MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Pakistan
Index
At its creation in 1947, Pakistan looked back on two
traditions while seeking to reject a third. One was the
more than
100 years of British colonial rule that radically reshaped
the
superstructure of the subcontinent and was the door to
modernity.
The other inheritance, the Muslim conquest and dominance
from the
thirteenth century to the nineteenth century, provided the
Islamic factor that led to the partition of India and
shaped
modern-day Pakistan. The Muslim conquest also offered a
useful
mythology of exaggerated Islamic military prowess and
dominance.
The tradition that the new nation rejected and sought to
leave
behind was that of largely Hindu India. Indeed,
differentiation
from that heritage was the raison d'ĂȘtre of Pakistan, yet
it
remains important, for much of Pakistan's cultural
heritage is
shared with India. India also remains the primary
preoccupation
of Pakistan's foreign policy and security concerns.
The country's British heritage has played the greatest
role
in shaping the often amorphous military tradition of the
Muslim
period into streamlined modern forces. Beginning in the
earliest
days of the East India Company (chartered in 1600), native
guards
were hired by the British to protect trading posts. As
time went
by, these troops were given additional training and were
organized under British officers into the armies of the
company's
presidencies at Calcutta (Fort William), Madras (Fort St.
George), and Bombay. In 1748 the presidency armies were
brought
under the command of Major Stringer Lawrence, who
subsequently
became known as the father of the British Indian Army. A
series
of military reforms, first undertaken by Robert Clive in
the mideighteenth century, continued through the first half of
the
nineteenth century as the British Parliament asserted
increasing
control over the East India Company and its military arm.
Part of
the legacy that shaped the British Indian Army was the
growing
understanding that civil and military spheres of activity
were
distinct and that each must respect the other but that
ultimate
control rested with the civilian power, whether in later
times
the governor general or the local district magistrate. The
role
of the military was to give "aid-to-the-civil power."
The critical event in the evolution of the British
Indian
Army was the uprising of 1857-58--known as the Indian
Mutiny or
Sepoy Rebellion by British historians and sometimes as the
First
War of Independence by later Indian nationalists--when
troops in
north-central India, Muslim and Hindu alike, rose up
against the
British
(see The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism
, ch. 1). Some
bonds
of loyalty held, but many Indian troops slaughtered both
their
British leaders and hapless civilians. With the help of
Indian
troops who did not join the rebellion--especially Sikhs
and
Muslims from the Punjab--the mutineers were put down with
a
violence that matched the atrocities that they had
committed.
The bond between Indian and Briton had been broken, and
a
rethinking of British military policy in India was set in
motion.
East India Company rule was abolished, and direct British
rule--
the British Raj--was instituted in 1858. Emphasis was put
on
recruiting in areas where disaffection was least and where
the
British discerned the existence of "martial races" (ethnic
groups) noted for their military tradition, lack of
political
sophistication, and demonstrated loyalty. By these
criteria, the
most fertile area for recruitment was in the Punjab region
of
northwestern India. The Punjabization of the British
Indian Army
and the assumptions that underlay it would weigh heavily
on both
the international and the domestic politics of Pakistan
once it
was created as an independent entity.
The Pakistan Army structure of the early 1990s in many
ways
bore a close resemblance to the British Indian Army
structure at
the end of the nineteenth century. During that period,
recruitment into individual, homogeneous regiments
depended on
class and caste, rather than on territory. Over time,
these
regiments became sources of immense pride to the men who
served
in them and to the ethnic group from which they were
frequently
recruited. Service in a specific regiment passed from
father to
son; the eventual shift from British to Pakistani rule
went with
hardly a ripple in the structure except for the change in
nationality of the senior officer corps.
The British experimented with various forms of
recruitment
and of elevation to officer rank. During the period
between the
two world wars (1919-39), the British trained Indian
officers to
command at least Indian troops, and training
establishments were
set up to produce an indigenous officer corps. A small
number of
officer candidates were sent to Britain to the Royal
Military
Academy at Sandhurst; after 1932 the majority of
candidates were
trained at the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun.
