OCCUPYING A FOCAL GEOGRAPHIC bridge linking Africa and Asia,
contemporary Egypt is the inheritor of a civilization dating back more
than 6,000 years. The unification of Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt in the
third millennium B.C. required the development of administrative and
religious structures, and the monuments that remain demonstrate the
mathematical, astronomical, and architectural skills attained in
constructing rock tombs, temples, and pyramids--the latter dedicated to
the divine kings, the pharaohs.
Egypt's strategic location has made it the object of numerous
conquests: by the Ptolemies, Romans, Greeks, Arabs, Fatimids, Mamluks,
Ottomans, and Napoleon Bonaparte. The most recent conquerors, the
British, granted Egypt partial independence in 1922 and withdrew
completely in 1954. Of these foreign rules, the Arab Muslim conquest, by
its arabization and Islamization, had the greatest impact on Egyptian
life and culture, resulting in the rapid conversion of the overwhelming
majority of the population to Islam and the spread of Sunni Muslim
religious and educational institutions. Shia Islam, represented by the
Fatimid conquest in 969, led to the founding the same year of Al Azhar,
later transformed into a Sunni theological school, and in the 1990s
still regarded as the outstanding interpreter of Islamic religious law
(sharia).
The rule of Muhammad Ali (1805-48), an Albanian officer in the army
of the Ottoman sultan, who succeeded in detaching Egypt from Ottoman
control, represented another major influence on Egypt's history.
Muhammad Ali encouraged the development of agriculture, by introducing
long-staple cotton as a major crop; by expanding Egypt's infrastructure
through a network of canals, irrigation systems, and roads; and by
promoting secular education. His efforts to create a manufacturing
sector failed, however, in part because Britain's tariff policies were
designed to favor the import of raw materials to be processed in
Britain.
For contemporary Egypt, the Free Officers' 1952 Revolution,
spearheaded by Gamal Abdul Nasser, has clearly been the formative event.
Nasser's charismatic leadership institutionalized the role of the
military and created an authoritarian state that pursued goals of
"Arab socialism." These goals centered on the implementation
of agrarian reform, nationalization of key industries, a one-party state
(the Arab Socialist Union--ASU) domestically, and closer ties with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe internationally. Major events of
Nasser's regime included the construction of the Aswan High Dam with
Soviet aid; the take- over of the Suez Canal in 1956, which led to the
1956 War and the British-French-Israeli Tripartite Invasion of the Sinai
Peninsula (also known as Sinai); and the short-lived Egyptian-Syrian
union as the United Arab Republic (1958-61). Egyptian participation in
the June 1967 War with Israel resulted in Egypt's loss of the Gaza Strip
and Sinai and the so-called War of Attrition along the Suez Canal in
1969-70.
Nasser's death brought to office his vice president, Anwar as Sadat,
also a military man but more conservative in political outlook than his
predecessor. Sadat's rule has been characterized as patriarchal, a
return to a traditional method of government that relied on clientelism.
Sadat demilitarized the state in favor of the bourgeoisie and opened
Egypt to capitalism and to the West through the infitah
(opening or open door) in 1974. Sadat also moved toward some
democratization and constitutionalism, represented by the Constitution
of 1971, which, however, concentrated power in the hands of the
president. Sadat's early successes in the October 1973 War with Israel
made him a popular hero and psychologically boosted the morale of
Egyptians. In an attempt to end the state of war with Israel, Sadat
journeyed to Jerusalem in November 1977; as a next step, through the
mediation of United States president Jimmy Carter, he signed the Camp
David Accords in September 1978 and the Egyptian- Israeli peace treaty
in March 1979. These actions, however, and Sadat's increasing repression
of domestic opposition, resulted in Egypt's being cut off from the rest
of the Arab world and ultimately led to Sadat's assassination by a
Muslim extremist group, Al Jihad (Holy War), in October 1981.
Husni Mubarak, Sadat's vice president, took over the government and
was initially regarded by many as an interim president. He demonstrated
a commitment to gradualism aimed at modifying and preserving the best
elements of his predecessors' accomplishments while building domestic
consensus, tolerating opposition, promoting an equal partnership between
the public and private sectors, allowing greater democracy and
constitutionalism, and relying on technocrats for advice. In addition,
through skillful diplomacy he gained Egypt's return to the Arab fold in
1987 and assumed a leadership role in the Arab world. Simultaneously he
maintained good relations with the West and improved relations with the
Soviet Union.
Mubarak's gradualism seemed to many observers a useful leadership
characteristic for contemporary Egypt. For example, he strove to prevent
the small but growing number of Muslim extremists, sometimes referred to
as fundamentalists, from exercising disproportionate influence over the
moderate body of Muslims, who in November 1990 constituted approximately
90 percent of the country's population of about 56 million persons. (In
announcing the population figure, the Census Bureau stated that the
population has increased by 1 million persons in nine months and seven
days.) Although concerned about the intimidation of Christian
minorities, mainly Copts, at the hands of Muslim extremists, as of
mid-1991, the government has been unable to prevent young Coptic
Christians from acting on their own to counter acts of violence against
their religious centers and property.
Since the 1952 Revolution, the government has appointed the
functionaries of mosques and Islamic religious schools. The growth of
Islamic political movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and of
Islamic associations in universities resulted in increased pressure on
the government in the 1980s for application of the sharia in legal
decisions. Mubarak acceded to the gradual application of the process.
The 1952 Revolution also expanded secular education, and from 1964 to
1974 the government was obliged by law to hire all those with higher
education degrees. The practice led to an overstaffed and ineffective
bureaucracy. The infitah ended this hiring requirement, but by
the mid-1980s unemployment among university graduates was estimated to
be as high as 30 percent.
The 1952 Revolution initiated free health care at public health
facilities. Although these services continued in the early 1990s,
facilities often lacked adequate medical personnel. In addition, a
social security program was begun in the 1960s.
