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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Saudi Arabia
Index
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Saudi Arabia,
1992
SAUDI ARABIA OBSERVED in 1992 the sixtieth anniversary of its
existence as a state and the tenth anniversary of King Fahd ibn
Abd al Aziz Al Saud's accession to the throne. Rather than
adopting the title of king, Fahd was styled in Arabic
Khadim al Haramayn, or "custodian of the two holy mosques,"
thereby stressing the Islamic aspect of his governance. In this
regard, he echoed the partnership between the religious and
political elements of society established in 1744 by Muhammad ibn
Saud, the
amir (see Glossary)
in Ad Diriyah near Riyadh, and
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, the shaykh who had come to the area
to promote the doctrine of the oneness of God in true Islam. As a
result of this cooperation and based on the strict Hanbali
interpretation of Islamic law, political rule was the province of
the House of Saud (Al Saud), whose leader was also given the
title of imam, and religious authority was in the hands of
the Al ash Shaykh (the family of the shaykh, Muhammad ibn
Abd al Wahhab). This arrangement, however, did not give unchecked
political power to the ruler because in accordance with the
precepts of Abd al Wahhab, based on the political theory of Taqi
ad Din ibn Taimiya, secular authority must conform to divine law
and produce civil order in order to be legitimate.
Historically, the collaboration of the Al Saud and the Al ash
Shaykh resulted in the Al Saud dominion in Najd, the central
region of the Arabian Peninsula, for more than two centuries,
except for the brief period from 1891 to 1902 when the Al Rashid
exiled the Al Saud to Kuwait. Because it has never been subjected
to foreign rule and the consequent dissolution of its
homogeneity, Najd has exerted an unusually strong influence on
the jurisdiction of the Al Saud. In addition, because the region
lacked large cities and the strong leadership they could provide,
an interdependent relationship developed among Najdi towns, which
paid tribute, and tribes, which provided protection.
Traditionally, Najdi political power lay with the tribal shaykhs,
who, when they became amirs, or governors of a wider area,
endeavored to dissociate themselves from their tribal roles
because they were ruling a more diverse population.
The prominence of the Al Saud is reflected in the name
Saudi Arabia; the country is the only one to be named for
the ruling family. The present kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives
its existence from the campaigns of its founder, Abd al Aziz ibn
Abd ar Rahman Al Saud, who initially captured Riyadh with his
beduin followers in 1902. Thereafter, with the aid of the Ikhwan,
or brotherhood, a fervent group of Wahhabi beduin warriors, he
retook the rest of Najd, defeating the Al Rashid forces at Hail
in the north in 1921, and in 1924 conquering the Hijaz, including
Mecca and Medina. Chosen as king of the Hijaz and Najd in 1927,
Abd al Aziz was obliged to defeat the Ikhwan militarily in 1929
because in their zeal the Ikhwan had encroached on the borders of
neighboring states, thereby arousing the concern of Britain, in
particular. In 1932 Abd al Aziz proclaimed the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, which covered an area approximating to the territory of
the present state. The discovery of oil in 1938 ultimately
transformed the kingdom and the lives of its inhabitants. During
his reign, however, Abd al Aziz sought to obtain "the iron of the
West without its ideas," as the king phrased it; he sought to
make use of Western technology but at the same time to maintain
the traditional institutions associated with Islamic and Arab
life.
Upon Abd al Aziz's death in 1953, his son Saud ibn Abd al
Aziz Al Saud succeeded to the throne. Saud proved to be an
ineffective ruler and a spendthrift, whose luxurious life-style,
together with that of the advisers with whom he surrounded
himself, rapidly led to the depletion of the kingdom's treasury.
As a result, the Al Saud obliged Saud in 1958, and again in 1962,
to give his brother, Crown Prince Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud,
executive power to conduct foreign and domestic affairs. In 1964
the royal family, with the consent of the ulama, or religious
leaders, deposed Saud and made Faisal king, appointing Khalid ibn
Abd al Aziz Al Saud, another brother, as crown prince.
