MODERN-DAY ALGERIA is a leading member state of the Arab Maghrib, the
term applied to the western part of Arab North Africa. Algeria is
inhabited predominantly by Muslim Arabs but it has a large Berber
minority. The most significant forces in the country's history have been
the spread of Islam, arabization, colonization, and the struggle for
independence.
North Africa served as a transit region for peoples moving toward
Europe or the Middle East. Thus, the region's inhabitants have been
influenced by populations from other areas. Out of this mix developed
the Berber people, whose language and culture, although pushed from
coastal areas by conquering and colonizing Carthaginians, Romans, and
Byzantines, dominated most of the land until the spread of Islam and the
coming of the Arabs.
The introduction of Islam and Arabic had a profound impact on North
Africa (or the Maghrib) beginning in the seventh century. The new religion and
language introduced changes in social and economic relations,
established links with a rich culture, and provided a powerful idiom of
political discourse and organization. From the great Berber dynasties of
the Almoravids and Almohads to the militants seeking an Islamic state in
the early 1990s, the call to return to true Islamic values and practices
has had social resonance and political power. For 300 years, beginning
in the early sixteenth century, Algeria was a province of the Ottoman
Empire under a regency that had Algiers as its capital. During this
period, the modern Algerian state began to emerge as a distinct
territory between Tunisia and Morocco.
The French occupation of Algeria, beginning in 1830, had a profound
impact. In addition to enduring the affront of being ruled by a foreign,
non-Muslim power, many Algerians lost their lands to the new government
or to colonists. Traditional leaders were eliminated, coopted, or made
irrelevant; social structures were stressed to the breaking point.
Viewed by the Europeans with condescension at best and contempt at
worst--never as equals--the Algerians endured 132 years of colonial
subjugation. Nonetheless, this period saw the formation of new social
classes, which, after exposure to ideas of equality and political
liberty, would help propel the country to independence. During the years
of French domination, the struggles to survive, to co-exist, to gain
equality, and to achieve independence shaped a large part of the
Algerian national identity.
The War of Independence (1954-62), brutal and long, was the most
recent major turning point in the country's history. Although often
fratricidal, it ultimately united Algerians and seared the value of
independence and the philosophy of anticolonialism into the national
consciousness. Since independence in 1962, Algeria has sought to create
political structures that reflect the unique character of the country
and that can cope with the daunting challenges of rebuilding a society
and an economy that had been subject to years of trauma and painful
transformation.
Algeria - PREHISTORY OF CENTRAL NORTH AFRICA
The cave paintings found at Tassili-n-Ajjer, north of Tamanrasset,
and at other locations depict vibrant and vivid scenes of everyday life
in the central Maghrib between about 8000 B.C. and 4000 B.C. They were
executed by a hunting people in the Capsian period of the Neolithic age
who lived in a savanna region teeming with giant buffalo, elephant,
rhinoceros, and hippopotamus, animals that no longer exist in the
now-desert area. The pictures provide the most complete record of a
prehistoric African culture.
Earlier inhabitants of the central Maghrib have left behind equally
significant remains. Early remnants of hominid occupation in North
Africa, for example, were found in Ain el Hanech, near Saïda (ca.
200,000 B.C.). Later, Neanderthal tool makers produced hand axes in the
Levalloisian and Mousterian styles (ca. 43,000 B.C.) similar to those in
the Levant. According to some sources, North Africa was the site of the
highest state of development of Middle Paleolithic flake-tool
techniques. Tools of this era, starting about 30,000 B.C., are called
Aterian (after the site Bir el Ater, south of Annaba) and are marked by
a high standard of workmanship, great variety, and specialization.
The earliest blade industries in North Africa are called
Ibero-Maurusian or Oranian (after a site near Oran). The industry
appears to have spread throughout the coastal regions of the Maghrib
between 15,000 and 10,000 B.C. Between about 9000 and 5000 B.C., the
Capsian culture began influencing the IberoMaurusian , and after about
3000 B.C. the remains of just one human type can be found throughout the
region. Neolithic civilization (marked by animal domestication and
subsistence agriculture) developed in the Saharan and Mediterranean
Maghrib between 6000 and 2000 B.C. This type of economy, so richly
depicted in the Tassili-n-Ajjer cave paintings, predominated in the
Maghrib until the classical period.
The amalgam of peoples of North Africa coalesced eventually into a
distinct native population that came to be called Berbers. Distinguished
primarily by cultural and linguistic attributes, the Berbers lacked a
written language and hence tended to be overlooked or marginalized in
historical accounts. Roman, Greek, Byzantine, and Arab Muslim
chroniclers typically depicted the Berbers as "barbaric"
enemies, troublesome nomads, or ignorant peasants. They were, however,
to play a major role in the area's history.
Algeria - NORTH AFRICA DURING THE CLASSICAL PERIOD
Increases in urbanization and in the area under cultivation during
Roman rule caused wholesale dislocations of Berber society. Nomadic
tribes were forced to settle or move from traditional rangelands.
Sedentary tribes lost their autonomy and connection with the land.
Berber opposition to the Roman presence was nearly constant. The Roman
emperor Trajan (r. A.D. 98-117) established a frontier in the south by
encircling the Aurès and Nemencha mountains and building a line of
forts from Vescera (modern Biskra) to Ad Majores (Hennchir Besseriani,
southeast of Biskra). The defensive line extended at least as far as
Castellum Dimmidi (modern Messaad, southwest of Biskra), Roman Algeria's
southernmost fort. Romans settled and developed the area around Sitifis
(modern Sétif) in the second century, but farther west the influence of
Rome did not extend beyond the coast and principal military roads until
much later.
The Roman military presence in North Africa was relatively small,
consisting of about 28,000 troops and auxiliaries in Numidia and the two
Mauretanian provinces. Starting in the second century A.D., these
garrisons were manned mostly by local inhabitants.
Aside from Carthage, urbanization in North Africa came in part with
the establishment of settlements of veterans under the Roman emperors
Claudius (r. A.D. 41-54), Nerva (r. A.D. 96-98), and Trajan. In Algeria
such settlements included Tipasa, Cuicul (modern Djemila, northeast of Sétif),
Thamugadi (modern Timgad, southeast of Sétif), and Sitifis. The
prosperity of most towns depended on agriculture. Called the
"granary of the empire," North Africa, according to one
estimate, produced 1 million tons of cereals each year, one-quarter of
which was exported. Other crops included fruit, figs, grapes, and beans.
By the second century A.D., olive oil rivaled cereals as an export item.
The beginnings of the decline of the Roman Empire were less serious
in North Africa than elsewhere. There were uprisings, however. In A.D.
238, landowners rebelled unsuccessfully against the emperor's fiscal
policies. Sporadic tribal revolts in the Mauretanian mountains followed
from 253 to 288. The towns also suffered economic difficulties, and
building activity almost ceased.
The towns of Roman North Africa had a substantial Jewish population.
Some Jews were deported from Palestine in the first and second centuries
A.D. for rebelling against Roman rule; others had come earlier with
Punic settlers. In addition, a number of Berber tribes had converted to
Judaism.
Christianity arrived in the second century and soon gained converts
in the towns and among slaves. More than eighty bishops, some from
distant frontier regions of Numidia, attended the Council of Carthage in
256. By the end of the fourth century, the settled areas had become
Christianized, and some Berber tribes had converted en masse.
A division in the church that came to be known as the Donatist
controversy began in 313 among Christians in North Africa. The Donatists
stressed the holiness of the church and refused to accept the authority
to administer the sacraments of those who had surrendered the scriptures
when they were forbidden under the Emperor Diocletaian (r. 284-305). The
Donatists also opposed the involvement of Emperor Constantine (r.
306-37) in church affairs in contrast to the majority of Christians who
welcomed official imperial recognition.
The occasionally violent controversy has been characterized as a
struggle between opponents and supporters of the Roman system. The most
articulate North African critic of the Donatist position, which came to
be called a heresy, was Augustine, bishop of Hippo Regius. Augustine
(354-430) maintained that the unworthiness of a minister did not affect
the validity of the sacraments because their true minister was Christ.
In his sermons and books Augustine, who is considered a leading exponent
of Christian truths, evolved a theory of the right of orthodox Christian
rulers to use force against schismatics and heretics. Although the
dispute was resolved by a decision of an imperial commission in Carthage
in 411, Donatist communities continued to exist through the sixth
century.
Algeria - Vandals and Byzantines
Unlike the invasions of previous religions and cultures, the coming
of Islam, which was spread by Arabs, was to have pervasive and
longlasting effects on the Maghrib. The new faith, in its various forms,
would penetrate nearly all segments of society, bringing with it armies,
learned men, and fervent mystics, and in large part replacing tribal
practices and loyalties with new social norms and political idioms.
Nonetheless, the Islamization and arabization of the region were
complicated and lengthy processes. Whereas nomadic Berbers were quick to
convert and assist the Arab invaders, not until the twelfth century
under the Almohad Dynasty did the Christian and Jewish communities
become totally marginalized.