The 1952 Revolution had given priority to economic development and
had made the state the prime economic agent of Arab socialism. The
National Charter of 1962 clearly spelled out the state's role. The role
of the private sector, however, was considerably enlarged by the infitah
after the October 1973 War, and private-sector employees on average
received three times the salaries of government workers. Mubarak
encouraged private investment but funds flowed largely into the service
sector and agriculture rather than into industry, despite government
development plans (1982-86, 1987-91) designed to promote the latter. The
shortage of skilled personnel, especially in the technical and
industrial spheres, also had a major impact on the economy.
Agricultural production had not benefited significantly from the
development process. By 1990, although production had shifted away from
concentration on long-staple cotton to such crops as rice, fruits, and
vegetables, self-sufficiency had fallen below the 1960 level. Only
approximately 3 percent of Egypt's land was suitable for agriculture.
Despite postrevolutionary land reforms, increased mechanization, and
land reclamation programs following the construction of the Aswan High
Dam--a program underway in 1991 involved 300,000 feddans to be
worked jointly with Sudan--Egypt's agricultural output did not keep pace
with population growth. Although pricing reforms and the elimination of
government quotas for most crops helped increase output, production
remained insufficient. Part of the problem was lack of proper drainage
and consequent reduction of optimum yields. In general, a major
challenge facing Egypt was better exploitation of its water resources,
including exploration for new underground water, particularly in the
Western Desert, and improved irrigation technology. Government
development plans also sought to promote generation of electricity and
other energy sources such as oil, gas, and coal as well as to improve
further the transportation network of roads, railroads, and canals and
to update telecommunications.
Egypt's major sources of foreign exchange used for development
projects and for needed imports were oil revenues, Suez Canal tolls,
tourism income, and workers' remittances from the approximately 2.5
million Egyptians working abroad. Added to these were capital grants
from other Arab states after the October 1973 War and, as well, economic
and military grants from the United States and loans from the Paris Club
(the informal name for a consortium of eighteen Western creditor
nations) after the conclusion of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel.
Egypt faced a serious economic situation in the late 1980s and early
1990s: stagnation and ultimately negative economic growth in addition to
heavy indebtedness. After two years of negotiations with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Egyptian government finally
concluded a preliminary agreement in October 1990 that enabled it to
reschedule its US$18 billion debt to Paris Club members. The agreement
required Egypt to increase prices of certain basic commodities such as
gas, fuel oil, gasoline, electricity, flour, and rice by eliminating or
reducing subsidies. Mandated, as well, were the devaluation and
unification of the Central Bank exchange rate and the exchange rate of
commercial banks, raising of the interest rate, and reforming of the
foreign investment law. Egypt also sought to promote privatization of
the industrial public sector--one of the recommendations of the World
Bank--and announced in October 1990 that it would establish nine new
industrial "free zones" to encourage investment and create
more jobs. Some officials recognized that, additionally, the government
needed to restructure management style in the public sector and banking
to encourage greater efficiency and productivity. Another economic
problem facing Egypt was rising inflation, which between 1987 and 1989
had increased between 20 and 25 percent annually. In early 1991,
inflation was estimated to have dropped to 11 percent, but it
nevertheless had a severe impact especially on lower income groups.
Egypt also endeavored to improve its trade and financial situation by
concluding barter agreements that eliminated the need to expend foreign
currency. For example, in August 1990 it reached a five-year agreement
with the Soviet Union that was worth £E5 billion, with other
supplemental agreements to follow.
Egypt's economic situation became particularly critical in 1990
because of the Persian Gulf crisis. In October, before the crisis
developed into a war, the World Bank had calculated that Egypt would
lose US$2.4 billion in remittances from workers in Iraq and Kuwait,
US$500 million from the loss of exports to Iraq and Kuwait, US$500
million from tourism, and US$200 million from Suez Canal tolls. In
addition, Egyptian minister of international cooperation Maurice
Makramallah estimated that Egypt would require a further US$900 million
to meet the needs of Egyptians repatriated from Iraq and Kuwait. In
early April 1991, after the war, Egyptian officials announced that
700,000 Egyptians who had worked in Iraq and Kuwait had returned home
jobless. Estimates of unemployment in early 1991 varied, with some
figures as high as 20 percent, despite the approximate 684,000 visas
issued to Egyptians for work in Saudi Arabia after the Persian Gulf
crisis began.
The estimated costs did not take into account actual war costs of
sending about 38,000 Egyptian armed forces personnel to Saudi Arabia and
provisioning them. Saudi Arabia, which in December promised US$1.5
billion, and Kuwait, together with several European Economic Community
(EEC) member nations, had agreed to contribute to these costs and to the
losses incurred by Egypt's economy, but funds were slow in arriving.
President George Bush of the United States proposed in September that
the United States forgive Egypt its approximately US$7 billion military
debt because of Egypt's help in the Persian Gulf crisis; Congress
subsequently endorsed this proposal. This action relieved Egypt of
annual repayments amounting to more than US$700 million. Other countries
such as Canada, several EEC member states, the Persian Gulf countries
and Saudi Arabia also forgave Egypt's debt obligations. By early
November 1990 the total debt cancellation stood at about US$14 billion.
In subsequent action, Egypt sent a delegation in mid-April 1991 to
the IMF requesting an eighteen-month standby agreement and a loan. When
United States secretary of state James A. Baker III visited Cairo in
March, he had promised that the United States, grateful for Egypt's
support in the war with Iraq, would put in a good word for Egypt with
the IMF. In mid-May the IMF approved the standby agreement and granted
Egypt a US$372 million loan, but imposed certain additional conditions
on the Egyptian economy. The IMF agreement paved the way for Egypt to
obtain favorable terms from the Paris Club for its debt to member
countries. On May 25, it was announced that Egyptian government debts
would be reduced 50 percent and advantageous terms granted on the
remainder. In mid-June the World Bank agreed to an additional US$520
million loan to Egypt.
