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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Pakistan
Index
The Zia era ended as it had begun, with a Bhutto in
power,
for Benazir's party emerged with a narrow victory. Her
position
was much different from that of her father. She became
prime
minister under a constitution that left great power in the
hands
of the president, her parliamentary majority was narrow,
and the
army was strong, self-confident, and unwilling to renounce
its
political role. As the price of power, Benazir had to
negotiate
an arrangement with President Ishaq Khan and General Beg
by which
she reportedly promised to keep Zia's constitutional
changes and
to limit her involvement in military affairs, including
management of the fighting in Afghanistan and nuclear
weapons
policy.
Several times Benazir ineffectually challenged the
armed
forces and the president on military matters. She was
never able
to find a comfortable relationship with these other two
major
players of the triangle of political power in Pakistan.
She
showed interest in improving relations with India but had
little
scope to take concrete steps. She skillfully cultivated
her good
ties to Washington, but overall her performance as prime
minister
was disappointing, and when the president--with the
obvious
backing of the army--dismissed her in August 1990 and
called for
new elections, there was little opposition.
The elections brought to power the Islamic Democratic
Alliance (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad--IJI), a coalition that
enjoyed
the implicit support of both the president and the armed
forces.
Punjab's chief minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, a businessman
and
protégé of Zia, became prime minister. Although the
dismissal of
Benazir had been against the spirit, if not the letter, of
the
constitution, the new power arrangement seemed to offer
Pakistan
favorable prospects for stable representative rule because
the
three power centers were all in apparent alignment, and
Nawaz
Sharif represented the interests of the Punjabi majority.
The
arrangement worked adequately for some time, and when
General
Beg's time for retirement as chief of the army staff came,
he did
not attempt to force an extension of his tour of duty.
Beg's replacement, General Asif Nawaz Janjua, was a
much
lower-profile leader and sought to lead the army away from
corruption and toward a renewed emphasis on
professionalism and a
sensible adaptation to the post-Cold War realities of
Pakistan's
strategic position. The army, however, was drawn into
politics in
May 1992 when the law and order situation in Sindh
deteriorated
so badly that the provincial government invited the army
to
restore public order under Article 147 of the
constitution.
Although the army could not solve Sindh's many problems,
it made
significant progress in combatting the cycle of terror,
banditry,
and kidnapping that had plagued the province. The army
stopped
short of imposing martial law, but it intervened in the
politics
of the province and, in the process, moved against
political
allies of Nawaz Sharif, the IJI coalition prime minister,
who was
already at odds with the president.
General Janjua died suddenly in January 1993, and
President
Ishaq Khan used his prerogative to reach well down the
list of
lieutenant generals to appoint Abdul Waheed, a highly
regarded
officer without apparent political aspirations. Waheed
seemed to
fit Pakistani political scientist Mohammad Waseem's
description
as "the transition from a group of conservative generals
led by
Zia who were inspired by Islamic ideals to a relatively
liberal
and modernist generation of military officers who have
positive
attitudes toward Western-style democracy."
Waheed was quickly called upon to demonstrate his
commitment
to democratic process. When a power struggle between the
president and the prime minister in April 1993 resulted in
Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif's ouster, the military resisted the
temptation to take charge during the ensuing period of
political
turmoil. In July, Waheed brokered a settlement in which
both the
prime minister and the president resigned, a neutral
caretaker
government was appointed, and new elections were scheduled
for
October (see
"The Silent Revolution": A Year of Political Struggle, ch. 4).
There remained different points of view within the
officer
corps, almost all of whom had little respect for
politicians and
feared that an incompetent civilian leader might
irreparably
damage their core values--the integrity of the military
and the
security of Pakistan. Some officers were politically
ambitious
and had found their period of power under Zia rewarding--
financially and otherwise. Many, however, believed that
any
political activity, whether in the context of martial law
or in
the context of helping elected leaders deal with crises
caused by
politicians' ineptitude, undermined discipline and morale
and
detracted from the ability of the armed forces to perform
military missions. Retired General Shaukat Riza,
describing an
earlier period of martial law observed: "After a short
period of
hot, righteous action, military men succumb to setting
their mark
on whatever is served up to them. Martial Law is disarmed,
leaving in its wake a debris of shattered dreams and
wasting
social order."
