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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Uzbekistan
Index
Following the death of Stalin in 1953, the relative relaxation of
totalitarian control initiated by First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev (in
office 1953-64) brought the rehabilitation of some of the Uzbek
nationalists who had been purged. More Uzbeks began to join the Communist
Party of Uzbekistan and to assume positions in the government. However,
those Uzbeks who participated in the regime did so on Russian terms.
Russian was the language of state, and Russification was the prerequisite
for obtaining a position in the government or the party. Those who did not
or could not abandon their Uzbek lifestyles and identities were excluded
from leading roles in official Uzbek society. Because of these conditions,
Uzbekistan gained a reputation as one of the most politically conservative
republics in the Soviet Union.
As Uzbeks were beginning to gain leading positions in society, they also
were establishing or reviving unofficial networks based on regional and
clan loyalties. These networks provided their members support and often
profitable connections between them and the state and the party. An
extreme example of this phenomenon occurred under the leadership of Sharaf
Rashidov, who was first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan
from 1959 to 1982. During his tenure, Rashidov brought numerous relatives
and associates from his native region into government and party leadership
positions. The individuals who thus became "connected" treated
their positions as personal fiefdoms to enrich themselves.
In this way, Rashidov was able to initiate efforts to make Uzbekistan
less subservient to Moscow. As became apparent after his death, Rashidov's
strategy had been to remain a loyal ally of Leonid I. Brezhnev, leader of
the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982, by bribing high officials of the
central government. With this advantage, the Uzbek government was allowed
to merely feign compliance with Moscow's demands for increasingly higher
cotton quotas.
Data as of March 1996
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