It appeared for a time that North Korea could not remain
immune indefinitely to the fallout from the political and
economic collapse of communist regimes as well as to the rise of
South Korea as an economic powerhouse. Eventually, the severe
economic difficulties and adverse changes in the international
environment will become serious enough to compel the North Korean
leadership to introduce some changes in the economic
institutions. At the outset of 1993, however, it does not seem
that North Korea will fundamentally overhaul its economic system.
Only selective reforms--such as the gradual expansion of peasant
and handicraft markets, extension of free-market-based retail
outlets dealing with local consumer goods, and a much wider
application of the independent accounting system in industrial
enterprises with more discretion for the disposition of the
"profits"--are expected to be implemented.
North Korea's leadership probably drew a lesson from China's
experience: in spite of popular demands that political
liberalization follow economic liberalization, communist rule can
still be prolonged if leaders have sufficient will and power. The
decision to adopt both Chinese-style joint ventures and special
economic zones shows that North Korean leaders are willing to
make that gamble. But they are more likely to open the economy to
foreign trade and direct investment than to approve fundamental
economic reforms.
Expanding economic ties with South Korea and diplomatic
normalization with Japan offers the greatest future economic
opportunities. One important component of the off-again-on-again
negotiations for normalization that began in 1990 is North
Korea's demand that Japan provide reparations as compensation for
its colonial rule over Korea. Both reparations and improved
political relations with Japan will ease North Korea's economic
hardships. Reparations can be used immediately to repay part of
North Korea's debt to Japan, alleviating a longstanding source of
friction between the two countries and paving the way toward
importing much-needed advanced capital goods and technology from
Japan.
The possibility of joint ventures with South Korean firms
and, to a lesser extent, with mainstream Japanese firms is
particularly promising. North Korea's cheap labor force will be a
strong magnet for South Korean and Japanese firms, at least
initially. In time, North Korean workers will need more technical
training, and the communist managers will have to be taught
Western management practices, both of which will add to labor
costs.
The economic role of formerly communist allies, particularly
that of the former Soviet Union, is expected to decline
drastically. By the end of the decade, Japan will likely become
North Korea's second largest trading partner after Russia and
then possibly its largest trading partner--or at least its
largest source of imports. Inter-Korean trade, however, has the
potential to increase to the point that South Korea may
eventually overtake Japan in a decade or so to become North
Korea's largest trading partner. If this occurs, China and Russia
will probably become North Korea's third and fourth largest
trading partners, respectively.
North Korea's admission to the UN in 1991 makes it eligible
for various types of economic, scientific, and technical
assistance from the UN and its various specialized agencies. UN
membership also increases the possibility that North Korea can
participate in international organizations such as the
World Bank (see Glossary)
and the IMF.
Reparations payments and economic aid from Japan, trade
credits from South Korea, and participation in various
international organizations will substantially help North Korea's
modernization. A modernized and expanded infrastructure--with
particular attention to transportation and communications--will
have to precede the commitment of scarce resources to modernizing
a specific industrial sector or plant.
In order to alleviate chronic energy shortages and meet
growing industrial needs, rebuilding and restructuring the energy
industry will have to take precedence over other industrial
projects. Restructuring could eventually alter the practice of
relying equally on coal-powered and hydroelectric plants,
gradually replacing coal with alternative sources such as nuclear
energy. Doing so would make electric-power generation less
vulnerable to the faltering coal industry and to the vagaries of
rainfall. The extractive industries will also have to receive
substantial investment before North Korea can take advantage of
its mineral resources. Easily accessed coal may have been
depleted; as with iron ores, zinc, and other minerals, deeper
seams will have to be mined. It also will be necessary to
introduce modern mining equipment and techniques.
Although poor harvests frequently are attributed to bad
weather, farming is relatively well developed. Nonetheless,
productivity can be greatly increased by introducing modern farm
machinery, high-quality seeds, and more and better distribution
of fertilizer. The prospects for improving farm output through
decollectivization, however, appear to be dim in the near future.
With the Cold War over and the signing of the Agreement on
Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation between
the two Koreas in December 1991, reduced defense expenditures are
a real possibility in the near future. Arms control already is on
the agenda in the inter-Korean talks. Diverting some or most of
North Korea's defense spending to economic development projects
would make a substantial contribution toward economic progress.
As of mid-1993, however, it did not appear that the
nonaggression pact would soon pave the way to economic
integration and reunification of the two Koreas. Significant
differences in the unification formulas remains. There is little
likelihood of a German-style absorption of North Korea by South
Korea, and North Korea has voiced its concern and opposition to
the possibility of absorption to the South Korean authorities. If
South Korea had ever entertained the idea of a German-style
unification, the hindsight of the German experience has forced it
to take a more sober and realistic appraisal of the possibility.
