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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Algeria Index
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Algeris, 1993
Insert: Detail of Wilayat, 1993
ALGERIA IN OCTOBER 1994 was in a state bordering on civil war.
The military in late January 1994 had named General Lamine
Zeroual, previously minister of defense, as president. He was to
rule in coordination with the High Security Council (Haut Conseil
de Sûreté) because the High Council of State (Haut Conseil
d'État--HCÉ), created two years previously, had been abolished.
In April armed forces leaders removed Prime Minister Redha Malek
from his post after an incumbency of only eight months, replacing
him with Mokdad Sifi, an engineer technocrat who had served as
minister of equipment. Efforts to achieve a workable compromise
with the major Islamic activist group, the Islamic Salvation
Front (Front Islamique du Salut--FIS), appeared unsuccessful.
Martial law, imposed in February 1992, continued.
To understand the forces behind recent events, one must look
at the factors that have shaped Algeria's history. The indigenous
peoples of the region of North Africa that today constitutes
Algeria comprise an ethnic group known as the Berbers. In the
mid-1990s, the Berbers represented only about 20 percent of
Algeria's population. In A.D. 642, following conquests by the
Romans, the Vandals, and the Byzantines, the region came under
the influence of Islam and the Arabs. Hence, the vast majority of
the population, about 80 percent, are Arabs. Islam and
arabization, therefore, have profoundly influenced the area.
The Arab rulers of Algeria have come from various groups. In
chronological order, they have included the Umayyads, the
Abbasids, the Fatimids, the Almoravids, the Almohads, and the
Zayanids. The latter group was followed in the sixteenth century
and early seventeenth century by a series of privateer merchant
captains. One of the early sixteenth-century Muslim privateers,
Khair ad Din, ruled present-day Algeria on behalf of the Ottoman
Turks, who gave him the title of provincial governor. The Ottoman
sultan nominally controlled the area into the nineteenth century
but in reality exerted minimal influence.
From their base in Algeria, the privateers preyed on French
vessels and those of other Western nations. Because France was
occupied with the Napoleonic wars and their aftermath in the
first part of the nineteenth century, it was not in a position to
act against the Algerian privateers. In 1827, however, as a
result of an alleged slight to the French consul by the local
ruler, or dey, France undertook what became a three-year blockade
of Algiers. The incident led to a full-scale French invasion of
Algeria in 1830 and the imposition of French rule, which lasted
until Algeria obtained its independence in 1962.
In the course of French colonization of Algeria, discontent
on the part of the inhabitants led to several uprisings. The most
prominent of these was a revolt that originated in the Kabylie
region in eastern Algeria in 1871 and spread through much of the
country. Serious disturbances also broke out on V-E (Victory in
Europe) Day, 1945. In response to the latter uprisings, the
French military killed more than 1,500 Algerians and arrested
more than 5,400 persons. French actions and growing Algerian
nationalism led in 1954 to the creation by Ahmed Ben Bella and
his colleagues of the National Liberation Front (Front de
Libération Nationale--FLN) and a military network throughout
Algeria, the National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération
Nationale--ALN).
The FLN launched the War of Independence on November 1, 1954,
and called on all Algerian Muslims to support it. A bloody war
ensued. The conflict ended on July 1, 1962, with Algeria
obtaining independence at the cost of as many as 300,000 Algerian
dead. The major reason for the prolongation of the war was
France's determination to maintain direct control of Algeria
because of its strategic location. Seeking to integrate Algeria
into the Third French Republic, France had made Algeria a part of
France proper, whereas under similar circumstances it had given
Morocco and Tunisia the status of protectorates. France granted
independence to Morocco and Tunisia in March 1956, although their
institutions were less developed than those of Algeria, believing
that it could continue to exercise control over the other two
states through Algeria.
In the thirty-two years since independence, the Algerian
republic has seen a number of regimes and several forceful
overthrows of governments in which the military has played a
major role. From 1963 to 1989, Algeria was technically a
socialist state. In February 1979, following the death of Houari
Boumediene in December 1978, Chadli Benjedid became president.
Beginning in 1980, Benjedid began to liberalize Algeria's
economy, shifting from investment in heavy industry to
concentration on agriculture and light industry. In addition, the
regime disbanded a number of large government enterprises and
state farms. The drop of world oil prices in 1986, however,
together with poor domestic economic management, aggravated the
already depressed economic situation. Despite some attempts at
diversification, the oil industry and especially natural gas
remained major sources of national income. The economy was
characterized by high unemployment, particularly among younger
males in the cities. (About 70 percent of Algerians are under
thirty years old, and 44 percent of the total population are
under age fifteen.) The resulting social unrest stemmed from the
discontent of those youths who were either unemployed or in dead-
end jobs and from food and housing shortages. The unrest
culminated in a series of strikes in late September and early
October 1988 in major industrial areas and cities, including
Algiers. The strikes were repressed by the military with
considerable force and a loss of life estimated in the hundreds.
To counter this unrest and the rising appeal of the Islamists
(Muslim activists, sometimes seen as fundamentalists), Benjedid
expanded the reforms designed to encourage private agriculture
and small businesses. In 1989 he also instituted political
reforms, including a new constitution that eliminated the term
socialist, separated the FLN from the state, and granted
freedom of expression, association, and meeting. However, because
Boumediene's socialist policies had been exacted at such a high
cost to the economy, Benjedid's reforms came too late, in the
opinion of many observers. Furthermore, the control of one party,
the FLN, between 1962 and 1980 had led to an authoritarianism
that was difficult to overcome and that had resulted in the rise
of Islamists, particularly in the form of the FIS.
