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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Pakistan
Index
When Mian Nawaz Sharif became prime minister in
November
1990, his political coalition, the IJI, had more than a
two-
thirds majority in the National Assembly. The IJI
alliance, a
grouping of parties whose chief components were the PML
and the
JI, had been formed in 1988 to oppose the PPP in the
elections of
that year. In the 1988 elections, the PPP emerged as the
single
largest group in the National Assembly, and its leader,
Benazir,
became prime minister. At the same time, however, Nawaz
Sharif
emerged as the most powerful politician outside the PPP.
Just two
years later, the IJI under Nawaz Sharif's leadership
achieved
victory at the polls, and Nawaz Sharif took over in a
peaceful,
constitutional transfer of power--the third prime minister
since
Zia's death in 1988 ushered in a return to democracy.
Nawaz
Sharif's ascendancy also marked a transition in the
political
culture of Pakistan--a power shift from the traditional
feudal
aristocracy to a growing class of modern entrepreneurs.
This
transition mirrored the socioeconomic changes that had
been at
work in Pakistan, moving the country gradually from a
feudal to
an industrial society.
Nawaz Sharif, born in Lahore in 1949, belongs to a
postindependence generation of politicians. Scion of a
leading
industrial family, he is a practicing Muslim, an ardent
capitalist, and a political moderate. A graduate of
Government
College Lahore, with a degree from Punjab University Law
College,
also in Lahore, he rose to prominence representing an
urban
constituency seeking its own political identity. His
family,
along with other major industrial families, had suffered
from the
nationalization of large industrial enterprises during
Bhutto's
regime (1971-77). Nawaz Sharif had worked to build a
political
constituency that would favor private industrial and
commercial
entrepreneurship. He served in Punjab, first as finance
minister
and then as chief minister, before coming to national
office. As
finance minister, he presented development-oriented
budgets. As
chief minister, he stressed welfare and development
activities
and the maintenance of law and order.
In his first address to the nation after taking office
as
prime minister, Nawaz Sharif announced his government's
comprehensive national reconstruction plan and said that
its
implementation would ensure the successful march of
Pakistan into
the twenty-first century. He stressed that proper use of
the
country's natural resources would be made, the pace of
industrialization expedited, and the best use of talented
manpower identified. Under his development policy,
investment
would be encouraged, and restrictions on setting up new
industries would be lifted.
Early assessments of Nawaz Sharif and his government
noted
his initiative, youthful energy, and already proven
ability and
popularity in his home province, the country's power base.
The
newspaper Dawn pointed out, however, that his
Punjab
connection was both an asset and a liability and that "to
acquire
a genuinely all-Pakistan stature, he will have to have
ingenuity,
and acumen, magnanimity and vision, and the strength to
take bold
decisions."
Nawaz Sharif's cabinet initially included eighteen
ministers:
nine from Punjab, two from the Islamabad Capital
Territory, six
from Sindh, and one from Balochistan. His cabinet was
later
expanded to include representation from the North-West
Frontier
Province. Of paramount importance to the new government
was
implementation of Nawaz Sharif's program for strengthening
the
economy. Goals of the program included self-reliance,
deregulation and denationalization, taxation reform,
foreign-
exchange and payment reform, administrative and law
reform, and
increases in agricultural productivity and exports. The
government's economic strategy rested on streamlining the
institutional framework for industrialization and on
starting a
new partnership with the private sector in order to
promote
common objectives. Nawaz Sharif regarded unemployment as
Pakistan's major problem and believed it could be solved
only by
rapid industrialization. He said his government was
considering
special incentives for rural industrialization and
agro-based
industries and was fully committed to a policy of
deregulation.
The IJI government was third in a line representing a
dyarchical arrangement of shared power between Pakistan's
civil-
military and political forces. Nawaz Sharif and his
predecessors,
Junejo and Benazir, came to power under a constitutional
framework in which, under the controversial Eighth
Amendment
introduced by Zia, the president was empowered to dissolve
the
parliament and dismiss the government. Both Junejo and
Benazir
had earlier been unceremoniously dismissed from office,
and the
constitutional framework limited Nawaz Sharif's ability to
govern
despite the support of a majority in the parliament. He,
too,
would be dismissed under the constitutional framework in
1993.