Meanwhile, with regard to economic development Egypt signed an
agreement at the end of May 1991 with the African Development Bank for a
US$350 million loan to finance part of the Kuraymar power station. This
sum was supplemented by contributions of US$100 million from the Arab
Fund for Social and Economic Development, US$100 million from the World
Bank, and US$10 million from the Islamic Bank for Development. On July
10 the Egypt Consultative Group, consisting of thirty countries and
institutions, pledged US$8 billion in aid to Egypt over the next two
years, more than twice the minimum Egypt had suggested. The World Bank,
which organized the group, stated that the donors had determined on
"massive support" for Egypt's reform program, which it
described as "daring" and "exhaustive." It estimated
that Egypt had lost approximately US$20 billion as a result of the war
in the Persian Gulf.
The endorsement of Egypt's policies represented by the action of this
World Bank-affiliated group was an encouraging sign. In summary,
however, Egypt's prospective economic situation depended upon several
factors: the successful implementation of the IMF agreement, its
capacity to promote itself as an investment and financial center, its
role in the region as well as its position as a partner of the West, and
perhaps most critically, its ability to follow through on necessary
economic reforms.
The role of government was prominent not only in Egypt's economic
life but also in other spheres, such as political parties, parliamentary
organization and elections, the judiciary, and the military. The
Constitution of 1971 validated a mixed
presidential-parliamentary-cabinet system with power concentrated in the
hands of the president, who had extensive opportunities to bestow
patronage, including the appointment of the prime minister, and who
could legislate by decree in emergencies. Whereas the People's Assembly,
the elected lower house, theoretically could exercise a check on the
president, in reality this did not occur, and the assembly had no role
in foreign affairs or defense matters. The upper house, the Consultative
Council, was an advisory body created in 1980 when the Central Committee
of the Arab Socialist Union, then the only legitimate political party,
became the nucleus of the council.
Under Mubarak the People's Assembly acquired greater authority over
minor matters of state and more freedom of debate; assembly committees
also exercised an oversight role with regard to cabinet ministers. The
dominant political party remained the National Democratic Party (NDP),
which had succeeded the ASU, but it was largely an appendage of the
government. The new Electoral Law in 1984 limited opposition seats in
the assembly to parties that obtained at least 8 percent of the vote,
thereby eliminating representation on the part of some of the small
fringe parties. In May 1990, however, Egypt acquired several new
parties: the Green Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, and the Young
Egypt (Misr al Fatah) Party became eligible to run for election. The
Supreme Administrative Court rejected, however, the application for
party status of the Nasserite Party on the ground that its program was
totalitarian. A similar request for party recognition by the Muslim
Brotherhood in January 1990 had been rejected because the body had been
formed on a religious basis.
In May 1990, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the People's
Assembly elected in May 1987 was invalid. It so ruled because a 1986
amendment to the 1972 Electoral Law was judged unconstitutional by
reason of its discrimination against independent candidates through use
of the closed list system of proportional representation, requiring
selection of a single slate. As a result, assembly legislation passed up
to June 2 would stand, but new elections had to be held under the
second- ballot system, in which, if no individual received an absolute
majority, a run-off was held between the top two candidates. Mubarak
adjourned the existing assembly and called a referendum for October 11
on whether the assembly should be dissolved. The referendum resulted in
new assembly elections called for November 29, with nine legal parties
authorized to participate.
In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood and three of the major opposition
parties--the right-of-center New Wafd Party, the left- of-center
Socialist Labor Party, and the centrist Liberal Party-- declined to take
part in the elections. They refused because of amendments to the 1972
Electoral Law forbidding unified lists (the Muslim Brotherhood had
combined with the Socialist Labor Party for election purposes) and
preventing NDP members from changing allegiance. Other reasons for the
abstention of these parties was the government's refusal to lift the
state of emergency or to allow judicial bodies to supervise the
election. As a result, in a very low voter turnout estimated at between
8 and 25 percent of those eligible, the NDP claimed to control 79.6
percent of the new assembly, with independents holding 19 percent and
the left 1.4 percent. The NDP percentage included, however, ninety-five
independents affiliated with the NDP, indicating that party control was
not as strong as it might seem. An internationally known Egyptian
political analyst has said that the 1990 elections showed that local
issues and loyalties counted for more in party politics than political
platforms and that unless the NDP is separated from the government,
Mubarak's desire for reorganization of NDP structure in the interests of
increased democratization cannot occur. The November election was
further clouded by the October 12 assassination by Muslim extremists of
assembly speaker Rafat al Mahjub, constitutionally next in line to the
president.
The Persian Gulf crisis and the ensuing war resulted in quandaries
for various Egyptian parties other than the NDP. For example, divisions
occurred among Islamist groups with some supporting Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait and others backing Iraq. The Muslim Brotherhood decided to end
its alliance with the Socialist Labor Party and seek to gain party
status of its own. The leftist parties also experienced confusion, with
some members of Tagammu supporting each side in the Persian Gulf war.
Evidence of the greater role of constitutionalism was the growing
independence of the judiciary under Mubarak. Judges increasingly
defended the rights of citizens against the state. The Ministry of
Interior, however, often ignored court decrees.
On the foreign affairs front as well, Mubarak followed a policy of
gradualism. He continued the friendly relations with the West
established under Sadat but sought a more independent course for Egypt.
For instance, he improved relations with the Soviet Union and rejected
United States president Ronald Reagan's proposal to take joint military
action against Libya.
A number of events reflected Mubarak's growing confidence in
asserting his personal role and that of Egypt on the Middle East scene.