A rank that predated that of the native officer was the
viceroy's commissioned officer--an Indian who had risen
from the
ranks and performed officer functions (except for
commanding
officer), especially at the company level. The viceroy's
commissioned officer came from the same social background
as did
the troops in his unit and performed a dual function: for
the
troops, he was a role model and figure of respect to whom
they
could turn for advice; he was also an invaluable
intermediary
between the troops and the British officer who commanded
them.
The British Indian Army came under immense stress
during both
world wars, when it was rapidly expanded and deployed
abroad to
wherever the British Empire appeared threatened. During
World War
I, nearly 750,000 Indian troops were recruited for
service; some
36,000 were killed, and twice as many were wounded. The
troops
generally acquitted themselves well, and their
contribution was
used as an arguing point by Indian nationalist politicians
who
sought greater autonomy for their country.
The army encountered a different kind of stress during
the
interwar period and beyond, when it was called on to
suppress the
growing wave of nationalist resistance. This use of Indian
personnel alienated the nationalist leaders, especially
those of
the Indian National Congress, who would become the leaders
of
India in 1947. The problem was much less serious in what
was to
become Pakistan. Indeed, during the "Quit India" movement
during
World War II, when the British sought to crush Congress
with
special vigor because of its resistance to the war, the
All-India
Muslim League and the army supported the British cause
(see Toward Partition
, ch. 1).
During World War II, the British Indian Army (together
with
the small Royal Indian Navy and Royal Indian Air Force)
grew to
meet imperial requirements, expanding from essentially a
constabulary force of 175,000 to a mass army of more than
2
million. This growth meant appointing many Indians as
officers,
who received only short training courses, and general
recruitment
in areas of the country where "martial" spirit had not
been
discerned before. Once again, Indian troops performed
loyally and
effectively, even while the country was in political
turmoil.
Data as of April 1994
Soldiers on parade
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington
The Colonial Background
At its creation in 1947, Pakistan looked back on two
traditions while seeking to reject a third. One was the
more than
100 years of British colonial rule that radically reshaped
the
superstructure of the subcontinent and was the door to
modernity.
The other inheritance, the Muslim conquest and dominance
from the
thirteenth century to the nineteenth century, provided the
Islamic factor that led to the partition of India and
shaped
modern-day Pakistan. The Muslim conquest also offered a
useful
mythology of exaggerated Islamic military prowess and
dominance.
The tradition that the new nation rejected and sought to
leave
behind was that of largely Hindu India. Indeed,
differentiation
from that heritage was the raison d'ĂȘtre of Pakistan, yet
it
remains important, for much of Pakistan's cultural
heritage is
shared with India. India also remains the primary
preoccupation
of Pakistan's foreign policy and security concerns.
The country's British heritage has played the greatest
role
in shaping the often amorphous military tradition of the
Muslim
period into streamlined modern forces. Beginning in the
earliest
days of the East India Company (chartered in 1600), native
guards
were hired by the British to protect trading posts. As
time went
by, these troops were given additional training and were
organized under British officers into the armies of the
company's
presidencies at Calcutta (Fort William), Madras (Fort St.
George), and Bombay. In 1748 the presidency armies were
brought
under the command of Major Stringer Lawrence, who
subsequently
became known as the father of the British Indian Army. A
series
of military reforms, first undertaken by Robert Clive in
the mideighteenth century, continued through the first half of
the
nineteenth century as the British Parliament asserted
increasing
control over the East India Company and its military arm.
Part of
the legacy that shaped the British Indian Army was the
growing
understanding that civil and military spheres of activity
were
distinct and that each must respect the other but that
ultimate
control rested with the civilian power, whether in later
times
the governor general or the local district magistrate. The
role
of the military was to give "aid-to-the-civil power."