In response to the newly gained right to form political
organizations, parties proliferated, of which the FIS constituted
the leading opposition party. The FIS demonstrated its appeal, or
perhaps the extent of popular disillusionment with the FLN, by
defeating the FLN in June 1990 local and provincial elections,
winning in such major cities as Algiers, Constantine, and Oran.
The Berber party, Front of Socialist Forces (Front des Forces
Socialistes--FFS), and Ben Bella's Movement for Democracy in
Algeria (Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie--MDA) and
several other small opposition parties did not participate.
Again in the December 1991 national elections, the FIS
surprised many by its large-scale victories despite the presence
in jail of the party's leadership, including Abbassi Madani and
Ahmed Belhadj. To prevent the holding of second-stage, run-off
elections in mid-January 1992, which the FIS presumably would
have won decisively, the army staged a coup led by Minister of
Defense General Khaled Nezzar. Martial law was reimposed, and
Benjedid resigned. The military named Sid Ahmed Ghozali president
and head of a short-lived six-person High Security Council, which
was replaced by the five-person HCE. Both bodies were dominated
by the military. Army leaders recalled Mohamed Boudiaf from his
self-imposed exile in Morocco to serve on the HCE and be head of
state.
In response to the popular demonstrations that occurred in
February 1992, the authorities banned the FIS in early March and
dissolved the communal and municipal assemblies. The court banned
the FIS on the ground that it violated the constitution, which
prohibited political parties based on religion, race, or regional
identity. After an initial period of calm, many Islamists were
arrested and tried by military courts, receiving severe
sentences; in 1992 about 10,000 Algerians were sent to prison
camps in the Sahara. The military government's repression of the
FIS brought sharp responses from other political parties; the FLN
and the FFS sought an alliance with the FIS to preserve the
democratic process. Furthermore, the repression caused some
elements in the FIS and in the military to become more radical.
Rapidly, a violent environment was created, leading to the
assassination of Boudiaf in June 1992 and to terrorist attacks on
civilians as well as military personnel. Ali Kafi of the HCE
succeeded Boudiaf as head of state, but he was unsuccessful in
resolving the country's political and economic problems.
The military named Redha Malek prime minister in August 1993.
Recognizing the need for some compromise, Malek sought to
initiate talks with the opposition, despite his firm stance
against terrorism. However, because the banned FIS was not
included in the proposed dialogue scheduled for mid-December 1993
when the authorization for the HCE was due to end, other parties
boycotted the talks. The HCE's mandate was extended into January
1994, but because most parties had lost confidence in the
government only smaller parties participated in the dialogue. By
September 1994, in the fourth round of the national dialogue,
five parties were taking part.
In naming General Zeroual as new president, the army took
direct responsibility for governing. Despite opposition criticism
of the renewed military rule, Zeroual committed himself to
working with the opposition, including the FIS. This stance has
caused divisions within the military over political strategy and
prompted the resignation of Malek as prime minister in April. In
a conciliatory gesture toward the FIS, in mid-September 1994 the
government released five senior leaders from prison. Included
among those released were Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, who
were placed under house arrest and asked by the government to
assist it in reaching a reconciliation with the FIS. In pursuit
of some sort of accommodation with the FIS, in late September
three generals were holding negotiations on behalf of the
government separately with Madani and Belhadj in their homes.
Meanwhile, violence has increased, and more than 10,000 (some
estimates range as high as 30,000) Algerians are reliably
reported to have been killed between January 1992 and October
1994. Between February 22, 1993, and May 15, 1994, death
sentences were passed on 489 persons, of which twenty-six have
been carried out. In addition, some sixty-eight foreigners--the
number is variously reported--had been killed by October 1994. As
a result of the violence, numerous West European countries and
the United States in 1993 urged their nationals to leave Algeria.
French citizens were particularly affected by such warnings
because in late 1993 the French government estimated that
approximately 76,000 French nationals, including those holding
dual nationality, resided in Algeria.
The main body of the FIS was willing to consider
reconciliation with the authorities under certain conditions,
such as the freeing of FIS members who had been imprisoned and
the legalization of the party. The most radical group, however,
the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé--GIA), had split
from the FIS, which it considered too conciliatory, and rejected
any compromise. Instead, the GIA, an urban terrorist group, began
military action in November 1991. It claimed responsibility for
killing the majority of the sixty-eight foreigners and also
targeted oil installation personnel. Particularly embarrassing to
the government was the GIA's kidnapping of the Omani and Yemeni
ambassadors in July 1994. (They were subsequently released.)
Another Muslim activist group, the FIS-sponsored Armed Islamic
Movement (Mouvement Islamique Armé--MIA), later renamed the
Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut--AIS), engaged
in traditional guerrilla warfare. The AIS consisted in late 1994
of about 10,000 men and attacks military bases; it denies any
involvement in attacks on civilians and foreigners.
While working on the one hand to promote dialogue, the
government on the other hand instituted sharp repressive measures
on Islamists. Curfews designed to counter terrorism, instituted
in December 1992, were not lifted until 1994, and martial law
continued to apply. The government undertook a counteroffensive
against radical Islamist groups beginning in 1992, and had
succeeded in killing several leaders of the GIA, including the
group's head, Mourad Sid Ahmed (known as Djafar al Afghani), in
February 1994 and Cherif Gousmi, Djafar al Afghani's successor,
in September 1994. The government's apparent inability to stop
the killing of unveiled women led to the formation of at least
two anti-Islamic groups: the Organization of Free Young
Algerians, which announced in March 1994 that it would resort to
counterkillings of veiled women at the rate of twenty to one, and
the Secret Organization for Safeguarding the Algerian Republic.
