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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Qatar
Index
Armed Forces: In 1993 personnel strength 9,500:
army,
8,000, of whom 30 percent Qataris; navy, 700; and air
force, 800.
Army had twenty-four AMX-30 main battle tanks and thirty
armored
infantry vehicles. Navy had three missile craft. Air force
had
Alpha Jet and Mirage F1 fighters and armed helicopters.
Qatar -- Historical Background
QATAR IS A SMALL COUNTRY dominated by the Persian
Gulf's
largest ruling family, the Al Thani. The amir, Shaykh
Khalifa ibn
Hamad Al Thani, is the country's ruler, but his son,
Shaykh Hamad
ibn Khalifa Al Thani, in addition to being the heir
apparent and
minister of defense, wields considerable power in the
day-to-day
running of the country. The Al Thani regime tolerates no
political opposition. The social mores of the country are
shaped
by a somewhat milder version of
Wahhabi (see Glossary)
Islam than
is found in neighboring Saudi Arabia. Women are permitted
to
drive if they obtain permits, for example, and non-Qatari
women
need not veil in public.
Occupying a barren peninsula scorched by extreme summer
heat,
Qatar was transformed between the mid-1960s and the
mid-1980s
from a poor British protectorate noted mainly for pearling
into
an independent state with modern infrastructure, services,
and
industries. The state was built using mostly foreign labor
and
expertise, with funding from oil revenues. And as in other
states
where oil dominates the economy, Qatar's fortunes have
followed
those of the world oil market. The late 1980s and early
1990s
were times of relative austerity, with development
projects
canceled or delayed. But those years were also a period of
significant transition when Qatar began its shift from an
economy
reliant almost entirely on oil to one that would be
supported by
the exploitation of natural gas from the North Field, the
world's
largest natural gas field.
The early 1990s also constituted a watershed period in
foreign relations because the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq
on
August 2, 1990, changed regional and world alignments.
Qatar sent
troops to fight for Kuwait's liberation and, reversing its
previous opposition to the presence of foreign forces in
the
region, permitted United States, Canadian, and French air
force
fighter aircraft to operate from Doha (also seen as Ad
Dawhah).
This placed Qatar firmly on the anti-Iraq side of the
great rift
that split the Arab world after the invasion and weakened
the
full support for the Palestine Liberation Organization
that the
country had previously shown.
![[PDF]](/images/frd/cs/pdf.gif)
Figure 9. Qatar, 1993
Human habitation of the Qatar Peninsula dates as far
back as
50,000 years, when small groups of Stone Age inhabitants
built
coastal encampments, settlements, and sites for working
flint,
according to recent archaeological evidence. Other finds
have
included pottery from the Al Ubaid culture of Mesopotamia
and
northern Arabia (ca. 5000 B.C.), rock carvings, burial
mounds,
and a large town that dates from about 500 B.C. at Wusail,
some
twenty kilometers north of Doha. The Qatar Peninsula was
close
enough to the Dilmun civilization (ca. 4000 to 2000 B.C.)
in
Bahrain to have felt its influence. A harsh climate, lack
of
resources, and frequent periods of conflict, however, seem
to
have made it inevitable that no settlement would develop
and
prosper for any significant length of time before the
discovery
of oil.
The peninsula was used almost continuously as rangeland
for
nomadic tribes from Najd and Al Hasa regions in Saudi
Arabia,
with seasonal encampments around sources of water. In
addition,
fishing and pearling settlements were established on those
parts
of the coast near a major well. Until the late eighteenth
century, the principal towns were on the east coast--Al
Huwayla,
Al Fuwayrit, and Al Bida--and the modern city of Doha
developed
around the largest of these, Al Bida. The population
consisted of
nomadic and settled Arabs and a significant proportion of
slaves
brought originally from East Africa.
The Qatar Peninsula came under the sway of several
great
powers over the centuries. The Abbasid era (750-1258) saw
the
rise of several settlements, including Murwab. The
Portuguese
ruled from 1517 to 1538, when they lost to the Ottomans.
In the
1760s, the Al Khalifa and the Al Jalahima sections of the
Bani
Utub tribe migrated from Kuwait to Qatar's northwest coast
and
founded Az Zubarah
(see
fig. 9). Because the Bani Utub had
important trading connections with Kuwait and were close
to the
rich oyster banks, Az Zubarah became a thriving center of
trade
and pearling, despite hostilities between the Al Khalifa
and the
Al Jalahima.
