Saudi Arabia
Index
Until Iraq concentrated its forces on Saudi Arabia's
northeastern border after the occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the
kingdom had been exposed to few direct threats to its territory.
The only overtly hostile actions were from Yemeni-based Egyptian
air and naval units in 1963, PDRY forces that attacked Saudi
border posts in 1969 and 1973, and Iranian attacks on shipping in
the Persian Gulf in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the nation's wide
geographic expanse and lengthy coastlines on both the Red Sea and
Persian Gulf, combined with a small, scattered population,
presented unusual problems of defense. With the world's largest
reserves of oil and vulnerable oil processing facilities, the
kingdom saw itself as a tempting target for aggressive forces.
Moreover, it was militarily weak in a highly volatile region of
the world, amid heavily armed and potentially hostile neighbors.
Until the late 1980s, Saudi security concerns focused on the
communist influence in nearby countries, notably in Ethiopia and
the PDRY, which gave the Soviet Union access to naval facilities
in the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia interpreted the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979 as a means of establishing a staging
area for future operations in the Persian Gulf. The revolution in
Iran earlier that year produced a radical Shia-dominated regime
in Tehran and introduced a far more immediate threat to gulf
stability. Iranian belligerence led Saudi Arabia to support Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq War. The heating up of the tanker war in
1987 escalated tensions. The Saudis, concerned about domestic
attitudes and the reaction of Arab states, discouraged deeper
United States involvement in the crisis. In April 1987, the
United States agreed to Kuwait's request that Kuwaiti tankers
sail under the United States flag with naval escorts. Saudi
Arabia cooperated with this operation by assisting in mine
clearance and air surveillance.
The Saudi leadership considered Iran's condemnation of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and its adherence to United
Nations (UN) sanctions during the Persian Gulf War to be welcome
signs of moderation. The overthrow of the Marxist regime in Addis
Ababa in 1991 and the collapse of Soviet influence in the Middle
East further reduced the threat of radical influences near the
kingdom's borders.
The Persian Gulf War in 1991 battered the offensive
capability of Iraq's formidable military machine. An estimated
forty divisions were lost or rendered ineffective. About twothirds of Iraq's 4,500 tanks were destroyed as well as more than
2,000 artillery pieces. Nevertheless, the Iraqi army's active
manpower strength was an estimated 380,000 at the war's end,
including three divisions of the Republican Guards, the troops
considered most loyal to President Saddam Husayn. Despite
crippling blows to its fighting potential, Iraq remained a
potential adversary and a long-term security threat to Saudi
Arabia's limited forces.
Relations with Yemen have always been troubled in modern
times. The border has been the scene of periodic tribal clashes
and boundary disputes. The Riyadh government's bases in the
southern desert enabled it to maintain ground and air units near
the Yemeni frontier. Saudi Arabia had subsidized the Yemen Arab
Republic (YAR--North Yemen) government and the northern Yemeni
tribes and tried to isolate the Marxist government of the PDRY.
The reuniting of the two Yemens in May 1990 left Saudi Arabia
uneasy that secular leftist elements of a more populous combined
Yemen might prevail over the Islamic conservatism of the former
YAR. Relations worsened when Yemen came out in support of Iraq,
after the latter's invasion of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia retaliated by
deporting about 1 million Yemeni workers whose repatriated
earnings had formed a major part of Yemen's economy.
Long stretches of uninhabited desert, known as the Empty
Quarter, or Rub al Khali, formed disputed territory between Yemen
and Saudi Arabia. To counter Yemeni smuggling and to maintain
better surveillance of the border area, Saudi Arabia announced in
1991 that it was seeking bids on an electronic security system to
detect illegal crossings. In 1992 Saudi Arabia demanded that
foreign oil companies discontinue test drilling in parts of the
disputed territory that had long been under Yemeni control. The
kingdom was thought to fear that a surge of oil revenues could be
used to modernize the Yemeni armed forces. Saudi border patrols
were increased and, according to the Yemenis, Saudi agents were
active among residents of the disputed area for the purpose of
undermining Yemen's authority.