In September 1989, he proposed ten points to enable direct
Palestinian-Israeli talks on Israeli prime minister Yitzhaq Shamir's
election plan. The points included international observers for the
election, withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the balloting
area, an end to Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank, and the
participation of East Jerusalem residents in the election. The Israeli
Labor Party endorsed the proposals, but the Likud government sharply
opposed them.
Egypt's more prominent role in the international sphere was also
reflected in Mubarak's April 1990 visits to various Asian and European
capitals: Beijing, Pyongyang, Moscow, and London. He focused primarily
on economic matters, seeking debt relief and expanded export markets for
Egypt. His purpose also included a request for political action
condemning Israel's settlement of Soviet Jewish immigrants in the
occupied territories and banning weapons proliferation in the Middle
East.
The major event affecting Egypt's relations with the Arab world and
the broader international sphere was clearly its decision to side with
Saudi Arabia and the United States in opposing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
on August 2, 1990. Earlier Mubarak had sought unsuccessfully to mediate
between Iraq and Kuwait. Egyptians were unsympathetic with Iraq despite
the presence there of nearly 1 million Egyptian workers because of
numerous instances of mistreatment of Egyptians by Iraq and
disenchantment with Saddam Husayn's Baath socialism and his
authoritarian actions. Mubarak's condemnation of Iraq's occupation of
Kuwait, therefore, was initially popular in Egypt; as the crisis
developed into war, however, popular support appeared to wane somewhat
although observers believed Egyptians supported Mubarak's position
approximately three to one.
Even before Iraq invaded Kuwait, its threats to that country began
producing a realignment in the Arab world. In mid-July Syrian president
Hafiz al Assad paid a historic visit to Cairo after thirteen years of
separation between the two nations; both countries shared a concern
about Iraq's growing bellicosity. The visit led to the creation of a
joint ministerial committee to further cooperation in the economic,
industrial, petroleum, energy, agricultural, education, and information
fields. (At the beginning of April 1991, after the war, Mubarak and
Assad met again in Cairo and announced their opposition to breaking up
Iraq.) In mid-October Libyan president Muammar al Qadhafi visited Cairo,
as an aftermath of which a number of cooperation agreements were also
signed.
A further indication of the new alignment was the majority vote in
early September of League of Arab States (Arab League) members to return
Arab League headquarters to Cairo. Egypt had been expelled from the Arab
League in 1979 after signing the peace treaty with Israel. Readmitted to
the Arab League proper in 1989, Egypt had subsequently joined several
League-affiliated bodies such as the Arab Atomic Energy Organization and
the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. The vote
indicated the split in the organization because only twelve of the
twenty-one members, those supporting the condemnation of Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, sent their foreign ministers to the Cairo meeting;
representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, among others, were conspicuously absent.
The rift was underscored by Egypt's announcement of its decision in
mid-September not to participate further in the Arab Cooperation
Council, a primarily economic body formed in 1989 by Egypt, Jordan,
Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen, prior to the May 1990
union of North and South Yemen). In December Mubarak proposed the
creation of a new Arab alliance consisting of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Syria, presumably as a replacement for the Arab Cooperation Council, and
warned pro- Iraqi Sudan that Egypt would act if Iraqi weapons were
transferred there.
Whereas it supported the United States, Egypt's stance in the Persian
Gulf crisis was a moderate one. It advocated the ouster of Iraq from
Kuwait, but in early November 1990, Mubarak sent word to President Bush
that sanctions should be given two to three more months to work before
any military attack on Iraq. In a speech to the joint session of the
People's Assembly and the Consultative Council on January 24, 1991,
Mubarak stated that he had made twenty-six unavailing appeals to Saddam
Husayn and had eventually sent a force of 35,000 Egyptians to Saudi
Arabia in conformity with the provisions of the Arab Mutual Defense Pact
signed in 1950. Also in January, Mubarak sent Minister of Foreign
Affairs Ismat Abdul Majid to Washington with a message indicating, among
other points, that if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, Egypt considered Saddam
Husayn's remaining in power acceptable.
As the war was ending, Mubarak again addressed a joint legislative
session on March 3, 1991. He stated that Egypt was prepared to help
rebuild Iraq as well as Kuwait with Egyptian labor and set forth a
nine-point program, which he described as a "pan-Arab appeal."
The points included that there should be no vengeance, that border
disputes must be settled, that the Middle East must be freed of weapons
of mass destruction, that the Arab- Israeli dispute must be settled, and
that the basis for participation of all Arab citizens in democracy
should be expanded. As time passed, however, Egypt became disillusioned
by the responses of Kuwait, particularly, and, to a lesser extent, Saudi
Arabia to Egypt's offers of manpower assistance. Egypt had agreed to
serve with Syria in a Persian Gulf peacekeeping force proposed by the
six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council, in accordance with the Damascus
Declaration of March 6. Kuwait had made public promises to grant
contracts to Egyptian firms and to hire Egyptian workers for its
reconstruction efforts. It granted minimal awards to Egypt, however, and
implied that Egyptians were fit only for menial labor. In addition,
Kuwait indicated its preference for United States rather than Egyptian
troops on its territory.
Informed observers believed that Mubarak's announcement on April 8
that Egyptian forces would be withdrawn from the Persian Gulf was the
cumulative result of these factors. The United States was shocked by
Mubarak's decision and expressed its displeasure to Kuwait, indicating
that only a minimal number of United States forces would remain in the
area. As a result of United States pressure, Kuwait modified its
position, and Egypt agreed in principle with United States secretary of
defense Richard B. Cheney to send peacekeeping and border patrol troops
to Kuwait. In mid-June the number of such troops remained to be worked
out, but Mubarak's visit to Kuwait on July 18 indicated that relations
between the two countries had improved. Other evidence of improved
Egyptian relations with all Arab states was the unanimous election of
Ismat Abdul Majid as secretary general of the Arab League in May.
