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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Sudan
Index
When the British attempted to forge an indigenous officer
class before World War II, most Sudanese officers came from upper
and middle-class urban families that enjoyed inherited wealth and
prestige. After that time, greater numbers were drawn from the
emerging class of merchants and civil servants inhabiting urban
areas where formal elementary and secondary education was more
easily obtainable. Officer cadets, who had to possess a fourthyear secondary school certificate, were chosen on the basis of
performance in a series of written and oral competitive
examinations. A requirement that cadets possess a good knowledge
of Arabic had long eliminated many southerners educated in
English who otherwise might have qualified. It was estimated that
only 5 to 10 percent of all Sudanese officer cadets in 1981 were
southerners.
The quality of incoming officers, extremely high during the
preindependence period, was thought to have been lowered by the
increased size of the army--particularly during the 1968-72 surge
in personnel strength. The Sudanese Communist Party, which had
become entrenched in the universities and trade unions during the
1960s, contributed to the emergence of a generation of officers
that was predominantly anti-Western. Many officers received their
initial training from Soviet advisers. After the revolt against
Nimeiri in 1971, in which some communist officers were
implicated, retribution fell on many of the officers with leftist
leanings. The officer corps became increasingly conservative at a
time when Nimeiri himself was stressing nationalism for Sudan.
The military faction that deposed Nimeiri in 1985 was not
distinguished by any particular political orientation, although
as individuals its members maintained links with all the
important social, religious, and ethnic groups.
In spite of the linkage of the Bashir junta to the NIF and
Nimeiri's earlier Islamization program, it was generally believed
that among career officers no more than 5 percent were dedicated
to Muslim activism. Most officers were modern in outlook, of
middle-class and urban backgrounds, and inclined to be
nonsectarian.
In the armed forces as a whole, the political and ethnic
makeup was influenced by historical factors. From the time of the
Anglo-Egyptian condominium, many nomadic peoples of northeastern
Sudan had served in the military, as had members of the
Khatmiyyah politico-religious sect. By the 1980s, however,
Sudanese from the northeast and the Nile Valley were estimated to
constitute no more than 20 percent of the military, although they
continued to be well represented in the officer corps. Many
officers had ties to the Khatmiyyah group and to the Mirghani
family and were supporters of the Democratic Unionist Party.
Under the Bashir government, northerners continued to dominate
the senior leadership, although numerous sensitive positions were
held by officers with origins in the south. A general who was a
Dinka led one of the brigades active in the fighting against the
Dinka-led SPLA.
In the early 1980s, it was estimated that members of the
Ansar politico-religious group and other Sudanese from Darfur and
Kurdufan provinces accounted for approximately 60 percent of the
army's enlisted manpower. The Ansar and other western Sudanese
might have been even more numerous in the uniformed services had
not recruitment restrictions been imposed during the Nimeiri
regime, when these groups were perceived to be among the major
sources of opposition to the national leadership.
The presence in the armed forces of non-Muslim black
southerners has been a source of contention in Sudan since the
condominium period. Until after World War II, southerners were
recruited for service only in the Equatoria Corps and rarely
served alongside northern Sudanese. Recruitment was suspended
after the 1955 mutiny in the south, and when it was resumed the
following year, southern volunteers were required to serve in the
north under northern officers. The rebellion in the south
discouraged southerners from joining the armed forces until the
1972 settlement.
As part of the Addis Ababa accords ending the civil war,
6,000 of the former Anya Nya (named after a tribal poison)
guerrillas were to be integrated gradually into the national
army's Southern Command to serve with 6,000 northerners. By
including southern officers in the top echelon of the Southern
Command, the two forces appeared to have meshed successfully. In
1982 it was estimated that southerners outnumbered northerners
7,000 to 5,000 in the Southern Command, but there were relatively
few southerners stationed in the north, and none held important
positions. Nimeiri's decision the following year to transfer
southern troops to the north because of his doubts over their
loyalty to the central government was resisted by the southerners
and was one of a number of factors that triggered the renewal of
the civil war.
Data as of June 1991
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