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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Saudi Arabia
Index
Following the assassination, Crown Prince Khalid immediately
succeeded to the throne and received the oaths, formal pledges of
support from the family and tribal leaders, within the
traditional three days. Fahd, the minister of interior, was named
crown prince, as expected.
Khalid's preparation for ruling a modern state included his
accompanying Faisal on foreign missions and representing Saudi
Arabia at the United Nations. He was a quiet but influential
figure within the royal family. He was known, for instance, to
have rallied the family to support Faisal in the ouster of Saud
in 1964. The calm strength and consistency that he displayed
during this delicate and potentially dangerous crisis in many
ways typified his reign. Although he ruled quietly, he ruled
effectively and was considerably more than the figurehead many
had expected him to be.
Khalid's leadership style was remarkably different from
Faisal's. He was more liberal in terms of informing the press of
the rationale behind foreign policy decisions. And although he
largely used the same policymaking team as Faisal did, he allowed
them greater latitude in decisionmaking within their separate
portfolios. In regional affairs he permitted the governors
considerably more autonomy and even authorized their use of
discretionary funds. Above all, he valued consensus and the team
approach to problem solving.
The new king's first diplomatic coup was the conclusion in
April 1975 of a demarcation agreement concerning the Al Buraymi
Oasis, where the frontiers of Abu Dhabi, Oman, and Saudi Arabia
meet. Claims and counterclaims over this frontier area had
exacerbated relations among the three states for years. The
successful conclusion of negotiations under Khalid's aegis added
to his stature as a statesman among knowledgeable observers of
the peninsula political scene.
In April 1976, Khalid made state visits to all the gulf
states in the hope of promoting closer relations with his
peninsular neighbors. These early visits, in retrospect, probably
laid the foundation for the later establishment of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). Coinciding with Khalid's visits to
neighboring states, Iran called for a formal, collective security
arrangement of the shaykhdoms of the Persian Gulf. This proposal,
although not summarily rejected, was received with great coolness
by the Saudi government, as wary of Iran's hegemonistic
pretensions as they were of Iraq's.
Probably the most sensitive areas of Saudi Arabia's relations
with its neighbors during Khalid's reign were its relations with
the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR--North Yemen) and the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY--South Yemen). Despite the
establishment of relations with the YAR after the conclusion of
its civil war in 1967 and massive Saudi aid, relations remained
strained and marked by mutual distrust. The YAR government felt
that Saudi Arabia wished to maintain it only as a convenient
buffer state for protection of the kingdom against the PDRY, a
major recipient of Soviet arms.
In a reorganization of the Council of Ministers in late 1975,
Khalid named Crown Prince Fahd deputy prime minister and
designated Abd Allah (another half brother and the commander of
the Saudi Arabian National Guard) as second deputy prime minister
(see The Royal Family
, ch. 4;
Saudi Arabian National Guard
, ch.
5).
Fahd, who had already participated in major decisions, became
chief spokesman for the kingdom and a major architect of Saudi
modernization, foreign affairs, and oil policy. In 1976 a major
concern of the Saudi government was the year-old civil war in
Lebanon. Although strongly committed to the official Saudi
position that opposed outside intervention or interference in
Lebanese affairs, Fahd nevertheless was instrumental in setting
up a League of Arab States (Arab League) peacekeeping force.
Despite this increasing reliance on Fahd, the strains of office
began to tell on Khalid, forcing him to return to the United
States for successful open-heart surgery in Cleveland, Ohio.
Much of the kingdom's attention in the late 1970s and early
1980s was focused on the construction of the Yanbu and Jubayl
industrial complexes, to diversify the kingdom's industrial base
(see Non-Oil Industrial Sector
, ch. 3). In addition to expanding
industrial and petroleum facilities one of Khalid's major
domestic accomplishments was his emphasis on agricultural
development
(see Modern Agriculture
, ch. 3).
In the field of foreign affairs, United States-Saudi
relations continued to be cordial under Khalid, although Saudi
Arabia remained frustrated by perceived United States
intransigence in the settlement of the Palestinian problem. In a
January 1978 meeting with President Jimmy Carter in Riyadh, the
king insisted that peace in the area could be achieved only by
the complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, as
well as self-determination and resettlement rights for the
Palestinians.