In the broader international sphere, Secretary of State Baker paid
several post-Persian Gulf war visits to Cairo in the first half of 1991,
and Egypt was among the first Arab states to indicate its acceptance of
the Baker plan for a twofold approach to Middle East talks. The plan
proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union jointly sponsor an
opening session to be followed by direct negotiations between Israel and
its Arab neighbors. On July 19, in a further step toward easing Middle
East tensions, Mubarak proposed that Israel suspend the expansion of
settlements in the occupied territories, in return for which the Arab
states would end their economic boycott of Israel. Saudi Arabia and
Jordan soon afterward indicated agreement with this proposal.
Mubarak's domestic policy has been summarized as one of limited
liberalization, limited Islamization, and limited repression. These
three factors all impinged on national security, a sphere in which
Mubarak emphasized the maintenance of domestic stability, probably a
more important concern after the 1979 peace treaty with Israel than
external threats. Egypt had a professional officer corps but a shortage
of well trained enlisted personnel, especially noncommissioned officers,
because of the attraction of higher paying civilian employment.
Conscripts, based on the 1955 National Military Service Law, served for
three years in one of the four services: army, navy, air force, or Air
Defense Force, or they might be assigned to the police, prison guard
service, or the military economic service. Until the Persian Gulf crisis
of late 1990-91, the last war in which the armed services had seen
action was the October 1973 War.
Egypt's defense spending was proportionately less than that of most
Middle Eastern countries, but it represented 11 percent of gross
national product (GNP) in 1987, or 32 percent of total government
spending. In addition, Egypt benefited to a substantial degree from
foreign military assistance. From 1955 to 1975, this aid came primarily
from the Soviet Union, with the result that Egypt had much Soviet
military equipment in its inventory. From the signing of the peace
treaty with Israel in 1979 onward, the United States became Egypt's main
military supplier, and the orientation of the armed forces became
Western. Egypt's defense industry was the largest in the Arab world,
producing arms, ammunition, artillery, and other military goods and
assembling aircraft and armored vehicles for domestic use or export to
Third World countries.
With reference to internal security, the military were called out to
join the police and the paramilitary police, the Central Security Forces
(CSF), to suppress dissent when occasions warranted. This occurred
during the 1977 food riots and the 1986 riots by the CSF. The police and
intelligence services kept a watchful eye on rightwing Islamic groups,
of which the Muslim Brotherhood was the chief, but Al Jihad was one of
the most extreme--the organization's leader in Bani Suwayf in Upper
Egypt was killed in a riot in late June 1991. Left-wing factions were
kept under surveillance as well, although the Communist Party of Egypt
had been officially banned since the early 1950s. Former Minister of
Interior General Zaki Badr was responsible for the arrest of as many as
20,000 persons charged with being dissidents during his four-year
tenure; this figure included arrests in April 1989 of 1,500 persons
accused of acts of Muslim extremism against Christian churches and
businesses. Moreover, human rights organizations brought accusations of
torture on a regular basis against Egypt's internal security forces.
Mubarak relieved Badr of his post in early January 1990; his successor,
General Muhammad Abd al Halim Musa, stated that he considered the
opposition to be "part of the mechanism" of government. This
statement encouraged popular hope for a more liberal internal security
policy. Restrictions remained, however, and in September 1990, a group
of Muslim activists and leftists was barred by the government from
traveling to Iraq and Saudi Arabia on a peace mission.
Part of Egypt's internal security concern related to its neighbor to
the south, Sudan, which staged a massive pro-Iraqi demonstration in
Khartoum on January 19, just after the Persian Gulf war began. Egyptian
security forces had been keeping a watchful eye on a number of Sudanese
activists, and 500 of them were rounded up and deported on January 23 as
representing a threat to Egyptian security. Although public
demonstrations have been outlawed in Egypt, about 2,000 Cairo University
students staged an antiwar demonstration on February 24, which Cairo
police broke up with tear gas. No serious injuries were reported.
The government's continuing concern over national security was but
one aspect of the problems posed by the Persian Gulf war. The war had
far-reaching political, economic, and diplomatic implications for
Egypt's future. In mid-July 1991, it remained to be seen whether Egypt
would continue to evolve democratic political institutions, to reform
governmental administrative structures, and to promote economic reforms
designed to further agricultural and industrial development. Also in
question was whether Egypt could resume the position of Arab leadership
it had gained under Nasser, now that Syria's Hafiz al Assad was
reasserting his regional leadership role, and whether the realignment
resulting from the war would work in Egypt's favor.
Egypt - Historical Setting
The emperor ruled as successor to the Ptolemies with the title of
"Pharaoh, Lord of the Two Lands," and the conventional divine
attributes assigned to Egyptian kings were attributed to him. Rome was
careful, however, to bring the native priesthood under its control,
although guaranteeing traditional priestly rights and privileges.
Augustus and his successors continued the tradition of building
temples to the local gods on which the rulers and the gods were depicted
in the Egyptian manner. The Romans completed the construction of an
architectural jewel, the Temple of Isis on Philae Island (Jazirat
Filah), which was begun under the Ptolemies. A new artistic development
during this period was the painting of portraits on wood, an art that
originated in the Fayyum region. These portraits were placed on the
coffins of mummies.
The general pattern of Roman Egypt included a strong, centralized
administration supported by a military force large enough to guarantee
internal order and to provide security against marauding nomads. There
was an elaborate bureaucracy with an extended system of registers and
controls, and a social hierarchy based on caste and privilege with
preferred treatment for the Hellenized population of the towns over the
rural and native Egyptian population. The best land continued to form
the royal domain.
