and Russian empires until it won independence from notional British control in 1919. A brief experiment in democracy ended in a 1973 coup and a 1978 Communist counter-coup. The Soviet Union invaded in 1979 to support the tottering Afghan Communist regime, touching off a long and destructive war. The USSR withdrew in 1989 under relentless pressure by internationally supported anti-Communist mujahedin rebels. A series of subsequent civil wars saw Kabul finally fall in 1996 to the Taliban, a hardline Pakistani-sponsored movement that emerged in 1994 to end the country's civil war and anarchy. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City, a US, Allied, and anti-Taliban Northern Alliance military action toppled the Taliban for sheltering Osama BIN LADIN. The UN-sponsored Bonn Conference in 2001 established a process for political reconstruction that included the adoption of a new constitution, a presidential election in 2004, and National Assembly elections in 2005. In December 2004, Hamid KARZAI became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan and the National Assembly was inaugurated the following December. Despite gains toward building a stable central government, a resurgent Taliban and continuing provincial instability - particularly in the south and the east - remain serious challenges for the Afghan Government.
|
Location | | Southern Asia, north and west of Pakistan, east of Iran
|
Area(sq km) | | total: 652,230 sq km land: 652,230 sq km water: 0 sq km
|
Geographic coordinates | | 33 00 N, 65 00 E
|
Land boundaries(km) | | total: 5,529 km border countries: China 76 km, Iran 936 km, Pakistan 2,430 km, Tajikistan 1,206 km, Turkmenistan 744 km, Uzbekistan 137 km
|
Coastline(km) | | 0 km (landlocked)
|
Climate | | arid to semiarid; cold winters and hot summers
|
Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Amu Darya 258 m highest point: Noshak 7,485 m
|
Natural resources | | natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chromite, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious and semiprecious stones
|
Land use(%) | | arable land: 12.13% permanent crops: 0.21% other: 87.66% (2005)
|
Irrigated land(sq km) | | 27,200 sq km (2003)
|
Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 65 cu km (1997)
|
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 23.26 cu km/yr (2%/0%/98%) per capita: 779 cu m/yr (2000)
|
Natural hazards | | damaging earthquakes occur in Hindu Kush mountains; flooding; droughts
|
Environment - current issues | | limited natural fresh water resources; inadequate supplies of potable water; soil degradation; overgrazing; deforestation (much of the remaining forests are being cut down for fuel and building materials); desertification; air and water pollution
|
Environment - international agreements | | party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection signed, but not ratified: Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Life Conservation
|
Geography - note | | landlocked; the Hindu Kush mountains that run northeast to southwest divide the northern provinces from the rest of the country; the highest peaks are in the northern Vakhan (Wakhan Corridor)
|
Population | | 28.396 million (July 2009 est.) note: this is a significantly revised figure; the previous estimate of 33,609,937 was extrapolated from the last Afghan census held in 1979, which was never completed because of the Soviet invasion; a new Afghan census is scheduled to take place in 2010
|
Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 44.5% (male 7,664,670/female 7,300,446) 15-64 years: 53% (male 9,147,846/female 8,679,800) 65 years and over: 2.4% (male 394,572/female 422,603) (2009 est.)
|
Median age(years) | | total: 17.6 years male: 17.6 years female: 17.6 years (2009 est.)
|
Population growth rate(%) | | 2.629% (2009 est.)
|
Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 45.46 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
|
Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 19.18 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
|
Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | 21 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
|
Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 24% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 5.4% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
|
Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.05 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.05 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.93 male(s)/female total population: 1.05 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
|
Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 151.95 deaths/1,000 live births male: 156.01 deaths/1,000 live births female: 147.7 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
|
Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 44.64 years male: 44.47 years female: 44.81 years (2009 est.)
|
Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 6.53 children born/woman (2009 est.)