Also in March, thousands of Algerians, particularly women, took
to the streets to protest against the killing of unveiled women
and to demonstrate their disillusionment with both the government
and the FIS. Furthermore, the regime seemed unable or unwilling
to prevent Islamist attacks on Berbers. In consequence, in 1993
Berbers began arming themselves in self-defense. Also indicative
of the questionable effectiveness of government security measures
was the successful escape of about 1,000 prisoners from the
Tazoult high-security prison near Batna in March 1994.
Given the absence of basic government bodies such as elected
assemblies, contemporary Algeria is being governed by the
military. In late 1994, the only body that theoretically
exercised some legislative functions was the National
Transitional Council (Conseil National de Transition--CNT),
created in May 1994. Zeroual installed the CNT, which in
principle was to consist of 200 members: eighty-five from
political parties; eighty-five representing unions, professional
and social organizations; and thirty-five civil service members.
In actuality, the twenty-two seats for the five legal political
parties (the FIS was not included) were unoccupied because the
parties refused to participate.
Leaders of the armed forces became the main force rejecting
Islamists. Elements of the army, however, recognized that a
compromise with moderate Islamists appeared to be necessary if
the country were to move ahead. Furthermore, military leaders
seemed aware that the FIS had made inroads within the lower ranks
of the armed forces. Zeroual undertook a large-scale
reorganization of the top echelons of military leadership after
coming to power, introducing younger officers more willing to
consider compromise with Islamists. In addition to military
service staff appointments, he named new commanders to five out
of the six military regions in May 1994. In June Zeroual
appointed new governors to thirty-nine of the forty-eight
wilayat, or governorates.
Public frustration has led to some growth in the number of
Islamists, but accurate figures as to their strength are lacking.
The overall Algerian attraction to Islamist groups appears to
stem from increasing skepticism as to the likelihood of
democratic government being restored.
The position of Islamists in general and the FIS in
particular in contemporary Algerian society reflects the role of
Islam in Algeria. Historically, the marabouts, or Muslim holy
men, played a prominent role among the bedouin tribes that
constituted the major element of the early culture of the area. A
number of marabouts were also associated with mystical Sufi
Islamic brotherhoods that existed primarily in rural and
mountainous areas of North Africa. When the French came to
dominate Algeria from 1830 onward, they endeavored to undermine
Muslim culture and to substitute Western ways. Therefore, the
contemporary efforts of the FIS to restore the Islamic heritage
of Algerians can be seen not only as a religious and cultural
phenomenon but also as part of a nationalist resurgence to revive
a way of life that was discouraged by a colonial power.
Since independence in 1962, Algeria has experienced
ambivalence about the role of Islam in society. The 1962
constitution made Islam the state religion because the founders
saw Islam as a force for bringing cohesion to the new country.
The government assumed control of mosques and religious schools
and administered religious endowments. In the late 1960s and the
1970s, Boumediene's development policies, which led to the
redistribution of oil revenues, were often considered to be
instances of Islamic activism. However, many French-educated
Algerians in the upper and upper middle classes were secularly
oriented and wished to minimize the role of Islam in Algerian
society.
A number of Western observers believe that Islamist movements
grew as a result of political underrepresentation and economic
hardships experienced by the average Algerian. The FIS in
particular saw itself as the heir of the FLN. It promised to
continue the redistribution of wealth that the FLN had promoted
in the 1960s and the 1970s, using oil revenues. For example, the
FIS capitalized on its well-organized party structure after the
1989 earthquake by distributing food and medical supplies in
affected areas and providing such services as garbage collection
and school tutoring. Such social service programs, when added to
the FIS's role of providing religious instruction, met with
popular response and constituted a threat in the eyes of many of
those in positions of government power.
Because of economic constraints, the government found it very
difficult in the late 1980s and early 1990s to counter any
Islamist activities relating to the economy and social services.
Despite its deteriorating economy, Algeria for years had avoided
rescheduling its debt payments for fear of losing its political
and economic independence. Thus, in 1993 the country devoted 96
percent of its hydrocarbon export revenues to debt repayment.
When the economic situation became critical in 1994, partly
because of a severe drought that resulted in Algeria's being able
to meet only about 10 percent of its grain needs and the
consequent death by starvation of about 1,000 persons monthly,
the regime was obliged to act. In addition, most industries were
operating only at 50 percent of capacity because of lack of funds
for raw materials and other inputs; inflation officially was
estimated at 25 percent but actually was considerably higher (for
example, in September 1991 it had reached 227 percent); the 1993
gross domestic product
(GDP--see Glossary) growth rate was -1.7
percent; land erosion was causing the loss of about 40,000
hectares of cultivated land annually; and water distribution
losses were as high as 40 percent, according to the
World Bank (see Glossary).
To qualify for an International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary)
structural adjustment loan, the government needed to
take preliminary reform measures. These steps included
instituting 20 percent to 100 percent price increases in late
March 1994 on nine basic commodities--among which were bread,
flour, and milk--and devaluing the Algerian dinar (for value of
the dinar--see Glossary)
by 40 percent in early April. Following
the IMF's approval in May of a US$1.1 billion standby economic
stabilization loan extending to April 1995, Algeria was able to
ask the Paris Club (see Glossary) of
official creditors for
rescheduling of other government debt (total indebtedness,
including loans from private banks, was estimated at US$26
billion). In July Algeria received economic aid in the amount of
US$1.1 billion from France as well as a loan from the European
Union. In October 1994, Algeria had not yet completed its plans
for rescheduling its commercial loan repayments with the
London Club (see Glossary).