The first Arab military expeditions into the Maghrib, between 642 and
669, resulted in the spread of Islam. These early forays from a base in
Egypt occurred under local initiative rather than under orders from the
central caliphate. When the seat of the caliphate moved from Medina to
Damascus, however, the Umayyads (a Muslim dynasty ruling from 661 to
750) recognized that the strategic necessity of dominating the
Mediterranean dictated a concerted military effort on the North African
front. In 670, therefore, an Arab army under Uqba ibn Nafi established
the town of Al Qayrawan about 160 kilometers south of present-day Tunis
and used it as a base for further operations.
Abu al Muhajir Dina, Uqba's successor, pushed westward into Algeria
and eventually worked out a modus vivendi with Kusayla, the ruler of an
extensive confederation of Christian Berbers. Kusayla, who had been
based in Tilimsan (Tlemcen), became a Muslim and moved his headquarters
to Takirwan, near Al Qayrawan.
This harmony was short-lived, however. Arab and Berber forces
controlled the region in turn until 697. By 711 Umayyad forces helped by
Berber converts to Islam had conquered all of North Africa. Governors
appointed by the Umayyad caliphs ruled from Al Qayrawan, the new wilaya
(province) of Ifriqiya, which covered Tripolitania (the western part of
present-day Libya), Tunisia, and eastern Algeria.
Paradoxically, the spread of Islam among the Berbers did not
guarantee their support for the Arab-dominated caliphate. The ruling
Arabs alienated the Berbers by taxing them heavily; treating converts as
second-class Muslims; and, at worst, by enslaving them. As a result,
widespread opposition took the form of open revolt in 739-40 under the
banner of Kharijite Islam. The Kharijites objected to Ali, the fourth
caliph, making peace with the Umayyads in 657 and left Ali's camp
(khariji means "those who leave"). The Kharijites had been
fighting Umayyad rule in the East, and many Berbers were attracted by
the sect's egalitarian precepts. For example, according to Kharijism,
any suitable Muslim candidate could be elected caliph without regard to
race, station, or descent from the Prophet Muhammad.
After the revolt, Kharijites established a number of theocratic
tribal kingdoms, most of which had short and troubled histories. Others,
however, like Sijilmasa and Tilimsan, which straddled the principal
trade routes, proved more viable and prospered. In 750 the Abbasids, who
succeeded the Umayyads as Muslim rulers, moved the caliphate to Baghdad
and reestablished caliphal authority in Ifriqiya, appointing Ibrahim ibn
Al Aghlab as governor in Al Qayrawan. Although nominally serving at the
caliph's pleasure, Al Aghlab and his successors ruled independently
until 909, presiding over a court that became a center for learning and
culture.
Just to the west of Aghlabid lands, Abd ar Rahman ibn Rustum ruled
most of the central Maghrib from Tahirt, southwest of Algiers. The
rulers of the Rustumid imamate, which lasted from 761 to 909, each an Ibadi
Kharijite imam, were elected by leading citizens. The imams gained a
reputation for honesty, piety, and justice. The court at Tahirt was
noted for its support of scholarship in mathematics, astronomy, and
astrology, as well as theology and law. The Rustumid imams, however,
failed, by choice or by neglect, to organize a reliable standing army.
This important factor, accompanied by the dynasty's eventual collapse
into decadence, opened the way for Tahirt's demise under the assault of
the Fatimids.
Algeria - Fatimids
In the closing decades of the ninth century, missionaries of the
Ismaili sect of Shia Islam converted the Kutama Berbers of what was later
known as the Petite Kabylie region and led them in battle against the Sunni
rulers of Ifriqiya. Al Qayrawan fell to them in 909. The
Ismaili imam, Ubaydallah, declared himself caliph and established Mahdia
as his capital. Ubaydallah initiated the Fatimid Dynasty, named after
Fatima, daughter of Muhammad and wife of Ali, from whom the caliph
claimed descent.
The Fatimids turned westward in 911, destroying the imamate of Tahirt
and conquering Sijilmasa in Morocco. Ibadi Kharijite refugees from
Tahirt fled south to the oasis at Ouargla beyond the Atlas Mountains,
whence in the eleventh century they moved southwest to Oued Mzab.
Maintaining their cohesion and beliefs over the centuries, Ibadi
religious leaders have dominated public life in the region to this day.
For many years, the Fatimids posed a threat to Morocco, but their
deepest ambition was to rule the East, the Mashriq, which included Egypt
and Muslim lands beyond. By 969 they had conquered Egypt. In 972 the
Fatimid ruler Al Muizz established the new city of Cairo as his capital.
The Fatimids left the rule of Ifriqiya and most of Algeria to the Zirids
(972-1148). This Berber dynasty, which had founded the towns of Miliana,
Médéa, and Algiers and centered significant local power in Algeria for
the first time, turned over its domain west of Ifriqiya to the Banu
Hammad branch of its family. The Hammadids ruled from 1011 to 1151,
during which time Bejaïa became the most important port in the Maghrib.
This period was marked by constant conflict, political instability,
and economic decline. The Hammadids, by rejecting the Ismaili doctrine
for Sunni orthodoxy and renouncing submission to the Fatimids, initiated
chronic conflict with the Zirids. Two great Berber confederations--the
Sanhaja and the Zenata--engaged in an epic struggle. The fiercely brave,
camelborne nomads of the western desert and steppe as well as the
sedentary farmers of the Kabylie to the east swore allegiance to the
Sanhaja. Their traditional enemies, the Zenata, were tough, resourceful
horsemen from the cold plateau of the northern interior of Morocco and
the western Tell in Algeria.
In addition, raiders from Genoa, Pisa, and Norman Sicily attacked
ports and disrupted coastal trade. Trans-Saharan trade shifted to
Fatimid Egypt and to routes in the west leading to Spanish markets. The
countryside was being overtaxed by growing cities.
Contributing to these political and economic dislocations was a large
incursion of Arab beduin from Egypt starting in the first half of the
eleventh century. Part of this movement was an invasion by the Banu
Hilal and Banu Sulaym tribes, apparently sent by the Fatimids to weaken
the Zirids. These Arab beduin overcame the Zirids and Hammadids and in
1057 sacked Al Qayrawan. They sent farmers fleeing from the fertile
plains to the mountains and left cities and towns in ruin.
For the first time, the extensive use of Arabic spread to the
countryside. Sedentary Berbers who sought protection from the Hilalians
were gradually arabized.
Algeria - Almoravids
Like the Almoravids, the Almohads found their initial inspiration in
Islamic reform. Their spiritual leader, the Moroccan Muhammad ibn
Abdallah ibn Tumart, sought to reform Almoravid decadence. Rejected in
Marrakech and other cities, he turned to his Masmuda tribe in the Atlas
Mountains for support. Because of their emphasis on the unity of God,
his followers were known as Al Muwahhidun (unitarians, or Almohads).
Although declaring himself mahdi, imam, and masum
(infallible leader sent by God), Muhammad ibn Abdallah ibn Tumart
consulted with a council of ten of his oldest disciples. Influenced by
the Berber tradition of representative government, he later added an
assembly composed of fifty leaders from various tribes. The Almohad
rebellion began in 1125 with attacks on Moroccan cities, including Sus
and Marrakech.
Upon Muhammad ibn Abdallah ibn Tumart's death in 1130, his successor
Abd al Mumin took the title of caliph and placed members of his own
family in power, converting the system into a traditional monarchy. The
Almohads entered Spain at the invitation of the Andalusian amirs, who
had risen against the Almoravids there. Abd al Mumin forced the
submission of the amirs and reestablished the caliphate of Córdoba,
giving the Almohad sultan supreme religious as well as political
authority within his domains. The Almohads took control of Morocco in
1146, captured Algiers around 1151, and by 1160 had completed the
conquest of the central Maghrib and advanced to Tripolitania.
Nonetheless, pockets of Almoravid resistance continued to hold out in
the Kabylie for at least fifty years.
After Abd al Mumin's death in 1163, his son Abu Yaqub Yusuf (r.
1163-84) and grandson Yaqub al Mansur (r. 1184-99) presided over the
zenith of Almohad power. For the first time, the Maghrib was united
under a local regime, and although the empire was troubled by conflict
on its fringes, handcrafts and agriculture flourished at its center and
an efficient bureaucracy filled the tax coffers. In 1229 the Almohad
court renounced the teachings of Muhammad ibn Tumart, opting instead for
greater tolerance and a return to the Maliki school of law. As evidence of this change, the Almohads
hosted two of the greatest thinkers of Andalus: Abu Bakr ibn Tufayl and
Ibn Rushd (Averroes).
The Almohads shared the crusading instincts of their Castilian
adversaries, but the continuing wars in Spain overtaxed their resources.