On balance, the army preferred to avoid direct
involvement
unless the political order threatened to collapse
completely. The
crucial question for Pakistan's political future was in
the
shaping of the middle ground. Should the armed forces
simply be
recognized as having a voice in Pakistan's politics, or
should
their role be formally institutionalized? Zia's attempts
to do
the latter through creation of a National Security Council
had
been successfully resisted by Junejo, but the question
remained
central to Pakistan's security as well as to its politics.
The external relations of the military deteriorated
sharply
in the post-Zia period because of the collapse of
Pakistan's
relationship with the United States. President George Bush
determined in October 1990 that he could no longer certify
that
Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons and, as required
by the
Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act,
terminated all
United States assistance to Pakistan that was not already
in the
pipeline. Pakistan handled the cutoff with little public
rancor
and committed itself to freezing the nuclear program in an
attempt to placate the United States. Washington permitted
such
commercial purchases as spare parts for aircraft and the
continued joint naval and special forces exercises, but
such key
items as fighter aircraft on order were kept in abeyance.
Further, the United States moved to reclaim nine ships
that were
on loan--about half of Pakistan's surface fleet.
In late 1993, the administration of President William
J.
Clinton, citing what it considered to be asymmetrical
treatment
accorded to Pakistan and India over their respective
nuclear
programs, proposed revising the Pressler Amendment and
certain
"country-specific" sections of the Foreign Assistance Act.
The
administration argued that by the time nuclear
nonproliferation
provisions had been added to the Foreign Assistance Act,
India
had already acquired the capability to build nuclear
weapons and
thus Pakistan had borne the brunt of most United States
sanctions. In early 1994, the administration withdrew its
proposal to revise the amendment because of strong
criticism from
a number of influential members of Congress, including
Senator
Pressler himself. In March the administration was reported
as
"floating" a proposal for releasing to Pakistan up to
twenty-
eight F-16 fighter aircraft--already paid for and part of
a long-
standing commercial order but undeliverable because of the
Pressler Amendment. The proposal, which was certain to be
challenged in the United States Congress, was to be part
of a
broader initiative to get India and Pakistan to halt their
production of weapons-grade nuclear material and to
discourage
them from deploying surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.
The impact on Pakistan's military readiness by the
United
States decision to halt assistance has been described by
observers as near catastrophic, but even more important
than the
money and equipment involved was the strategic signal sent
by the
aid cutoff. As long as Pakistan was in the front line of
opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
United
States found ways of continuing its aid despite Pakistan's
nuclear program. Once the Soviet forces left Afghanistan
and the
Soviet Union itself ceased to exist, Pakistan's importance
dwindled. Whatever limited successes Pakistan may have had
in
salvaging parts of the relationship with the United
States, it
was clear that the end of the Cold War marked the end of
Pakistan's strategic role.
The loss of United States support came at a difficult
time.
Unrest in Indian Kashmir had developed rapidly after 1989,
and
Pakistan inevitably supplied moral and covert matériel
support,
thus raising the specter of a new conflict with India.
There were
serious concerns in early 1990 that a war might break out.
At
United States prompting, both sides took effective steps
to
reduce the danger. Neither country wanted a conflict, but
Pakistan remained in a quandary because it could not
ignore
events in Kashmir although it did not have substantial
international support for its position. The United States
and
China made clear their unwillingness to provide political
or
matériel support to Pakistan, thus increasing still
further the
latter's sense of isolation.
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan removed a
potential
threat to Pakistan, and the substantial retreat of Russia
from
the security affairs of the subcontinent offset somewhat
the
withdrawal of the United States. For the first time since
1947,
Pakistan was not concerned about a two-front threat.
Further, the
emergence of five independent Muslim republics in Central
Asia
raised hopes that they might become allies and offer
Pakistan
both the political support and the strategic depth it
lacked. As
long as Afghanistan was in chaos, Pakistan would lack
direct
access to the new republics. However, it was still far
from
certain in the early 1990s whether or not the republics
would
find Pakistan an interesting political partner.
Approaching the next century, Pakistan faces yet
another
reconfiguration of the forces that determine its security
environment. As Russia, China, and the United States stand
back
from South Asia, there are fewer constraints on India. Yet
other
sweeping changes are under way in the international
environment.
Pakistan remains engaged in its search for outside help to
ensure
its security. The end of the Cold War was only changed the
terms
of the problem.
Data as of April 1994
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