In order to gain popular support for the structural
adjustment program, the IMF specifically asked that other donors
make loans that would facilitate housing construction. Algeria
faces a severe housing crisis because between 1962 and 1989 the
country built only about 48,000 housing units annually. This
figure is in contrast to the 107,000 needed to prevent further
deterioration of the situation and the 234,000 units needed per
year to provide each household with a unit. With regard to other
services, to maintain its existing health level, the country
requires an additional 24,000 hospital beds and 5,000 more
paramedics. To meet the needs of the number of new students
resulting from Algeria's high population growth rate (variously
estimated at 2.7 percent to 2.9 percent per year), it needs
24,000 additional classrooms and 8,000 more teachers by 2005.
Because of the serious economic situation, when Islamists
made such a good showing in the June 1990 elections, and again in
the December 1991 elections, some Western observers considered
the results primarily a vote against the FLN rather than an
endorsement of Islamism. The military, whose leadership was
secularly oriented, felt threatened, however, and determined to
take decisive action.
The repressive measures adopted demonstrated that democracy
constituted a somewhat thin veneer. Algeria's military leaders
were apparently unwilling to accept the risks connected with
political pluralism and liberalization. Furthermore, the country
lacked a solid commitment to the electoral process. In the
December 1991 elections, of the 13.2 million Algerians eligible
to vote, only 7.8 million, or 59 percent, voted. Moreover, the
continued influence of the military on the processes of
government represents a further obstacle to true democracy.
While undergoing these domestic difficulties, the Algerian
government has sought to obtain not only economic assistance from
abroad but also political support. Traditionally, Algeria's
closest economic relations have been with France, to which it
ships most of its exports and to which thousands of Algerian
workers continue to migrate, often illegally in contravention of
immigration restrictions. However, given Algeria's colonial
heritage, a love-hate relationship exists between it and France.
Many older Algerians, particularly military officers, are proud
of their French culture and training but also resent past
dependence; many younger people are ardent nationalists or
Islamists and tend to reject France's role and the influence of
the West in general. Furthermore, France, concerned at the unrest
so close to it as well as the potential for subversion of
thousands of Algerians in France, seems to have been pressuring
Algeria to take harsh measures against Islamists. The United
States has been more conciliatory, stressing the need for the
Algerian government to compromise with Islamists in order to move
toward greater democracy. Democracy appears to be a more
acceptable course than socialism, in view of developments in
Eastern Europe in recent years and the questionable success of
Boumediene's socialist policies.
On the regional level, Algeria historically has tended to
view itself as the leading state of the Arab Maghrib. In recent
years, however, the country's economic plight has limited its
regional influence, and the role of Morocco appears to be
growing. Algeria is a founding member of the Union of the Arab
Maghreb (Union du Maghreb Arabe--UMA), which came into existence
in 1989, designed to create a common market among Algeria, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Benjedid saw the UMA as a
factor for peace and stability in the region as well as for
social and economic progress. Formed at the time of the Soviet
Union's disintegration and the prospect of serious economic
competition from the European Community, the UMA was intended not
only to promote economic cooperation but also to promote common
policies in the broader political and social fields. For example,
at its November 1992 meeting, the UMA ministers of foreign
affairs agreed to take common action to counter the rise of
Islamism in the Maghrib. However, at their February 1993 meeting
the ministers decided on a "pause" in the UMA's work. In
actuality, because of economic differences among the members,
none of the fifteen conventions adopted since 1989 has been
implemented.
Thus, in late 1994 the Algerian government was challenged on
a number of fronts. Its greatest problems lay in the domestic
field: the strength of Islamism, which threatened to topple the
regime, and the economy. The IMF loan, supplemented by Paris
Club, London Club, and other foreign financial assistance, gave
some hope of relieving economic hardships in the long run. In all
likelihood, however, the austerity measures nonetheless would
create in the immediate future further unemployment and cost-of-
living increases that would have a serious impact on less
affluent members of society. Therefore, the government needs to
make progress in the social and infrastructure fields,
particularly in housing and to a lesser extent in health care and
education, if it is to offer a domestic program to counteract the
popular appeal of Islamists. Wise use for such purposes of funds
obtained from abroad while simultaneously seeking to negotiate a
compromise with moderate Islamist groups like the FIS, may
represent the government's best hope of remaining in power.