In the Maghrib, the Almohad position was compromised by factional strife
and was challenged by a renewal of tribal warfare. The Bani Merin
(Zenata Berbers) took advantage of declining Almohad power to establish
a tribal state in Morocco, initiating nearly sixty years of warfare
there that concluded with their capture of Marrakech, the last Almohad
stronghold, in 1271. Despite repeated efforts to subjugate the central
Maghrib, however, the Merinids were never able to restore the frontiers
of the Almohad Empire.
Algeria - Zayanids
At about the time Spain was establishing its presidios in the
Maghrib, the Muslim privateer brothers Aruj and Khair ad Din--the latter
known to Europeans as Barbarossa, or Red Beard--were operating
successfully off Tunisia under the Hafsids. In 1516 Aruj moved his base
of operations to Algiers, but was killed in 1518 during his invasion of
Tlemcen. Khair ad Din succeeded him as military commander of Algiers.
The Ottoman sultan gave him the title of beylerbey (provincial
governor) and a contingent of some 2,000 janissaries, well-armed Ottoman
soldiers. With the aid of this force, Khair ad Din subdued the coastal
region between Constantine and Oran (although the city of Oran remained
in Spanish hands until 1791). Under Khair ad Din's regency, Algiers
became the center of Ottoman authority in the Maghrib, from which Tunis,
Tripoli, and Tlemcen would be overcome and Morocco's independence would
be threatened.
So successful was Khair ad Din at Algiers that he was recalled to
Constantinople in 1533 by the sultan, Süleyman I (r. 1520-66), known in
Europe as Süleyman the Magnificent, and appointed admiral of the
Ottoman fleet. The next year he mounted a successful seaborne assault on
Tunis.
The next beylerbey was Khair ad Din's son Hassan, who
assumed the position in 1544. Until 1587 the area was governed by
officers who served terms with no fixed limits. Subsequently, with the
institution of a regular Ottoman administration, governors with the
title of pasha ruled for three-year terms. Turkish was the
official language, and Arabs and Berbers were excluded from government
posts.
The pasha was assisted by janissaries, known in Algeria as the ojaq
and led by an agha. Recruited from Anatolian peasants, they
were committed to a lifetime of service. Although isolated from the rest
of society and subject to their own laws and courts, they depended on
the ruler and the taifa for income. In the seventeenth century,
the force numbered about 15,000, but it was to shrink to only 3,700 by
1830. Discontent among the ojaq rose in the mid-1600s because
they were not paid regularly, and they repeatedly revolted against the
pasha. As a result, the agha charged the pasha with corruption
and incompetence and seized power in 1659.
The taifa had the last word, however, when in 1671 it
rebelled, killed the agha, and placed one of its own in power.
The new leader received the title of dey, which originated in
Tunisia. After 1689 the right to select the dey passed to the divan, a
council of some sixty notables. The divan at first was dominated by the ojaq,
but by the eighteenth century it became the dey's instrument. In 1710
the dey persuaded the sultan to recognize him and his successors as
regent, replacing the pasha in that role. Although Algiers remained a
part of the Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte, or Ottoman government,
ceased to have effective influence there.
The dey was in effect a constitutional autocrat, but his authority
was restricted by the divan and the taifa, as well as by local
political conditions. The dey was elected for a life term, but in the
159 years (1671-1830) that the system survived, fourteen of the
twenty-nine deys were removed from office by assassination. Despite
usurpation, military coups, and occasional mob rule, the day-to-day
operation of government was remarkably orderly. In accordance with the
millet system applied throughout the Ottoman Empire, each ethnic
group--Turks, Arabs, Kabyles, Berbers, Jews, Europeans--was represented
by a guild that exercised legal jurisdiction over its constituents.
The dey had direct administrative control only in the regent's
enclave, the Dar as Sultan (Domain of the Sultan), which included the
city of Algiers and its environs and the fertile Mitidja Plain. The rest
of the territory under the regency was divided into three provinces (beyliks):
Constantine in the east; Titteri in the central region, with its capital
at Médéa; and a western province that after 1791 had its seat at Oran,
abandoned that year by Spain when the city was destroyed in an
earthquake. Each province was governed by a bey appointed by the dey,
usually from the same circle of families.
A contingent of the ojaq was assigned to each bey, who also
had at his disposal the provincial auxiliaries provided by the
privileged makhzen tribes, traditionally exempted from paying
taxes on condition that they collect them from other tribes. Tax
revenues were conveyed from the provinces to Algiers twice yearly, but
the beys were otherwise left to their own devices. Although the regency
patronized the tribal chieftains, it never had the unanimous allegiance
of the countryside, where heavy taxation frequently provoked unrest.
Autonomous tribal states were tolerated, and the regency's authority was
seldom applied in the Kabylie.
Algeria - Relations with the United States
Most of France's actions in Algeria, not least the invasion of
Algiers, were propelled by contradictory impulses. In the period between
Napoleon's downfall in 1815 and the revolution of 1830, the restored
French monarchy was in crisis, and the dey was weak politically,
economically, and militarily. The French monarch sought to reverse his
domestic unpopularity. As a result of what the French considered an
insult to the French consul in Algiers by the dey in 1827, France
blockaded Algiers for three years. France used the failure of the
blockade as a reason for a military expedition against Algiers in 1830.
Invasion of Algiers
Using Napoleon's 1808 contingency plan for the invasion of Algeria,
34,000 French soldiers landed twenty-seven kilometers west of Algiers,
at Sidi Ferruch, on June 12, 1830. To face the French, the dey sent
7,000 janissaries, 19,000 troops from the beys of Constantine and Oran,
and about 17,000 Kabyles. The French established a strong beachhead and
pushed toward Algiers, thanks in part to superior artillery and better
organization. Algiers was captured after a three-week campaign, and
Hussein Dey fled into exile. French troops raped, looted (taking 50
million francs from the treasury in the Casbah), desecrated mosques, and
destroyed cemeteries. It was an inauspicious beginning to France's
self-described "civilizing mission," whose character on the
whole was cynical, arrogant, and cruel.
Hardly had the news of the capture of Algiers reached Paris than
Charles X was deposed, and his cousin Louis Philippe, the "citizen
king," was named to preside over a constitutional monarchy. The new
government, composed of liberal opponents of the Algiers expedition, was
reluctant to pursue the conquest ordered by the old regime, but
withdrawing from Algeria proved more difficult than conquering it. A
parliamentary commission that examined the Algerian situation concluded
that although French policy, behavior, and organization were failures,
the occupation should continue for the sake of national prestige. In
1834 France annexed the occupied areas, which had an estimated Muslim
population of about 3 million, as a colony. Colonial administration in
the occupied areas--the so-called régime du sabre (government
of the sword)--was placed under a governor general, a high-ranking army
officer invested with civil and military jurisdiction, who was
responsible to the minister of war.
Algeria - The Land and Colonizers
Even before the decision was made to annex Algeria, major changes had
taken place. In a bargain-hunting frenzy to take over or buy at low
prices all manner of property--homes, shops, farms and
factories--Europeans poured into Algiers after it fell. French
authorities took possession of the beylik lands, from which
Ottoman officials had derived income. Over time, as pressures increased
to obtain more land for settlement by Europeans, the state seized more
categories of land, particularly that used by tribes, religious
foundations, and villages.
Soon after the conquest of Algiers, the soldier-politician Bertrand
Clauzel and others formed a company to acquire agricultural land and,
despite official discouragement, to subsidize its settlement by European
farmers, triggering a land rush. Clauzel recognized the farming
potential of the Mitidja Plain and envisioned the production there of
cotton on a large scale. As governor general (1835-36), he used his
office to make private investments in land and encouraged army officers
and bureaucrats in his administration to do the same. This development
created a vested interest among government officials in greater French
involvement in Algeria. Commercial interests with influence in the
government also began to recognize the prospects for profitable land
speculation in expanding the French zone of occupation. They created
large agricultural tracts, built factories and businesses, and exploited
cheap local labor.
Called colons (colonists) or, more popularly, pieds noirs
(literally, black feet), the European settlers were largely of peasant
farmer or working-class origin from the poor southern areas of Italy,
Spain, and France. Others were criminal and political deportees from
France, transported under sentence in large numbers to Algeria. In the
1840s and 1850s, to encourage settlement in rural areas official policy
was to offer grants of land for a fee and a promise that improvements
would be made. A distinction soon developed between the grands
colons (great colonists) at one end of the scale, often self-made
men who had accumulated large estates or built successful businesses,
and the petits blancs (little whites), smallholders and workers
at the other end, whose lot was often not much better than that of their
Muslim counterparts. According to historian John Ruedy, although by 1848
only 15,000 of the 109,000 European settlers were in rural areas,
"by systematically expropriating both pastoralists and farmers,
rural colonization was the most important single factor in the
destructuring of traditional society."