Another topic reportedly discussed in Riyadh during this
meeting was Soviet penetration and growing influence through arms
sales and treaties of friendship with the two Yemens. Five months
after the Riyadh meeting Khalid asked Carter to sell advanced
fighter planes to Saudi Arabia to assist in countering communist
aggression in the area. The first delivery of the sixty F-15s
under the agreement approved by Carter arrived in the kingdom in
January 1982. The sale and delivery of the F-15s, the subsequent
United States release of sophisticated equipment to enhance the
capabilities of the aircraft, and the negotiations resulting in
the approval of the airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
aircraft owed much to Khalid's insistence on Saudi Arabia's being
treated as a full partner in all United States-Saudi areas of
joint concern.
In 1979 many of the kingdom's ideas about its own stability
and its relations concerning its neighbors and allies were
shattered. On March 26, 1979, as a result of the Egypt-Israeli
peace treaty, Khalid broke relations with Egypt and led in
seeking Arab economic sanctions against Egypt.
Some foreign observers thought in 1979 that traditionalism
was no longer a strong force in Saudi Arabia. This idea was
disproved when at least 500 dissidents invaded and seized the
Grand Mosque in Mecca on November 20, 1979. The leader of the
dissidents, Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaiba, a Sunni,
was from one of the foremost families of Najd. His grandfather
had ridden with Abd al Aziz in the early decades of the century,
and other family members were among the foremost of the Ikhwan.
Juhaiman said that his justification was that the Al Saud had
lost its legitimacy through corruption, ostentation, and mindless
imitation of the West--virtually an echo of his grandfather's
charge in 1921 against Abd al Aziz. Juhaiman's accusations
against the Saudi monarchy closely resembled Ayatollah Ruhollah
Musaui, Khomeini's diatribes against the shah.
The Saudi leadership was stunned and initially paralyzed by
the takeover. The Grand Mosque surrounds the Kaaba, symbol of the
oneness of God and believed by Muslims to have been built by the
Prophet Abraham. The courtyard is one of the sites where the
hajj, the fifth pillar of Islam, is enacted
(see Pilgrimage
, ch.
2). Because of the holiness of the place, no non-Muslims may
enter the city of Mecca. Furthermore, all holy places come under
a special injunction in Islam. It is forbidden to shed blood
there or to deface or to pollute them in any way. Despite careful
planning on Juhaiman's part, a guard was shot dead by one of the
nervous dissidents. Such a desecration is a major violation under
Islamic law and merits crucifixion for the convicted offender.
Juhaiman's party included women as well as men, other
peninsular Arabs, and a few Egyptians. A score of the dissidents
were unemployed graduates of the kingdom's seminary in Medina.
They had provisions for the siege they expected as well as
extensive supplies of arms.
The government's initial attempts to rout the dissidents were
stymied. Before any military move could be authorized, the ulama
had to issue a dispensation to allow the bearing of arms in a
holy place. When the religious problems were solved by
announcement of the ulama's ruling, logistical problems bogged
down the efforts of the military and the national guard for
several days. Finally, two weeks later the military effort
succeeded, and the dissidents were dislodged. All the surviving
males were eventually beheaded in the squares of four Saudi
cities.
Far from discounting the efforts of the rebels, the leaders
examined themselves and their policies more closely. Khalid,
particularly, was sensitive to their complaints. Many of the
dissidents had come from two of the tribes that traditionally
have been recruited for the national guard. Khalid had spent much
time with these people in the desert.
Compounding the nightmare for the regime were Shia riots in
Al Qatif in the Eastern Province two weeks after the siege of the
Grand Mosque. Many of the rioters bore posters with Khomenini's
picture. Although these were not the first Shia protests in the
kingdom (others had occurred in 1970 and 1978), the December
rioters had become emboldened by Khomeini's triumphal return to
Iran in early 1979. Up to 20,000 national guard troops were
immediately moved into the Eastern Province. Several
demonstrators were killed and hundreds reportedly arrested.
Almost visibly shaken by the takeover of the mosque and the
Shia disturbances, the Saudi leadership announced in the
aftermath of these events that a consultative assembly (majlis
ash shura) would soon be formed. The Shia disturbances in the
Eastern Province encouraged the government to take a closer look
at conditions there. Although it was clear that the Shia had been
radicalized by Khomeini, it was also obvious that repression and
imprisonment were stop-gap solutions and as likely to promote
further resistance as to quell it. Further, the Shia lived in the
area of the kingdom most vulnerable to sabotage, where numerous
oil and gas pipelines crisscross the terrain. Aramco had
adamantly refused to discriminate against the Shia in their
hiring practices, as had Saudi governmental agencies. Aramco had
a preponderance of Shia employees--not only because of Aramco's
location but also because Aramco employment offered a Shia the
best chance for mobility.