|
Nationality | | noun: Afghan(s) adjective: Afghan
|
Ethnic groups(%) | | Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
|
Religions(%) | | Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%
|
Languages(%) | | Afghan Persian or Dari (official) 50%, Pashto (official) 35%, Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) 11%, 30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashai) 4%, much bilingualism
|
Country name | | conventional long form: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan conventional short form: Afghanistan local long form: Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Afghanestan local short form: Afghanestan former: Republic of Afghanistan
|
Government type | | Islamic republic
|
Capital | | name: Kabul geographic coordinates: 34 31 N, 69 11 E time difference: UTC+4.5 (9.5 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
|
Administrative divisions | | 34 provinces (welayat, singular - welayat); Badakhshan, Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh, Bamyan, Daykundi, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghor, Helmand, Herat, Jowzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Kunduz, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Nimroz, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktiya, Panjshir, Parwan, Samangan, Sar-e Pul, Takhar, Uruzgan, Wardak, Zabul
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Constitution | | new constitution drafted 14 December 2003-4 January 2004; signed 16 January 2004; ratified 26 January 2004
|
Legal system | | based on mixed civil and sharia law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
|
Suffrage | | 18 years of age; universal
|
Executive branch | | chief of state: President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Hamid KARZAI (since 7 December 2004); First Vice President Fahim KHAN (since 19 November 2009); Second Vice President Abdul Karim KHALILI (since 7 December 2004) note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government; former King ZAHIR Shah held the honorific, "Father of the Country," and presided symbolically over certain occasions but lacked any governing authority; the honorific is not hereditary; King ZAHIR Shah died on 23 July 2007 head of government: President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Hamid KARZAI (since 7 December 2004); First Vice President Fahim KHAN (since 19 November 2009); Second Vice President Abdul Karim KHALILI (since 7 December 2004) cabinet: 25 ministers; note - under the new constitution, ministers are appointed by the president and approved by the National Assembly elections: the president and two vice presidents are elected by direct vote for a five-year term (eligible for a second term); if no candidate receives 50% or more of the vote in the first round of voting, the two candidates with the most votes will participate in a second round; a president can only be elected for two terms; election last held 20 August 2009 (next to be held in 2014) election results: Hamid KARZAI reelected president; percent of vote - Hamid KARZAI 49.67%, Abdullah ABDULLAH 30.59%, Ramazan BASHARDOST 10.46%, Ashraf GHANI 2.94%; other 6.34%
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Legislative branch | | the bicameral National Assembly consists of the Meshrano Jirga or House of Elders (102 seats, one-third elected from provincial councils for four-year terms, one-third elected from local district councils for three-year terms, and one-third nominated by the president for five-year terms) and the Wolesi Jirga or House of People (no more than 249 seats), directly elected for five-year terms note: on rare occasions the government may convene a Loya Jirga (Grand Council) on issues of independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity; it can amend the provisions of the constitution and prosecute the president; it is made up of members of the National Assembly and chairpersons of the provincial and district councils elections: last held 18 September 2005 (next election expected in 2010) election results: the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system used in the election did not make use of political party slates; most candidates ran as independents
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Judicial branch | | the constitution establishes a nine-member Stera Mahkama or Supreme Court (its nine justices are appointed for 10-year terms by the president with approval of the Wolesi Jirga) and subordinate High Courts and Appeals Courts; there is also a minister of justice; a separate Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission established by the Bonn Agreement is charged with investigating human rights abuses and war crimes
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Political pressure groups and leaders | | other: religious groups; tribal leaders; ethnically based groups; Taliban
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International organization participation | | ADB, CP, ECO, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OSCE (partner), SAARC, SACEP, SCO (guest), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)
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Flag description | | three equal vertical bands of black (hoist side), red, and green, with the national emblem in white centered on the red band and slightly overlapping the other two bands; the center of the emblem features a mosque with pulpit and flags on either side, below the mosque are numerals for the solar year 1298 (1919 in the Gregorian calendar, the year of Afghan independence from the UK); this central image is circled by a border consisting of sheaves of wheat on the left and right, in the upper-center is an Arabic inscription of the Shahada (Muslim creed) below which are rays of the rising sun over the Takbir (Arabic expression meaning "God is great"), and at bottom center is a scroll bearing the name Afghanistan
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Economy - overview | | Afghanistan's economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 largely because of the infusion of international assistance, the recovery of the agricultural sector, and service sector growth. Despite the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade with neighboring countries. Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. Criminality, insecurity, and the Afghan Government's inability to extend rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic growth. It will probably take the remainder of the decade and continuing donor aid and attention to significantly raise Afghanistan's living standards from its current level, among the lowest in the world. International pledges made by more than 60 countries and international financial institutions at the Berlin Donors Conference for Afghan reconstruction in March 2004 reached $8.9 billion for 2004-09. While the international community remains committed to Afghanistan's development, pledging over $57 billion at three donors' conferences since 2002, Kabul will need to overcome a number of challenges. Expanding poppy cultivation and a growing opium trade generate roughly $3 billion in illicit economic activity and looms as one of Kabul's most serious policy concerns. Other long-term challenges include: budget sustainability, job creation, corruption, government capacity, and rebuilding war torn infrastructure.
