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North Korea-Postwar Economic Planning

North Korea Index

During what North Korea called the "peaceful construction" period before the Korean War, the fundamental task of the economy was to overtake the level of output and efficiency attained toward the end of the Japanese occupation; to restructure and develop a viable economy reoriented toward the communist-bloc countries; and to begin the process of socializing the economy. Nationalization of key industrial enterprises and land reform, both of which were carried out in 1946, laid the groundwork for two successive one-year plans in 1947 and 1948, respectively, and the Two-Year Plan of 1949-50. It was during this period that the piece-rate wage system and the independent accounting system began to be applied and that the commercial network increasingly came under state and cooperative ownership.

The basic goal of the Three-Year Plan, officially named the Three-Year Post-war Reconstruction Plan of 1954-56, was to reconstruct an economy torn by the Korean War. The plan stressed more than merely regaining the prewar output levels. The Soviet Union, China, and East European countries provided reconstruction assistance. The highest priority was developing heavy industry, but an earnest effort to collectivize farming also was begun. At the end of 1957, output of most industrial commodities had returned to 1949 levels, except for a few items such as chemical fertilizers, carbides, and sulfuric acid, whose recovery took longer.

Having basically completed the task of reconstruction, the state planned to lay a solid foundation for industrialization while completing the socialization process and solving the basic problems of food and shelter during the Five-Year Plan of 1957- 60. The socialization process was completed by 1958 in all sectors of the economy, and the Ch'llima Movement (see Glossary) was introduced. Although growth rates reportedly were high, there were serious imbalances among the different economic sectors. Because rewards were given to individuals and enterprises that met production quotas, frantic efforts to fulfill plan targets in competition with other enterprises and industries caused disproportionate growth among various enterprises, between industry and agriculture and between light and heavy industries. Because resources were limited and the transportation system suffered bottlenecks, resources were diverted to politically well-connected enterprises or those whose managers complained the loudest. An enterprise or industry that performed better than others often did so at the expense of others. Such disruptions intensified as the target year of the plan approached.

Until the 1960s, North Korea's economy grew much faster than South Korea's. Although P'yongyang was behind in total national output, it was ahead of Seoul in per capita national output, because of its smaller population relative to South Korea. For example, in 1960 North Korea's population was slightly over 10 million persons, while South Korea's population was almost 25 million persons. Phenomenal annual economic growth rates of 30 percent and 21 percent during the Three-Year Plan of 1954-56 and the Five-Year Plan of 1957-60, respectively, were reported. After claiming early fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan in 1959, North Korea officially designated 1960 a "buffer year"--a year of adjustment to restore balances among sectors before the next plan became effective in 1961. Not surprisingly the same phenomenon recurred in subsequent plans. Because the Five-Year Plan was fulfilled early, it became a de facto four-year plan. Beginning in the early 1960s, however, P'yongyang's economic growth slowed until it was stagnant at the beginning of the 1990s.

Various factors explain the very high rate of economic development of the country in the 1950s and the general slowdown since the 1960s. During the reconstruction period after the Korean War, there were opportunities for extensive economic growth--attainable through the communist regime's ability to marshall idle resources and labor and to impose a low rate of consumption. This general pattern of initially high growth resulting in a high rate of capital formation was mirrored in other Soviet-type economies. Toward the end of the 1950s, as reconstruction work was completed and idle capacity began to diminish, the economy had to shift from the extensive to the intensive stage, where the simple communist discipline of marshalling underutilized resources became less effective. In the new stage, inefficiency arising from emerging bottlenecks led to diminishing returns. Further growth would only be attained by increasing efficiency and technological progress.

Beginning in the early 1960s, a series of serious bottlenecks began to impede development. Bottlenecks were pervasive and generally were created by the lack of arable land, skilled labor, energy, and transportation, and deficiencies in the extractive industries. Moreover, both land and marine transportation lacked modern equipment and modes of transportation. The inability of the energy and extractive industries as well as of the transportation network to supply power and raw materials as rapidly as the manufacturing plants could absorb them began to slow industrial growth.

The First Seven-Year Plan (initially 1961-67) built on the groundwork of the earlier plans but changed the focus of industrialization. Heavy industry, with the machine tool industry as its linchpin, was given continuing priority. During the plan, however, the economy experienced widespread slowdowns and reverses for the first time, in sharp contrast to the rapid and uninterrupted growth during previous plans. Disappointing performance forced the planners to extend the plan three more years, until 1970. During the last part of the de facto ten-year plan, emphasis shifted to pursuing parallel development of the economy and of defense capabilities. This shift was prompted by concern over the military takeover in South Korea by General Park Chung Hee (1961-79), escalation of the United States involvement in Vietnam, and the widening Sino-Soviet split. It was thought that stimulating a technological revolution in the munitions industry was one means to achieve these parallel goals. In the end, the necessity to divert resources to defense became the official explanation for the plan's failure.