Faisal, a devout Muslim, sought to modernize the kingdom,
especially in regard to economic development, education, and
defense, while simultaneously playing a key role in foreign
policy. For instance, during the October 1973 War between Israel
and the Arab states of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, Faisal helped to
initiate an oil embargo against those countries that supported
Israel; the embargo led to the tripling of oil prices. He
supported the education of girls and the opening of government
television stations to promote education. Tragically, Faisal was
assassinated in 1975 by a deranged nephew.
Crown Prince Khalid ibn Abd al Aziz became king (and de facto
prime minister) immediately; his brother, Fahd ibn Abd al Aziz Al
Saud, served as deputy prime minister and another brother, Abd
Allah ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, as second deputy prime minister.
Khalid dealt primarily with domestic affairs, stressing
agricultural development. He also visited all the gulf states,
and took a keen interest in settling Saudi Arabia's outstanding
boundary disputes, including that of the Al Buraymi Oasis with
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1975. (The area near Al Buraymi
disputed with Oman had been resolved in 1971.) Fahd became the
principal spokesman on foreign affairs and oil policy. Khalid's
reign was an eventful one; it saw the attempt by strict Islamists
(also known as fundamentalists) who criticized the corrupting
influence of Western culture on the royal family to take over the
Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, riots by Eastern Province
Shia (see Glossary) also
in 1979 and 1980, and the formation of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981.
Upon Khalid's death in 1982, Fahd assumed the throne, with
Abd Allah becoming crown prince. Fahd soon faced the impact on
the kingdom of the fall in oil revenues, which ended in the 1986
oil price crash. Recognizing the need for a more united Arab
front, particularly in view of the deteriorating economic
situation, he reestablished diplomatic relations with Egypt in
1987; relations had been broken in 1978 as a result of Anwar as
Sadat's signing of the Camp David Accords creating a separate
peace between Egypt and Israel. Fahd also played a mediating role
in the Lebanese civil war in 1989, bringing most of the members
of the Lebanese National Assembly to At Taif to settle their
differences.
To understand the forces that have shaped Saudi Arabia in the
early 1990s, one must consider the roles of geographic factors,
tribal allegiance and beduin life, Islam, the Al Saud, and the
discovery of oil. Tribal affiliation has been the focus of
identity in the Arabian Peninsula, approximately 80 percent of
which is occupied by Saudi Arabia. Well into the present century,
several great deserts, including the Rub al Khali, one of the
largest in the world, cut tribal groups off from one another and
isolated Najd, particularly, from other areas of the country. As
a result, a high degree of cultural homogeneity developed among
the inhabitants; the majority follow Sunni Wahhabi Islam and a
patriarchal family system. Only about 5 percent of the Saudi
population adheres to the Shia sect. The Shia, in general,
represent the lowest socioeconomic group in the country, and
their grievances over their status have led to protest
demonstrations in the 1970s and again in 1979-80, that have
resulted in government actions designed to better their lot.
Saudi tribal allegiance and the beduin heritage have been
weakened, however, since the mid-twentieth century by the
increased role of a centralized state, by the growth of
urbanization, and by the industrialization that has accompanied
the finding of oil. At the same time, the impact of Islam on
different elements of the population has varied. Many of the
educated younger technocrats have felt a need to adapt Islamic
institutions to fit the demands of modern technology. Other young
people, more conservatively inclined, as well as a number of
their elders and those with a more traditional beduin life-style,
have deplored the alienation from Muslim values and the
corruption that they believe Western ways and the presence,
according to 1992 census figures, of some 4.6 million foreigners
(in contrast to an indigenous population of 12.3 million) have
brought into the kingdom. Their activist Islamism was reflected
in the 1979 attempt by extremists to take over the Grand Mosque
in Mecca and by other aspects of the Islamic revival, such as the
prominent wearing of the hijab, or long black cloak and
veil by women, and the more active role of the Committees for the
Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (mutawwiin)
in enforcing standards of public morality. The government found
itself caught between these two trends. On the one hand, it
feared the extremism of some of the traditionalists, which could
well undermine the economic, education, and social development
programs that the government had been implementing and which also
constituted a threat to internal security. On the other hand, as
guardian of the holy places of Islam, the sites of the annual
pilgrimage for Muslims the world over, the government needed to
legitimate itself as an "Islamic government."