Algeria - Opposition to the Occupation
The French faced other opposition as well in the area. The superior
of a religious brotherhood, Muhyi ad Din, who had spent time in Ottoman
jails for opposing the dey's rule, launched attacks against the French
and their makhzen allies at Oran in 1832. In the same year,
tribal elders chose Muhyi ad Din's son, twenty-five-year-old Abd al
Qadir, to take his place leading the jihad. Abd al Qadir, who was
recognized as amir al muminin (commander of the faithful),
quickly gained the support of tribes throughout Algeria. A devout and
austere marabout, he was also a cunning political leader and a
resourceful warrior. From his capital in Tlemcen, Abd al Qadir set about
building a territorial Muslim state based on the communities of the
interior but drawing its strength from the tribes and religious
brotherhoods. By 1839 he controlled more than two-thirds of Algeria. His
government maintained an army and a bureaucracy, collected taxes,
supported education, undertook public works, and established
agricultural and manufacturing cooperatives to stimulate economic
activity.
The French in Algiers viewed with concern the success of a Muslim
government and the rapid growth of a viable territorial state that
barred the extension of European settlement. Abd al Qadir fought running
battles across Algeria with French forces, which included units of the
Foreign Legion, organized in 1831 for Algerian service. Although his
forces were defeated by the French under General Thomas Bugeaud in 1836,
Abd al Qadir negotiated a favorable peace treaty the next year. The
treaty gained conditional recognition for Abd al Qadir's regime by
defining the territory under its control and salvaged his prestige among
the tribes just as the shaykhs were about to desert him. To provoke new
hostilities, the French deliberately broke the treaty in 1839 by
occupying Constantine. Abd al Qadir took up the holy war again,
destroyed the French settlements on the Mitidja Plain, and at one point
advanced to the outskirts of Algiers itself. He struck where the French
were weakest and retreated when they advanced against him in greater
strength. The government moved from camp to camp with the amir and his
army. Gradually, however, superior French resources and manpower and the
defection of tribal chieftains took their toll. Reinforcements poured
into Algeria after 1840 until Bugeaud had at his disposal 108,000 men,
one-third of the French army. Bugeaud's strategy was to destroy Abd al
Qadir's bases, then to starve the population by destroying its means of
subsistence--crops, orchards, and herds. On several occasions, French
troops burned or asphyxiated noncombatants hiding from the terror in
caves. One by one, the amir's strongholds fell to the French, and many
of his ablest commanders were killed or captured so that by 1843 the
Muslim state had collapsed. Abd al Qadir took refuge with his ally, the
sultan of Morocco, Abd ar Rahman II, and launched raids into Algeria.
However, Abd al Qadir was obliged to surrender to the commander of Oran
Province, General Louis de Lamoricière, at the end of 1847.
Abd al Qadir was promised safe conduct to Egypt or Palestine if his
followers laid down their arms and kept the peace. He accepted these
conditions, but the minister of war--who years earlier as general in
Algeria had been badly defeated by Abd al Qadir--had him consigned to
prison in France. In 1852 Louis Napoleon, the president of the Second
Republic who would soon establish the Second Empire as Napoleon III,
freed Abd al Qadir and gave him a pension of 150,000 francs. In 1855 Abd
al Qadir moved from the Byrsa, the citadel area of Carthage, to
Damascus. There in 1860 Abd al Qadir intervened to save the lives of an
estimated 12,000 Christians, including the French consul and staff,
during a massacre instigated by local Ottoman officials. The French
government, in appreciation, conferred on him the Grand Cordon of the
Legion of Honor, and additional honors followed from a number of other
European governments. Declining all invitations to return to public
life, he devoted himself to scholarly pursuits and charity until his
death in Damascus in 1883.
Abd al Qadir is recognized and venerated as the first hero of
Algerian independence. Not without cause, his green and white standard
was adopted by the Algerian liberation movement during the War of
Independence and became the national flag of independent Algeria. The
Algerian government brought his remains back to Algeria to be interred
with much ceremony on July 5, 1966, the fourth anniversary of
independence and the 136th anniversary of the French conquest. A mosque
bearing his name has been constructed as a national shrine in
Constantine.
Algeria - Colonization and Military Control
A royal ordinance in 1845 called for three types of administration in
Algeria. In areas where Europeans were a substantial part of the
population, colons elected mayors and councils for self-governing
"full exercise" communes (communes de plein exercice).
In the "mixed" communes, where Muslims were a large majority,
government was in the hands of appointed and some elected officials,
including representatives of the grands chefs (great
chieftains) and a French administrator. The indigenous communes (communes
indigènes), remote areas not adequately pacified, remained under
the régime du sabre.
By 1848 nearly all of northern Algeria was under French control.
Important tools of the colonial administration, from this time until
their elimination in the 1870s, were the bureaux arabes (Arab
offices), staffed by Arabists whose function was to collect information
on the indigenous people and to carry out administrative functions,
nominally in cooperation with the army. The bureaux arabes on
occasion acted with sympathy to the local population and formed a buffer
between Muslims and rapacious colons.
Under the régime du sabre, the colons had been permitted
limited self-government in areas where European settlement was most
intense, but there was constant friction between them and the army. The
colons charged that the bureaux arabes hindered the progress of
colonization. They agitated against military rule, complaining that
their legal rights were denied under the arbitrary controls imposed on
the colony and insisting on a civil administration for Algeria fully
integrated with metropolitan France. The army warned that the
introduction of civilian government would invite Muslim retaliation and
threaten the security of Algeria. The French government vacillated in
its policy, yielding small concessions to the colon demands on the one
hand while maintaining the régime du sabre to protect the
interests of the Muslim majority on the other.
Shortly after Louis Philippe's constitutional monarchy was overthrown
in the revolution of 1848, the new government of the Second Republic
ended Algeria's status as a colony and declared the occupied lands an
integral part of France. Three "civil territories"--Algiers,
Oran, and Constantine--were organized as French départements
(local administrative units) under a civilian government. For the first time, French citizens in the civil territories
elected their own councils and mayors; Muslims had to be appointed,
could not hold more than one-third of council seats, and could not serve
as mayors or assistant mayors. The administration of territories outside
the zones settled by colons remained under a régime du sabre.
Local Muslim administration was allowed to continue under the
supervision of French military commanders, charged with maintaining
order in newly pacified regions, and the bureaux arabes.
Theoretically, these areas were closed to European colonization.
European migration, encouraged during the Second Republic, stimulated
the civilian administration to open new land for settlement against the
advice of the army. With the advent of the Second Empire in 1852,
Napoleon III returned Algeria to military control. In 1858 a separate
Ministry of Algerian Affairs was created to supervise administration of
the country through a military governor general assisted by a civil
minister.
Napoleon III visited Algeria twice in the early 1860s. He was
profoundly impressed with the nobility and virtue of the tribal
chieftains, who appealed to the emperor's romantic nature, and was
shocked by the self-serving attitude of the colon leaders. He determined
to halt the expansion of European settlement beyond the coastal zone and
to restrict contact between Muslims and the colons, whom he considered
to have a corrupting influence on the indigenous population. He
envisioned a grand design for preserving most of Algeria for the Muslims
by founding a royaume arabe (Arab kingdom) with himself as the roi
des Arabes (king of the Arabs). He instituted the so-called
politics of the grands chefs to deal with the Muslims directly
through their traditional leaders.
To further his plans for the royaume arabe, Napoleon III
issued two decrees affecting tribal structure, land tenure, and the
legal status of Muslims in French Algeria. The first, promulgated in
1863, was intended to renounce the state's claims to tribal lands and
eventually provide private plots to individuals in the tribes, thus
dismantling "feudal" structures and protecting the lands from
the colons. Tribal areas were to be identified, delimited into douars
(administrative units), and given over to councils. Arable land was to
be divided among members of the douar over a period of one to
three generations, after which it could be bought and sold by the
individual owners. Unfortunately for the tribes, however, the plans of
Napoleon III quickly unraveled. French officials sympathetic to the
colons took much of the tribal land they surveyed into the public
domain. In addition, some tribal leaders immediately sold communal lands
for quick gains. The process of converting arable land to individual
ownership was accelerated to only a few years when laws were enacted in
the 1870s stipulating that no sale of land by an individual Muslim could
be invalidated by the claim that it was collectively owned. The cudah
and other tribal officials, appointed by the French on the basis of
their loyalty to France rather than the allegiance owed them by the
tribe, lost their credibility as they were drawn into the European
orbit, becoming known derisively as beni-oui-ouis (yes-men).
Napoleon III visualized three distinct Algerias: a French colony, an
Arab country, and a military camp, each with a distinct form of local
government. The second decree, issued in 1865, was designed to recognize
the differences in cultural background of the French and the Muslims. As
French nationals, Muslims could serve on equal terms in the French armed
forces and civil service and could migrate to metropolitan France. They
were also granted the protection of French law while retaining the right
to adhere to Islamic law in litigation concerning their personal status.
