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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Saudi Arabia
Index
Despite the political and military upheavals in surrounding
countries, Saudi Arabia's internal situation appeared to be under
control in early 1992. Most Saudis seemed to accept the authority
of the Al Saud and strict observance of Islamic law to ensure
domestic stability. However, the kingdom's sudden exposure to
international scrutiny after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990
brought into sharp relief the polarization between the two
competing forces of society--the powerful religious establishment
and the liberal reformist elements. The modern sector pressed for
greater popular participation in decision making and for greater
accountability by the government
(see Other Groups
, ch. 4).
Criticism and anger over corruption by members of the royal
family and other members of the elite were more openly expressed
than previously. King Fahd promised that he would create a
majlis ash shura (consultative council) to respond to
political grievances. Such promises had been made in the past,
however, with little result.
Some potential for social instability arose from the
modernists' belief that the ruling family remained too
deferential to traditional Muslim interests. These liberal
elements desired the opportunity for involvement in the political
process and a share of political power. In May 1991, it was
reported that even the conservative religious establishment had
petitioned the government for a consultative assembly. This
action was accompanied by demonstrations in several cities.
Extremists accused the religious establishment of hypocrisy in
adhering to Islamic practices and of the maldistribution of
wealth, fueling resentments within broad segments of Saudi
society.
Marginal political groups of the left and right were
considered illegal and their members were subject to arrest and
detention by government security organs. These groups included
the Organization of Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula,
the Arab Socialist Action Party, and the Party of God in the
Hijaz. The sizable alien population, estimated at 4.6 million in
1992 and representing more than half the labor force, was feared
as a possible source of divisiveness as well as a disruptive
influence on the thinking and attitudes of the indigenous
population. It was assumed that clandestine organs of external
political movements such as the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) were represented in the labor force. Among the most
numerous of the foreign workers were Yemenis, who always tended
to be regarded with suspicion. Because many of these workers were
employed in strategic economic sectors and in the oil industry,
strikes and sabotage were constant dangers. In 1990 the Saudi
authorities took measures to identify illegal residents and to
regularize their status or deport them. These efforts intensified
after the Persian Gulf crisis began, and about 1 million Yemenis
as well as Sudanese, Iraqis, and Palestinians were compelled to
leave.
In the oil-rich Eastern Province (Al Ahsa) lived between
200,000 and 400,000 Shia. They had endured two centuries of
Wahhabi subjugation and remained disaffected elements in Saudi
society. Riots in late 1979 and early 1980 among the Shia were
believed to have been inspired by taped messages of the Ayatollah
Khomeini. Because Shia comprised possibly half of the labor force
of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), from 1988 called
the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco), the government
treated their presence as a security problem. During the 1980s,
the government bolstered its security forces in the area, while
at the same time attempting to allay Shia resentment by
responding to their social and religious grievances. Among other
groups with a distinct identity within the kingdom were the
Hijazis, who lived along the mountainous western coast extending
to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and the tribes of Asir
Province just north of Yemen. Although both groups benefited from
the rising wealth of the country, they lacked sympathy for the
traditional royalist regime and for the strict religious
leadership. Accordingly, questions of their fundamental loyalty
to the Al Saud persisted.
The likelihood of schisms within the royal family arising
from policy differences or personal rivalries seemed remote but
could not be completely discounted. Factional disputes could
arise over such issues as the closeness of ties with the United
States or curbing the power of the religious establishment. For
the most part, the informal assembly of princes has succeeded in
keeping rivalries within bounds and has prevented internal
differences from becoming public issues.
In view of elaborate security measures, such as the division
of armed power between the regular military and the national
guard, and the substantial benefits enjoyed by both officers and
enlisted personnel, the possibility of an insurrection emerging
from the armed forces was regarded as highly unlikely.
Nevertheless, in 1991 leaflets critical of royal princes were
reportedly distributed in garrisons. The influence of radical
Islamists among soldiers and lower ranking officers was said to
be growing.