The Six-Year Plan of 1971-76 followed immediately in 1971. In the aftermath of the poor performance of the preceding plan, growth targets of the Six-Year Plan were scaled down substantially. Because some of the proposed targets in the First Seven-Year Plan had not been attained even by 1970, the Six-Year Plan did not deviate much from its predecessor in basic goals. The Six-Year Plan placed more emphasis on technological advance, self-sufficiency in industrial raw materials, improving product quality, correcting imbalances among different sectors, and developing the power and extractive industries; the last of these had been deemed largely responsible for slowdowns during the First Seven-Year Plan. The plan called for attaining a self- sufficiency rate of 60 to 70 percent in all industrial sectors by substituting domestic raw materials wherever possible and by organizing and renovating technical processes to make the substitution feasible. Improving transport capacity was seen as one of the urgent tasks in accelerating economic development-- understandable since it was one of the major bottlenecks of the Six-Year Plan (see Transportation and Communications , this ch.).

North Korea claimed to have fulfilled the Six-Year Plan by the end of August 1975, a full year and four months ahead of schedule. Under the circumstances, it was expected that the next plan would start without delay in 1976, a year early, as was the case when the First Seven-Year Plan was instituted in 1961. Even if the Six-Year Plan had been completed on schedule, the next plan should have started in 1977. However, it was not until nearly two years and four months later that the long-awaited plan was unveiled--1977 had become a "buffer year."

The inability of the planners to continuously formulate and institute economic plans reveals as much about the inefficacy of planning itself as the extent of the economic difficulties and administrative disruptions facing the country. For example, targets for successive plans have to be based on the accomplishments of preceding plans. If these targets are underfulfilled, all targets of the next plan--initially based on satisfaction of the plan--have to be reformulated and adjusted. Aside from underfulfillment of the targets, widespread disruptions and imbalances among various sectors of the economy further complicate plan formulation.

The basic thrust of the Second Seven-Year Plan (1978-84) was to achieve the three-pronged goals of self-reliance, modernization, and "scientification." Although the emphasis on self-reliance was not new, it had not previously been the explicit focus of an economic plan. This new emphasis might have been a reaction to mounting foreign debt originating from large- scale imports of Western machinery and equipment in the mid- 1970s. Through modernization North Korea hoped to increase mechanization and automation in all sectors of the economy. "Scientification" is a buzzword for the adoption of up-to-date production and management techniques. The specific objectives of the economic plan were to strengthen the fuel, energy, and resource bases of industry through priority development of the energy and extractive industries; to modernize industry; to substitute domestic resources for certain imported raw materials; to expand freight-carrying capacity in railroad, road, and marine transportation systems; to centralize and containerize the transportation system; and to accelerate a technical revolution in agriculture.

In order to meet the manpower and technology requirements of an expanding economy, the education sector also was targeted for improvements. The quality of the comprehensive eleven-year compulsory education system was to be enhanced to train more technicians and specialists, and to expand the training of specialists, particularly in the fields of fuel, mechanical, electronic, and automation engineering (see Education , ch. 2).

Successful fulfillment of the so-called nature-remaking projects also was part of the Second Seven-Year Plan. These projects referred to the five-point program for nature transformation unveiled by Kim Il Sung in 1976: completing the irrigation of non-paddy fields; reclaiming 100,000 hectares of new land; building 150,000 hectares to 200,000 hectares of terraced fields; carrying out afforestation and water conservation work; and reclaiming tidal land.

From all indications, the Second Seven-Year Plan was not successful. North Korea generally downplayed the accomplishments of the plan, and no other plan received less official fanfare. It was officially claimed that the economy had grown at an annual rate of 8.8 percent during the plan, somewhat below the planned rate of 9.6 percent. The reliability of this aggregate measure, however, is questionable. During the plan, the target annual output of 10 million tons of grains (cereals and pulses) was attained. However, by official admission, the targets of only five other commodities were fulfilled. Judging from the growth rates announced for some twelve industrial products, it is highly unlikely that the total industrial output increased at an average rate of 12.2 percent as claimed. After the plan concluded, there was no new economic plan for two years, indications of both the plan's failure and the severity of the economic and planning problems confronting the economy in the mid-1980s.

The main targets of the Third Seven-Year Plan of 1987-93 are to achieve the so-called "Ten Long-Range Major Goals of the 1980s for the Construction of the Socialist Economy" (see table 2, Appendix). These goals, conceived in 1980, are to be fulfilled by the end of the decade. The fact that these targets are rolled over to the end of the Third Seven-Year Plan is another indication of the disappointing economic performance during the Second Seven-Year Plan. The three policy goals of self-reliance, modernization, and "scientification" were repeated. Economic growth was set at 7.9 percent annually, lower than the previous plan. Although achieving the ten major goals of the 1980s is the main thrust of the Third Seven-Year Plan, some substantial changes have been made in specific quantitative targets. For example, the target for the annual output of steel has been drastically reduced from 15 million tons to 10 millon tons. This reduction will have serious negative secondary effects on heavy industry. The output targets of cement and non-ferrous metals-- two major export items--have been increased significantly. The June 1989 introduction of the Three-Year Plan for Light Industry as part of the Third Seven-Year Plan is intended to boost the standard of living by addressing consumer needs.