President Ishaq Khan had been credited with guiding
Pakistan
back to democracy after eleven years of autocracy and
martial law
under Zia. After Zia's death, Ishaq Khan, then chairman of
the
Senate, was next in the line of succession as stipulated
in the
constitution. The armed forces requested him to assume the
presidency. As acting president, Ishaq Khan instituted an
emergency council, and he and the council decided that
general
elections would be held in November 1988 and that
political
parties would be allowed to participate in them. When the
PPP won
these elections, Ishaq Khan called on Benazir to form a
government, and she was sworn in as prime minister. Ishaq
Khan
was elected president by a combined sitting of the
national and
provincial assemblies, receiving 78 percent of the
electoral
votes. When Ishaq Khan dismissed Benazir and her
government in
1990, he again called a general election. As a result,
Nawaz
Sharif was brought to power in 1990.
Pakistan's emerging two-party system was strengthened
by the
1988 and 1990 elections and the constitutional transfer of
power
in 1990 from Benazir to Nawaz Sharif. In these elections,
the two
political alliances, the IJI and the PDA (headed by the
PPP),
became the main contenders for power. Although both
alliances
agreed on Pakistan's need for a liberal democracy and a
market
economy, the PDA opposition represented a real political
challenge to the government, and Benazir conducted a
relentless
campaign to oust Nawaz Sharif.
From the outset, the Nawaz Sharif government's record
was
mixed. On the one hand, it achieved passage in May 1991 of
the
Shariat Bill, which declared the Quran and the
sunna (see Glossary)
to be the law of the land. Islamic
fundamentalists, on
the other hand, did not think the bill went far enough.
The more
secular-minded Pakistanis feared that a theocracy was
being
established. A working group was set up to monitor and
make
recommendations for enforcing Islamic laws in the country.
The
working group adopted a nineteen-point plan that included
calls
for the implementation of all Islamic legislation,
especially the
laws creating sharia courts; transformation of the
education
system to reflect Islamic teaching; controls on the print
and
electronic media designed to ensure Islamic moral values;
uniform
and enforced prayer schedules; and the establishment of an
Islamic banking system and the total abolition of
interest.
Additionally, in November 1991 the Federal Shariat
Court,
Pakistan's supreme religious court, declared the
provisions of
some twenty federal and provincial laws repugnant to
Islam. A
particular problem was the ruling that payment of interest
(riba) was prohibited by Islam even if the loan
involved
was for productive purposes. Although the government had
publicly
committed itself to Islamization, its major domestic
policy
initiative was the liberalization of the economy. If the
ruling
on riba were fully implemented, this new economic
policy
likely would fail. With no consensus in Pakistan regarding
either
the content or the pace of Islamic reform, Nawaz Sharif
sought to
strike an acceptable balance to enable his government to
remain
in power.
The government also had to contend with rampant crime
and
terrorism, which continued to be a cause for alarm in the
country, particularly in Sindh. Kidnappings, bombings, and
murders persisted despite concerted efforts by the police
and the
military to stem lawlessness. Pakistanis called this state
of
affairs the Kalashnikov culture because the flood of
available
automatic weapons gave long-standing ethnic and political
rivalries a deadly new significance
(see Prospects for Social Cohesion
, ch. 2). The arms were largely a legacy from the
war in
neighboring Afghanistan. The police were increasingly
outgunned,
and even foreigners were not immune from attack. In the
summer of
1991, the prime minister was forced to cancel an important
trip
to Japan in quest of investment in order to calm a
population
shaken by a particularly savage string of murders in
Punjab. In
an effort to stem the violence, the government decreed
that
Pakistanis turn in their weapons, but, predictably, few of
them
did. The government also passed the Twelfth Amendment to
the
constitution, which provided for the further
jurisdictional
authority of Speedy Trial Courts to dispense summary
justice. The
opposition, however, criticized the law as suppressing
fundamental rights.