Saudi Arabia viewed with concern the possibility of renewed
Arab-Israeli hostilities and the strong Israeli military
establishment was seen as a potential threat to its security.
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia considered a comprehensive settlement
of the Palestinian question a primary objective of its policies.
The Saudis linked the influence of revolutionary Arab regimes to
the continuation of the Arab-Israeli confrontation and the
Israeli occupation of Arab territory on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Saudi Arabia did not see war with Israel as an
imminent threat, but it feared Israel's ability to mount
strategic air strikes against sensitive Saudi targets at the
outset of any future Arab-Israeli conflict. The possibility of
such preemptive strikes by Israel had impelled Saudi Arabia to
commit a major part of its modern air defense to its northern
border zones. The most likely Israeli targets in the kingdom
would be the complex of military bases around Tabuk in the
northwest or the pipeline terminal and other oil facilities at
Yanbu al Bahr on the Red Sea. More distant Saudi targets could be
reached with aerial refueling.
In spite of past differences and their considerable military
strengths, the neighboring Islamic countries of Egypt and Syria
were not regarded in 1992 as potential adversaries. In certain
respects, Saudi Arabia's geographic position on the peninsula was
a favorable one. The harshness of its interior desert practically
limited overland attack to the northwest corner facing Jordan and
Syria and to the northeast corridor parallel to the Persian Gulf.
Harassing attacks by air or sea could be very damaging, however,
disrupting oil production and tanker traffic.
Countries surrounding the Arabian Peninsula--although heavily
armed--were poorly equipped to mount and sustain a full-scale
invasion by sea or air. Saudi Arabia would be less prepared to
deal with intervention by a neighboring power in one of the
smaller states of the peninsula, using local disturbances or
turmoil as a pretext and then expanding its position. The
politically vulnerable gulf oil states had been subject to
outside intervention in the past; for this reason, Saudi Arabia
and the smaller states had joined to form a system for collective
security.
Data as of December 1992
The Military Threat
Until Iraq concentrated its forces on Saudi Arabia's
northeastern border after the occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the
kingdom had been exposed to few direct threats to its territory.
The only overtly hostile actions were from Yemeni-based Egyptian
air and naval units in 1963, PDRY forces that attacked Saudi
border posts in 1969 and 1973, and Iranian attacks on shipping in
the Persian Gulf in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the nation's wide
geographic expanse and lengthy coastlines on both the Red Sea and
Persian Gulf, combined with a small, scattered population,
presented unusual problems of defense. With the world's largest
reserves of oil and vulnerable oil processing facilities, the
kingdom saw itself as a tempting target for aggressive forces.
Moreover, it was militarily weak in a highly volatile region of
the world, amid heavily armed and potentially hostile neighbors.
Until the late 1980s, Saudi security concerns focused on the
communist influence in nearby countries, notably in Ethiopia and
the PDRY, which gave the Soviet Union access to naval facilities
in the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia interpreted the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979 as a means of establishing a staging
area for future operations in the Persian Gulf. The revolution in
Iran earlier that year produced a radical Shia-dominated regime
in Tehran and introduced a far more immediate threat to gulf
stability. Iranian belligerence led Saudi Arabia to support Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq War. The heating up of the tanker war in
1987 escalated tensions. The Saudis, concerned about domestic
attitudes and the reaction of Arab states, discouraged deeper
United States involvement in the crisis. In April 1987, the
United States agreed to Kuwait's request that Kuwaiti tankers
sail under the United States flag with naval escorts. Saudi
Arabia cooperated with this operation by assisting in mine
clearance and air surveillance.
The Saudi leadership considered Iran's condemnation of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and its adherence to United
Nations (UN) sanctions during the Persian Gulf War to be welcome
signs of moderation. The overthrow of the Marxist regime in Addis
Ababa in 1991 and the collapse of Soviet influence in the Middle
East further reduced the threat of radical influences near the
kingdom's borders.
