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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Pakistan
Index
Although General Zia asserted that this military
intervention
in politics would be brief and there would be new
elections
within ninety days, he had the longest tenure of any
Pakistani
ruler. Although he came to power more as a spokesman of
military
interests--a first among equals--and was thought to be a
political naif, he was highly skilled in gathering power
into his
own hands.
On assuming power, Zia named himself chief martial law
administrator and suspended parts of the 1973
constitution. (Zia
assumed the presidency as well in September 1978.) Because
it
appeared that Bhutto, if freed and available as a
candidate,
might easily win the elections, Zia postponed them and
undertook
a campaign to discredit his predecessor politically. Zia's
initial assumption of power was peaceful, and even his
subsequent
decision to allow Bhutto to be hanged after Bhutto's
conviction
as an accomplice to murder a political opponent, did not
bring
disturbances severe enough to threaten his regime. There
was,
however, continued opposition to military rule, and Zia
was able
to maintain himself in power only through a combination of
political luck, skill, and authoritarianism.
Although the military regime was often repressive,
state
violence was downplayed, and some observers believe that
human
rights conditions were better than during the Bhutto
years. Zia
also emphasized the corruption in political life and the
need for
reform. Ethnic resistance in Balochistan and the
North-West
Frontier Province was dealt with adroitly; only the ethnic
Sindhis remained profoundly alienated
(see Zia ul-Haq and Military Domination, 1977-88
, ch. 1). Zia also proved
politically
skillful in employing a strategy of continually holding
out the
promise of free elections when circumstances permitted,
making
political concessions that would strengthen rather than
undermine
his position and, especially after 1979, co-opting
influential
political groups among orthodox Muslims. )
The first years of Zia's tenure marked another low
point in
the security situation. The Iranian Revolution of 1979
overthrew
one of Pakistan's staunchest friends, and the missionary
zeal of
its new Islamist regime did not bode well for
Pakistan-Iran
relations. The Saur Revolution (April Revolution) in
Afghanistan
in 1978 ousted a government that had become conciliatory
in its
relations with Pakistan, replacing it with a group that
also
preached radical change--this time, communist. When the
Soviet
army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan found
itself
in a security nightmare--for the first time, the Soviet
Union
posed a potentially immediate threat.
Relations with the United States were also at a low
point.
The administration of President Jimmy Carter had adopted
an
extremely hard line on Pakistan's nuclear program and
suspended
all military and economic assistance in April 1979. In
March
1979, after the Iranian Revolution, Pakistan withdrew from
a
moribund CENTO. Tensions with the United States peaked
when a
Pakistani mob burned the United States embassy in
Islamabad in
November 1979, killing two Americans and two Pakistani
employees,
in response to a BBC radio broadcast of Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini's speech, in which he falsely accused the United
States
of invading the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Although China
remained a
good friend, political scientist Robert G. Wirsing's
assessment
proved accurate: "Never before had Pakistan been quite so
isolated and quite so threatened at the same time."
Data as of April 1994
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