October 27, 1994
Helen Chapin Metz
Data as of December 1993
- Algeria-THE INDIVIDUAL, THE FAMILY, AND THE SEXES
- Algeria-Toward a Modern Society
- Algeria-Balance of Payments
- Algeria-The Elite
- Algeria-TRENDS
- Algeria-War of Independence
- Algeria-Health HEALTH AND WELFARE
- Algeria-Exports and Imports
- Algeria-Air Force
- Algeria-De Gaulle
- Algeria-Chapter 1 - Historical Setting
- Algeria-Urbanization and Density
- Algeria-National Consultative Council
- Algeria-Strategic Perspectives
- Algeria-EXTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
- Algeria-Prison Conditions
- Algeria-GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
- Algeria-Boumediene and the Socialist Experiment
- Algeria-Marabouts
- Algeria-Islamic Opposition
- Algeria-The Algerian General Workers' Union and the Workers' Movement
- Algeria-FLN
- Algeria-AGRICULTURE
- Algeria-POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES
- Algeria-PREFACE
- Algeria-INTERNAL SECURITY
- Algeria-The Women's Movement
- Algeria-Socialist Vanguard Party
- Algeria-Military Dictatorship
- Algeria-The Islamist Factor
- Algeria-Acknowledgments
- Algeria-Transportation
- Algeria-Democratization, October 1988-January 11, 1992
- Algeria-France and the Mediterranean Countries
- Algeria-The Sahara
- Algeria-Berber Separatism
- Algeria-Colonization and Military Control
- Algeria-Chapter 3 - The Economy
- Algeria-Climate and Hydrology
- Algeria-The Military and Boumediene
- Algeria-Wilayat
- Algeria-Hegemony of the Colons
- Algeria-The National Union of Algerian Farmers
- Algeria-Preindependence Society STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY
- Algeria-Chapter 5 - National Security
- Algeria-The Islamist Movement since the Late 1980s
- Algeria-CIVIL SOCIETY
- Algeria-Banking SERVICES
- Algeria-THE ARMED FORCES
- Algeria-Security Problems with Neighboring States
- Algeria-LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
- Algeria-Trading Partners
- Algeria-Aftermath of the War
- Algeria-Criminal Justice System
- Algeria-EDUCATION
- Algeria-Provincial Courts
- Algeria-Geographic Regions
- Algeria-Army
- Algeria-Security Interests Outside the Maghrib
- Algeria-Invasion of Algiers FRANCE IN ALGERIA, 1830-1962
- Algeria-Return to Authoritarianism, January 11, 1992
- Algeria-Roads
- Algeria-Crops
- Algeria-THE DEFENSE BURDEN
- Algeria-General Trends FOREIGN POLICY
- Algeria-GOVERNMENT ROLE
- Algeria-ALGERIA
- Algeria-Land Tenure and Reform
- Algeria-The United States
- Algeria-TRADE
- Algeria-Privateers
- Algeria-The Press
- Algeria-Africa
- Algeria-Fishing
- Algeria-TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
- Algeria-Almoravids
- Algeria-The Arabization Movement
- Algeria-Demographic Profile POPULATION
- Algeria-Family and Household
- Algeria-Currency and Exchange Rates
- Algeria-Trade Account
- Algeria-The Revolutionary Period and Independence
- Algeria-Airports
- Algeria-Hydrocarbons NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY
- Algeria-Political Movements
- Algeria-Arab and Middle East Affairs
- Algeria-DOMESTIC SECURITY CONCERNS
- Algeria-GEOGRAPHY
- Algeria-SOCIETY
- Algeria -COUNTRY PROFILE
- Algeria
- Algeria-Structure of the National Government
- Algeria-Forestry
- Algeria-Almohads
- Algeria-Philippeville
- Algeria-Minerals
- Algeria-Electoral System
- Algeria-The High Plateaus and the Saharan Atlas
- Algeria-Military Tribunals
- Algeria-European Offensive
- Algeria-Recent Political Events
- Algeria-Role of the FIS
- Algeria-Formation of the Second Algerian Republic, 1976-79
- Algeria-PHYSICAL SETTING
- Algeria-Legalization of Political Parties and Beginnings of a Pluralist System
- Algeria-Housing
- Algeria-Construction
- Algeria-Early History
- Algeria-Abd al Qadir
- Algeria-Local and Regional Government
- Algeria-The Revolution and Social Change
- Algeria-Budget
- Algeria-Table A - Selected Acronyms and Contractions
- Algeria-Carthage and the Berbers NORTH AFRICA DURING THE CLASSICAL PERIOD
- Algeria-Vandals and Byzantines
- Algeria-Zayanids
- Algeria
- Algeria
- Algeria
- Algeria-Sub-Saharan Africa
- Algeria
- Algeria-THE MILITARY HERITAGE
- Algeria
- Algeria-Conditions of Service
- Algeria-External Debt and Payments
- Algeria-Personnel and Recruitment
- Algeria-Committee of Public Safety
- Algeria-PREHISTORY OF CENTRAL NORTH AFRICA
- Algeria-The Entrepreneurial Class
- Algeria-Opposition to the Occupation
- Algeria
- Algeria-ECONOMY
- Algeria
- Algeria-Dawair
- Algeria-NATIONAL SECURITY
- Algeria-Livestock
- Algeria
- Algeria-Chapter 2 - The Society and Its Environment
- Algeria-Railroads
- Algeria-Legislative: National People's Assembly
- Algeria
- Algeria-Youth and Student Unions
- Algeria
- Algeria-The Generals' Putsch
- Algeria-FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE
- Algeria-Family Code
- Algeria-Political Configuration: The Army-Party-State Triangle
- Algeria-Foreign Aid
- Algeria-Relations with the United States
- Algeria-Algerian Nationalism
- Algeria-Telecommunications
- Algeria-Navy
- Algeria-Arabization
- Algeria
- Algeria
- Algeria-Chapter 4 - Government and Politics
- Algeria-Supreme Court
- Algeria-Tenets of Islam
- Algeria-Family Planning
- Algeria-Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia
- Algeria-The "Heroic" Stage: Ben Bella's Regime, 1962-65
- Algeria-Judicial System
- Algeria-Men and Women
- Algeria-Role of Political Parties
- Algeria-RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
- Algeria-Social Welfare
- Algeria-The West
- Algeria-Ottoman Rule
- Algeria-Electric Power
- Algeria
- Algeria-Ports
- Algeria-EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONS
- Algeria-Municipal Government
- Algeria-Manufacturing
- Algeria-Migration
- Algeria-The Peoples ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES
- Algeria-Ben Bella and the FLN
- Algeria-PUBLIC FINANCES
- Algeria-Intelligence Agencies
- Algeria-Fatimids
- Algeria-Conduct of the War
- Algeria-Islam and the Algerian State
- Algeria-Terrain
- Algeria-ISLAM
- Algeria-Investments
- Algeria
- Algeria-TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
- Algeria-INDUSTRY
- Algeria-The Land and Colonizers
- Algeria-Languages: Arabic and Berber
Background | | After more than a century of rule by France, Algerians fought through much of the 1950s to achieve independence in 1962. Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), has dominated politics ever since. Many Algerians in the subsequent generation were not satisfied, however, and moved to counter the FLN's centrality in Algerian politics. The surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 balloting spurred the Algerian army to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. The government later allowed elections featuring pro-government and moderate religious-based parties, but this did not appease the activists who progressively widened their attacks. The fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense fighting between 1992-98 resulting in over 100,000 deaths - many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s and FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, with the backing of the military, won the presidency in 1999 in an election widely viewed as fraudulent and was reelected in a landslide victory in 2004. BOUTEFLIKA was overwhelmingly reelected to a third term in 2009 after the government amended the constitution in 2008 to remove presidential term limits. Longstanding problems continue to face BOUTEFLIKA, including large-scale unemployment, a shortage of housing, unreliable electrical and water supplies, government inefficiencies and corruption, and the continuing activities of extremist militants. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 2006 merged with al-Qaida to form al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, which has launched an ongoing series of kidnappings and bombings - including high-profile, mass-casualty suicide attacks targeting the Algerian Government and Western interests.