But if Muslims wished to become full citizens, they had to accept the
full jurisdiction of the French legal code, including laws affecting
marriage and inheritance, and reject the competence of the religious
courts. In effect, this meant that a Muslim had to renounce his religion
in order to become a French citizen. This condition was bitterly
resented by Muslims, for whom the only road to political equality became
apostasy. Over the next century, fewer than 3,000 Muslims chose to cross
the barrier and become French citizens.
When the Prussians captured Napoleon III at the Battle of Sedan
(1870), ending the Second Empire, the colons in Algiers toppled the
military government and installed a civilian administration. Meanwhile,
in France the government directed one of its ministers, Adolphe Crémieux,
"to destroy the military regime . . . [and] to completely
assimilate Algeria into France." In October 1870, Crémieux, whose
concern with Algerian affairs dated from the time of the Second
Republic, issued a series of decrees providing for representation of the
Algerian départements in the National Assembly of France and
confirming colon control over local administration. A civilian governor
general was made responsible to the Ministry of Interior. The Crémieux
Decrees also granted blanket French citizenship to Algerian Jews, who
then numbered about 40,000. This act set them apart from Muslims, in
whose eyes they were identified thereafter with the colons. The measure
had to be enforced, however, over the objections of the colons, who made
little distinction between Muslims and Jews. (Automatic citizenship was
subsequently extended in 1889 to children of non- French Europeans born
in Algeria unless they specifically rejected it.)
The loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871 led to pressure on the
French government to make new land available in Algeria for about 5,000
Alsatian and Lorrainer refugees who were resettled there. During the
1870s, both the amount of European- owned land and the number of
settlers were doubled, and tens of thousands of unskilled Muslims, who
had been uprooted from their land, wandered into the cities or to colon
farming areas in search of work.
The most serious native insurrection since the time of Abd al Qadir
broke out in 1871 in the Kabylie and spread through much of Algeria. The
revolt was triggered by Crémieux's extension of civil (that is, colon)
authority to previously self-governing tribal reserves and the
abrogation of commitments made by the military government, but it
clearly had its basis in more long- standing grievances. Since the
Crimean War (1854-56), the demand for grain had pushed up the price of
Algerian wheat to European levels. Silos were emptied when the world
market's impact was felt in Algeria, and Muslim farmers sold their grain
reserves-- including seed grain--to speculators. But the community-owned
silos were the fundamental adaptation of a subsistence economy to an
unpredictable climate, and a good year's surplus was stored away against
a bad year's dearth. When serious drought struck Algeria and grain crops
failed in 1866 and for several years following, Muslim areas faced
starvation, and with famine came pestilence. It was estimated that 20
percent of the Muslim population of Constantine died over a three-year
period. In 1871 the civil authorities repudiated guarantees made to
tribal chieftains by the previous military government for loans to
replenish their seed supply. This act alienated even pro-French Muslim
leaders, while it undercut their ability to control their people. It was
against this background of misery and hopelessness that the stricken
Kabyles rose in revolt.
In the aftermath of the 1871 uprising, French authorities imposed
stern measures to punish and control the whole Muslim population. France
confiscated more than 500,000 hectares of tribal land and placed the
Kabylie under a régime d'exception (extraordinary rule), which
denied the due process guaranteed French nationals. A special indigénat
(native code) listed as offenses acts such as insolence and unauthorized
assembly not punishable by French law, and the normal jurisdiction of
the cudah was sharply restricted. The governor general was
empowered to jail suspects for up to five years without trial. The
argument was made in defense of these exceptional measures that the
French penal code as applied to Frenchmen was too permissive to control
Muslims.
Algeria - Hegemony of the Colons
A commission of inquiry set up by the French Senate in 1892 and
headed by former Premier Jules Ferry, an advocate of colonial expansion,
recommended that the government abandon a policy that assumed French
law, without major modifications, could fit the needs of an area
inhabited by close to 2 million Europeans and 4 million Muslims. Muslims
had no representation in Algeria's National Assembly and were grossly
underrepresented on local councils. Because of the many restrictions
imposed by the authorities, by 1915 only 50,000 Muslims were eligible to
vote in elections in the civil communes. Attempts to implement even the
most modest reforms were blocked or delayed by the local administration
in Algeria, dominated by colons, and by colon representatives in the
National Assembly, to which each of the three départements
sent six deputies and three senators.
Once elected to the National Assembly, colons became permanent
fixtures. Because of their seniority, they exercised disproportionate
influence, and their support was important to any government's survival.
The leader of the colon delegation, Auguste Warnier, succeeded during
the 1870s and 1880s in modifying or introducing legislation to
facilitate the private transfer of land to settlers and continue the
Algerian state's appropriation of land from the local population and
distribution to settlers. Consistent proponents of reform, like Georges
Clemenceau and socialist Jean Jaurès, were rare in the National
Assembly.
The bulk of Algeria's wealth in manufacturing, mining, agriculture,
and trade was controlled by the grands colons. The modern
European-owned and -managed sector of the economy centered around small
industry and a highly developed export trade, designed to provide food
and raw materials to France in return for capital and consumer goods.
Europeans held about 30 percent of the total arable land, including the
bulk of the most fertile land and most of the areas under irrigation. By
1900 Europeans produced more than two-thirds of the value of output in
agriculture and practically all agricultural exports. The modern, or
European, sector was run on a commercial basis and meshed with the
French market system that it supplied with wine, citrus, olives, and
vegetables. Nearly half of the value of European-owned real property was
in vineyards by 1914. By contrast, subsistence cereal
production--supplemented by olive, fig, and date growing and stock
raising--formed the basis of the traditional sector, but the land
available for cropping was submarginal even for cereals under prevailing
traditional cultivation practices.
The colonial regime imposed more and higher taxes on Muslims than on
Europeans. The Muslims, in addition to paying traditional taxes dating
from before the French conquest, also paid new taxes, from which the
colons were often exempted. In 1909, for instance, Muslims, who made up
almost 90 percent of the population but produced 20 percent of Algeria's
income, paid 70 percent of direct taxes and 45 percent of the total
taxes collected. And colons controlled how these revenues would be
spent. As a result, colon towns had handsome municipal buildings, paved
streets lined with trees, fountains and statues, while Algerian villages
and rural areas benefited little if at all from tax revenues.
The colonial regime proved severely detrimental to overall education
for Algerian Muslims, who had previously relied on religious schools to
learn reading, writing, and engage in religious studies. Not only did the state appropriate the habus lands
(the religious foundations that constituted the main source of income
for religious institutions, including schools) in 1843, but colon
officials refused to allocate enough money to maintain schools and
mosques properly and to provide for an adequate number of teachers and
religious leaders for the growing population. In 1892 more than five
times as much was spent for the education of Europeans as for Muslims,
who had five times as many children of school age. Because few Muslim
teachers were trained, Muslim schools were largely staffed by French
teachers. Even a state-operated madrasah (school) often had
French faculty members. Attempts to institute bilingual, bicultural
schools, intended to bring Muslim and European children together in the
classroom, were a conspicuous failure, rejected by both communities and
phased out after 1870. According to one estimate, fewer than 5 percent
of Algerian children attended any kind of school in 1870.
Efforts were begun by 1890 to educate a small number of Muslims along
with European students in the French school system as part of France's
"civilizing mission" in Algeria. The curriculum was entirely
French and allowed no place for Arabic studies, which were deliberately
downgraded even in Muslim schools. Within a generation, a class of
well-educated, gallicized Muslims--the évolués (literally,
the evolved ones)--had been created. Almost all of the handful of
Muslims who accepted French citizenship were évolués; more
significantly, it was in this privileged group of Muslims, strongly
influenced by French culture and political attitudes, that a new
Algerian self-consciousness developed.
Reporting to the French Senate in 1894, Governor General Jules Cambon
wrote that Algeria had "only a dust of people left her." He
referred to the destruction of the traditional ruling class that had
left Muslims without leaders and had deprived France of interlocuteurs
valables (literally, valid gobetweens ), through whom to reach the
masses of the people. He lamented that no genuine communication was
possible between the two communities.
The colons who ran Algeria maintained a condescending dialogue only
with the beni-oui-ouis. Later they deliberately thwarted
contact between the évolués and Muslim traditionalists on the
one hand and between évolués and official circles in France
on the other. They feared and mistrusted the francophone évolués,
who were classified either as assimilationists, insisting on being
accepted as Frenchmen but on their own terms, or as integrationists,
eager to work as members of a distinct Muslim elite on equal terms with
the French.
Algeria - Algerian Nationalism
One of the earliest movements for political reform was an
integrationist group, the Young Algerians (Jeunesse Algérienne). Its
members were drawn from the small, liberal elite of welleducated ,
middle-class évolués who demanded an opportunity to prove
that they were French as well as Muslim. In 1908 they delivered to
France's Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau a petition that expressed
opposition under the status quo to a proposed policy to conscript Muslim
Algerians into the French army. If, however, the state granted the
Muslims full citizenship, the petition went on, opposition to
conscription would be dropped. In 1911, in addition to demanding
preferential treatment for "the intellectual elements of the
country," the group called for an end to unequal taxation,
broadening of the franchise, more schools, and protection of indigenous
property. The Young Algerians added a significant voice to the reformist
movement against French colonial policy that began in 1892 and continued
until the outbreak of World War I. In part to reward Muslims who fought
and died for France, Clemenceau appointed reform-minded Charles Jonnart
as governor general. Reforms promulgated in 1919 and known as the
Jonnart Law expanded the number of Muslims permitted to vote to about
425,000. The legislation also removed all voters from the jurisdiction
of the humiliating indigénat.
