MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Pakistan
Index
On assuming power on December 20, 1971, Bhutto promised
to
make a new Pakistan out of the West Wing and to restore
national
confidence. He conveniently laid the entire blame for the
1971
war and Pakistan's defeat on Yahya Khan and his junta.
Asserting
the principle of civilian leadership, Bhutto introduced a
new
constitution with a modified parliamentary and federal
system. He
attempted to control and reform the civil service and took
steps
to revitalize a stagnant economy and ameliorate conditions
for
the poor under the banner of Islamic socialism. Bhutto's
most
visible success, however, was in the international arena,
where
he employed his diplomatic skills. He negotiated a
satisfactory
peace settlement with India in 1972, built new links
between
Pakistan and the oil-exporting Islamic countries to the
west, and
generally was effective in repairing Pakistan's image in
the
aftermath of the war.
Bhutto's program appeared to be laudable but fell short
in
performance. His near-monopoly of decision-making power
prevented
democratic institutions from taking root, and his
overreaching
ambitions managed in time to antagonize all but his
closest
friends.
The PPP manifesto was couched in socialist terms. When
Bhutto
issued the Economic Reform Order on January 3, 1972,
banking and
insurance institutions were nationalized, and seventy
other
industrial enterprises were taken over by the government.
The
Ministry of Production, which incorporated the Board of
Industrial Management, was established to oversee
industry.
Investment in the public sector increased substantially,
and
Bhutto maneuvered to break the power of the approximately
twenty
elite families who had dominated the nation's economy
during the
Ayub Khan period. Trade unions were strengthened, and
welfare
measures for labor were announced. Although Bhutto's
initial zeal
diminished as he came face-to-face with economic realities
and
the shortage of capital, he tried to refurbish his
populist image
with another spate of nationalizations in 1976.
Bhutto purged the military ranks of about 1,400
officers. He
also created a paramilitary force called the Federal
Security
Force (which functioned almost as his personal bodyguard),
a
watchdog on the armed forces, and an internal security
force. A
white paper on defense issued in 1976 firmly subordinated
the
armed forces to civilian control and gave Bhutto, then
also prime
minister, the decisive voice in all matters relating to
national
security. In that role, Bhutto took credit for bringing
home more
than 90,000 prisoners of war without allowing any of them
to come
to trial in Bangladesh for war crimes. In 1976 Bhutto
replaced
Tikka Khan, whose term had expired, with General Mohammad
Zia
ul-Haq as chief of staff of the army. Like Ayub Khan, Zia
was
appointed over several more senior generals. Also like
Ayub Khan,
Zia came from a community not heavily represented in the
armed
forces (the Arains from Punjab) and was thought to be
without
political ambition.
In April 1972, Bhutto lifted martial law and convened
the
National Assembly, which consisted of members elected from
the
West Wing in December 1970 (plus two from the East Wing
who
decided their loyalties were with a united Pakistan). The
standing controversies about the role of Islam, provincial
autonomy, and the form of government--presidential or
parliamentary--remained on the agenda. There was much
jostling
for position among the three major political groups: the
PPP,
most powerful in Punjab and Sindh; the National Awami
Party (NAP)
and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), both based in the
North-
West Frontier Province and Balochistan. The provincial
assemblies
were constituted from those elected in December 1970.
There was
much tension during the process of drafting a new
constitution,
especially from members from the North-West Frontier
Province and
Balochistan. Bhutto reached some accommodation with
opposition
leaders from those two provinces on the matter of
gubernatorial
appointment and constitutional principle.
Pakistan's third constitution was formally submitted on
December 31, 1972, approved on April 10, 1973, and
promulgated on
independence day, August 14, 1973. Although Bhutto
campaigned in
1970 for the restoration of a parliamentary system, by
1972 he
preferred a presidential system with himself as president.
However, in deference to the wishes of the opposition and
some in
his own cabinet, Bhutto accepted a formal parliamentary
system in
which the executive was responsible to the legislature.
Supposedly, in the interests of government stability,
provisions
were also included that made it almost impossible for the
National Assembly to remove the prime minister. The 1973
constitution provided for a federal structure in which
residuary
powers were reserved for the provinces. However, Bhutto
dismissed
the coalition NAP-JUI ministries in Balochistan and the
North-
West Frontier Province, revealing his preference for a
powerful
center without opposition in the provinces.
Bhutto's power derived less from the 1973 constitution
than
from his charismatic appeal to the people and from the
vigor of
the PPP. Its socialist program and Bhutto's oratory had
done much
to radicalize the urban sectors in the late 1960s and were
responsible for the popular optimism accompanying the
restoration
of democracy. The ideological appeal of the PPP to the
masses sat
uneasily with the compromises Bhutto reached with the
holders of
economic and political influence--the landlords and
commercial
elites. Factionalism and patrimonialism became rife in the
PPP,
especially in Punjab. The internal cohesion of the PPP and
its
standing in public esteem were affected adversely by the
ubiquitous political and bureaucratic corruption that
accompanied
state intervention in the economy and, equally, by the
rising
incidence of political violence, which included beating,
arresting, and even murdering opponents. The PPP had
started as a
movement mobilizing people to overthrow a military regime,
but in
Bhutto's lifetime it failed to change into a political
party
organized for peaceful functioning in an open polity.
Bhutto's predilection for a strong center and for
provincial
governments in the hands of the PPP inevitably aroused
opposition
in provinces where regional and ethnic identity was
strong.