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Location | | Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Morocco and Tunisia
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Area(sq km) | | total: 2,381,741 sq km land: 2,381,741 sq km water: 0 sq km
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Geographic coordinates | | 28 00 N, 3 00 E
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Land boundaries(km) | | total: 6,343 km border countries: Libya 982 km, Mali 1,376 km, Mauritania 463 km, Morocco 1,559 km, Niger 956 km, Tunisia 965 km, Western Sahara 42 km
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Coastline(km) | | 998 km
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Climate | | arid to semiarid; mild, wet winters with hot, dry summers along coast; drier with cold winters and hot summers on high plateau; sirocco is a hot, dust/sand-laden wind especially common in summer
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Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Chott Melrhir -40 m highest point: Tahat 3,003 m
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Natural resources | | petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, uranium, lead, zinc
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Land use(%) | | arable land: 3.17% permanent crops: 0.28% other: 96.55% (2005)
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Irrigated land(sq km) | | 5,690 sq km (2003)
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Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 14.3 cu km (1997)
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Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 6.07 cu km/yr (22%/13%/65%) per capita: 185 cu m/yr (2000)
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Natural hazards | | mountainous areas subject to severe earthquakes; mudslides and floods in rainy season
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Environment - current issues | | soil erosion from overgrazing and other poor farming practices; desertification; dumping of raw sewage, petroleum refining wastes, and other industrial effluents is leading to the pollution of rivers and coastal waters; Mediterranean Sea, in particular, becoming polluted from oil wastes, soil erosion, and fertilizer runoff; inadequate supplies of potable water
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Environment - international agreements | | party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
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Geography - note | | second-largest country in Africa (after Sudan)
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Population | | 34,178,188 (July 2009 est.)
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Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 25.4% (male 4,436,591/female 4,259,729) 15-64 years: 69.5% (male 11,976,965/female 11,777,618) 65 years and over: 5.1% (male 798,576/female 928,709) (2009 est.)
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Median age(years) | | total: 26.6 years male: 26.3 years female: 26.8 years (2009 est.)
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Population growth rate(%) | | 1.196% (2009 est.)
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Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 16.9 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 4.64 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
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Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | -0.29 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 65% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 2.5% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
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Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.02 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.86 male(s)/female total population: 1.01 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
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Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 27.73 deaths/1,000 live births male: 30.86 deaths/1,000 live births female: 24.45 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
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Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 74.02 years male: 72.35 years female: 75.77 years (2009 est.)
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Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 1.79 children born/woman (2009 est.)