In response to attacks on Az Zubarah by an Omani shaykh
who
ruled Bahrain from Bushehr in Iran, the Bani Utub of
Kuwait and
Qatar, as well as some local Qatari tribes, captured
Bahrain in
1783. The Al Khalifa claimed sovereignty over Bahrain and
ruled
it for several years from Az Zubarah. This angered the Al
Jalahima, who felt they were deprived of their share of
the
spoils, and so they moved a few kilometers up the Qatari
coast to
establish Al Khuwayr, which they used as a staging point
for
maritime raids against the shipping of the Al Khalifa and
the
Iranians.
Most of the Al Khalifa migrated to the more desirable
location of Bahrain and established a shaykhdom that
endures to
this day. That they left only a token presence in Az
Zubarah
meant initially that the Al Jalahima branch of the Bani
Utub
could achieve ascendancy in Qatar, with their leader,
Rahman ibn
Jabir Al Jalahima, earning a reputation as one of the most
feared
raiders on the surrounding waters. It also meant that with
the
economic decline of Az Zubarah (because the Al Khalifa
shifted
their trade connections to Bahrain), the peninsula would
once
more become a relative backwater. With no dominant local
ruler,
insecurity and rivalry characterized tribal relations.
Settled
tribes built walled towns, towers, and small forts to keep
raiding beduin at bay.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
continuing bloody conflict involved not only the Al
Khalifa, the
Al Jalahima, and the Iranians but also the Omanis under
Sayyid
Said ibn Sultan Al Said, the nascent Wahhabis of Arabia,
and the
Ottomans. The period also saw the rise of British power in
the
Persian Gulf as a result of their growing interests in
India.
Britain's desire for secure passage for East India Company
ships
led it to impose its own order in the gulf. The General
Treaty of
Peace of 1820 between the East India Company and the
shaykhs of
the coastal area--which became known as the Trucial Coast
because
of the series of treaties between the shaykhs and the
British--
was a way of ensuring safe passage. The agreement
acknowledged
British authority in the gulf and sought to end piracy and
the
kidnapping of slaves. Bahrain also became a party to the
treaty,
and it was assumed by the British and the Bahrainis that
Qatar,
as a dependency, was also a party to it.
But when, as punishment for piracy, an East India
Company
vessel bombarded Doha in 1821, destroying the town and
forcing
hundreds to flee, the residents had no idea why they were
being
attacked. The situation remained unsettled in 1867, when a
large
Bahraini force sacked and looted Doha and Al Wakrah. This
attack,
and the Qatari counterattack, prompted the British
political
agent, Colonel Lewis Pelly, to impose a settlement in
1868. His
mission to Bahrain and Qatar and the peace treaty that
resulted
were milestones in Qatar's history because they implicitly
recognized the distinctness of Qatar from Bahrain and
explicitly
acknowledged the position of Muhammad ibn Thani ibn
Muhammad, an
important representative of the peninsula's tribes. The Al
Thani
were originally beduin from Najd, but after settling in
Qatar,
they engaged in fishing, pearling, date palm cultivation,
and
trade.
With the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into eastern
Arabia
in 1871, Qatar became vulnerable to occupation. Muhammad
ibn
Thani opposed Ottoman designs on Qatar, but his son, Qasim
ibn
Muhammad Al Thani, accepted Ottoman sovereignty in 1872.
Although
Qasim ibn Muhammad privately complained of the Ottoman
presence,
he hoped that with Ottoman support he could dominate those
shaykhs in other towns who opposed him and rebuff
Bahrain's
claims on Az Zubarah. The question of Az Zubarah became
moot in
1878, however, when Qasim ibn Muhammad destroyed the town
as
punishment for the piracy of the Naim, a tribe that
resided in
the north of Qatar but was loyal to the shaykh of Bahrain.
Moreover, Qasim ibn Muhammad's ambivalent relations with
the
Ottomans deteriorated to the point that in 1893 they sent
a
military force to Doha to arrest him, ostensibly over his
refusal
to permit an Ottoman customhouse in Doha. Fighting broke
out, and
Qasim ibn Muhammad's supporters drove out the Ottoman
force. This
defeat, and Qasim ibn Muhammad's embrace after the turn of
the
century of the resurgent Wahhabis under Abd al Aziz ibn
Saud,
marked the de facto end of Ottoman rule in Qatar.