The empire that Rome established was wider, more enduring, and better
administered than any the Mediterranean world had known. For centuries,
it provided an ease of communication and a unity of culture throughout
the empire that would not be seen again until modern times. In Western
Europe, Rome founded a tradition of public order and municipal
government that outlasted the empire itself. In the East, however, where
Rome came into contact with older and more advanced civilizations, Roman
rule was less successful.
The story of Roman Egypt is a sad record of shortsighted exploitation
leading to economic and social decline. Like the Ptolemies, Rome treated
Egypt as a mere estate to be exploited for the benefit of the rulers.
But however incompetently some of the later Ptolemies managed their
estate, much of the wealth they derived from it remained in the country
itself. Rome, however, was an absentee landlord, and a large part of the
grain delivered as rent by the royal tenants or as tax by the landowners
as well as the numerous money-taxes were sent to Rome and represented a
complete loss to Egypt.
The history of Egypt in this period cannot be separated from the
history of the Roman Empire. Thus, Egypt was affected by the spread of
Christianity in the empire in the first century A.D. and by the decline
of the empire during the third century A.D. Christianity arrived early
in Egypt, and the new religion quickly spread from Alexandria into the
hinterland, reaching Upper Egypt by the second century. According to
some Christian traditions, St. Mark brought Christianity to Egypt in
A.D. 37, and the church in Alexandria was founded in A.D. 40. The
Egyptian Christians are called Copts, a word derived from the Greek word
for the country, Aegyptos. In the Coptic language, the Copts
also called themselves "people of Egypt." Thus the word Copt
originally implied nationality rather than religion.
In the third century A.D., the decay of the empire gradually affected
the Roman administration of Egypt. Roman bureaucracy became
overcentralized and poorly managed. The number of qualified applicants
for administrative positions was seriously reduced by Roman civil war,
pestilence, and conflict among claimants to imperial power.
A renaissance of imperial authority and effectiveness took place
under Emperor Diocletian. During his reign (284-305), the partition of
the Roman Empire into eastern and western segments began. Diocletian
inaugurated drastic political and fiscal reforms and sought to simplify
imperial administration. Under Diocletian, the administrative unity of
Egypt was destroyed by transforming Egypt from one province into three.
Seeing Christianity as a threat to Roman state religion and thus to the
unity of the empire, Diocletian launched a violent persecution of
Christians.
The Egyptian church was particularly affected by the Roman
persecutions, beginning with Septimius Severus's edict of 202 dissolving
the influential Christian School of Alexandria and forbidding future
conversions to Christianity. In 303 Emperor Diocletian issued a decree
ordering all churches demolished, all sacred books burned, and all
Christians who were not officials made slaves. The decree was carried
out for three years, a period known as the "Era of Martyrs."
The lives of many Egyptian Christians were spared only because more
workers were needed in the porphyry quarries and emerald mines that were
worked by Egyptian Christians as "convict labor."
Emperor Constantine I (324-337) ruled both the eastern and western
parts of the empire. In 330 he established his capital at Byzantium,
which he renamed Constantinople (present-day Istanbul). Egypt was
governed from Constantinople as part of the Byzantine Empire. In 312
Constantine established Christianity as the official religion of the
empire, and his Edict of Milan of 313 established freedom of worship.
By the middle of the fourth century, Egypt was largely a Christian
country. In 324 the ecumenical Council of Nicea established the
patriarchate of Alexandria as second only to that of Rome; its
jurisdiction extended over Egypt and Libya. The patriarchate had a
profound influence on the early development of the Christian church
because it helped to clarify belief and to formulate dogmas. In 333 the
number of Egyptian bishops was estimated at nearly 100.
After the fall of Rome, the Byzantine Empire became the center of
both political and religious power. The political and religious conflict
between the Copts of Egypt and the rulers of Byzantium began when the
patriarchate of Constantinople began to rival that of Alexandria. The
Council of Chalcedon in 451 initiated the great schism that separated
the Egyptian Church from Catholic Christendom. The schism had momentous
consequences for the future of Christianity in the East and for
Byzantine power. Ostensibly, the council was called to decide on the
nature of Christ. If Christ were both God and man, had he two natures?
The Arians had already been declared heretics for denying or minimizing
the divinity of Christ; the opposite was to ignore or minimize his
humanity. Coptic Christians were Monophysites who believed that after
the incarnation Christ had but one nature with dual aspects. The
council, however, declared that Christ had two natures and that he was
equally human and equally divine. The Coptic Church refused to accept
the council's decree and rejected the bishop sent to Egypt. Henceforth,
the Coptic Church was in schism from the Catholic Church as represented
by the Byzantine Empire and the Byzantine Church.
For nearly two centuries, Monophysitism in Egypt became the symbol of
national and religious resistance to Byzantium's political and religious
authority. The Egyptian Church was severely persecuted by Byzantium.
Churches were closed, and Coptic Christians were killed, tortured, and
exiled in an effort to force the Egyptian Church to accept Byzantine
orthodoxy. The Coptic Church continued to appoint its own patriarchs,
refusing to accept those chosen by Constantinople and attempting to
depose them. The break with Catholicism in the fifth century converted
the Coptic Church to a national church with deeply rooted traditions
that have remained unchanged to this day.
By the seventh century, the religious persecutions and the growing
pressure of taxation had engendered great hatred of the Byzantines. As a
result, the Egyptians offered little resistance to the conquering armies
of Islam.
A new era began in Egypt with the arrival in Al Fustat in 868 of
Ahmad ibn Tulun as governor on behalf of his stepfather, Bayakbah, a
chamberlain in Baghdad to whom Caliph Al Mutazz had granted Egypt as a
fief. Ahmad ibn Tulun inaugurated the autonomy of Egypt and, with the
succession of his son, Khumarawayh, to power, established the principle
of locally based hereditary rule. Autonomy greatly benefited Egypt
because the local dynasty halted or reduced the drain of revenue from
the country to Baghdad. The Tulinid state ended in 905 when imperial
troops entered Al Fustat. For the next thirty years, Egypt was again
under the direct control of the central government in Baghdad.