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Nationality | | noun: Algerian(s) adjective: Algerian
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Ethnic groups(%) | | Arab-Berber 99%, European less than 1% note: almost all Algerians are Berber in origin, not Arab; the minority who identify themselves as Berber live mostly in the mountainous region of Kabylie east of Algiers; the Berbers are also Muslim but identify with their Berber rather than Arab cultural heritage; Berbers have long agitated, sometimes violently, for autonomy; the government is unlikely to grant autonomy but has offered to begin sponsoring teaching Berber language in schools
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Religions(%) | | Sunni Muslim (state religion) 99%, Christian and Jewish 1%
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Languages(%) | | Arabic (official), French, Berber dialects
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Country name | | conventional long form: People's Democratic Republic of Algeria conventional short form: Algeria local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Jaza'iriyah ad Dimuqratiyah ash Sha'biyah local short form: Al Jaza'ir
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Government type | | republic
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Capital | | name: Algiers geographic coordinates: 36 45 N, 3 03 E time difference: UTC+1 (6 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
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Administrative divisions | | 48 provinces (wilayat, singular - wilaya); Adrar, Ain Defla, Ain Temouchent, Alger, Annaba, Batna, Bechar, Bejaia, Biskra, Blida, Bordj Bou Arreridj, Bouira, Boumerdes, Chlef, Constantine, Djelfa, El Bayadh, El Oued, El Tarf, Ghardaia, Guelma, Illizi, Jijel, Khenchela, Laghouat, Mascara, Medea, Mila, Mostaganem, M'Sila, Naama, Oran, Ouargla, Oum el Bouaghi, Relizane, Saida, Setif, Sidi Bel Abbes, Skikda, Souk Ahras, Tamanghasset, Tebessa, Tiaret, Tindouf, Tipaza, Tissemsilt, Tizi Ouzou, Tlemcen
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Constitution | | 8 September 1963; revised 19 November 1976; effective 22 November 1976; revised 3 November 1988, 23 February 1989, 28 November 1996, 10 April 2002, and 12 November 2008
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Legal system | | socialist, based on French and Islamic law; judicial review of legislative acts in ad hoc Constitutional Council composed of various public officials including several Supreme Court justices; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
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Suffrage | | 18 years of age; universal
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Executive branch | | chief of state: President Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA (since 28 April 1999) note - the president is both the chief of state and head of government; a November 2008 constitutional amendment separated the position of head of government from that of the prime minister head of government: President Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA (since 28 April 1999) cabinet: Cabinet of Ministers appointed by the president elections: president elected by popular vote for a five-year term; note - a November 2008 constitutional amendment abolished presidential term limits; election last held 9 April 2009 (next to be held in April 2014) election results: Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA reelected president for third term; percent of vote - Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA 90.2%, Louisa HANOUNE 4.2%, Moussa TOUATI 2.3%, Djahid YOUNSI 1.4%, Ali Fawzi REBIANE less than 1%, Mohamed SAID less than 1%
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Legislative branch | | bicameral Parliament consists of the National Council (upper house; 144 seats; one-third of the members appointed by the president, two-thirds elected by indirect vote to serve six-year terms; the constitution requires half the Council to be renewed every three years) and the National People's Assembly (lower house; 389 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms) elections: National Council - last held 28 December 2006 (next to be held 29 December 2009); National People's Assembly - last held 17 May 2007 (next to be held in 2012) election results: National Council - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; National People's Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - FLN 136, RND 61, MSP 52, PT 26, RCD 19, FNA 13, other 49, independents 33;
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Judicial branch | | Supreme Court
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Political pressure groups and leaders | | The Algerian Human Rights League or LADDH [Hocine ZEHOUANE]; SOS Disparus [Nacera DUTOUR]
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International organization participation | | ABEDA, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AMU, AU, BIS, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt (signatory), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC, LAS, MIGA, MONUC, NAM, OAPEC, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, OPEC, OSCE (partner), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)
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Flag description | | two equal vertical bands of green (hoist side) and white; a red, five-pointed star within a red crescent centered over the two-color boundary; the colors represent Islam (green), purity and peace (white), and liberty (red); the crescent and star are also Islamic symbols, but the crescent is more closed than those of other Muslim countries because the Algerians believe the long crescent horns bring happiness
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Economy - overview | | The hydrocarbons sector is the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 60% of budget revenues, 30% of GDP, and over 95% of export earnings. Algeria has the eighth-largest reserves of natural gas in the world and is the fourth-largest gas exporter; it ranks 15th in oil reserves. Sustained high oil prices in recent years have helped improve Algeria's financial and macroeconomic indicators. Algeria is running substantial trade surpluses and building up record foreign exchange reserves. Algeria has decreased its external debt to less than 5% of GDP after repaying its Paris Club and London Club debt in 2006. Real GDP has risen due to higher oil output and increased government spending. The government's continued efforts to diversify the economy by attracting foreign and domestic investment outside the energy sector, however, has had little success in reducing high unemployment and improving living standards. Structural reform within the economy, such as development of the banking sector and the construction of infrastructure, moves ahead slowly hampered by corruption and bureaucratic resistance.
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GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $233.5 billion (2008 est.) $225.6 billion (2007 est.) $218.8 billion (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP (official exchange rate) | | $159.7 billion (2008 est.)
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GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 3.5% (2008 est.) 3.1% (2007 est.) 2.1% (2006 est.)
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GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $6,900 (2008 est.) $6,800 (2007 est.) $6,600 (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 8.3% industry: 62.3% services: 29.4% (2008 est.)
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Labor force | | 9.464 million (2008 est.)
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Labor force - by occupation(%) | | agriculture 14%, industry 13.4%, construction and public works 10%, trade 14.6%, government 32%, other 16% (2003 est.)
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Unemployment rate(%) | | 12.8% (2008 est.) 11.8% (2007 est.)
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Population below poverty line(%) | | 23% (2006 est.)
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Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: 2.8% highest 10%: 26.8% (1995)
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Distribution of family income - Gini index | | 35.3 (1995)
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Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP) | | 26.1% of GDP (2008 est.)
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Budget | | revenues: $70.06 billion expenditures: $56.04 billion (2008 est.)
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Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | 4.4% (2008 est.) 3.5% (2007 est.)
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Stock of money | | $60.91 billion (31 December 2008) $55.43 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of quasi money | | $30.36 billion (31 December 2008) $28.59 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of domestic credit | | $NA (31 December 2008) $NA (31 December 2007)
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Market value of publicly traded shares | | $NA
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Economic aid - recipient | | $370.6 million (2005 est.)
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Public debt(% of GDP) | | 8.4% of GDP (2008 est.) 37.4% of GDP (2004 est.)
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Agriculture - products | | wheat, barley, oats, grapes, olives, citrus, fruits; sheep, cattle
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Industries | | petroleum, natural gas, light industries, mining, electrical, petrochemical, food processing
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Industrial production growth rate(%) | | 3.2% (2008 est.)
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Current account balance | | $35.27 billion (2008 est.) $30.6 billion (2007 est.)