The Ottomans officially renounced sovereignty over
Qatar in
1913, and in 1916 the new ruler, Qasim ibn Muhammad's son,
Abd
Allah ibn Qasim Al Thani, signed a treaty with Britain
bringing
the peninsula into the trucial system. This meant that in
exchange for Britain's military protection, Qatar
relinquished
its autonomy in foreign affairs and other areas, such as
the
power to cede territory. The treaty also had provisions
suppressing slavery, piracy, and gunrunning, but the
British were
not strict about enforcing those provisions.
Despite Qatar's coming under British "protection," Abd
Allah
ibn Qasim was far from secure: recalcitrant tribes refused
to pay
tribute; disgruntled family members intrigued against him;
and he
felt vulnerable to the designs of Bahrain, not to mention
the
Wahhabis. Despite numerous requests by Abd Allah ibn
Qasim--for
strong military support, for weapons, and even for a
loan--the
British kept him at arm's length. This changed in the
1930s, when
competition (mainly between Britain and the United States)
for
oil concessions in the region intensified. In a 1935
treaty,
Britain made more specific promises of assistance than in
earlier
treaties in return for the granting of a concession to the
Anglo-
Persian Oil Company.
The scramble for oil, in turn, raised the stakes in
regional
territorial disputes and put a dollar value on the
question of
national borders. In 1936, for example, Bahrain claimed
rule over
a group of islands, the largest of which is Hawar, on the
west
coast of Qatar because it had established a small military
garrison there. Britain accepted the Bahraini claim over
Abd
Allah ibn Qasim's objections, in large part because the
Bahraini
shaykh's personal British adviser was able to frame
Bahrain's
case in a legal manner familiar to British officials. The
question of domain continued in the early 1990s. Triggered
by a
dispute involving the Naim, the Bahrainis once again laid
claim
to the deserted town of Az Zubarah in 1937. Abd Allah ibn
Qasim
sent a large, heavily armed force and succeeded in
defeating the
Naim. The British political resident in Bahrain supported
Qatar's
claim and warned Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa, the ruler of
Bahrain,
not to intervene militarily. Bitter and angry over the
loss of Az
Zubarah, Hamad ibn Isa imposed a crushing embargo on trade
and
travel to Qatar.
Oil was discovered in Qatar in 1939, but its
exploitation was
halted between 1942 and 1947 because of World War II and
its
aftermath. The disruption of food supplies caused by the
war
prolonged a period of economic hardship in Qatar that had
begun
in the 1920s with the collapse of the pearl trade and had
increased with the global depression of the early 1930s
and the
Bahraini embargo. As they had in previous times of
privation,
whole families and tribes moved to other parts of the
gulf,
leaving many Qatari villages deserted. Even Shaykh Abd
Allah ibn
Qasim went into debt and, in preparation for his
retirement,
groomed his favored second son, Hamad ibn Abd Allah Al
Thani, to
be his successor. Hamad ibn Abd Allah's death in 1948,
however,
led to a succession crisis in which the main candidates
were Abd
Allah ibn Qasim's eldest son, Ali ibn Abd Allah Al Thani,
and
Hamad ibn Abd Allah's teenage son, Khalifa ibn Hamad Al
Thani.
Oil exports and payments for offshore rights began in
1949
and marked a turning point in Qatar. Not only would oil
revenues
dramatically transform the economy and society, but they
would
also provide the focus for domestic disputes and foreign
relations. This became frighteningly clear to Abd Allah
ibn Qasim
when several of his relatives threatened armed opposition
if they
did not receive increases in their allowances. Aged and
anxious,
Abd Allah ibn Qasim turned to the British, promised to
abdicate,
and agreed, among other things, to an official British
presence
in Qatar in exchange for recognition and support for Ali
ibn Abd
Allah as ruler in 1949.
The 1950s saw the cautious development of government
structures and public services under British tutelage. Ali
ibn
Abd Allah was at first reluctant to share power, which had
centered in his household, with an infant bureaucracy run
and
staffed mainly by outsiders. Ali ibn Abd Allah's
increasing
financial difficulties and inability to control striking
oil
workers and obstreperous shaykhs, however, led him to
succumb to
British pressure. The first real budget was drawn up by a
British
adviser in 1953. By 1954 there were forty-two Qatari
government
employees.