Nawaz Sharif held to his conviction that the solution
to
Pakistan's political problems was free-market reform and
economic
growth, so he liberalized foreign-exchange regulations and
denationalized public-sector industrial enterprises and
financial
institutions. Furthermore, government approval was no
longer
required for the establishment of new industrial
enterprises
(with some exceptions, particularly in relation to arms
and
explosives). A number of important industries such as
electricity
generation, shipping, airlines, highway construction, and
telecommunications were opened up to the private sector.
Although
there was support for liberalizing and privatizing the
economy,
there was considerable criticism of the process of
implementation. Some critics feared that moving too fast
could
produce turmoil, with the resultant demand for
renationalization.
Other critics asked for protection for the more vulnerable
groups
in society who would not be able to compete in a free
market. The
government's ability to focus effectively on and deal with
these
problems was weakened by its involvement with the Pakistan
Cooperative Societies and the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) financial scandals
(see Finance
, ch.
3).
In keeping with his goals of consolidating economic
growth
and overcoming the country's regional divisions, Nawaz
Sharif was
convinced of the need for a modern national
infrastructure,
regardless of cost. As a result, he launched the
construction of
a US$1 billion superhighway project, which National
Highway
Authority chairman Hidayat Niazi described as a step
toward
building a nation
(see Transportation
, ch. 3).
Nawaz Sharif's government continued to be under
pressure from
within and without, and his ruling coalition, the IJI, was
plagued by internal dissention. Tensions, disagreements,
and
political rivalries were present within the IJI's largest
component, the Pakistan Muslim League. In May 1992, the
fundamentalist JI, the second largest member of the
coalition,
formally left the IJI. Since its inception, the IJI had
been an
alliance of varied right-of-center and Islamic parties in
a
marriage of convenience to oppose the PPP. However, the
PML and
the JI had long been antagonists, and their disagreements
mounted
over a number of issues. The JI was unhappy with the IJI
government's support of Saudi Arabia and the United States
during
the Persian Gulf crisis (1990-91), fearing that the defeat
of
Iraq would transform
Shia (see Glossary)
Iran into a major
regional power. The JI also criticized the mainstream PML
for what it perceived to be foot-dragging on Islamization,
including the matter of riba, as well as its abandonment of
support
for the Afghan mujahidin in favor of efforts to
establish
a neutral, United Nations-sponsored government in Kabul.
The JI
also criticized the government's policy on Kashmir as not
evidencing sufficient commitment to Islamic "freedom
fighters"
there.
The government's chief opposition, Benazir and the PPP,
criticized Nawaz Sharif's efforts at privatization,
calling them
the "loot and plunder" of Pakistan and saying his plan
favored
large investors and ran roughshod over labor. Benazir was
also
critical of the government's Islamization policies and
continued
to allege that the 1990 elections, which brought Nawaz
Sharif's
government to power, were fraudulent. In late 1992, she
tried to
organize widespread protest marches against the
government. In
response, Nawaz Sharif banned Benazir from two of the
country's
largest cities and ordered police measures against her
supporters.
Benazir ultimately did not muster enough demonstrators
throughout the country to threaten the government.
However, Nawaz
Sharif's actions, in the eyes of some, made him appear too
willing to espouse repressive measures rather than adhere
to
democratic principles. Subsequently, relations between
Nawaz
Sharif and Benazir appeared to soften somewhat. He
reportedly
ceased calling her an "enemy of Pakistan," and Benazir
abandoned
her demonstrations designed to topple Nawaz Sharif's
government
through street power.
The ruling coalition appeared to weaken by early 1993.
The
four major powers in Pakistan continued to be the
president, the
military, Nawaz Sharif's IJI government, and the PPP
opposition
led by Benazir. Reports of a growing rift between Nawaz
Sharif
and Ishaq Khan became more commonplace. The
military--which never
had an overt constitutional role in the government but
which had
historically been a key player in the formation and
dismissal of
governments--was closely and nervously monitored by
observers.
Data as of April 1994
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