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Exports | | $78.23 billion (2008 est.) $60.6 billion (2007 est.)
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Exports - commodities(%) | | petroleum, natural gas, and petroleum products 97%
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Exports - partners(%) | | US 23.9%, Italy 15.5%, Spain 11.4%, France 8%, Netherlands 7.8%, Canada 6.8% (2008)
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Imports | | $39.16 billion (2008 est.) $26.4 billion (2007 est.)
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Imports - commodities(%) | | capital goods, foodstuffs, consumer goods
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Imports - partners(%) | | France 16.5%, Italy 11%, China 10.3%, Spain 7.4%, Germany 6.1%, US 5.5% (2008)
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Reserves of foreign exchange and gold | | $143.5 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $110.6 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Debt - external | | $3.753 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $3.957 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Stock of direct foreign investment - at home | | $13.76 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $11.91 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad | | $1.162 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $962 million (31 December 2007 est.)
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Exchange rates | | Algerian dinars (DZD) per US dollar - 63.25 (2008 est.), 69.9 (2007), 72.647 (2006), 73.276 (2005), 72.061 (2004)
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Currency (code) | | Algerian dinar (DZD)
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Telephones - main lines in use | | 3.314 million (2008)
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Telephones - mobile cellular | | 31.871 million (2008)
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Telephone system | | general assessment: a weak network of fixed-main lines, which remains at roughly 10 telephones per 100 persons, is offset by the rapid increase in mobile cellular subscribership; in 2008, combined fixed-line and mobile telephone density surpassed 100 telephones per 100 persons domestic: privatization of Algeria's telecommunications sector began in 2000; three mobile cellular licenses have been issued and, in 2005, a consortium led by Egypt's Orascom Telecom won a 15-year license to build and operate a fixed-line network in Algeria; the license will allow Orascom to develop high-speed data and other specialized services and contribute to meeting the large unfulfilled demand for basic residential telephony; Internet broadband services began in 2003 international: country code - 213; landing point for the SEA-ME-WE-4 fiber-optic submarine cable system that provides links to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia; microwave radio relay to Italy, France, Spain, Morocco, and Tunisia; coaxial cable to Morocco and Tunisia; participant in Medarabtel; satellite earth stations - 51 (Intelsat, Intersputnik, and Arabsat) (2008)
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Internet country code | | .dz
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Internet users | | 4.1 million (2008)
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Airports | | 143 (2009)
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Pipelines(km) | | condensate 1,937 km; gas 14,648 km; liquid petroleum gas 2,933 km; oil 7,579 km (2008)
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Roadways(km) | | total: 108,302 km paved: 76,028 km (includes 645 km of expressways) unpaved: 32,274 km (2004)
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Ports and terminals | | Algiers, Annaba, Arzew, Bejaia, Djendjene, Jijel, Mostaganem, Oran, Skikda
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Military branches | | People's National Army (Armee Nationale Populaire, ANP), Land Forces (Forces Terrestres, FT), Navy of the Republic of Algeria (Marine de la Republique Algerienne, MRA), Air Force (Al-Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Jaza'eriya, QJJ), Territorial Air Defense Force (2009)
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Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | 19-30 years of age for compulsory military service; conscript service obligation - 18 months (6 months basic training, 12 months civil projects) (2006)
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Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 9,736,757 females age 16-49: 9,590,978 (2008 est.)
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Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 8,317,473 females age 16-49: 8,367,005 (2009 est.)
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Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 375,852 female: 362,158 (2009 est.)
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Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | 3.3% of GDP (2006)
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Disputes - international | | Algeria, and many other states, rejects Moroccan administration of Western Sahara; the Polisario Front, exiled in Algeria, represents the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic; Algeria's border with Morocco remains an irritant to bilateral relations, each nation accusing the other of harboring militants and arms smuggling; Algeria remains concerned about armed bandits operating throughout the Sahel who sometimes destabilize southern Algerian towns; dormant disputes include Libyan claims of about 32,000 sq km still reflected on its maps of southeastern Algeria and the FLN's assertions of a claim to Chirac Pastures in southeastern Morocco
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Refugees and internally displaced persons | | refugees (country of origin): 90,000 (Western Saharan Sahrawi, mostly living in Algerian-sponsored camps in the southwestern Algerian town of Tindouf) IDPs: undetermined (civil war during 1990s) (2007)
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Trafficking in persons | | current situation: Algeria is a transit country for men and women trafficked from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and involuntary servitude; Algerian children are trafficked internally for the purpose of domestic servitude or street vending tier rating: Tier 3 - Algeria did not report any serious law enforcement actions to punish traffickers who force women into commercial sexual exploitation or men into involuntary servitude in 2007; the government again reported no investigations of trafficking of children for domestic servitude or improvements in protection services available to victims of trafficking; Algeria still lacks victim protection services, and its failure to distinguish between trafficking and illegal migration may result in the punishment of victims of trafficking (2008)
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Electricity - production(kWh) | | 34.98 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 99.7% hydro: 0.3% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
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Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 28.34 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 273 million kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 279 million kWh (2007 est.)
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Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 2.18 million bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 299,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 1.891 million bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 14,320 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 12.2 billion bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
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Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 86.5 billion cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 26.83 billion cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 59.67 billion cu m (2008)
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Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 4.502 trillion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | 0.1%; note - no country specific models provided (2007 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | 21,000 (2007 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - deaths | | fewer than 1,000 (2007 est.)
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Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 69.9% male: 79.6% female: 60.1% (2002 est.)
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School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years) | | total: 13 years male: 13 years female: 13 years (2005)
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Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | 5.1% of GDP (1999)
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