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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Pakistan
Index
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, it was
natural
for Pakistan to covet the wealth and surplus military
equipment
of the United States. United States-Pakistan relations
were
cordial, and throughout the late 1940s, Pakistan sought to
nurture those close relations and gain access to United
States
military support; initially, these attempts were rebuffed.
As the new decade opened, however, a series of events
put new
hope into the possibility of United States-Pakistan
cooperation.
First was the reassessment of Pakistan's military position
undertaken by Ayub Khan. The second event was the outbreak
of the
Korean War (1950-53), which drew United States attention
toward
Asia and marked the point of no return of the
globalization of
United States security policy. The third factor was the
advent of
the Eisenhower-Dulles team, which set to work building a
ring of
containment around the Sino-Soviet bloc. India, committed
itself
to nonalignment, had come into sharp disagreement with the
United
States in the United Nations when it refused to censure
China as
an aggressor in the Korean War and thus was viewed by the
United
States as a voice for communist appeasement. India's
refusal to
join the United States-sponsored 1951 Treaty of Peace with
Japan--a pact among nations designed among other purposes
to
recruit Japan as an ally against communist inroads in
Asia--further divided the two countries. India was not
available
as an ally; Pakistan was the inevitable alternative
(see Foreign Policy
, ch. 4).
Pakistan and the United States drew closer together,
highlevel visits were exchanged, and the groundwork was laid
for a
security relationship that seemed to meet Pakistan's
political
needs and equipment deficit. At United States prompting,
Pakistan
and Turkey concluded a security treaty in 1954--the TurkoPakistan Pact--which immediately enabled United States
military
assistance to Pakistan under the Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement signed the same year. Pakistan also became a
member of
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and
joined
the Baghdad Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty
Organization
(CENTO) in 1959. Pakistan had little interest in SEATO and
discerned no danger to its interests from China, joining
mainly
to oblige Washington. Even CENTO, which offered the
advantage of
a new approach to the Muslim world, was problematic
because it
drove a wedge between Pakistan and the Arab countries that
remained outside it and was seen by Pakistanis as
institutionally
weak because the United States was never willing to become
a full
member. None of these arrangements addressed Pakistan's
main
concern, however--India.
At Pakistan's insistence, an additional agreement (the
Agreement of Cooperation) on security was concluded with
the
United States in March 1959, by which the United States
committed
itself to the "preservation of the independence and
integrity of
Pakistan" and agreed to take "appropriate action,
including the
use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon . . .
in
order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its
request." The
Agreement of Cooperation also said nothing about India and
was
cast in the context of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which
dealt with
communist threats to the Middle East. Pakistan saw the
agreement
as representing a high level of United States commitment,
however, and some United States officials apparently
encouraged
an interpretation that saw more in the agreement than was
actually there. There was considerable self-deception on
both
sides--Pakistan believed that it had secured an ally in
its
rivalry with India, and the United States focused on
Pakistan as
an adherent to the anticommunist cause.
Tangible gains to Pakistan from the relationship were
substantial. Between 1954 and 1965, the United States
provided
Pakistan with US$630 million in direct-grant assistance
and more
than US$670 million in concessional sales and
defense-support
assistance. Pakistan received equipment for one additional
armored division, four infantry divisions, and one armored
brigade and received support elements for two corps. The
Pakistan
Air Force received six squadrons of modern jet aircraft.
The
Pakistan Navy received twelve ships. The ports of Karachi
(in
West Pakistan) and Chittagong (in East Pakistan) were
modernized.
The program did not, however, provide for the wholesale
modernization of the military, much less its expansion.
Forces in
Kashmir and East Pakistan were excluded, and there was a
continuing tug-of-war between the United States and
Pakistan as
Pakistan sought to extend the scope of the program and
wring more
benefits out of it.
The impact on the military of this new relationship was
intense. Pakistanis embraced the latest concepts in
military
organization and thinking with enthusiasm and adopted
United
States training and operational doctrine. The army and the
air
force were transformed into fairly modern, well-equipped
fighting
forces. In the course of the rearmament program, the
military was
substantially reorganized along United States lines, and
hundreds
of Pakistani officers were trained by United States
officers,
either in Pakistan or in schools in the United States.
Although
many British traditions remained, much of the tone of the
army,
especially the officer corps, was Americanized.
Pakistan's hopes for an equitable settlement of its
disputes
with India, especially over Kashmir, were probably small
in any
event, but by bringing the United States directly into the
South
Asian security equation, rapprochement with India became
virtually impossible. More important, India responded to
Pakistan's new alignment by turning to the Soviet Union
for
military and political support--and the Soviet leader at
the
time, Nikita S. Khrushchev, was only too happy to oblige.
As a
result, Pakistan not only incurred Soviet hostility but
also
ultimately triggered a Soviet military supply program in
India
that more than offset the United States assistance to
Pakistan.
Soviet displeasure was further heightened by Pakistan's
decision
to grant facilities at Peshawar for the United States to
conduct
U-2 aerial reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.
Data as of April 1994
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