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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Somalia
Index
In the early 1980s, the Somali armed forces had to adjust to
the realities of their defeat in the Ogaden War. Somali manpower
had doubled during the conflict, but the Ethiopian army had
destroyed a significant amount of Somali equipment. Shortages of
military hardware, inadequate maintenance, and lack of spare
parts for what remained of Soviet-supplied equipment limited the
effectiveness of all units. Better relations between Somalia and
the United States resolved some of these problems. Between 1983
and 1986, United States military assistance to Somalia averaged
US$36 to US$40 million per year
(see Foreign Military Assistance
, this ch.). This aid was insufficient, however, to restore the
Somali armed forces to their pre-Ogaden War effectiveness.
As insurgent activity intensified during the late 1980s and
the Somali government failed to develop additional sources of
large-scale military assistance, the armed forces slowly
deteriorated. By 1990 the Somali military was in a state of
collapse. After Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in January 1991, the
SNA and all related military and security services ceased to
exist. Most of their military equipment fell into the hands of
insurgents, clan militiamen, or bandits. The status of former
military and security personnel varied. Some fled abroad to
countries such as Kenya or Ethiopia; others returned to civilian
life or became insurgents, bandits, or clan militia members. A
small number remained loyal to Siad Barre, who took refuge in
southern Somalia and then launched a military campaign to regain
power. The campaign failed, however, and Siad Barre sought exile
in Nigeria, where he remained in early 1992.
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