The government therefore has sought to achieve political and
social compromises. Repeated announcements have been made
regarding the royal family's intention to create a consultative
council, first proposed by King Faisal in 1964, as a means of
giving a greater voice to the people. On August 20, 1993, Fahd
announced the appointment of sixty men to the Consultative
Council. Members of the council were primarily religious and
tribal leaders; government officials, businessmen, and retired
military and police officers were also included. An additional
small step was King Fahd's decree of March 1992 establishing a
main, or basic, code of laws that regularizes succession to the
throne (the king chooses the heir apparent from among the sons
and grandsons of Abd al Aziz) and sets forth various
administrative procedures concerning the state. Fahd also issued
a decree concerning the provinces, or regions, of the kingdom.
Each region is to have an amir, a deputy, and a consultative
council composed of at least ten persons appointed by the amir
for a four-year term. The code does not, however, protect
individual rights in the Western sense, as many professionals and
technocrats had desired. Rather, it says that "the state protects
human rights in accordance with the Islamic sharia."
The Saudi concept of legitimacy is akin to the beduin concept
of tribal democracy in which the individual exchanges views with
the tribal shaykh. Saudi rulers and most traditionalists reject
Western participatory democracy, because the latter establishes
the people as the source of decision rather than the will of God
as found in the sharia and as interpreted by the ulama. Moreover,
in their view, democracy lacks the stability that a Muslim form
of government provides. For these reasons, the government has
tended to repress dissent and jail dissidents. Such repression
applied to students and religious figures who belonged to such
organizations as the Organization of Islamic Revolution in the
Arabian Peninsula, active in January and February 1992 in
criticizing the ruling family and the government.
Socially, the education of girls, although placed under the
supervision of the religious authorities, has led over the four
decades that girls' schools have existed to a considerable number
of women graduates who were seeking employment in various sectors
and who increasingly were making their presence felt. This trend
occurred at a time of rising unemployment for Saudi males,
particularly for graduates in the field of religious studies, and
posed a further potential source of dissidence. In addition,
growing urbanization was tending to increase the number of
nuclear as opposed to extended families, thereby breaking down
traditional social structures. There were also indications that
drug smuggling and drug use were rising; twenty of the forty
executions that occurred between January 1 and May 1, 1993, were
drug related.
The Al Saud played the central role in achieving the needed
compromises in the political, social, and foreign affairs fields,
as well as in directing the economy with the support of the
technocrats and the merchants. The control exercised by the Al
Saud is demonstrated by the fact that as of 1993 the amirs, or
governors, of all fourteen of Saudi Arabia's regions were members
of the royal family. Some members of the family, such as King
Fahd and his full brothers Sultan, Nayif, and Salman, were
considered to be, however, more aligned with the modernizers;
King Fahd's half brother Crown Prince Abd Allah, was more of a
traditionalist. Specifically, the crown prince enjoyed the
support of the tribal elements and headed the Saudi Arabian
National Guard, a paramilitary body composed largely of beduin
soldiers that served as a counterbalance to the regular armed
forces, which were headed by Minister of Defense and Aviation
Amir Sultan ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud. The nation's police force
reported to Minister of Interior Amir Nayif ibn Abd al Aziz Al
Saud.
The crown prince was also considered closer than the king to
the religious establishment, or the ulama. Thirty to forty of the
most influential ulama, mainly members of the Al ash Shaykh,
constituted the Council of Senior Ulama, seven of whose members
were dismissed by the king in December 1992 on the pretext of
"poor health." The actual reason for their dismissal was their
failure to condemn July criticisms (published in September) of
the government by a group of religious scholars who called
themselves the Committee for the Defense of Rights under the
Sharia. The king named ten younger and more progressive ulama to
replace them.