A major impetus to the development of the British-run
police
force came in 1956 when about 2,000 demonstrators, who
coalesced
over issues such as Gamal Abdul Nasser's pan-Arabism and
opposition to Britain and to Shaykh Ali ibn Abd Allah's
retinue,
marched through Doha. This and other demonstrations led
Ali ibn
Abd Allah to invest the police with his personal authority
and
support, a significant reversal of his previous reliance
on his
retainers and beduin fighters.
Public services developed haltingly during the 1950s.
The
first telephone exchange opened in 1953, the first
desalination
plant in 1954, and the first power plant in 1957. Also
built in
this period were a jetty, a customs warehouse, an
airstrip, and a
police headquarters. In the 1950s, 150 adult males of the
Al
Thani received outright grants from the government.
Shaykhs also
received land and government positions. This mollified
them as
long as oil revenues increased. When revenues declined in
the
late 1950s, however, Ali ibn Abd Allah could not handle
the
family pressures this engendered. That Shaykh Ali ibn Abd
Allah
spent extravagantly, owned a villa in Switzerland, and
hunted in
Pakistan fueled discontent, especially among those who
were
excluded from the regime's largesse (non-Al Thani Qataris)
and
those who were not excluded but thought they deserved more
(other
branches of the Al Thani). Seniority and proximity to the
shaykh
determined the size of allowances.
Succumbing to family pressures and poor health, Ali ibn
Abd
Allah abdicated in 1960. But instead of handing power over
to
Khalifa ibn Hamad, who had been named heir apparent in
1948, he
made his son, Ahmad ibn Ali, ruler. Nonetheless, Khalifa
ibn
Hamad, as heir apparent and deputy ruler, gained
considerable
power, in large part because Ahmad ibn Ali, as had his
father,
spent much time outside the country.
Although he did not care much for governing, Ahmad ibn
Ali
could not avoid dealing with family business. One of his
first
acts was to increase funding for the shaykhs at the
expense of
development projects and social services. In addition to
allowances, adult male Al Thani were also given government
positions. This added to the antiregime resentment already
felt
by, among others, oil workers, low-ranking Al Thani,
dissident
shaykhs, and some leading individuals. These groups formed
the
National Unity Front in response to a fatal shooting on
April 19,
1963, by one of Shaykh Ahmad ibn Ali's nephews. The front
called
a general strike, and its demands included a reduction of
the
ruler's privileges, recognition of trade unions, and
increased
social services. Ahmad ibn Ali cracked down by jailing
fifty
leading individuals and exiling the front's leaders. He
also
instituted some reforms, eventually including the
provision of
land and loans to poor Qataris.
Largely under Khalifa ibn Hamad's guiding hand, the
infrastructure, foreign labor force, and bureaucracy
continued to
grow in the 1960s. There were even some early attempts at
diversifying Qatar's economic base, most notably with the
establishment of a cement factory, a national fishing
company,
and small-scale agriculture.
In 1968 Britain announced its intention of withdrawing
from
military commitments east of Suez, including those in
force with
Qatar, by 1971. For a while, the rulers of Bahrain, Qatar,
and
the Trucial Coast contemplated forming a federation after
the
British withdrawal. A dispute arose between Ahmad ibn Ali
and
Khalifa ibn Hamad, however, because Khalifa ibn Hamad
opposed
Bahrain's attempts to become the senior partner in the
federation. Still giving public support to the federation,
Ahmad
ibn Ali nonetheless promulgated a provisional constitution
in
April 1970, which declared Qatar an independent, Arab,
Islamic
state with the sharia (Islamic law) as its basic law.
Khalifa ibn
Hamad was appointed prime minister in May. The first
Council of
Ministers was sworn in on January 1, 1970, and seven of
its ten
members were Al Thani. Khalifa ibn Hamad's argument
prevailed
with regard to the federation proposal. Qatar became an
independent state on September 3, 1971. That Ahmad ibn Ali
issued
the formal announcement from his Swiss villa instead of
from his
Doha palace indicated to many Qataris that it was time for
a
change. On February 22, 1972, Khalifa ibn Hamad deposed
Ahmad ibn
Ali, who was hunting with his falcons in Iran. Khalifa ibn
Hamad
had the tacit support of the Al Thani and of Britain, and
he had
the political, financial, and military support of Saudi
Arabia.
