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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Saudi Arabia
Index
In contrast to its relations with Iran or Iraq, Saudi
Arabia's ties with the small Arab oil-producing states along its
eastern flank have been historically close. In 1992 the kingdom
was allied with its fellow monarchies and shaykhdoms of Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional collective security
and economic organization. Saudi Arabia had taken the lead in
forming the GCC. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September
1980 had provided the impetus Riyadh needed to convince its
neighbors to join in a defensive pact. During the initial phase
of that conflict, Iraqi forces achieved major victories inside
Iran. Despite their distrust of the revolutionary regime in
Tehran, Iraq's early successes alarmed the Saudis because they
feared a defeat of Iran would embolden Baghdad to adopt an
aggressive posture against other countries, especially in the
Arabian Peninsula. Riyadh did not need to persuade the Kuwaitis
and other gulf rulers about the security implications of a
victorious Iraq; they all shared similar views of Iraqi
ambitions, and they recognized the vulnerability of their small
states. Representatives from Saudi Arabia and the five other
countries began meeting in January 1981 to work out the details
of an alliance, and the GCC was officially inaugurated four
months later.
Although the Iran-Iraq War continued to preoccupy the GCC
until the belligerents agreed to a cease-fire in 1988, the focus
of security concerns had shifted from Baghdad to Tehran by late
1981, when it became obvious that Iraq would not be able to
defeat Iran. Even before the Iran-Iraq War had begun, the Saudis
and their allies believed Iranian agents fomented demonstrations
and riots among the Shia population living in the countries on
the Arab side of the Persian Gulf. Renewed alarm about Iran was
aroused in December 1981, when Bahraini police announced the
arrest of a clandestine group of Arab men associated with the
illegal Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, based in
Tehran. The Saudis and most other GCC rulers believed that the
group, which had a large cache of arms allegedly provided by the
Iranian embassy in Manama, planned to assassinate Bahraini
officials and seize public buildings as part of a plot to
overthrow the regime. This incident convinced Saudi Arabia that
Iran sponsored terrorist groups and inclined the kingdom to
support the Iraqi war effort more openly.
GCC concerns about Iranian involvement with regional
terrorism remained high for almost three years following the
Bahrain incident. Between 1982 and 1985, a series of
assassinations, detonations of explosives-laden automobiles, and
airplane hijackings throughout the Middle East, as well as the
outbreak of the tanker war in the Persian Gulf, all contributed
to reinforcing the strong suspicions about Iran. From a GCC
perspective, the most unsettling example of terrorism was the
1983 truck bombing of several sites in Kuwait, including the
United States embassy. The Saudis and their allies generally
disbelieved Iranian denials of complicity. Nevertheless, GCC
security forces failed to obtain conclusive evidence directly
linking Iran to the various Arab Shia groups that carried out
violent acts. The lack of tangible proof prompted Oman and the
UAE to improve their bilateral relations with Iran and to mediate
between Riyadh and Tehran. These efforts actually led to a
limited rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. For about a
year, from 1985 to 1986, the two countries cooperated on several
issues including oil policy.
During 1986 the intensification of the tanker-war phase of
the Iran-Iraq conflict and the revelations of covert United
States arms shipments to Tehran combined to refocus GCC concerns
on conventional security matters. Saudi Arabia differed with
Kuwait regarding the most effective means of dealing with the new
threat. In particular, the Saudis rejected the Kuwaiti view that
the presence of foreign warships in the Persian Gulf would
intimidate Iran into ceasing retaliatory attacks on GCC shipping.
The Saudis believed that the presence of foreign naval vessels
would merely provoke Iran into widening the conflict, and the
ultimate consequences would be adverse for all the GCC states.
Riyadh therefore supported the renewal of United Nations (UN)
efforts to negotiate a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. After
the UN Security Council passed Resolution 598 calling for a
cease-fire and mediated peace talks between the warring
countries, Saudi Arabia joined its GCC allies in support of all
diplomatic moves to bring sanctions against Iran if it refused to
accept the resolution. All GCC countries were relieved when Iran
agreed in 1988 to abide by the terms of Resolution 598.
The cessation of fighting between Iran and Iraq led to the
realization of the GCC's deepest fears: that a militarily strong
Iraq would try to intimidate its neighbors. By the end of 1988,
Iraq had begun to pressure Kuwait for the rights to use Kuwaiti
islands that controlled access to Iraqi ports. Tension between
Iraq and Kuwait escalated, culminating in August 1990 with Iraq's
invasion, occupation, and annexation of the small country. The
aggression revealed to a stunned GCC that the alliance had
insufficient power to deter or repel an attack on one of its
members. Saudi Arabia thus requested United States assistance, as
well as assistance from its Arab allies. All other GCC members
provided military contingents for the coalition that was formed
to confront Iraq. Following the liberation of Kuwait, the GCC
decided that it would be necessary to maintain security alliances
with countries from outside the Persian Gulf region. As of 1992,
however, the GCC had not negotiated any arrangements for itself,
although individual members had concluded bilateral defense pacts
with other countries.
Data as of December 1992
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