The next autonomous dynasty in Egypt, the Ikhshidid, was founded by
Muhammad ibn Tughj, who arrived as governor in 935. The dynasty's name
comes from the title of Ikhshid given to Tughj by the caliph. This
dynasty ruled Egypt until the Fatimid conquest of 969.
The Tulinids and the Ikhshidids brought Egypt peace and prosperity by
pursuing wise agrarian policies that increased yields, by eliminating
tax abuses, and by reforming the administration. Neither the Tulinids
nor the Ikhshidids sought to withdraw Egypt from the Islamic empire
headed by the caliph in Baghdad. Ahmad ibn Tulun and his successors were
orthodox Sunni Muslims, loyal to the principle of Islamic unity. Their
purpose was to carve out an autonomous and hereditary principality under
loose caliphal authority.
The Fatimids, the next dynasty to rule Egypt, unlike the Tulinids and
the Ikhshidids, wanted independence, not autonomy, from Baghdad. In
addition, as heads of a great religious movement, the Ismaili
Shia Islam, they also challenged the Sunni Abbasids
for the caliphate itself. The name of the dynasty is derived from
Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad and the wife of Ali, the
fourth caliph and the founder of Shia Islam. The leader of the movement,
who first established the dynasty in Tunisia in 906, claimed descent
from Fatima.
Under the Fatimids, Egypt became the center of a vast empire, which
at its peak comprised North Africa, Sicily, Palestine, Syria, the Red
Sea coast of Africa, Yemen, and the Hijaz in Arabia, including the holy
cities of Mecca and Medina. Control of the holy cities conferred
enormous prestige on a Muslim sovereign and the power to use the yearly
pilgrimage to Mecca to his advantage. Cairo was the seat of the Shia
caliph, who was the head of a religion as well as the sovereign of an
empire. The Fatimids established Al Azhar in Cairo as an intellectual
center where scholars and teachers elaborated the doctrines of the
Ismaili Shia faith.
The first century of Fatimid rule represents a high point for
medieval Egypt. The administration was reorganized and expanded. It
functioned with admirable efficiency: tax farming was abolished, and
strict probity and regularity in the assessment and collection of taxes
was enforced. The revenues of Egypt were high and were then augmented by
the tribute of subject provinces. This period was also an age of great
commercial expansion and industrial production. The Fatimids fostered
both agriculture and industry and developed an important export trade.
Realizing the importance of trade both for the prosperity of Egypt and
for the extension of Fatimid influence, the Fatimids developed a wide
network of commercial relations, notably with Europe and India, two
areas with which Egypt had previously had almost no contact.
Egyptian ships sailed to Sicily and Spain. Egyptian fleets controlled
the eastern Mediterranean, and the Fatimids established close relations
with the Italian city states, particularly Amalfi and Pisa. The two
great harbors of Alexandria in Egypt and Tripoli in present-day Lebanon
became centers of world trade. In the east, the Fatimids gradually
extended their sovereignty over the ports and outlets of the Red Sea for
trade with India and Southeast Asia and tried to win influence on the
shores of the Indian Ocean. In lands far beyond the reach of Fatimid
arms, the Ismaili missionary and the Egyptian merchant went
side-by-side.
In the end, however, the Fatimid bid for world power failed. A
weakened and shrunken empire was unable to resist the crusaders, who in
July 1099 captured Jerusalem from the Fatimid garrison after a siege of
five weeks.
The crusaders were driven from Jerusalem and most of Palestine by the
great Kurdish general Salah ad Din ibn Ayyub, known in the West as
Saladin. Saladin came to Egypt in 1168 in the entourage of his uncle,
the Kurdish general Shirkuh, who became the wazir, or senior
minister, of the last Fatimid caliph. After the death of his uncle,
Saladin became the master of Egypt. The dynasty he founded in Egypt,
called the Ayyubid, ruled until 1260.
Saladin abolished the Fatimid caliphate, which by this time was dead
as a religious force, and returned Egypt to Sunni orthodoxy. He restored
and tightened the bonds that tied Egypt to eastern Islam and
reincorporated Egypt into the Sunni fold represented by the Abbasid
caliphate in Baghdad. At the same time, Egypt was opened to the new
social changes and intellectual movements that had been emerging in the
East. Saladin introduced into Egypt the madrasah, a
mosque-college, which was the intellectual heart of the Sunni religious
revival. Even Al Azhar, founded by the Fatimids, became in time the
center of Islamic orthodoxy.
In 1193 Saladin died peacefully in Damascus. After his death, his
dominions split up into a loose dynastic empire controlled by members of
his family, the Ayyubids. Within this empire, the Ayyubid sultans of
Egypt were paramount because their control of a rich, well-defined
territory gave them a secure basis of power. Economically, the Ayyubid
period was one of growth and prosperity. Italian, French, and Catalan
merchants operated in ports under Ayyubid control. Egyptian products,
including alum, for which there was a great demand, were exported to
Europe. Egypt also profited from the transit trade from the East. Like
the Fatimids before him, Saladin brought Yemen under his control, thus
securing both ends of the Red Sea and an important commercial and
strategic advantage.
Culturally, too, the Ayyubid period was one of great activity. Egypt
became a center of Arab scholarship and literature and, along with
Syria, acquired a cultural primacy that it has retained through the
modern period. The prosperity of the cities, the patronage of the
Ayyubid princes, and the Sunni revival made the Ayyubid period a
cultural high point in Egyptian and Arab history.
Egypt - The Mamluks, 1250-1517
After the French left Egypt, an Ottoman army remained in the country.