Feelings of Sindhi solidarity were maintained by Bhutto's
personal connections with the feudal leaders
(wadera) of
Sindh and his ability to manipulate offices and
officeholders. He
did not enjoy the same leverage in the North-West Frontier
Province or Balochistan.
A long-dormant crisis erupted in Balochistan in 1973
into an
insurgency that lasted four years and became increasingly
bitter.
The insurgency was put down by the Pakistan Army, which
employed
brutal methods and equipment, including Huey-Cobra
helicopter
gunships, provided by Iran and flown by Iranian pilots.
The
deep-seated Baloch nationalism based on tribal identity
had
international as well as domestic aspects. Divided in the
nineteenth century among Iran, Afghanistan, and British
India,
the Baloch found their aspirations and traditional nomadic
life
frustrated by the presence of national boundaries and the
extension of central administration over their lands.
Moreover,
many of the most militant Baloch nationalists were also
vaguely
Marxist-Leninist and willing to risk Soviet protection for
an
autonomous Balochistan. As the insurgency wore on, the
influence
of a relatively small but disciplined liberation front
seemed to
increase.
Bhutto was able to mobilize domestic support for his
drive
against the Baloch. Punjab's support was most tangibly
represented in the use of the army to put down the
insurgency.
One of the main Baloch grievances was the influx of
Punjabi
settlers, miners, and traders into their resource-rich but
sparsely populated lands. Bhutto could also invoke the
idea of
national integration with effect in the aftermath of
Bengali
secession. External assistance to Bhutto was generously
given by
the shah of Iran, who feared a spread of the insurrection
among
the Iranian Baloch. Some foreign governments feared that
an
independent or autonomous Balochistan might allow the
Soviet
Union to develop and use the port at Gwadar, and no
outside power
was willing to assist the Baloch openly or to sponsor the
cause
of Baloch autonomy. During the mid-1970s, Afghanistan was
preoccupied with its own internal problems and seemingly
anxious
to normalize relations with Pakistan. India was fearful of
further balkanization of the subcontinent after
Bangladesh, and
the Soviet Union did not wish to jeopardize the leverage
it was
gaining with Pakistan. However, during the Bhutto regime
hostilities in Balochistan were protracted. The succeeding
Zia
ul-Haq government took a more moderate approach, relying
more on
economic development to placate the Baloch.
Bhutto proceeded cautiously in the field of land reform
and
did not fulfill earlier promises of distributing land to
the
landless on the scale he had promised, as he was forced to
recognize and to cultivate the sociopolitical influence of
landowners. However, he did not impede the process of
consolidation of tenancy rights and acquisition of
mid-sized
holdings by servicemen. Punjab was the vital agricultural
region
of Pakistan; it remained a bastion of support for the
government.
Bhutto specifically targeted the powerful and
privileged
Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and introduced measures of
administrative reform with the declared purpose of
limiting the
paternalistic power of the bureaucracy. The CSP, however,
had
played the role of guardian alongside the army since
independence. Many of its members reacted badly to
Bhutto's
politicizing appointments, for which patronage seemed a
more
important criterion than merit or seniority.
Relations with India were, at best, uneven during the
Bhutto
period. He accomplished the return of the prisoners of war
through the Simla Agreement of 1972, but no settlement of
the key
problem of Kashmir was possible beyond an agreement that
any
settlement should be peaceful. Bhutto reacted strongly to
the
detonation of a nuclear device by India in 1974 and
pledged that
Pakistan would match that development even if Pakistanis
had to
"eat grass" to cover the cost.
Bhutto claimed success for his economic policies. The
gross
national product
(GNP--see Glossary)
and the rate of
economic
growth climbed. Inflation fell from 25 percent in fiscal
year
(FY--see Glossary)
1972 to 6 percent in FY 1976, although
other
economic measures he introduced did not perform as well.
Bhutto pointed out that his foreign policy had brought
Pakistan prestige in the Islamic world, peace if not
friendship
with India, and self-respect in dealings with the great
powers.
He felt assured of victory in any election. Therefore,
with
commitment to a constitutional order at stake, in January
1977 he
announced he would hold national and provincial assembly
elections in March.
The response of the opposition to this news was
vigorous.
Nine political parties ranging across the ideological
spectrum
formed a united front--the Pakistan National Alliance
(PNA).
Fundamentalist Muslims were satisfied by the adoption of
Nizam-i-Mustafa (see Glossary),
meaning "Rule of the
Prophet," as
the front's slogan. Modern secular elements, however,
respected
the association of Air Marshal Asghar Khan. The PNA ran
candidates for almost all national and provincial seats.
As curbs
on the press and political activity were relaxed for the
election
campaign, an apparently strong wave of support for the PNA
swept
Pakistan's cities. This prompted a whirlwind tour of the
country
by Bhutto, with all his winning charm in the forefront. In
the
background lurked indirect curbs on free expression as
well as
political gangsterism.
National Assembly election results were announced on
March 7,
proclaiming the PPP the winner with 155 seats versus
thirty-six
seats for the PNA. Expecting trouble, Bhutto invoked
Section 144
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which restricted
assembly for
political reasons. The PNA immediately challenged the
election
results as rigged and demanded a new election--not a
recount.
Bhutto refused, and a mass protest movement was launched
against
him. Religious symbols were used by both sides to mobilize
agitation; for example, Bhutto imposed prohibitions on the
consumption of alcoholic beverages and on gambling.
Despite talks
between Bhutto and opposition leaders, the disorders
persisted as
a multitude of frustrations were vented. The army
intervened on
July 5, took all political leaders including Bhutto into
custody,
and proclaimed martial law.
Data as of April 1994
|
|