The huge cost of absorption would economically overwhelm South
Korea and have the potential of destabilizing the entire Korean
Peninsula. However, inter-Korean economic cooperation through
trade and joint ventures has the potential of significantly jump
starting and modernizing the North Korean economy by introducing
South Korean capital and technological and managerial know-how.
Improvements in the North Korean economy will, in turn,
facilitate and increase the probability of economic integration
and eventual reunification.
Because of the secretive nature of the North Korean regime,
the scarcity of consistent and reliable economic data,
particularly since the 1960s, makes studying its economy a
challenge. Among the North Korean sources that consistently
contain economic topics are Chosn chungyang yngam
(Korean Central Yearbook), an annual with sections on the economy
and other related topics; K lloja (The Worker), a monthly
journal of the KWP Central Committee; Nodong simmun
(Workers' Daily), the KWP's daily newspaper; and Foreign Trade
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Korea
Today, monthly English-language periodicals. K lloja
and other Korean-languages periodicals, as well as those in other
languages such as Japanese, are available in English as the
Korean Affairs Report series issued by the United States Joint
Publications Research Service.
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Background | | An independent kingdom for much of its long history, Korea was occupied by Japan beginning in 1905 following the Russo-Japanese War. Five years later, Japan formally annexed the entire peninsula. Following World War II, Korea was split with the northern half coming under Soviet-sponsored Communist control. After failing in the Korean War (1950-53) to conquer the US-backed Republic of Korea (ROK) in the southern portion by force, North Korea (DPRK), under its founder President KIM Il Sung, adopted a policy of ostensible diplomatic and economic "self-reliance" as a check against outside influence. The DPRK demonized the US as the ultimate threat to its social system through state-funded propaganda, and molded political, economic, and military policies around the core ideological objective of eventual unification of Korea under Pyongyang's control. KIM's son, the current ruler KIM Jong Il, was officially designated as his father's successor in 1980, assuming a growing political and managerial role until the elder KIM's death in 1994. After decades of economic mismanagement and resource misallocation, the DPRK since the mid-1990s has relied heavily on international aid to feed its population. North Korea's history of regional military provocations, proliferation of military-related items, long-range missile development, WMD programs including nuclear weapons test in 2006 and 2009, and massive conventional armed forces are of major concern to the international community.
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Location | | Eastern Asia, northern half of the Korean Peninsula bordering the Korea Bay and the Sea of Japan, between China and South Korea
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Area(sq km) | | total: 120,538 sq km land: 120,408 sq km water: 130 sq km
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Geographic coordinates | | 40 00 N, 127 00 E
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Land boundaries(km) | | total: 1,673 km border countries: China 1,416 km, South Korea 238 km, Russia 19 km
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Coastline(km) | | 2,495 km
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Climate | | temperate with rainfall concentrated in summer
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Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Sea of Japan 0 m highest point: Paektu-san 2,744 m
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Natural resources | | coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnesite, iron ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salt, fluorspar, hydropower
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Land use(%) | | arable land: 22.4% permanent crops: 1.66% other: 75.94% (2005)
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Irrigated land(sq km) | | 14,600 sq km (2003)
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Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 77.1 cu km (1999)
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Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 9.02 cu km/yr (20%/25%/55%) per capita: 401 cu m/yr (2000)
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Natural hazards | | late spring droughts often followed by severe flooding; occasional typhoons during the early fall
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Environment - current issues | | water pollution; inadequate supplies of potable water; waterborne disease; deforestation; soil erosion and degradation
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Environment - international agreements | | party to: Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution signed, but not ratified: Law of the Sea
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Geography - note | | strategic location bordering China, South Korea, and Russia; mountainous interior is isolated and sparsely populated
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Population | | 22,665,345 (July 2009 est.)
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Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 21.3% (male 2,440,439/female 2,376,557) 15-64 years: 69.4% (male 7,776,889/female 7,945,399) 65 years and over: 9.4% (male 820,504/female 1,305,557) (2009 est.)
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Median age(years) | | total: 33.5 years male: 32.1 years female: 34.9 years (2009 est.)
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Population growth rate(%) | | 0.42% (2009 est.)
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Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 14.82 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 10.52 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
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Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | -0.09 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 63% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 0.9% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
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Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.03 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 0.98 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.63 male(s)/female total population: 0.95 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
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Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 51.34 deaths/1,000 live births male: 58.64 deaths/1,000 live births female: 43.6 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
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Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 63.81 years male: 61.23 years female: 66.53 years (2009 est.)
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Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 1.96 children born/woman (2009 est.)