The most popular Muslim leader in Algeria after the war was Khalid
ibn Hashim, grandson of Abd al Qadir and a member of the Young
Algerians, although he differed with some members of the group over
acceptance of the Jonnart Law. Some Young Algerians were willing to work
within the framework set out by the reforms, but Emir Khalid, as he was
known, continued to press for the complete Young Algerian program. He
was able to win electoral victories in Algiers and to enliven political
discourse with his calls for reform and full assimilation, but by 1923
he tired of the struggle and left Algeria, eventually retiring to
Damascus.
Some of the Young Algerians in 1926 formed the Federation of Elected
Natives (Fédération des Elus Indigènes--FEI), as many of the former
group's members had joined the circle of Muslims eligible to hold public
office. The federation's objectives were the assimilation of the évolués
into the French community, with full citizenship but without
surrendering their personal status as Muslims, and the eventual
integration of Algeria as a full province of France. Other objectives
included equal pay for equal work for government employees, abolition of
travel restrictions to and from France, abolition of the indigénat
(which had been reinstituted earlier), and electoral reform.
The first group to call for Algerian independence was the Star of
North Africa (Étoile Nord-Africain, known as Star). The group was
originally a solidarity group formed in 1926 in Paris to coordinate
political activity among North African workers in France and to defend
"the material, moral, and social interests of North African
Muslims." The leaders included members of the French Communist
Party and its labor confederation, and in the early years of the
struggle for independence the party provided material and moral support.
Ahmed Messali Hadj, the Star's secretary general, enunciated the groups
demands in 1927. In addition to independence from France, the Star
called for freedom of press and association, a parliament chosen through
universal suffrage, confiscation of large estates, and the institution
of Arabic schools. The Star was banned in 1929 and operated underground
until 1934, when its newspaper reached a circulation of 43,500.
Influenced by the Arab nationalist ideas of Lebanese Druze Shakib
Arslan, Messali Hadj turned away from communist ideology to a more
nationalist outlook, for which the French Communist Party attacked the
Star. He returned to Algeria to organize urban workers and peasant
farmers and in 1937 founded the Party of the Algerian People (Parti du
Peuple Algérien--PPA) to mobilize the Algerian working class at home
and in France to improve its situation through political action. For
Messali Hadj, who ruled the PPA with an iron hand, these aims were
inseparable from the struggle for an independent Algeria in which
socialist and Islamic values would be fused.
Algeria's Islamic reform movement took inspiration from Egyptian
reformers Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida and stressed the Arab
and Islamic roots of the country. Starting in the 1920s, the reform
ulama, religious scholars, promoted a purification of Islam in Algeria
and a return to the Quran and the sunna, or tradition of the Prophet. The reformers favored the adoption
of modern methods of inquiry and rejected the superstitions and folk
practices of the countryside, actions that brought them into
confrontation with the marabouts. The reformers published their own
periodicals and books, and established free modern Islamic schools that
stressed Arabic language and culture as an alternative to the schools
for Muslims operated for many years by the French. Under the dynamic
leadership of Shaykh Abd al Hamid Ben Badis, the reformist ulama
organized the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (Association des Uléma
Musulmans Algériens- -AUMA) in 1931. Although their support was
concentrated in the Constantine area, the AUMA struck a responsive chord
among the Muslim masses, with whom it had closer ties than did the other
nationalist organizations. As the Islamic reformers gained popularity
and influence, the colonial authorities responded in 1933 by refusing
them permission to preach in official mosques. This move and similar
ones sparked several years of sporadic religious unrest.
European influences had some impact on indigenous Muslim political
movements because Ferhat Abbas and Messali Hadj essentially looked to
France for their ideological models. Ben Badis, however, believed that
"Islam is our religion, Arabic our language, Algeria our
fatherland." Abbas summed up the philosophy of the liberal
integrationists in opposition to the claims of the nationalists when he
denied in 1936 that Algeria had a separate identity. Ben Badis responded
that he, too, had looked to the past and found "that this Algerian
nation is not France, cannot be France, and does not want to be France .
. . [but] has its culture, its traditions and its characteristics, good
or bad, like every other nation of the earth."
The colons, for their part, rejected any movement toward reform,
whether instigated by integrationist or nationalist organizations.
Reaction in Paris to the nationalists was divided. In the 1930s, French
liberals saw only the évolués as a possible channel for
diffusing political power in Algeria, denigrating Messali Hadj for
demagoguery and the AUMA for religious obscurantism. At all times,
however, the French government was confronted by the monolithic
intransigence of the leaders of the European community in Algeria in
opposing any devolution of power to Muslims, even to basically
pro-French évolués. The colons also had powerful allies in
the National Assembly, the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the
business community, and were strengthened in their resistance by their
almost total control of the Algerian administration and police.
Algeria - Viollette Plan
The mounting social, political, and economic crises in Algeria for
the first time induced older and newly emerged classes of indigenous
society to engage from 1933 to 1936 in numerous acts of political
protest. The government responded with more restrictive laws governing
public order and security. In 1936 French socialist Léon Blum became
premier in a Popular Front government and appointed Maurice Viollette
his minister of state. The ulama, sensing a new attitude in Paris that
would favor their agenda, cautiously joined forces with the FEI.
Representatives of these groups and members of the Algerian Communist
Party (Parti Communiste Algérien--PCA) met in Algiers in 1936 at the
first Algerian Muslim Congress. (Messali Hadj and the Star were left out
owing to misgivings about their more radical program.) The congress drew
up an extensive Charter of Demands, which called for the abolition of
laws permitting imposition of the régime d'exception,
political integration of Algeria and France, maintenance of personal
legal status by Muslims acquiring French citizenship, fusion of European
and Muslim education systems in Algeria, freedom to use Arabic in
education and the press, equal wages for equal work, land reform,
establishment of a single electoral college, and universal suffrage.
Blum and Viollette gave a warm reception to a congress delegation in
Paris and indicated that many of their demands could be met. Meanwhile,
Violettee drew up for the Blum government a proposal to extend French
citizenship with full political equality to certain classes of the
Muslim "elite," including university graduates, elected
officials, army officers, and professionals. Messali Hadj saw in the
Viollette Plan a new "instrument of colonialism . . . to split the
Algerian people by separating the elite from the masses." The
components of the congress--the ulama, the FEI, and communists--were
heartened by the proposal and gave it varying measures of support.
Mohamed Bendjelloul and Abbas, as spokesmen for the évolués,
who would have the most to gain from the measure, considered this plan a
major step toward achieving their aims and redoubled their efforts
through the liberal FEI to gain broad support for the policy of Algerian
integration with France. Not unexpectedly, however, the colons had taken
uncompromising exception to the Viollette Plan. Although the project
would have granted immediate French citizenship and voting rights to
only about 21,000 Muslims, with provision for adding a few thousand more
each year, spokesmen for the colons raised the specter of the European
electorate's being submerged by a Muslim majority. Colon administrators
and their supporters threw procedural obstacles in the path of the
legislation, and the government gave it only lukewarm support, resulting
in its ultimate failure.
While the Viollette Plan was still a live issue, however, Messali
Hadj made a dramatic comeback to Algeria and had significant local
success in attracting people to the Star. A mark of his success was the
fact that in 1937 the government dissolved the Star. The same year
Messali Hadj formed the PPA, which had a more moderate program, but he
and other PPA leaders were arrested following a large demonstration in
Algiers. Although Messali Hadj spent many years in jail, his party had
the most widespread support of all opposition groups until it was banned
in 1939.
Disillusioned by the failure of the Viollette Plan to win acceptance
in Paris, Abbas shifted from a position of favoring assimilation of the évolués
and full integration with France to calling for the development of a
Muslim Algeria in close association with France but retaining "her
own physiognomy, her language, her customs, her traditions." His
more immediate goal was greater political, social, and economic equality
for Muslims with the colons. By 1938 the cooperation among the parties
that made up the congress began to break up.
Algeria - Polarization and Politicization
Algerian Muslims rallied to the French side at the start of World War
II as they had done in World War I. Nazi Germany's quick defeat of
France, however, and the establishment of the collaborationist Vichy
regime, to which the colons were generally sympathetic, not only
increased the difficulties of the Muslims but also posed an ominous
threat to the Jews in Algeria. The Algerian administration vigorously
enforced the anti-Semitic laws imposed by Vichy, which stripped Algerian
Jews of their French citizenship. Potential opposition leaders in both
the European and the Muslim communities were arrested.