In contrast to his predecessor's policies, Khalifa ibn
Hamad
cut family allowances and increased spending on social
programs,
including housing, health, education, and pensions. In
addition,
he filled many top government posts with close relatives.
In 1993 Khalifa ibn Hamad remained the amir, but his
son,
Hamad ibn Khalifa, the heir apparent and minister of
defense, had
taken over much of the day-to-day running of the country.
The two
consulted with each other on all matters of importance.
Data as of January 1993
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Background | | Ruled by the al-Thani family since the mid-1800s, Qatar transformed itself from a poor British protectorate noted mainly for pearling into an independent state with significant oil and natural gas revenues. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Qatari economy was crippled by a continuous siphoning off of petroleum revenues by the Amir, who had ruled the country since 1972. His son, the current Amir HAMAD bin Khalifa al-Thani, overthrew him in a bloodless coup in 1995. In 2001, Qatar resolved its longstanding border disputes with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. As of 2007, oil and natural gas revenues had enabled Qatar to attain the second-highest per capita income in the world.
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Location | | Middle East, peninsula bordering the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia
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Area(sq km) | | total: 11,586 sq km
land: 11,586 sq km
water: 0 sq km
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Geographic coordinates | | 25 30 N, 51 15 E
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Land boundaries(km) | | total: 60 km
border countries: Saudi Arabia 60 km
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Coastline(km) | | 563 km
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Climate | | arid; mild, pleasant winters; very hot, humid summers
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Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Persian Gulf 0 m
highest point: Qurayn Abu al Bawl 103 m
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Natural resources | | petroleum, natural gas, fish
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Land use(%) | | arable land: 1.64%
permanent crops: 0.27%
other: 98.09% (2005)
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Irrigated land(sq km) | | 130 sq km (2002)
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Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 0.1 cu km (1997)
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Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 0.29 cu km/yr (24%/3%/72%)
per capita: 358 cu m/yr (2000)
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Natural hazards | | haze, dust storms, sandstorms common
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Environment - current issues | | limited natural fresh water resources are increasing dependence on large-scale desalination facilities
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Environment - international agreements | | party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution
signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
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Geography - note | | strategic location in central Persian Gulf near major petroleum deposits
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Population | | 833,285 (July 2009 est.)
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Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 21.8% (male 93,805/female 88,040)
15-64 years: 76.8% (male 454,714/female 185,004)
65 years and over: 1.4% (male 6,792/female 4,930) (2009 est.)
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Median age(years) | | total: 30.8 years
male: 32.8 years
female: 25.4 years (2009 est.)
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Population growth rate(%) | | 0.957% (2009 est.)
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Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 15.61 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 2.46 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
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Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | -3.58 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 96% of total population (2008)
rate of urbanization: 2.2% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
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Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female
under 15 years: 1.06 male(s)/female
15-64 years: 2.46 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 1.38 male(s)/female
total population: 2 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
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Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 12.66 deaths/1,000 live births
male: 13.51 deaths/1,000 live births
female: 11.77 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
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Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 75.35 years
male: 73.66 years
female: 77.14 years (2009 est.)
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Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 2.45 children born/woman (2009 est.)
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Nationality | | noun: Qatari(s)
adjective: Qatari
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Ethnic groups(%) | | Arab 40%, Indian 18%, Pakistani 18%, Iranian 10%, other 14%
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Religions(%) | | Muslim 77.5%, Christian 8.5%, other 14% (2004 census)
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Languages(%) | | Arabic (official), English commonly used as a second language
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Country name | | conventional long form: State of Qatar
conventional short form: Qatar
local long form: Dawlat Qatar
local short form: Qatar
note: closest approximation of the native pronunciation falls between cutter and gutter, but not like guitar
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Government type | | emirate
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Capital | | name: Doha
geographic coordinates: 25 17 N, 51 32 E
time difference: UTC+3 (8 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
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Administrative divisions | | 10 municipalities (baladiyat, singular - baladiyah); Ad Dawhah, Al Ghuwayriyah, Al Jumayliyah, Al Khawr, Al Wakrah, Ar Rayyan, Jarayan al Batinah, Madinat ash Shamal, Umm Sa'id, Umm Salal
