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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Saudi Arabia
Index
The rise of the centralized state has undercut tribal
autonomy, and sedentarization has undermined the economic
benefits of tribal organization, but in the 1990s the tribe
remained a central focus of identity for those claiming a tribal
affiliation. Contemporary tribal leadership continued to play a
pivotal role in relations between individuals and the central
government, particularly among those who were recently settled or
still nomadic.
The tribal leader, the
shaykh (see Glossary), governs by
consensus. Shaykhs acquire influence through their ability to
mediate disputes and persuade their peers toward a given course
of action. The qualities their position demands are a detailed
grasp of tribal affairs, a reputation for giving good advice, and
generosity. Shaykhs are essentially arbitrators; the process of
resolving disputes reflects the tribe's egalitarian ethos.
Shaykhs do not lead discussions but carefully ascertain
everyone's opinion on a given question. Consensus is necessary
before action is taken. To force a decision is to undermine one's
influence; leaders are effective only as long as they conform to
the tribe's expectations.
Tribal leaders in the past brokered relationships among
competing tribes and clans. Raiding was a mechanism of economic
redistribution that conferred status on strong and successful
raiding clans. Tribes or lineages could opt out of the round of
raiding and counterraiding by seeking the protection of a
stronger, more militarily oriented group. The protected paid
their protector an agreed sum (khuwa), in return for which
their lives and property were to be spared. The shaykh who
accepted khuwa was obliged to safeguard those who paid it
or compensate them for whatever damages they incurred. As with
the booty of raiding, the shaykh who accepted the payment could
only guarantee this influence by distributing it to his fellow
tribesmen. These client-patron relationships based on payment of
protection money were undermined by Abd al Aziz in the 1920s when
he released weaker tribes from obligations to stronger ones and
made himself the sole source of wealth redistributed from the
spoils of raiding, and then later from oil profits.
The working relationship between the monarchy and tribal
leaders is viewed in much the same framework as the traditional
relationship between the shaykh and tribal members. In fact, the
same framework of the relationship between tribal shaykh and
tribal members is the model for the ideal relationship between
the monarchy and all Saudi citizens. Just as the tribal shaykh
was expected to mediate disputes and assure the welfare of his
group by receiving tribute and dispensing largesse, governors in
the provinces and the king himself continue the custom of holding
an open audience
(majlis--see Glossary)
at which any tribesman or
other male citizen could gain a hearing. The largesse of the
shaykh was dispensed not as direct handouts of food or clothing,
as in the past, but through the institutions of the state
bureaucracy in the form of free medical care, welfare payments,
grants for housing, lucrative contracts, and government jobs.
The tribes of Arabia acknowledged the political authority of
the Saudi monarchy as being above the tribal group. Loyalty to
the state was not a matter of nationality or still less an
abstract notion of citizenship; it was a matter of loyalty to the
Al Saud (see Glossary)
and to the royal family as the focus of
the Islamic nation. In a study of the Al Murrah, Nicholas Hopkins
notes that "The Al Murrah make a distinction between al-Dawlah
(the state or bureaucracy) and al-Hukumah (the Saudi royal family
or governors); they are loyal to the latter and fearful of the
former, but fear that the state is taking over the government."
Most tribes were affiliated with the Al Saud through marriage
ties as the product of Abd al Aziz's deliberate policy of
cementing ties between himself and the tribal groups. In the
1970s and 1980s, the political alliance between tribe and state
was reinforced by marrying tribal women to government officials
and Saudi princes. According to a 1981 study carried out among
the Al Saar beduin in southern Arabia, these marriages were
encouraged by tribal leaders because they were seen as a means of
ensuring continuing access to government leaders.
Tribal solidarity has been institutionalized and tribal ties
to both dawlah and hukumah have been cemented
through the national guard. The amir of the Al Murrah tribal unit
studied by Hopkins was the head of a national guard unit composed
mainly of Al Murrah, and most Al Murrah families in the unit
under study had at least one family member serving in the
national guard. Through the national guard former nomads received
training and the potential for high-level careers, as well as
instruction in military sciences, and housing, health, and social
services for dependents and families. The government also
provided water taps and markets in cities, towns, and villages
that were used in marketing livestock. Also provided were
veterinary services, subsidized fodder, and buildings for
storage.
Data as of December 1992
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