Allied landings were made at Algiers and Oran by 70,000 British and
United States troops on November 8, 1942, in coordination with landings
in Morocco. As part of Operation Torch under the overall command of
Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Algiers and Oran were secured
two days later after a determined resistance by French defenders. On
November 11, Admiral Jean Louis Darlan, commander in chief of Vichy
French forces, ordered a cease-fire in North Africa. Algeria provided a
base for the subsequent Allied campaign in Tunisia.
After the fall of the Vichy regime in Algeria, General Henri Giraud,
Free French commander in chief in North Africa, slowly rescinded
repressive Vichy laws despite opposition by colon extremists. He also
called on the Muslim population to supply troops for the Allied war
effort. Ferhat Abbas and twenty-four other Muslim leaders replied that
Algerians were ready to fight with the Allies in freeing their homeland
but demanded the right to call a conference of Muslim representatives to
develop political, economic, and social institutions for the indigenous
population "within an essentially French framework." Giraud,
who succeeded in raising an army of 250,000 men to fight in the Italian
campaign, refused to consider this proposal, explaining that
"politics" must wait until the end of the war.
In March 1943, Abbas, who had abandoned assimilation as a viable
alternative to self-determination, presented the French administration
with the Manifesto of the Algerian People, signed by fifty-six Algerian
nationalist and international leaders. Outlining the past evils of
colonial rule and denouncing continued suppression, the manifesto
demanded specifically an Algerian constitution that would guarantee
immediate and effective political participation and legal equality for
Muslims. It called for agrarian reform, recognition of Arabic as an
official language on equal terms with French, recognition of a full
range of civil liberties, and the liberation of political prisoners of
all parties.
The French governor general created a commission composed of
prominent Muslims and Europeans to study the manifesto. This commission
produced a supplementary reform program, which was forwarded to General
Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French movement. De Gaulle and his
newly appointed governor general in Algeria, General Georges Catroux, a
recognized liberal, viewed the manifesto as evidence of a need to
develop a mutually advantageous relationship between the European and
Muslim communities. Catroux was reportedly shocked by the "blinded
spirit of social conservatism" of the colons, but he did not regard
the manifesto as a satisfactory basis for cooperation because he felt it
would submerge the European minority in a Muslim state. Instead, the
French administration in 1944 instituted a reform package, based on the
1936 Viollette Plan, that granted full French citizenship to certain
categories of "meritorious" Algerian Muslims--military
officers and decorated veterans, university graduates, government
officials, and members of the Legion of Honor--who numbered about
60,000.
A new factor influencing Muslim reaction to the reintroduction of the
Viollette Plan--which by that date even many moderates had rejected as
inadequate--was the shift in Abbas's position from support for
integration to the demand for an independent Algerian state federated
with France. Abbas gained the support of the AUMA and of Messali Hadj,
who joined him in forming the Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (Amis
du Manifeste et de la Liberté--AML) to work for Algerian independence.
Within a short time, the AML's newspaper, Égalité, claimed
500,000 subscribers, indicating unprecedented interest in independence.
During this time the outlawed PPA was creating secret political cells
throughout the country and paramilitary groups in the Kabylie and the
Constantine region. In addition, PPA supporters joined the AML in large
numbers and attempted to promote Messali Hadj's independence concept in
contrast to the more moderate autonomy advocates. Social unrest grew in
the winter of 1944-45, fueled in part by a poor wheat harvest, shortages
of manufactured goods, and severe unemployment. On May Day, the AML
organized demonstrations in twenty-one towns across the country, with
marchers demanding freedom for Messali Hadj and independence for
Algeria. Violence erupted in some locations, including Algiers and Oran,
leaving many wounded and three dead.
Nationalist leaders were resolving to mark the approaching liberation
of Europe with demonstrations calling for their own liberation, and it
was clear that a clash with the authorities was imminent. The tensions
between the Muslim and colon communities exploded on May 8, 1945, V-E
Day, in an outburst of such violence as to make their polarization
complete, if not irreparable. Police had told AML organizers they could
march in Sétif only if they did not display nationalist flags or
placards. They ignored the warnings, the march began, and gunfire
resulted in which a number of police and demonstrators were killed.
Marchers rampaged, leading to the killing of 103 Europeans. Word spread
to the countryside, and villagers attacked colon settlements and
government buildings.
The army and police responded by conducting a prolonged and
systematic ratissage (literally, raking over) of suspected
centers of dissidence. In addition, military airplanes and ships
attacked Muslim population centers. According to official French
figures, 1,500 Muslims died as a result of these countermeasures. Other
estimates vary from 6,000 to as high as 45,000 killed.
In the aftermath of the Sétif violence, the AML was outlawed, and
5,460 Muslims, including Abbas, were arrested. Abbas deplored the
uprising but charged that its repression had taken Algeria "back to
the days of the Crusades." In April 1946, Abbas once again asserted
the demands of the manifesto and founded the Democratic Union of the
Algerian Manifesto (Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien--UDMA),
abandoning the alliance that the AML had made with Messali Hadj's PPA
and the AUMA. Abbas called for a free, secular, and republican Algeria
loosely federated with France. Upon his release from five-year house
arrest, Messali Hadj returned to Algeria and formed the Movement for the
Triumph of Democratic Liberties (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés
Démocratiques--MTLD), which quickly drew supporters from a broad
cross-section of society. Committed to unequivocal independence, the
MTLD firmly opposed Abbas's proposal for federation. The PPA continued
to operate, but clandestinely, always striving for an independent, Arab,
and Islamic Algeria. The clandestine Special Organization (Organisation
Spéciale--OS) was created within the MTLD by Hocine Ait Ahmed in 1947
to conduct terrorist operations when political protest through legal
channels was suppressed by authorities. Ait Ahmed was later succeeded as
chief of the OS by Ahmed Ben Bella, one of the early Algerian
nationalist leaders.
The National Assembly approved the government-proposed Organic
Statute of Algeria in August 1947. This law called for the creation of
an Algerian Assembly with one house representing Europeans and
"meritorious" Muslims, and the other representing the
remaining more than 8 million Muslims. The statute also replaced mixed
communes with elected local councils, abolished military government in
the Algerian Sahara, recognized Arabic as an official language with
French, and proposed enfranchising Muslim women. Muslim and colon
deputies alike abstained or voted against the statute but for
diametrically opposed reasons: the Muslims because it fell short of
their expectations and the colons because it went too far.
The sweeping victory of Messali Hadj's MTLD in the 1947 municipal
elections frightened the colons, whose political leaders, through fraud
and intimidation, attempted to obtain a result more favorable to them in
the following year's first Algerian Assembly voting. The term élection
algérienne became a synonym for rigged election. The MTLD was
allowed nine seats, Abbas's UDMA was given eight, and
government-approved "independents" were awarded fifty-five
seats. These results may have reassured some of the colons that the
nationalists had been rejected by the Muslim community, but the
elections suggested to many Muslims that a peaceful solution to
Algeria's problems was not possible.
At the first session of the colon-controlled Algerian Assembly, an
MTLD delegate was arrested at the door, prompting other Muslim
representatives to walk out in protest. A request by Abbas to gain the
floor was refused. Frustrated by these events, the nationalist parties,
joined by the PCA, formed a common political front that undertook to
have the results of the election voided. French socialists and moderates
tried to initiate a formal inquiry into the reports of vote fraud but
were prevented from doing so by the assembly's European delegates, who
persuaded the governor general that an investigation would disturb the
peace. New elections in 1951 were subject to the same sort of rigging
that had characterized the 1948 voting.
In 1952 anti-French demonstrations precipitated by the OS led to
Messali Hadj's arrest and deportation to France. Internal divisions and
attacks by the authorities severely weakened the MTLD, draining its
energies. Colon extremists took every opportunity to persuade the French
government of the need for draconian measures against the emergent
independence movement.
Ben Bella created a new underground action committee to replace the
OS, which had been broken up by the French police in 1950. The new
group, the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (Comité Révolutionnaire
d'Unité et d'Action--CRUA), was based in Cairo, where Ben Bella had
fled in 1952. Known as the chefs historiques (historical
chiefs), the group's nine original leaders--Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Boudiaf,
Belkacem Krim, Rabah Bitat, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Mourad Didouch, Moustafa
Ben Boulaid, Mohamed Khider, and Ben Bella--were considered the leaders
of the Algerian War of Independence.
Between March and October 1954, the CRUA organized a military network
in Algeria comprising six military regions (referred to at the time as wilayat;
sing., wilaya). The leaders of these regions and their
followers became known as the "internals." Ben Bella, Khider,
and Ait Ahmed formed the External Delegation in Cairo. Encouraged by
Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser (r. 1954-71), their role was to
gain foreign support for the rebellion and to acquire arms, supplies,
and funds for the wilaya commanders. In October the CRUA
renamed itself the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération
Nationale--FLN), which assumed responsibility for the political
direction of the revolution. The National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération
Nationale--ALN), the FLN's military arm, was to conduct the War of
Independence within Algeria.