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Constitution | | ratified by public referendum on 29 April 2003, endorsed by the Amir on 8 June 2004, effective on 9 June 2005
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Legal system | | based on Islamic and civil law codes; discretionary system of law controlled by the Amir, although civil codes are being implemented; Islamic law dominates family and personal matters; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
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Suffrage | | 18 years of age; universal
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Executive branch | | chief of state: Amir HAMAD bin Khalifa al-Thani (since 27 June 1995 when, as heir apparent, he ousted his father, Amir KHALIFA bin Hamad al-Thani, in a bloodless coup); Heir Apparent TAMIM bin Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, fourth son of the amir (selected Heir Apparent by the amir on 5 August 2003); note - Amir HAMAD also holds the positions of Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
head of government: Prime Minister HAMAD bin Jasim bin Jabir al-Thani (since 3 April 2007); Deputy Prime Minister Abdallah bin Hamad al-ATIYAH (since 3 April 2007)
cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the amir
elections: the amir is hereditary
note: in April 2007, Qatar held nationwide elections for a 29-member Central Municipal Council (CMC), which has limited consultative powers aimed at improving the provision of municipal services; the first election for the CMC was held in March 1999
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Legislative branch | | unicameral Advisory Council or Majlis al-Shura (35 seats; members appointed)
note: no legislative elections have been held since 1970 when there were partial elections to the body; Council members have had their terms extended every year since the new constitution came into force on 9 June 2005; the constitution provides for a new 45-member Advisory Council or Majlis al-Shura; the public would elect two-thirds of the Majlis al-Shura; the Amir would appoint the remaining members; preparations are underway to conduct elections to the Majlis al-Shura
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Judicial branch | | Courts of First Instance, Appeal, and Cassation; an Administrative Court and a Constitutional Court were established in 2007; note - all judges are appointed by Amiri Decree based on the recommendation of the Supreme Judiciary Council for renewable three-year terms
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Political pressure groups and leaders | | none
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International organization participation | | ABEDA, ACC, AFESD, AMF, FAO, G-77, GCC, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OAPEC, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
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Flag description | | maroon with a broad white serrated band (nine white points) on the hoist side
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Economy - overview | | Qatar has experienced rapid economic growth over the last several years on the back of high oil prices, and in 2008 posted its eighth consecutive budget surplus. Economic policy is focused on developing Qatar's nonassociated natural gas reserves and increasing private and foreign investment in non-energy sectors, but oil and gas still account for more than 50% of GDP, roughly 85% of export earnings, and 70% of government revenues. Oil and gas have made Qatar the second highest per-capita income country - following Liechtenstein - and one of the world's fastest growing. Proved oil reserves of 15 billion barrels should enable continued output at current levels for 37 years. Qatar's proved reserves of natural gas are nearly 26 trillion cubic meters, about 14% of the world total and third largest in the world. The drop in oil prices in late 2008 and the global financial crisis will reduce Qatar's budget surplus and may slow the pace of investment and development projects in 2009.
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GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $91.55 billion (2008 est.)
$80.73 billion (2007 est.)
$68.82 billion (2006 est.)
note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP (official exchange rate) | | $102.3 billion (2008 est.)
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GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 13.4% (2008 est.)
17.3% (2007 est.)
12.2% (2006 est.)
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GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $111,000 (2008 est.)
$99,100 (2007 est.)
$85,800 (2006 est.)
note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 0.1%
industry: 74.9%
services: 25.1% (2008 est.)
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Labor force | | 1.119 million (2008 est.)
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Unemployment rate(%) | | 0.4% (2008 est.)
0.7% (2007 est.)
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Population below poverty line(%) | | NA%
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Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: NA%
highest 10%: NA%
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Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP) | | 32.1% of GDP (2008 est.)
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Budget | | revenues: $36.59 billion
expenditures: $27.14 billion (2008 est.)
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Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | 15.2% (2008 est.)
13.7% (2007 est.)
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Stock of money | | $13.98 billion (31 December 2008)
$9.718 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of quasi money | | $36.58 billion (31 December 2008)
$22.6 billion (31 December 2007)
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Stock of domestic credit | | $59.43 billion (31 December 2008)
$30.52 billion (31 December 2007)
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Market value of publicly traded shares | | $76.31 billion (31 December 2008)
$95.49 billion (31 December 2007)
$61.56 billion (31 December 2006)
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Economic aid - recipient | | $2.18 million (2004)
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Public debt(% of GDP) | | 5.1% of GDP (2008 est.)
11% of GDP (2007 est.)