The military leadership has been free from serious
conspiracies against the regime except for an abortive coup by
air force officers in 1969. About 300 air force personnel were
arrested even before the plot was set in motion. The dissidents
were tried and sentenced to prison, but by the mid-1970s all had
been released. High wages and privileges tended to keep
discontent among the officer corps to a minimum. The appointment
of many members of the royal family to military positions also
provided a measure of protection against intrigue. The separate
national guard, with its tribal roots, provided an additional
safeguard against any threat from the military.
The prestige of the House of Saud was closely associated with
the protection of the holy places. When, in 1979, an armed group
of about 500 religious extremists occupied the Grand Mosque of
Mecca, the standing of the royal family was seriously affected.
The insurgent leader condemned the Al Saud for corruption,
declaring that the kingdom's rulers had forsaken the primary
tenets of Islam. Security forces did not immediately respond to
the occupation because of the Quran's strictures against shedding
blood in the holy place. Partly as a result of lack of
coordination and poor discipline, it took troops, national guard,
and security forces fourteen days of heavy fighting to oust the
insurgents. Many people were killed. The occupation of the Grand
Mosque inspired riots and demonstrations by Shia dissidents,
which were answered by the liberal use of firearms and the
sealing off of major trouble spots by the national guard
(see
The Reign of Khalid, 1975-82).
Followers of Ayatollah Khomeini tried to stir up trouble by
disrupting the annual hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, on several
occasions during the 1980s, but heavy security controls usually
succeeded in preventing major incidents
(see Pilgrimage
, ch. 2).
In July 1987, however, more than 400 people died as a result of a
serious riot instigated by thousands of Iranian pilgrims.
Khomeini called for the overthrow of the Saudi royal family to
avenge the pilgrims' deaths. Saudi Arabia, in turn, accused Iran
of staging the riots to support its demands that Mecca and Medina
be internationalized as pan-Islamic cities. Several Saudi Shia
were tried and executed for exploding bombs at Saudi oil
facilities in 1988, probably as retaliation by Iran and its
sympathizers against restrictions on Iranian attendance at the
annual pilgrimage after the 1987 riots. A number of bomb attacks
were made on Saudi agencies abroad--primarily offices of the
national airline, Saudia. Saudi diplomats were assassinated by
groups calling themselves the Party of God in the Hijaz, Soldiers
of the Right, and Arab Fury. Both types of attack were thought to
be the work of Saudi Shia instigated by elements of the Iranian
government. Saudi Arabia accused Iran in connection with two bomb
incidents during the 1989 hajj in apparent retaliation for Saudi
restrictions against Iranian pilgrims. Sixteen Kuwaiti Shia were
executed for these attacks
(see Regional Security
, ch. 4).
Some easing of relations with Iran occurred after Khomeini's
death in 1989. During the 1990 pilgrimage, more than 1,400
pilgrims were trampled to death or suffocated after they were
stampeded in an underground tunnel. The incident, however, was
not linked to Iran. Disputes over the size of the Iranian
contingent and rules governing their conduct prevented Iranians
from participating in the hajj for three years. In 1991 the
Saudis accepted a quota of 115,000 Iranian pilgrims and allowed
political demonstrations in Mecca. Although peaceful, the
demonstrations included strident attacks on the United States and
Israel.
The Persian Gulf War placed new strains on the government's
efforts to maintain the allegiances of both the modern, secular
segments of Saudi society and the traditional, religious
elements. Although it offered some conciliatory gestures to the
modernists, the government appeared adamant and ready to respond
forcefully to any dissent against the authority of the Al Saud.
The existence of a large and diffuse royal family, the vast
territorial extent of the kingdom, and its widely scattered
population centers reduced the likelihood that an attempt to
overthrow Saudi rule could succeed. Still, the government
continued to exercise control over the information media and
strictly supervised or prohibited independent interest groups
such as political parties or labor unions.
Islamic radicals were few in number but had undeniable
influence, projecting their messages from the public mosques and
university classrooms. Their criticism that the government under
King Fahd had weakened in its devotion to Islamic principles was
difficult to silence because it was offered in an Islamic
context. Islamist pressure for greater Islamization in education,
the press, and foreign policy appeared to strengthen after the
Persian Gulf War.
Data as of December 1992
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