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GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $22.32 billion (2008 est.) $21.58 billion (2007 est.) $19.25 billion (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
|
GDP (official exchange rate) | | $11.71 billion (2008 est.)
|
GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 3.4% (2008 est.) 12.1% (2007 est.) 8.2% (2006 est.)
|
GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $800 (2008 est.) $800 (2007 est.) $700 (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
|
GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 31% industry: 26% services: 43% note: data exclude opium production (2008 est.)
|
Labor force | | 15 million (2004 est.)
|
Labor force - by occupation(%) | | agriculture: 80% industry: 10% services: 10% (2004 est.)
|
Unemployment rate(%) | | 40% (2008 est.) 40% (2005 est.)
|
Population below poverty line(%) | | 53% (2003)
|
Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: NA% highest 10%: NA%
|
Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP) | | NA% of GDP
|
Budget | | revenues: $890 million expenditures: $2.7 billion note: Afghanistan has also received $2.6 billion from the Reconstruction Trust Fund and $63 million from the Law and Order Trust Fund (2007 est.)
|
Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | 13% (2007 est.)
|
Stock of money | | $1.688 billion (31 December 2008) $1.426 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of quasi money | | $1.219 billion (31 December 2008) $958.6 million (31 December 2007)
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Stock of domestic credit | | $363.6 million (31 December 2008) $12.04 million (31 December 2007)
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Market value of publicly traded shares | | $NA
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Economic aid - recipient | | $2.775 billion (2005)
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Public debt(% of GDP) | | NA% of GDP
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Agriculture - products | | opium, wheat, fruits, nuts; wool, mutton, sheepskins, lambskins
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Industries | | small-scale production of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, cement; handwoven carpets; natural gas, coal, copper
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Industrial production growth rate(%) | | NA%
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Current account balance | | -$67 million (2007 est.)
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Exports | | $327 million (2007) $274 million (2006); note - not including illicit exports or reexports
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Exports - commodities(%) | | opium, fruits and nuts, handwoven carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, precious and semi-precious gems
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Exports - partners(%) | | India 20.5%, Pakistan 18.5%, US 17.2%, Tajikistan 13.3%, Netherlands 7.2% (2008)
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Imports | | $4.85 billion (2007) $3.823 billion (2006)
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Imports - commodities(%) | | capital goods, food, textiles, petroleum products
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Imports - partners(%) | | Pakistan 36.9%, US 9.5%, Germany 7.7%, India 5.2% (2008)
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Reserves of foreign exchange and gold | | $NA
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Debt - external | | $8 billion (2004)
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Exchange rates | | afghanis (AFA) per US dollar - 50 (2007), 46 (2006), 47.7 (2005), 48 (2004), 49 (2003)
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Currency (code) | | afghani (AFA)
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Telephones - main lines in use | | 460,000 (2008)
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Telephones - mobile cellular | | 8.45 million (2008)
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Telephone system | | general assessment: limited landline telephone service; an increasing number of Afghans utilize mobile-cellular phone networks domestic: aided by the presence of multiple providers, mobile-cellular telephone service is improving rapidly international: country code - 93; five VSAT's installed in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad provide international and domestic voice and data connectivity (2007)
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Internet country code | | .af
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Internet users | | 500,000 (2008)
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Airports | | 51 (2009)
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Pipelines(km) | | gas 466 km (2008)
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Roadways(km) | | total: 42,150 km paved: 12,350 km unpaved: 29,800 km (2006)
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Ports and terminals | | Kheyrabad, Shir Khan
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Military branches | | Afghan Armed Forces: Afghan National Army (ANA, includes Afghan National Army Air Corps) (2009)
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Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | 22 years of age; inductees are contracted into service for a 4-year term (2005)
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Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 7,431,147 females age 16-49: 7,004,819 (2008 est.)
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Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 4,371,193 females age 16-49: 4,072,945 (2009 est.)
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Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 382,720 female: 361,733 (2009 est.)
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Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | 1.9% of GDP (2006 est.)
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Disputes - international | | Pakistan has built fences in some portions of its border with Afghanistan which remains open in some areas to foreign terrorists and other illegal activities
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Refugees and internally displaced persons | | IDPs: 132,246 (mostly Pashtuns and Kuchis displaced in south and west due to drought and instability) (2007)
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Electricity - production(kWh) | | 839 million kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 36.3% hydro: 63.7% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
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Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 1.01 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 230 million kWh (2007 est.)
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Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 0 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 5,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 0 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 4,404 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 0 bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
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Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 30 million cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 30 million cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008)
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Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 49.55 billion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | 0.01% (2001 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | NA
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HIV/AIDS - deaths | | NA
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Major infectious diseases | | degree of risk: high food or waterborne diseases: bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever vectorborne disease: malaria animal contact disease: rabies note: highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has been identified in this country; it poses a negligible risk with extremely rare cases possible among US citizens who have close contact with birds (2009)
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Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 28.1% male: 43.1% female: 12.6% (2000 est.)
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School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years) | | total: 8 years male: 11 years female: 4 years (2004)
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Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | NA
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