Algeria - War of Independence
The FLN uprising presented nationalist groups with the question of
whether to adopt armed revolt as the main mode of action. During the
first year of the war, Abbas's UDMA, the ulama, and the PCA maintained a
friendly neutrality toward the FLN. The communists, who had made no move
to cooperate in the uprising at the start, later tried to infiltrate the
FLN, but FLN leaders publicly repudiated the support of the party. In
April 1956, Abbas flew to Cairo, where he formally joined the FLN. This
action brought in many évolués who had supported the UDMA in
the past. The AUMA also threw the full weight of its prestige behind the
FLN. Bendjelloul and the prointegrationist moderates had already
abandoned their efforts to mediate between the French and the rebels.
After the collapse of the MTLD, Messali Hadj formed the leftist
National Algerian Movement (Mouvement National Algérien-- MNA), which
advocated a policy of violent revolution and total independence similar
to that of the FLN. The ALN subsequently wiped out the MNA guerrilla
operation, and Messali Hadj's movement lost what little influence it had
had in Algeria. However, the MNA gained the support of a majority of
Algerian workers in France through the Union of Algerian Workers (Union
Syndicale des Travailleurs Algériens). The FLN also established a
strong organization in France to oppose the MNA. Merciless "café
wars," resulting in nearly 5,000 deaths, were waged in France
between the two rebel groups throughout the years of the War of
Independence.
On the political front, the FLN worked to persuade--and to
coerce--the Algerian masses to support the aims of the independence
movement. FLN-oriented labor unions, professional associations, and
students' and women's organizations were organized to rally diverse
segments of the population. Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist from Martinique
who became the FLN's leading political theorist, provided a
sophisticated intellectual justification for the use of violence in
achieving national liberation. From Cairo, Ben Bella ordered the
liquidation of potential interlocuteurs valables, those
independent representatives of the Muslim community acceptable to the
French through whom a compromise or reforms within the system might be
achieved.
As the FLN campaign spread through the countryside, many European
farmers in the interior sold their holdings and sought refuge in
Algiers, where their cry for sterner countermeasures swelled. Colon
vigilante units, whose unauthorized activities were conducted with the
passive cooperation of police authorities, carried out ratonnades
(literally, rat-hunts; synonymous with Arab-killings) against suspected
FLN members of the Muslim community. The colons demanded the
proclamation of a state of emergency, the proscription of all groups
advocating separation from France, and the imposition of capital
punishment for politically motivated crimes.
By 1955 effective political action groups within the colon community
succeeded in intimidating the governors general sent by Paris to resolve
the conflict. A major success was the conversion of Jacques Soustelle,
who went to Algeria as governor general in January 1955 determined to
restore peace. Soustelle, a one-time leftist and by 1955 an ardent
Gaullist, began an ambitious reform program (the Soustelle Plan) aimed
at improving economic conditions among the Muslim population.
Algeria - Philippeville
An important watershed in the War of Independence was the massacre of
civilians by the FLN near the town of Philippeville in August 1955.
Before this operation, FLN policy was to attack only military and
government-related targets. The wilaya commander for the
Constantine region, however, decided a drastic escalation was needed.
The killing by the FLN and its supporters of 123 people, including old
women and babies, shocked Soustelle into calling for more repressive
measures against the rebels. The government claimed it killed 1,273
guerrillas in retaliation; according to the FLN, 12,000 Muslims perished
in an orgy of bloodletting by the armed forces and police, as well as
colon gangs. After Philippeville, all-out war began in Algeria.
Soustelle's successor, Governor General Robert Lacoste, a socialist,
abolished the Algerian Assembly. Lacoste saw the assembly, which was
dominated by colons, as hindering the work of his administration, and he
undertook to rule Algeria by decreelaw . He favored stepping up French
military operations and granted the army exceptional police powers--a
concession of dubious legality under French law--to deal with the
mounting terrorism. At the same time, Lacoste proposed a new
administrative structure that would give Algeria a degree of autonomy
and a decentralized government. Although remaining an integral part of
France, Algeria was to be divided into five districts, each of which
would have a territorial assembly elected from a single slate of
candidates. Colon deputies were able to delay until 1958 passage of the
measure by the National Assembly.
In August-September 1956, the internal leadership of the FLN met to
organize a formal policy-making body to synchronize the movement's
political and military activities. The highest authority of the FLN was
vested in the thirty-four-member National Council of the Algerian
Revolution (Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne--CNRA),
within which the five-man Committee of Coordination and Enforcement
(Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution--CCE) formed the executive. The
externals, including Ben Bella, knew the conference was taking place but
by chance or design on the part of the internals were unable to attend.
Meanwhile, in October 1956 Lacoste had the FLN external political
leaders who were in Algeria at the time arrested and imprisoned for the
duration of the war. This action caused the remaining rebel leaders to
harden their stance.
France took a more openly hostile view of President Nasser's material
and political assistance to the FLN, which some French analysts believed
was the most important element in sustaining continued rebel activity in
Algeria. This attitude was a factor in persuading France to participate
in the November 1956 AngloSuez Campaign, meant to topple Nasser from
power.
During 1957 support for the FLN weakened as the breach between the
internals and externals widened. To halt the drift, the FLN expanded its
executive committee to include Abbas, as well as imprisoned political
leaders such as Ben Bella. It also convinced communist and Arab members
of the United Nations (UN) to apply diplomatic pressure on the French
government to negotiate a cease-fire.
Algeria - Conduct of the War
From its origins in 1954 as ragtag maquisards numbering in
the hundreds and armed with a motley assortment of hunting rifles and
discarded French, German, and United States light weapons, the ALN had
evolved by 1957 into a disciplined fighting force of nearly 40,000. More
than 30,000 were organized along conventional lines in external units
that were stationed in Moroccan and Tunisian sanctuaries near the
Algerian border, where they served primarily to divert some French
manpower from the main theaters of guerrilla activity to guard against
infiltration. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the internals in
the wilayat; estimates of the numbers of internals range from
6,000 to more than 25,000, with thousands of part-time irregulars.
During 1956 and 1957, the ALN successfully applied hit-and- run
tactics according to the classic canons of guerrilla warfare.
Specializing in ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact
with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army
patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colon farms, mines, and
factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. Once
an engagement was broken off, the guerrillas merged with the population
in the countryside. Kidnapping was commonplace, as were the ritual
murder and mutilation of captured French military, colons of both
genders and every age, suspected collaborators, and traitors. At first,
the revolutionary forces targeted only Muslim officials of the colonial
regime; later, they coerced or killed even those civilians who simply
refused to support them. Moreover, during the first two years of the
conflict, the guerrillas killed about 6,000 Muslims and 1,000 Europeans.
Although successful in engendering an atmosphere of fear and
uncertainty within both communities in Algeria, the revolutionaries'
coercive tactics suggested that they had not as yet inspired the bulk of
the Muslim people to revolt against French colonial rule. Gradually,
however, the FLN/ALN gained control in certain sectors of the Aurès,
the Kabylie, and other mountainous areas around Constantine and south of
Algiers and Oran. In these places, the ALN established a simple but
effective--although frequently temporary--military administration that
was able to collect taxes and food and to recruit manpower. But it was
never able to hold large fixed positions. Muslims all over the country
also initiated underground social, judicial, and civil organizations,
gradually building their own state.
The loss of competent field commanders both on the battlefield and
through defections and political purges created difficulties for the
FLN. Moreover, power struggles in the early years of the war split
leadership in the wilayat, particularly in the Aurès. Some
officers created their own fiefdoms, using units under their command to
settle old scores and engage in private wars against military rivals
within the ALN. Although identified and exploited by French
intelligence, factionalism did not materially impair the overall
effectiveness of ALN military operations.
To increase international and domestic French attention to their
struggle, the FLN decided to bring the conflict to the cities and to
call a nationwide general strike. The most notable manifestation of the
new urban campaign was the Battle of Algiers, which began on September
30, 1956, when three women placed bombs at three sites including the
downtown office of Air France. The ALN carried out an average of 800
shootings and bombings per month through the spring of 1957, resulting
in many civilian casualties and inviting a crushing response from the
authorities. The 1957 general strike, timed to coincide with the UN
debate on Algeria, was imposed on Muslim workers and businesses. General
Jacques Massu, who was instructed to use whatever methods were necessary
to restore order in the city, frequently fought terrorism with acts of
terrorism. Using paratroopers, he broke the strike and systematically
destroyed the FLN infrastructure there. But the FLN had succeeded in
showing its ability to strike at the heart of French Algeria and in
rallying a mass response to its appeals among urban Muslims. Moreover,
the publicity given the brutal methods used by the army to win the
Battle of Algiers, including the widespread use of torture, cast doubt
in France about its role in Algeria.
Despite complaints from the military command in Algiers, the French
government was re