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Nationality | | noun: Korean(s) adjective: Korean
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Ethnic groups(%) | | racially homogeneous; there is a small Chinese community and a few ethnic Japanese
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Religions(%) | | traditionally Buddhist and Confucianist, some Christian and syncretic Chondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way) note: autonomous religious activities now almost nonexistent; government-sponsored religious groups exist to provide illusion of religious freedom
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Languages(%) | | Korean
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Country name | | conventional long form: Democratic People's Republic of Korea conventional short form: North Korea local long form: Choson-minjujuui-inmin-konghwaguk local short form: Choson abbreviation: DPRK
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Government type | | Communist state one-man dictatorship
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Capital | | name: Pyongyang geographic coordinates: 39 01 N, 125 45 E time difference: UTC+9 (14 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
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Administrative divisions | | 9 provinces (do, singular and plural) and 2 municipalities (si, singular and plural) provinces: Chagang-do (Chagang), Hamgyong-bukto (North Hamgyong), Hamgyong-namdo (South Hamgyong), Hwanghae-bukto (North Hwanghae), Hwanghae-namdo (South Hwanghae), Kangwon-do (Kangwon), P'yongan-bukto (North P'yongan), P'yongan-namdo (South P'yongan), Yanggang-do (Yanggang) municipalities: Nason-si, P'yongyang-si
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Constitution | | adopted 1948; revised several times
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Legal system | | based on Prussian civil law system with Japanese influences and Communist legal theory; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
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Suffrage | | 17 years of age; universal
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Executive branch | | chief of state: KIM Jong Il (since July 1994); note - on 9 April 2009, rubberstamp Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) reelected KIM Jong Il chairman of the National Defense Commission, a position accorded nation's "highest administrative authority"; SPA reelected KIM Yong Nam in 2009 president of its Presidium also with responsibility of representing state and receiving diplomatic credentials head of government: Premier KIM Yong Il (since 11 April 2007); Vice Premier KWAK Pom Gi (since 5 September 1998), Vice Premier O Su Yong (since 13 April 2009), Vice Premier PAK Su Gil (since 18 September 2009), Vice Premier PAK Myong Su (since 4 September 2009), Vice Premier RO Tu Chol (since 3 September 2003) cabinet: Naegak (cabinet) members, except for Minister of People's Armed Forces, are appointed by SPA elections: last held in September 2003; date of next election NA election results: KIM Jong Il and KIM Yong Nam were only nominees for positions and ran unopposed
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Legislative branch | | unicameral Supreme People's Assembly or Ch'oego Inmin Hoeui (687 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms) elections: last held 8 March 2009 (next due to be held in March 2014) election results: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; ruling party approves a list of candidates who are elected without opposition; a token number of seats are reserved for minor parties
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Judicial branch | | Central Court (judges are elected by the Supreme People's Assembly)
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Political pressure groups and leaders | | none
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International organization participation | | ARF, FAO, G-77, ICAO, ICRM, IFAD, IFRCS, IHO, IMO, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, NAM, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO
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Flag description | | three horizontal bands of blue (top), red (triple width), and blue; the red band is edged in white; on the hoist side of the red band is a white disk with a red five-pointed star
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Economy - overview | | North Korea, one of the world's most centrally directed and least open economies, faces chronic economic problems. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and shortages of spare parts. Large-scale military spending draws off resources needed for investment and civilian consumption. Industrial and power output have declined in parallel from pre-1990 levels. Severe flooding in the summer of 2007 aggravated chronic food shortages caused by on-going systemic problems including a lack of arable land, collective farming practices, and persistent shortages of tractors and fuel. Large-scale international food aid deliveries have allowed the people of North Korea to escape widespread starvation since famine threatened in 1995, but the population continues to suffer from prolonged malnutrition and poor living conditions. Since 2002, the government has allowed private "farmers' markets" to begin selling a wider range of goods. It also permitted some private farming - on an experimental basis - in an effort to boost agricultural output. In October 2005, the government tried to reverse some of these policies by forbidding private sales of grains and reinstituting a centralized food rationing system. By December 2005, the government terminated most international humanitarian assistance operations in North Korea (calling instead for developmental assistance only) and restricted the activities of remaining international and non-governmental aid organizations such as the World Food Program. External food aid now comes primarily from China and South Korea in the form of grants and long-term concessional loans. In May 2008, the US agreed to give 500,000 metric tons of food to North Korea via the World Food Program and US nongovernmental organizations; Pyongyang began receiving these shipments in mid-2008. During the October 2007 summit, South Korea also agreed to develop some of North Korea's infrastructure, natural resources, and light industry, but inter-Korean economic cooperation slowed in 2008 as Pyongyang restricted tourism and manufacturing joint ventures in the North, and food aid from South Korea was suspended. Firm political control remains the Communist government's overriding concern, which will likely inhibit the loosening of economic regulations.
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GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $40 billion (2008 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP (official exchange rate) | | $26.2 billion (2008 est.)
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GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 3.7% (2008 est.)