In a further move, in July 1993 the king named Shaykh Abd al
Aziz ibn Baz general mufti of the kingdom with the rank of
minister and president of the Administration of Scientific
Research and Fatwa. Abd al Aziz ibn Baz was also appointed to
preside over the new eighteen-member Higher Ulama Council. Based
on Abd al Aziz ibn Baz's advice, instead of the Ministry of
Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Trusts, the king created two new
ministries: the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call,
and Guidance and the Ministry of Pilgrimage; this action gave the
religious sector an additional voice in the Council of Ministers.
In addition to holding conservative domestic views, the crown
prince was more oriented than Fahd toward the Arab world. After
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, however, he joined the king
and other more pro-Western members of the royal family in asking
the United States to send forces to the kingdom.
In the foreign policy arena, Saudi Arabia historically has
sought to walk a narrow line between East and West. Because of
its strong commitment to Islam, the kingdom abhorred the atheist
policy of the former Soviet Union and therefore tended to be
somewhat pro-Western concerning defense matters. However, Saudi
Arabia also strongly opposed what it considered to be the pro-
Zionist policy of the United States with regard to Israel and the
rights of the Palestinians. At one time, the kingdom had
relatively close relations with Jordan, a fellow monarchy, but
Jordan's failure to support Saudi Arabia in the 1991 Persian Gulf
War soured those relations and resulted in the expulsion from the
kingdom of thousands of Palestinians and Jordanians. In the war,
Saudi Arabia also experienced a lack of support by Sudan and
Yemen, both of which countries it had aided substantially. In
1993 relations with Yemen were somewhat tense because the kingdom
expelled about 1 million Yemenis, as well, during the Persian
Gulf War. In addition, as of late 1992, Saudi Arabia had revived
a dispute with Yemen over an oil-rich border area.
Initially, Saudi Arabia saw both Iran and Iraq as neighbors
posing potential threats. After the Persian Gulf War, however,
Saudi Arabia's concern over containing Iraq increased, and the
kingdom set aside some of its reservations about Iran's form of
Shia Islam and began to normalize relations. Despite some border
disagreements with its Persian Gulf neighbors, for example, Qatar
in 1992 and early 1993, the kingdom's concern for regional
security caused its closest relations to be with other members of
the GCC; certain tensions existed in the organization,
nevertheless, because of Saudi Arabia's position as the "big
brother."
Saudi Arabia had taken the lead in 1970 in establishing the
Organization of the Islamic Conference to bring together all
Muslim countries. In addition, the kingdom followed a policy of
supporting Islamic countries in Africa and Asia and providing
military aid to Muslim groups opposing secular governments in
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and, formerly, in the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (now part of Yemen).
Saudi Arabia's concern for regional security and its active
role in supporting the GCC were understandable in view of its
relatively small population and the resultant constraint on the
size of its armed forces. To compensate for these limitations,
the kingdom consistently has endeavored to buy the most up-to-
date military matériel and especially to concentrate on
developing its air force and air defense system. For more than
twenty-five years, Saudi Arabia has had the highest ratio of
military expenditures in relation to military personnel of any
developing country. Following the Persian Gulf War, the kingdom
increased its 1993 defense expenditures 14 percent over those of
1992. Defense purchases included at least 315 United States M1A2
main battle tanks to upgrade matériel of the ground forces as
well as seventy-two United States F-15C Eagles and forty-eight
British Tornadoes for the air force. Furthermore, the Saudi navy
was considered of good quality in relation to naval forces of the
region, and the navy's facilities were excellent. In spite of
these policies, Saudi Arabia recognized its vulnerability because
it has the world's largest oil reserves and extensive oil-
processing facilities.
The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 1938 was the
major catalyst that transformed various aspects of the kingdom.