The Ottoman government was determined to prevent a revival of Mamluk
power and autonomy and to bring Egypt under the control of the central
government. The Ottomans appointed Khusraw Pasha as viceroy. Hostilities
occasionally broke out between his forces and those of the Mamluks who
had established themselves in Upper Egypt.
By 1803 it was apparent that a third party had emerged in the
struggle for power in Egypt. This was the Albanian contingent of Ottoman
forces that had come in 1801 to fight against the French. Muhammad Ali,
who had arrived in Egypt as a junior commander in the Albanian forces,
had by 1803 risen to commander. In just two short years, he would become
the Ottoman viceroy in Egypt.
Muhammad Ali, who has been called the "father of modern
Egypt," was able to attain control of Egypt because of his own
leadership abilities and political shrewdness but also because the
country seemed to be slipping into anarchy. The urban notables and the
ulama believed that Muhammad Ali was the only leader capable of bringing
order and security to the country. The Ottoman government, however,
aware of the threat Muhammad Ali represented to the central authority,
attempted to get rid of him by making him governor of the Hijaz.
Eventually, the Ottomans capitulated to Egyptian pressure, and in June
1805, they appointed Muhammad Ali governor of Egypt.
Between 1805 and 1811, Muhammad Ali consolidated his position in
Egypt by defeating the Mamluks and bringing Upper Egypt under his
control. Finally, in March 1811, Muhammad Ali had sixty-four Mamluks,
including twenty-four beys, assassinated in the citadel. From then on,
Muhammad Ali was the sole ruler of Egypt. Muhammad Ali represented the
successful continuation of policies begun by the Mamluk Ali Bey al
Kabir. Like Ali Bey, Muhammad Ali had great ambitions. He, too, wanted
to detach Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, and he realized that to do so
Egypt had to be strong economically and militarily.
Muhammad Ali's development strategy was based on agriculture. He
expanded the area under cultivation and planted crops specifically for
export, such as long-staple cotton, rice, indigo, and sugarcane. The
surplus income from agricultural production was used for public works,
such as irrigation, canals, dams, and barrages, and to finance
industrial development and the military. The development plans hinged on
the state's gaining a monopoly over the country's agricultural
resources. In practical terms, this meant the peasants were told what
crops to plant, in what quantity, and over what area. The government
bought directly from the peasants and sold directly to the buyer,
cutting out the intermediaries or merchants.
Muhammad Ali was also committed to the industrial development of
Egypt. The government set up modern factories for weaving cotton, jute,
silk, and wool. Workers were drafted into factories to weave on
government looms. Factories for sugar, indigo, glass, and tanning were
set up with the assistance of foreign advisers and imported machinery.
Industries employed about 4 percent of the population, or between
180,000 and 200,000 persons fifteen years of age and over. The textile
industry was protected by embargoes imposed by the government to
prohibit the import of the cheap British textiles that had flooded the
Egyptian market. Commercial activities were geared toward the
establishment of foreign trade monopolies and an attempt to acquire a
favorable balance of trade.
The historian Marsot has argued that Britain became determined to
check Muhammad Ali because a strong Egypt represented a threat to
Britain's economic and strategic interests. Economically, British
interests would be served as long as Egypt continued to produce raw
cotton for the textile mills of Lancashire and to import finished goods
from Britain. Thus, the British and also the French were particularly
angered by the Egyptian monopolies even though Britain and France
engaged in such trade practices as high tariffs and embargoes to protect
their own economies. Strategically, Britain wanted to maintain access to
the overland route through Egypt to India, a vital link in the line of
imperial communications. Britain was worried not only about the
establishment of a united, militarily strong state straddling the
eastern Mediterranean but also about Muhammad Ali's close ties to
France.
It was at this time that Lord Palmerston, the British minister of
foreign affairs, established the British policy, which lasted until the
outbreak of World War I, of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire. Britain preferred a weakened but intact Ottoman Empire that
would grant it the strategic and commercial advantages it needed to
maintain its influence in the region. Thus, Muhammad Ali's invasion of
Syria in 1831 and his attempt to break away from the Ottoman Empire
jeopardized British policy and its military and commercial interests in
the Middle East and India. The Egyptian invasion of Syria was provoked
ostensibly by the sultan's refusal to give Syria and Morea
(Peloponnesus) to Muhammad Ali in return for his assistance in opposing
the Greek war for independence in the late 1820s. This resulted in
Turkey and Egypt being forced out of the eastern Mediterranean by the
destruction of their combined naval strength at Navarino on the southern
coast of Greece.
When Egyptian forces invaded and occupied Syria and came within sight
of Istanbul, the great powers (Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and
Prussia) allied themselves with the Ottoman government to drive the
Egyptian forces out of Syria. A British fleet bombarded Beirut in
September 1840, and an Anglo-Turkish force landed, causing uprisings
against the Egyptian forces. Acre fell in November, and a British naval
force anchored off Alexandria. The Egyptian army was forced to retreat
to Egypt, and Muhammad Ali was obliged to accede to British demands.
According to the Treaty of 1841, Muhammad Ali was stripped of all the
conquered territory except Sudan but was granted the hereditary
governorship of Egypt for life, with succession going to the eldest male
in the family. Muhammad Ali was also compelled to agree to the
Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1838, which established "free
trade" in Egypt. This meant that Muhammad Ali was forced to abandon
his monopolies and establish new tariffs that were favorable to imports.
Thus, Egypt was unable to control the flood of cheap manufactured
imports that decimated local industries.
Muhammad Ali continued to rule Egypt after his defeat in Syria. He
became increasingly senile toward the end of his rule and his eldest
son, Ibrahim, petitioned the Ottoman government to be appointed governor
because of his father's inability to rule. Ibrahim was gravely ill of
tuberculosis, however, and ruled for only six months, from July to
November 1848. Muhammad Ali died in August 1849.
Egypt - Abbas Hilmi I, 1848-54 and Said, 1854-63