The Persian Gulf War in 1991 battered the offensive
capability of Iraq's formidable military machine. An estimated
forty divisions were lost or rendered ineffective. About twothirds of Iraq's 4,500 tanks were destroyed as well as more than
2,000 artillery pieces. Nevertheless, the Iraqi army's active
manpower strength was an estimated 380,000 at the war's end,
including three divisions of the Republican Guards, the troops
considered most loyal to President Saddam Husayn. Despite
crippling blows to its fighting potential, Iraq remained a
potential adversary and a long-term security threat to Saudi
Arabia's limited forces.
Relations with Yemen have always been troubled in modern
times. The border has been the scene of periodic tribal clashes
and boundary disputes. The Riyadh government's bases in the
southern desert enabled it to maintain ground and air units near
the Yemeni frontier. Saudi Arabia had subsidized the Yemen Arab
Republic (YAR--North Yemen) government and the northern Yemeni
tribes and tried to isolate the Marxist government of the PDRY.
The reuniting of the two Yemens in May 1990 left Saudi Arabia
uneasy that secular leftist elements of a more populous combined
Yemen might prevail over the Islamic conservatism of the former
YAR. Relations worsened when Yemen came out in support of Iraq,
after the latter's invasion of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia retaliated by
deporting about 1 million Yemeni workers whose repatriated
earnings had formed a major part of Yemen's economy.
Long stretches of uninhabited desert, known as the Empty
Quarter, or Rub al Khali, formed disputed territory between Yemen
and Saudi Arabia. To counter Yemeni smuggling and to maintain
better surveillance of the border area, Saudi Arabia announced in
1991 that it was seeking bids on an electronic security system to
detect illegal crossings. In 1992 Saudi Arabia demanded that
foreign oil companies discontinue test drilling in parts of the
disputed territory that had long been under Yemeni control. The
kingdom was thought to fear that a surge of oil revenues could be
used to modernize the Yemeni armed forces. Saudi border patrols
were increased and, according to the Yemenis, Saudi agents were
active among residents of the disputed area for the purpose of
undermining Yemen's authority.
Saudi Arabia viewed with concern the possibility of renewed
Arab-Israeli hostilities and the strong Israeli military
establishment was seen as a potential threat to its security.
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia considered a comprehensive settlement
of the Palestinian question a primary objective of its policies.
The Saudis linked the influence of revolutionary Arab regimes to
the continuation of the Arab-Israeli confrontation and the
Israeli occupation of Arab territory on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Saudi Arabia did not see war with Israel as an
imminent threat, but it feared Israel's ability to mount
strategic air strikes against sensitive Saudi targets at the
outset of any future Arab-Israeli conflict. The possibility of
such preemptive strikes by Israel had impelled Saudi Arabia to
commit a major part of its modern air defense to its northern
border zones. The most likely Israeli targets in the kingdom
would be the complex of military bases around Tabuk in the
northwest or the pipeline terminal and other oil facilities at
Yanbu al Bahr on the Red Sea. More distant Saudi targets could be
reached with aerial refueling.
In spite of past differences and their considerable military
strengths, the neighboring Islamic countries of Egypt and Syria
were not regarded in 1992 as potential adversaries. In certain
respects, Saudi Arabia's geographic position on the peninsula was
a favorable one. The harshness of its interior desert practically
limited overland attack to the northwest corner facing Jordan and
Syria and to the northeast corridor parallel to the Persian Gulf.
Harassing attacks by air or sea could be very damaging, however,
disrupting oil production and tanker traffic.
Countries surrounding the Arabian Peninsula--although heavily
armed--were poorly equipped to mount and sustain a full-scale
invasion by sea or air. Saudi Arabia would be less prepared to
deal with intervention by a neighboring power in one of the
smaller states of the peninsula, using local disturbances or
turmoil as a pretext and then expanding its position. The
politically vulnerable gulf oil states had been subject to
outside intervention in the past; for this reason, Saudi Arabia
and the smaller states had joined to form a system for collective
security.
Data as of December 1992
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