The huge revenues from the sale of oil and the payments received
from foreign companies involved in developing concessions in the
country enabled the government to launch large-scale development
programs by the early 1970s. Such programs initially focused on
creation of infrastructure in the areas of transportation,
telecommunications, electric power, and water. The programs also
addressed the fields of education, health, and social welfare;
the expansion and equipping of the armed forces; and the creation
of petroleum-based industries. From this beginning, the
government expanded its programs to drill more deep wells to tap
underground aquifers and to construct desalination plants. These
water sources, in turn, enabled ventures to make the country more
nearly self-sufficient agriculturally; in many instances,
however, such undertakings seriously depleted groundwater.
In pursuit of industrial diversification, the government
created the industrial cities of Al Jubayl in the Eastern
Province and Yanbu al Bahr (known as Yanbu) on the Red Sea
(see
fig. 1). The government also encouraged the establishment of
nonoil-related industries, anticipating the day when Saudi
Arabia's oil and gas resources would be depleted. Furthermore,
the kingdom also has some promising copper, lead, zinc, silver,
and gold deposits that have received little exploitation.
The kingdom's economic plans, including the Fifth Development
Plan (1990-95), continued to emphasize training the indigenous
labor force to handle technologically advanced processes and
hence to enable Saudi Arabia to reduce the number of its foreign
workers. The fifth plan also encouraged the creation of joint
industrial enterprises with GCC member states and other Arab and
Islamic countries and the development of industrial relations
with foreign countries in order to attract foreign capital and
transfer technology.
Saudi Arabia's economic goals were reflected in the national
budget announced for 1993, which set expenditures at US$52.6
billion and revenues at US$45.1 billion, thereby reducing the
deficit from US$8.0 billion in 1992 to US$7.5 billion in 1993.
The continued existence of a deficit, which has characterized the
Saudi economy since 1983, was a source of concern to some
observers. Major budgetary expenditure items were US$9.1 billion
for education (including funds to establish six new colleges and
800 new schools), US$8.2 billion for public organizations (not
further identified), and more than US$3.7 billion for health and
social development (including funds for setting up 500 new
clinics). Another major expenditure announced in March 1993 was
that substantial funds, most of which would be obtained from
private borrowing, would be invested in oil facilities in order
to raise the kingdom's oil production capacity to between 10.5
and 11 million barrels per day by 1995 and its total refining
capacity to 210,000 barrels per day.
The major event affecting Saudi Arabia and other gulf states
in the early 1990s was clearly the Persian Gulf War. The effect
of that war on the kingdom has yet to be assessed. Financially,
the cost of the war for the area as a whole has been estimated by
the Arab Monetary Fund at US$676 billion for 1990 and 1991. This
figure does not, however, take account of such factors as the
ecological impact of the war, the loss of jobs and income for
thousands of foreign workers employed in Saudi Arabia and
elsewhere in the gulf, and the slowdown effect on the growth of
the economies of Saudi Arabia and the gulf states. In most
instances, these economies had been growing at a good rate before
the war, which tended to deplete or eliminate any accumulated
financial reserves.
More difficult to measure, however, was the social impact of
the war. Many foreign observers had speculated that the arrival
in the kingdom of more than 600,000 foreign military personnel,
including women in uniform, would bring about significant changes
in Saudi society. However, military personnel tended to be
assigned to remote border areas of the country and were little
seen by the population as a whole. The net effect of their
presence was therefore minimal in the opinion of a number of
knowledgeable Saudis.
As Saudi Arabia entered the final years of the twentieth
century, there were signs, however, that the expression of public
dissent, once unthinkable, was becoming more commonplace. Such
dissent was usually couched within an Islamic framework, but
nonetheless it represented a force with which the Al Saud had to
reckon. King Fahd, now seventy-two, had succeeded thus far in
balancing the demands of modernists and traditionalists
domestically and in pursuing a policy of moderation
internationally. Some observers wondered, however, how much
longer Fahd would be able to rule and how adaptable the more
conservative Crown Prince Abd Allah would be as Fahd's successor.
August 23, 1993
Helen Chapin Metz
Data as of December 1992
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