The critical event in the evolution of the British
Indian
Army was the uprising of 1857-58--known as the Indian
Mutiny or
Sepoy Rebellion by British historians and sometimes as the
First
War of Independence by later Indian nationalists--when
troops in
north-central India, Muslim and Hindu alike, rose up
against the
British
(see The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism
, ch. 1). Some
bonds
of loyalty held, but many Indian troops slaughtered both
their
British leaders and hapless civilians. With the help of
Indian
troops who did not join the rebellion--especially Sikhs
and
Muslims from the Punjab--the mutineers were put down with
a
violence that matched the atrocities that they had
committed.
The bond between Indian and Briton had been broken, and
a
rethinking of British military policy in India was set in
motion.
East India Company rule was abolished, and direct British
rule--
the British Raj--was instituted in 1858. Emphasis was put
on
recruiting in areas where disaffection was least and where
the
British discerned the existence of "martial races" (ethnic
groups) noted for their military tradition, lack of
political
sophistication, and demonstrated loyalty. By these
criteria, the
most fertile area for recruitment was in the Punjab region
of
northwestern India. The Punjabization of the British
Indian Army
and the assumptions that underlay it would weigh heavily
on both
the international and the domestic politics of Pakistan
once it
was created as an independent entity.
The Pakistan Army structure of the early 1990s in many
ways
bore a close resemblance to the British Indian Army
structure at
the end of the nineteenth century. During that period,
recruitment into individual, homogeneous regiments
depended on
class and caste, rather than on territory. Over time,
these
regiments became sources of immense pride to the men who
served
in them and to the ethnic group from which they were
frequently
recruited. Service in a specific regiment passed from
father to
son; the eventual shift from British to Pakistani rule
went with
hardly a ripple in the structure except for the change in
nationality of the senior officer corps.
The British experimented with various forms of
recruitment
and of elevation to officer rank. During the period
between the
two world wars (1919-39), the British trained Indian
officers to
command at least Indian troops, and training
establishments were
set up to produce an indigenous officer corps. A small
number of
officer candidates were sent to Britain to the Royal
Military
Academy at Sandhurst; after 1932 the majority of
candidates were
trained at the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun.
A rank that predated that of the native officer was the
viceroy's commissioned officer--an Indian who had risen
from the
ranks and performed officer functions (except for
commanding
officer), especially at the company level. The viceroy's
commissioned officer came from the same social background
as did
the troops in his unit and performed a dual function: for
the
troops, he was a role model and figure of respect to whom
they
could turn for advice; he was also an invaluable
intermediary
between the troops and the British officer who commanded
them.
The British Indian Army came under immense stress
during both
world wars, when it was rapidly expanded and deployed
abroad to
wherever the British Empire appeared threatened. During
World War
I, nearly 750,000 Indian troops were recruited for
service; some
36,000 were killed, and twice as many were wounded. The
troops
generally acquitted themselves well, and their
contribution was
used as an arguing point by Indian nationalist politicians
who
sought greater autonomy for their country.
The army encountered a different kind of stress during
the
interwar period and beyond, when it was called on to
suppress the
growing wave of nationalist resistance. This use of Indian
personnel alienated the nationalist leaders, especially
those of
the Indian National Congress, who would become the leaders
of
India in 1947. The problem was much less serious in what
was to
become Pakistan. Indeed, during the "Quit India" movement
during
World War II, when the British sought to crush Congress
with
special vigor because of its resistance to the war, the
All-India
Muslim League and the army supported the British cause
(see Toward Partition
, ch. 1).
During World War II, the British Indian Army (together
with
the small Royal Indian Navy and Royal Indian Air Force)
grew to
meet imperial requirements, expanding from essentially a
constabulary force of 175,000 to a mass army of more than
2
million. This growth meant appointing many Indians as
officers,
who received only short training courses, and general
recruitment
in areas of the country where "martial" spirit had not
been
discerned before. Once again, Indian troops performed
loyally and
effectively, even while the country was in political
turmoil.
Data as of April 1994
|
|