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GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $1,800 (2008 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 23.3% industry: 43.1% services: 33.6% (2002 est.)
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Labor force | | 20 million note: estimates vary widely (2004 est.)
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Labor force - by occupation(%) | | agriculture: 37% industry and services: 63% (2004 est.)
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Unemployment rate(%) | | NA%
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Population below poverty line(%) | | NA%
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Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: NA% highest 10%: NA%
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Budget | | revenues: $2.88 billion expenditures: $2.98 billion (2005)
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Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | NA%
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Economic aid - recipient | | $372 million note: approximately 65,000 metric tons in food aid through the World Food Program appeals in 2007, plus additional aid from bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations (2007 est.)
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Agriculture - products | | rice, corn, potatoes, soybeans, pulses; cattle, pigs, pork, eggs
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Industries | | military products; machine building, electric power, chemicals; mining (coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, graphite, copper, zinc, lead, and precious metals), metallurgy; textiles, food processing; tourism
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Industrial production growth rate(%) | | NA%
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Exports | | $1.684 billion (2007)
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Exports - commodities(%) | | minerals, metallurgical products, manufactures (including armaments), textiles, agricultural and fishery products
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Exports - partners(%) | | South Korea 45%, China 35%, India 5% (2007)
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Imports | | $3.055 billion (2007) $2.879 billion (2006)
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Imports - commodities(%) | | petroleum, coking coal, machinery and equipment, textiles, grain
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Imports - partners(%) | | China 46%, South Korea 34%, Thailand 6%, Russia 4% (2007)
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Debt - external | | $12.5 billion (2001 est.)
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Exchange rates | | North Korean won (KPW) per US dollar - 140 (2007), 141 (2006), 170 (December 2004), market rate: North Korean won per US dollar - 3,400 (October 2008)
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Currency (code) | | North Korean won (KPW)
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Telephones - main lines in use | | 1.18 million (2008)
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Telephone system | | general assessment: inadequate system; currently mobile cellular telephone services are available in Pyongyang only domestic: fiber-optic links installed between cities; telephone directories unavailable; mobile cellular service, initiated in 2002, suspended in 2004; Orascom Telecom, an Egyptian company, launched mobile service on December 15, 2008 for the Pyongyang area only international: country code - 850; satellite earth stations - 2 (1 Intelsat - Indian Ocean, 1 Russian - Indian Ocean region); other international connections through Moscow and Beijing (2008)
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Internet country code | | .kp
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Airports | | 79 (2009)
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Pipelines(km) | | oil 154 km (2008)
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Roadways(km) | | total: 25,554 km paved: 724 km unpaved: 24,830 km (2006)
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Ports and terminals | | Ch'ongjin, Haeju, Hungnam (Hamhung), Kimch'aek, Kosong, Najin, Namp'o, Sinuiju, Songnim, Sonbong (formerly Unggi), Ungsang, Wonsan
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Military branches | | North Korean People's Army: Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force; civil security forces (2005)
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Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | 17 years of age (2004)
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Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 6,225,747 females age 16-49: 6,188,270 (2008 est.)
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Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 4,104,964 females age 16-49: 4,492,374 (2009 est.)
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Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 191,759 female: 184,641 (2009 est.)
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Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | NA
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Disputes - international | | risking arrest, imprisonment, and deportation, tens of thousands of North Koreans cross into China to escape famine, economic privation, and political oppression; North Korea and China dispute the sovereignty of certain islands in Yalu and Tumen rivers; Military Demarcation Line within the 4-km wide Demilitarized Zone has separated North from South Korea since 1953; periodic incidents in the Yellow Sea with South Korea which claims the Northern Limiting Line as a maritime boundary; North Korea supports South Korea in rejecting Japan's claim to Liancourt Rocks (Tok-do/Take-shima)
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Refugees and internally displaced persons | | IDPs: undetermined (flooding in mid-2007 and famine during mid-1990s) (2007)
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Trafficking in persons | | current situation: North Korea is a source country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation; the most common form of trafficking involves North Korean women and girls who cross the border into China voluntarily; additionally, North Korean women and girls are lured out of North Korea to escape poor social and economic conditions by the promise of food, jobs, and freedom, only to be forced into prostitution, marriage, or exploitative labor arrangements once in China tier rating: Tier 3 - North Korea does not fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government does not acknowledge the existence of human rights abuses in the country or recognize trafficking, either within the country or transnationally; North Korea has not ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol (2008)
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Electricity - production(kWh) | | 20.9 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 29% hydro: 71% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
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Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 17.49 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 120.7 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 16,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 0 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 13,890 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 0 bbl
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Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008)
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Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 0 cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | NA
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HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | NA
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HIV/AIDS - deaths | | NA
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Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 99% male: 99% female: 99%
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Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | NA
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