Compared with other towns in the Eastern Province, the Shia
towns of Al Qatif and Al Hufuf were depressed areas. The Shia
lacked decent schools, hospitals, roads, and sewerage and had
inadequate electrification and water supplies. Violent Shia
demonstrations occurred once against in February 1980, and,
although they were as harshly repressed as the previous ones, the
deputy minister of interior, Amir Ahmad ibn Abd al Aziz, was
directed to draw up a comprehensive plan to improve the standard
of living in Shia areas. His recommendations, which were
immediately accepted and implemented, included an electrification
project, swamp drainage, the construction of schools and a
hospital, street lighting, and loans for home construction.
In early November, a week before Ashura--the most important
Shia religious observance, which commemorates the death of
Husayn--the government announced a new US$240 million project for
Al Qatif. Shortly before Ashura, Fahd ordered the release of 100
Shia arrested in the November 1979 and February 1980
disturbances. Five days after Ashura, which was peaceful, Khalid
toured the area--a first for a Saudi monarch. Co-optation, which
served the Saudi leadership so well with the general populace,
also seemed the palliative for the Shia problem.
After the troubles of 1979 and 1980, the Saudi leadership
began to take a more assertive role in world leadership. Saudi
Arabia obtained agreement on the kingdom as the site of the
meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in January
1981. Hosting the conference of thirty-eight Muslim heads of
state was seen as a vehicle for refurbishing the Saudi image of
"guardian of the Holy Places." Also, the kingdom wished to
present an alternative to the Islamic radicalism of Libya's
Muammar al Qadhafi and Iran's Khomeini, both of whom had plagued
Saudi Arabia in the previous two years.
Shortly after the conference the Saudi leadership announced
the formation of the GCC project long favored by Khalid. Khalid
and Fahd had been campaigning actively for such an organization
for some time. The GCC included the six states of the peninsula
that have similar political institutions, social conditions, and
economic resources: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates. The aim of the GCC, as it was
formally announced at its first summit in May 1981, was to
coordinate and unify economic, industrial, and defense policies.
In the late 1970s Saudi Arabia faced a host of regional
problems. In addition to the legacy of the Palestinian problem,
early in Khalid's reign the civil war in Lebanon occurred. In
December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and in
September 1980 Iraq attacked Iran over suzerainty of the Shatt al
Arab waterway. In the latter connection, Saudi Arabia feared the
war might spread down the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, because Iraq
and Iran were so engaged, a unique opportunity existed of forming
an alliance that excluded them both. The two Yemens, who
registered their outrage at exclusion from the GCC, continued to
be one of the many Saudi headaches. The Soviet Union appeared to
be increasing its influence in both Yemens.
One month after the GCC second summit meeting in Riyadh,
Iranian-trained Shia attempted a coup d'état in Bahrain in
December 1981. The insurgents, most of whom were captured,
included Shia from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, reminding the Saudis
of one of their worst-case scenarios. Work was speeded up on a
causeway to connect Bahrain to the Saudi mainland, completed in
1986. The Saudis believed that given an emergency that the
Bahrainis could not contain, the Saudi national guard could use
the causeway to provide support.
In another regional development, the Saudis were angry at the
Syrians for having signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
with the Soviet Union. The Saudis, however, remained conciliatory
in the hope of maintaining the facade of Arab unity and also so
that they could function as mediators. In December 1980, when
Jordanian and Syrian troops were massed for confrontation, Amir
Abd Allah was sent to avert a crisis. Abd Allah, whose mother
hailed from a Syrian tribe and who maintained excellent personal
relations there, was successful.
Fahd was especially active in advancing Saudi foreign policy
objectives. He is credited with averting an escalation of
tensions between Algeria and Morocco in May 1981. His major
effort in 1980 and 1981 was in devising some alternative to the
divisive Camp David Accords, which had isolated Egypt, virtually
the only major state in the region on which the Saudis could
depend. However, before there could be a Saudi-Egyptian
rapprochement, a face-saving resolution to Egypt's agreement with
Israel was necessary to preserve Saudi Arabia's legitimacy as an
Arab mediator.
In August 1981, prior to Sadat's departure for the United
States to discuss the resumption of the peace process, Fahd
proposed his own peace plan to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Fahd peace plan, as it became known, stressed the necessity
for a comprehensive settlement that included the creation of a
Palestinian state and Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist
in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Although the plan was endorsed by the PLO, dissident
Palestinians, Libya, and Syria rejected it, leading to an early
close of the Arab Summit in November 1988
(see Arab Nationalism
, ch. 4).
Data as of December 1992
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