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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Sudan
Index
SPLA soldier guarding a cattle vaccination program near
Kapoeta, June 1988
Courtesy Roger Winter
SPLA-built bridge on road between Kapoeta and Torit in
eastern Al Istiwai, 1990
Courtesy Roger Winter
The SPLA was formed in 1983 when Lieutenant Colonel John
Garang of the SPAF was sent to quell a mutiny in Bor of 500
southern troops who were resisting orders to be rotated to the
north. Instead of ending the mutiny, Garang encouraged mutinies
in other garrisons and set himself at the head of the rebellion
against the Khartoum government. Garang, a Dinka born into a
Christian family, had studied at Grinnell College, Iowa, and
later returned to the United States to take a company commanders'
course at Fort Benning, Georgia, and again to earn advanced
economics degrees at Iowa State University.
By 1986 the SPLA was estimated to have 12,500 adherents
organized into twelve battalions and equipped with small arms and
a few mortars. Recruits were trained across the border in
Ethiopia, probably with the help of Ethiopian army officers. By
1989 the SPLA's strength had reached 20,000 to 30,000; by 1991 it
was estimated at 50,000 to 60,000. Many members of the SPLA
continued their civilian occupations, serving in individual
campaigns when called upon. At least forty battalions had been
formed, bearing such names as Tiger, Crocodile, Fire, Nile,
Kalishnikov, Bee, Eagle, and Hippo.
In addition to Garang, who as commander in chief adopted the
rank of colonel, other senior officers included a field
commander, a chief of staff, and a chief of staff for
administration and logistics. Most of these officers, as well as
zonal commanders, held the rank of lieutenant colonel, while
battalion commanders were majors or captains. Promotion was based
on seniority and the number of battles fought. Consequently, most
of the senior leadership and field commanders were members of the
Dinka group. Others were from the Nuer and Shilluk groups.
Members of some other groups from Al Istiwai were given commands
to help win over members of their groups.
The SPLA claimed that its arms came from captured government
stocks or were brought by troops deserting from the SPAF. It
admitted to having received a considerable amount of support and
matériel from Libya before 1985 because of Libya's hostility
toward Nimeiri and its desire to see him overthrown. It denied
receiving arms from Ethiopia, although it operated from bases in
Ethiopia, and outside observers believed that that country
furnished the bulk of the SPLA's weaponry. The government's
claims that the SPLA had Israeli advisers and received equipment
from Israel were generally discounted. Its small arms included
Soviet, United States, and German assault rifles. According to
The Military Balance, 1991-92, the SPLA also had 60mm
mortars, 14.5mm antiaircraft guns, and Soviet SA-7 shoulder-fired
SAMs. Other sources claimed that the SPLA had captured or
otherwise acquired howitzers, heavier mortars, BM-21 truckmounted rocket launchers, jeep-mounted 106mm antitank recoilless
rifles, and about twenty armored vehicles. It had a supply of
land mines that were widely used.
Amnesty International and Africa Watch have cited deliberate
killings by the SPLA of SPAF and militia prisoners captured in
combat, and of civilians believed to be informers or opposed to
the insurgency movement. Although about 300 government troops
were being held by the SPLA as of mid-1989, there were reports
that after the capture of Bor, surrendering soldiers, possibly
numbering in the hundreds, were shot. Indiscriminate SPLA rocket
and mortar attacks on government-held towns resulted in many
civilian casualties.
Data as of June 1991
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