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Agriculture - products | | fruits, vegetables; poultry, dairy products, beef; fish
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Industries | | crude oil production and refining, ammonia, fertilizers, petrochemicals, steel reinforcing bars, cement, commercial ship repair
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Industrial production growth rate(%) | | 13% (2008 est.)
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Current account balance | | $15.07 billion (2008 est.)
$10.45 billion (2007 est.)
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Exports | | $55.73 billion (2008 est.)
$42.02 billion (2007 est.)
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Exports - commodities(%) | | liquefied natural gas (LNG), petroleum products, fertilizers, steel
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Exports - partners(%) | | Japan 38.5%, South Korea 20.9%, Singapore 11.1%, India 4.5%, Thailand 4.4% (2008)
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Imports | | $25.11 billion (2008 est.)
$19.82 billion (2007 est.)
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Imports - commodities(%) | | machinery and transport equipment, food, chemicals
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Imports - partners(%) | | US 12.1%, Germany 9%, Italy 8.9%, Japan 8%, South Korea 7.5%, France 6.2%, UAE 5.5%, UK 4.9%, Saudi Arabia 4.6%, Turkey 4.2%, China 4.2% (2008)
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Reserves of foreign exchange and gold | | $9.998 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$9.752 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Debt - external | | $57.37 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$33.09 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Stock of direct foreign investment - at home | | $3.627 billion (2008 est.)
$2.601 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad | | $5.363 billion (31 December 2008 est.)
$6.993 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
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Exchange rates | | Qatari rials (QAR) per US dollar - 3.64 (2008 est.), 3.64 (2007), 3.64 (2006), 3.64 (2005), 3.64 (2004)
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Currency (code) | | Qatari rial (QAR)
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Telephones - main lines in use | | 263,400 (2008)
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Telephones - mobile cellular | | 1.683 million (2008)
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Telephone system | | general assessment: modern system centered in Doha
domestic: combined fixed and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership exceeds 200 telephones per 100 persons
international: country code - 974; landing point for the Fiber-Optic Link Around the Globe (FLAG) submarine cable network that provides links to Asia, Middle East, Europe, and the US; tropospheric scatter to Bahrain; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and the UAE; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean) and 1 Arabsat (2008)
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Internet country code | | .qa
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Internet users | | 436,000 (2008)
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Airports | | 5 (2009)
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Pipelines(km) | | condensate 145 km; condensate/gas 132 km; gas 978 km; liquid petroleum gas 90 km; oil 382 km (2008)
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Roadways(km) | | total: 7,790 km (2006)
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Ports and terminals | | Doha, Ra's Laffan
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Military branches | | Qatari Amiri Land Force (QALF), Qatari Amiri Navy (QAN), Qatari Amiri Air Force (QAAF) (2009)
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Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | 18 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2008)
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Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 320,383
females age 16-49: 167,475 (2008 est.)
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Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 318,388
females age 16-49: 136,841 (2009 est.)
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Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 6,337
female: 5,059 (2009 est.)
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Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | 10% of GDP (2005 est.)
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Disputes - international | | none
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Trafficking in persons | | current situation: Qatar is a destination country for men and women from South and Southeast Asia who migrate willingly, but are subsequently trafficked into involuntary servitude as domestic workers and laborers, and, to a lesser extent, commercial sexual exploitation; the most common offense was forcing workers to accept worse contract terms than those under which they were recruited; other conditions include bonded labor, withholding of pay, restrictions on movement, arbitrary detention, and physical, mental, and sexual abuse
tier rating: Tier 3 - Qatar failed, for the second consecutive year, to enforce criminal laws against traffickers, or to provide an effective mechanism to identify and protect victims; it continues to detain and deport victims rather than providing them protection; the government made little progress to increase prosecutions for trafficking in a meaningful way in 2007; workers complaining of working conditions or non-payment of wages were sometimes penalized (2008)
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Electricity - production(kWh) | | 15.11 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 100%
hydro: 0%
nuclear: 0%
other: 0% (2001)
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Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 13.73 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 1.208 million bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 129,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 1.043 million bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 0 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 15.21 billion bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
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Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 76.98 billion cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 20.2 billion cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 56.78 billion cu m (2008)
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Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 25.26 trillion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | 0.09% (2001 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | NA
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HIV/AIDS - deaths | | NA
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Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write
total population: 89%
male: 89.1%
female: 88.6% (2004 census)
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School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years) | | total: 13 years
male: 13 years
female: 14 years (2006)
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Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | 3.3% of GDP (2005)
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