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Pakistan
Index
The North-West Frontier Province is closely identified
with
Pakhtuns, one of the largest tribal groups in the world.
The
Pakhtuns predominate in Balochistan and are also the major
group
in southern Afghanistan. The West has long been fascinated
with
the Pakhtuns, one of the few peoples able to defeat the
advances
of British imperialism. Authors as diverse as Rudyard
Kipling and
contemporary Pakistani anthropologist Akbar S. Ahmed wrote
about
them. More is written about Pakhtun norms, values, and
social
organization than any other ethnic group in Pakistan.
Central to identity as a Pakhtun is adherence to the
malecentered code of conduct, the pakhtunwali. Foremost
in
this code is the notion of honor, nang, which is
articulated in a starkly black-and-white, all-or-nothing
manner.
Without honor, life for a Pakhtun is not worth living.
Honor
demands the maintenance of sexual propriety. Complete
chastity
among female relatives is of the essence; only with the
purity
and good repute of his mother, daughters, sisters, and
wife (or
wives) does a man ensure his honor. Thus women are
restricted to
private, family compounds in much of the province. Census
takers,
invariably male, are constrained not to ask about the
women in
another man's home, and the number of men in a household
is often
overstated because sons and brothers are a source of
strength.
Accurate enumeration of the population hence is not
possible.
Closely related to the notion of honor is the principle
of
revenge, or badal. Offenses to one's honor must be
avenged, or there is no honor. Although minor problems may
be
settled by negotiation, murder demands blood revenge, and
partners in illicit sexual liaisons are killed if
discovered.
Even making lewd innuendos or, in the case of women,
having one's
reputation maligned may mean death. The men involved
sometimes
escape to other regions, where they may well be tracked
down by
the woman's kin. When a woman is killed, the assailant is,
almost
without exception, a close male relative. Killings
associated
with sexual misconduct are the only ones that do not
demand
revenge. Even the courts are accustomed to dealing
leniently in
such cases. Vendettas and feuds are an endemic feature of
social
relations and an index of individual and group identity.
Another major dimension of pakhtunwali is
hospitality,
or melmastia. Commensalism is a means of showing
respect,
friendship, and alliance. A complex etiquette surrounds
the
serving of guests, in which the host or his sons, when
serving,
refuse to sit with those they entertain as a mark of
courtesy.
Closely related to melmastia is the requirement of
giving
refuge to anyone, even one's enemy, for as long as the
person is
within the precincts of one's home. These codes, too, are
related
to the concept of honor, for the host gains honor by
serving his
guest, and the person who places himself under another's
protection is weak, a supplicant. Refuge must extend to
the point
of being willing to sacrifice one's own life to defend
one's
guest, but a person who demeans himself so much as to
plead for
mercy should be spared.
Observers credit the relatively minimal tension that
initially existed between Pakistani Pakhtuns and the large
number
of Pakhtun refugees from Afghanistan to the deeply felt
obligation of Pakhtuns to obey the customary dictates of
hospitality. However, Pakistani Pakhtuns' frustration with
the
refugees escalated after the Soviet army withdrew from
Afghanistan in 1989. Many Pakistani Pakhtuns were upset
that the
internecine violence resulting from warring clans in
conflict in
Afghanistan was overflowing into Pakistan. In 1994
Pakistani
Pakhtuns were as eager as other Pakistanis to see the
refugees
return to Afghanistan.
Pakhtuns are organized into segmentary clans (called
khels), each named for a first migrant to their
area to
whom they trace their ancestry. Membership is tied to
landownership as well as to descent. A person who loses
his land
is no longer treated as a full (adult) member of the
community.
He no longer may join or speak in the tribal jirga,
or
council of tribal leaders, at which issues of common
interest are
debated. But because brothers divide property among
themselves,
rivalry builds among the children of brothers who may have
to
subdivide increasingly unequal portions of an original
estate.
Hence, a man's greatest rival for women, money, and land
(zan, zar, and zamin, respectively)
is his
first cousin--his father's brother's son--even though the
same
man may be his staunchest ally in the event of attack from
the
outside. Lineages themselves have a notable tendency to
fragment;
this tendency has contributed to the existence of a number
of
well-established clans among the Pakhtuns. At every level
of
Pakhtun social organization, groups are split into a
complex and
shifting pattern of alliance and enmity.
Most Pakhtuns are pious
Sunni (see Glossary)
Muslims, and
effective religious leaders often acquire a substantial
following. However, there is a basic ambivalence on the
whole toward mullahs, who have a formal role in leading prayers
and in taking care of the mosque.
An intensely egalitarian ethos exists among Pakhtun men
in a
clan; the tribal leader is considered the first among
equals. No
man willingly admits himself less than any other's equal.
Nor
will he, unless driven by the most dire circumstances, put
himself in a position of subservience or admit dependency
on
another. This sense of equality is evident in the
structure of
the men's council, composed of lineage elders who deal
with
matters ranging from disputes between local lineage
sections to
relations with other tribes or with the national
government.
Although the council can make and enforce binding
decisions,
within the body itself all are considered equals. To
attempt or
to appear to coerce another is to give grave insult and to
risk
initiating a feud.
To facilitate relations with Pakhtuns, the British
appointed
maliks, or minor chiefs. Agreements in which
Pakhtuns have
acceded to an external authority--whether the British or
the
Pakistani government--have been tenuous. The British
resorted to
a "divide and conquer" policy of playing various feuding
factions
against one another. British hegemony was frequently
precarious:
in 1937 Pakhtuns wiped out an entire British brigade.
Throughout
the 1930s, there were more troops stationed in Waziristan
(homeland of the Wazirs, among the most independent of
Pakhtun
tribes) in the southern part of the North-West Frontier
Province
than in the rest of the subcontinent.
In tribal areas, where the level of wealth is generally
limited, perennial feuding acts as a leveler. The killing,
pillaging, and destruction keep any one lineage from
amassing too
much more than any other. In settled areas, the intensity
of
feuds has declined, although everyone continues to be
loyal to
the ideals. Government control only erratically contains
violence--depending on whether a given government official
has
any relationship to the disputants. The proliferation of
guns--
including clones of Uzis, and Kalashnikovs--has
exacerbated much
of the violence.
Since the 1980s, many Pakhtuns have entered the police
force,
civil service, and military and have virtually taken over
the
country's transportation network. A former president of
Pakistan,
Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1988-93), is a Pakhtun, as are many
highranking military officers. The government of Pakistan has
established numerous schools in the North-West Frontier
Province-
-including ones devoted exclusively to girls--in an effort
to
imbue Pakhtuns with a sense of Pakistani nationalism.
A growing number of development projects in the
North-West
Frontier Province have provided diverse employment
opportunities
for Pakhtuns. Notably, the government has set up
comprehensive
projects like building roads and schools as a substitution
for
cultivating opium poppies. Incentives for industrial
investment
have also been provided. However, the government lost much
credibility when it proposed in 1991 (a proposal soon
withdrawn)
to build up the local infrastructure in the Gadoon-Amazai
area of
the North-West Frontier Province and to encourage it as a
target
for tax-free investment. Observers attributed the
government's
withdrawal of the incentive package to local unrest.
Data as of April 1994
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