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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Pakistan
Index
In mid-1965 Pakistan sent guerrilla forces into the
Indian
part of Kashmir in the hope of stirring up a rebellion
that would
either oust the Indians or at least force the issue back
onto the
international agenda. Pakistani forces did not find as
much
support among the Kashmiri population as they had hoped,
but
fighting spread by August, and a process of escalation
culminated
in a full-scale Indian offensive toward Lahore on
September 6.
Fighting, frequently very bitter, continued until a
UN-sponsored
cease-fire took hold on September 23. Both sides had
tacitly
agreed not to let the war spread to the East Wing of
Pakistan.
The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held
prisoners
and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were
relatively
heavy--on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks,
and
3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand
Indian
pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only
have led
to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most
Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial
prowess,
refused to accept the possibility of their country's
military
defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame
their
failure to attain their military aims on what they
considered to
be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.
Pakistan was rudely shocked by the reaction of the
United
States to the war. Judging the matter to be largely
Pakistan s
fault, the United States not only refused to come to
Pakistan s
aid under the terms of the Agreement of Cooperation, but
issued a
statement declaring its neutrality while also cutting off
military supplies. The Pakistanis were embittered at what
they
considered a friend's betrayal, and the experience taught
them to
avoid relying on any single source of support. For its
part, the
United States was disillusioned by a war in which both
sides used
United States-supplied equipment. The war brought other
repercussions for the security relationship as well. The
United
States withdrew its military assistance advisory group in
July
1967. In response to these events, Pakistan declined to
renew the
lease on the Peshawar military facility, which ended in
1969.
Eventually, United States-Pakistan relations grew
measurably
weaker as the United States became more deeply involved in
Vietnam and as its broader interest in the security of
South Asia
waned.
Iran, Indonesia, and especially China gave political
support
to Pakistan during the war, thus suggesting new directions
in
Pakistan that might translate into support for its
security
concerns. Most striking was the attitude of the Soviet
Union. Its
post-Khrushchev leadership, rather than rallying
reflexively to
India's side, adopted a neutral position and ultimately
provided
the good offices at Tashkent, which led to the January
1966
Tashkent Declaration that restored the status quo ante.
The aftermath of the 1965 war saw a dramatic shift in
Pakistan's security environment. Instead of a single
alignment
with the United States against China and the Soviet Union,
Pakistan found itself cut off from United States military
support, on increasingly warm terms with China, and
treated
equitably by the Soviet Union. Unchanged was the enmity
with
which India and Pakistan regarded each other over Kashmir.
The
result was the elaboration of a new security approach,
called by
Ayub Khan the "triangular tightrope"--a tricky endeavor to
maintain good ties with the United States while
cultivating China
and the Soviet Union. Support from other developing
nations was
also welcome. None of the new relationships carried the
weight of
previous ties with the United States, but, taken together,
they
at least provided Pakistan with a political counterbalance
to
India.
Pakistan needed other sources of military supply, most
urgently because of its wartime losses and the United
States
embargo. After 1965 China became Pakistan's principal
military
supplier, providing matériel to all three services in
substantial
quantity and at attractive prices. Submarines and Mirage
aircraft
were also purchased from France. The Soviet Union sought
to woo
Pakistan with military equipment, but that program never
really
developed because of Moscow's concern not to jeopardize
its more
important relationship with India. The United States
gradually
relaxed its embargo; however, it was only in 1973 that
substantial supplies again flowed to Pakistan.
The late 1960s were politically turbulent times for
Pakistan;
by 1969 conditions had deteriorated to the point where the
army
once again felt called on to intervene. On March 25, an
ailing
and discredited Ayub Khan transferred power to army
commander in
chief General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, who declared
himself
president as well as chief martial law administrator
(CMLA) and
announced that Pakistan would have national general
elections--
for the first time since independence--and a new
constitution.
The elections in December 1970 were fair but led to the
breakup
of Pakistan
(see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh
, ch. 1). In the
process, the army and Pakistan's security situation
deteriorated
still further.
The largely Punjabi army was in a politically untenable
position in East Pakistan, which had voted overwhelmingly
for an
autonomist party. Once it became clear that a compromise
between
the civilian leaders of West Pakistan and East Pakistan
was
unattainable, Yahya Khan was forced to choose between the
two
sides, and his actions were seen by the Bengalis of the
East Wing
as favoring the interests of West Pakistan, which were
hardly
distinguishable from those of the armed forces. Yahya Khan
decided to postpone indefinitely the convening of the new
National Assembly, which would have been dominated by
Bengalis.
It was feared that a government dominated by East
Pakistani
interests would cut back sharply on military prerogatives
and
roll back the dominance of Punjab in national affairs.
Within
days, unrest spread throughout East Pakistan. Bengalis
went on
strike and stopped paying taxes. Bengali autonomists
became
separatists.
Army elements in East Pakistan were strengthened in the
spring of 1971 and were used to suppress Bengali
recalcitrance.
The task was undertaken with ferocity; killing, rape,
looting,
and brutality were widespread and resulted in the flight
of
nearly 10 million refugees to India over six months.
International outrage was growing and forced the Richard
M. Nixon
administration in the United States to halt its attempts
to
reopen military supply lines to Pakistan.
The army was generally successful during the spring and
summer of 1971 in restoring order in East Pakistan, but
increasing Indian support of the antigovernment Bengali
guerrillas known as the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force)
began to
shift the balance. When Indian troops finally intervened
directly
in December, there was no hope of stopping them. Even
though the
garrison in East Pakistan had been reinforced, national
strategy
was still based on the assumption that Pakistan could not
simultaneously defend both wings of the country against an
Indian
attack; hence, an attack in the east would be countered in
the
west. On December 3, Pakistani forces began hostilities in
the
west with attacks on Indian airfields. They had little
success,
and within twenty-four hours India had seized air
superiority,
launched attacks against West Pakistan, and blockaded the
coast.
Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to the
Indian army
on December 16, and India offered a cease-fire. In the
face of
superior force on all fronts, Pakistan had little choice
but to
accept the breakup of the country.
The armed forces were shattered and their equipment
destroyed; 9,000 troops were lost, and 90,000 prisoners of
war
were in the hands of Indians and Bengalis in Bangladesh
(the
former East Pakistan). Yahya Khan resigned in disgrace,
and the
winner of the elections in West Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto,
succeeded him as CMLA and president. Pakistan, a country
originally created in the name of religion, lost its
raison
d'être as the homeland of Muslims in the subcontinent and
was
much reduced in size. Although the politicians were
ultimately
responsible for the events of 1971, the army and its
leaders were
the obvious villains.
The security situation of the nation also changed. Any
illusions of parity vis-à-vis India were demolished.
Although
both China and the United States had tilted toward
Pakistan
politically, it was abundantly clear that neither of those
superpowers was in a position to offset Indian primacy in
the
region, especially in view of the friendship treaty that
India
had signed with the Soviet Union in August 1971, just
before the
outbreak of hostilities. The Soviet Union, forced to
choose
sides, opted for India, and the rapprochement that had
taken
place between Pakistan and the Soviet Union evaporated.
Pakistan
stood largely alone and at the mercy of India. The 1972
bilateral
Simla Agreement restored most of the status quo ante the
1971 war
in the relations between the two nations. The agreement
states
that "the two countries are resolved to settle their
differences
by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any
other
peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them."
Although India
maintained the more narrow interpretation that disputes be
settled bilaterally, Pakistan in subsequent years favored
a
looser interpretation--one that did not exclude a
multilateral
settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Yet the loss of East Pakistan also had positive
implications
for Pakistan's security. The loss of the East Pakistani
population as a recruitment pool was only of minor
significance.
By shedding its most dissident and poorest province,
Pakistan
emerged stronger and was able to focus its energies more
effectively. A major strategic problem--the geographic
division
of the country--was eliminated. The loss of East Pakistan
also
removed the need for a Pakistani role in Southeast Asia.
Pakistan
withdrew from SEATO, and Bhutto refocused national
attention
toward Muslim West Asia. He apparently tried to develop
ways of
putting the Kashmir issue to rest so that Pakistan could
greatly
reduce its preoccupation with South Asia. No longer
closely tied
to the United States, Bhutto sought a larger role for
Pakistan
among the nonaligned countries and, especially, within the
Islamic world. A brilliant diplomat, he was able in a very
few
years to restore Pakistan's prestige, stake out a leading
role
for Pakistan among Muslim nations, court the superpowers,
and
even establish cordial relations with Bangladesh.
These triumphs were not shared with the military, as
Bhutto
moved to create a "professional but docile" military.
Senior
officers were dismissed, and their replacements were
chosen by
Bhutto. The military establishment was reorganized so that
it
would be under more effective civilian control. Bhutto's
1973
constitution narrowly defined the role of the military as
defending Pakistan against external aggression and
"subject to
law" acting in aid-to-the-civil power when called on so to
do.
Any attempt to abrogate the constitution was deemed high
treason
(see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional System
, ch. 1).
In 1972 Bhutto established the Federal Security Force
of some
18,000 men to provide assistance to the civil
administration and
police and to do civic action work. Not under military
control,
the Federal Security Force was, in effect, Bhutto's
private
political army. The military, beaten and demoralized, had
no
choice but to accept this further setback, even as it
harbored
deep concerns over the impact Bhutto was having on the
integrity
of the army and its ability to defend Pakistan.
In 1973 Bhutto began to focus on rebuilding the tamed
military because Pakistan continued to face serious
security
threats from abroad, highlighted by the Indian nuclear
test in
1974, and at home--a major insurgency from 1973 to 1977 in
Balochistan, which ultimately required the involvement of
80,000
army troops. New military production facilities and a navy
air
wing were established. Bhutto's diplomacy resulted in a
partial
lifting of the United States embargo on military sales to
Pakistan in 1973 and a complete removal of the embargo in
1977.
He also used diplomacy to tap into the burgeoning oil
revenues of
the Middle East; still, Pakistan could not afford to buy
much,
and its inventories of weapons were increasingly made up
of
outdated and ill-matched equipment from a variety of
sources.
Nonetheless, the army's self-confidence again began to
grow.
Expenditures on defense by 1974 had reattained the 1969
level--
even though the gross national product
(GNP--see Glossary)
was
little more than half of the amount that had been produced
before
Bangladesh became independent. The defense budget
continued to
increase over the next several years, supporting a
somewhat
expanded strength--428,000 personnel in 1976. Pakistan's
nuclear
program was also established by Bhutto. )
Bhutto's domestic position, however, eroded rapidly in
the
mid-1970s, and, as his charisma waned, he turned to the
army to
deal with domestic unrest. The rigged elections of March
1977
resulted in mass demonstrations demanding Bhutto's
resignation.
General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, chief of the army staff--a
new title
for service chiefs replacing the former title of commander
in
chief--saw that the army was unwilling to engage in the
violence
that would be necessary to put down the unrest. In a
stunning
move, Zia arrested Bhutto and other political leaders on
July 5,
1977, and declared Pakistan's third period of martial law.
Data as of April 1994
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