The Third Seven-Year Plan gives a great deal of attention to developing foreign trade and joint ventures, the first time a plan has addressed these issues. By the end of 1991, however, two years before the termination of the plan, no quantitative plan targets had been made public, an indication that the plan has not fared well. The diversion of resources to build highways, theaters, hotels, airports, and other facilities in order to host the Thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students in July 1989, must have had a negative impact on industrial and agricultural development, although the expansion and improvement of social infrastructure have resulted in some long-term economic benefits.

The shortage of foreign exchange because of a chronic trade deficit, a large foreign debt, and dwindling foreign aid has constrained economic development. In addition, North Korea has been diverting scarce resources from developmental projects to defense; it spent more than 20 percent of GNP on defense toward the end of the 1980s, a proportion among the highest in the world (see The Armed Forces , ch. 5). These negative factors, compounded by the declining efficiency of the central planning system and the failure to modernize the economy, have slowed the pace of growth since the 1960s. The demise of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and East European countries--North Korea's traditional trade partners and benefactors--has compounded the economic difficulties in the early 1990s.

Concomitant with the socialization of the economy and the growth in the total magnitude of national output has been a dramatic and revealing change in the relative share of output, indicating that the economy has been transformed from being primarily agricultural to primarily industrial. Whereas in 1946, industrial and agricultural outputs were 16.8 percent and 63.5 percent, respectively, of total national output, the relative position has reversed fundamentally since then so that the respective shares in 1970 were 57.3 percent and 21.5 percent. Judging from the agricultural share of 24 percent in 1981, there were slight reverses in the relative composition in the 1970s.

Growth and changes in the structure and ownership pattern of the economy also have changed the labor force. By 1958 individual private farmers, who once constituted more than 70 percent of the labor force, had been transformed into or replaced by state or collective farmers. Private artisans, merchants, and entrepreneurs had joined state or cooperative enterprises. In the industrial sector in 1963, the last year for which such data are available, there were 2,295 state enterprises and 642 cooperative enterprises. The size and importance of the state enterprises can be surmised by the fact that state enterprises, which constituted 78.1 percent of the total number of industrial enterprises, contributed 91.2 percent of total industrial output.

Data as of June 1993

Background		An independent kingdom for much of its long history, Korea was occupied by Japan beginning in 1905 following the Russo-Japanese War. Five years later, Japan formally annexed the entire peninsula. Following World War II, Korea was split with the northern half coming under Soviet-sponsored Communist control. After failing in the Korean War (1950-53) to conquer the US-backed Republic of Korea (ROK) in the southern portion by force, North Korea (DPRK), under its founder President KIM Il Sung, adopted a policy of ostensible diplomatic and economic "self-reliance" as a check against outside influence. The DPRK demonized the US as the ultimate threat to its social system through state-funded propaganda, and molded political, economic, and military policies around the core ideological objective of eventual unification of Korea under Pyongyang's control. KIM's son, the current ruler KIM Jong Il, was officially designated as his father's successor in 1980, assuming a growing political and managerial role until the elder KIM's death in 1994. After decades of economic mismanagement and resource misallocation, the DPRK since the mid-1990s has relied heavily on international aid to feed its population. North Korea's history of regional military provocations, proliferation of military-related items, long-range missile development, WMD programs including nuclear weapons test in 2006 and 2009, and massive conventional armed forces are of major concern to the international community.
Location		Eastern Asia, northern half of the Korean Peninsula bordering the Korea Bay and the Sea of Japan, between China and South Korea
Area(sq km)		total: 120,538 sq km land: 120,408 sq km water: 130 sq km
Geographic coordinates		40 00 N, 127 00 E
Land boundaries(km)		total: 1,673 km border countries: China 1,416 km, South Korea 238 km, Russia 19 km
Coastline(km)		2,495 km
Climate		temperate with rainfall concentrated in summer
Elevation extremes(m)		lowest point: Sea of Japan 0 m highest point: Paektu-san 2,744 m
Natural resources		coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnesite, iron ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salt, fluorspar, hydropower
Land use(%)		arable land: 22.4% permanent crops: 1.66% other: 75.94% (2005)
Irrigated land(sq km)		14,600 sq km (2003)
Total renewable water resources(cu km)		77.1 cu km (1999)
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural)		total: 9.02 cu km/yr (20%/25%/55%) per capita: 401 cu m/yr (2000)
Natural hazards		late spring droughts often followed by severe flooding; occasional typhoons during the early fall
Environment - current issues		water pollution; inadequate supplies of potable water; waterborne disease; deforestation; soil erosion and degradation
Environment - international agreements		party to: Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution signed, but not ratified: Law of the Sea
Geography - note		strategic location bordering China, South Korea, and Russia; mountainous interior is isolated and sparsely populated
Population		22,665,345 (July 2009 est.)
Age structure(%)		0-14 years: 21.3% (male 2,440,439/female 2,376,557) 15-64 years: 69.4% (male 7,776,889/female 7,945,399) 65 years and over: 9.4% (male 820,504/female 1,305,557) (2009 est.)
Median age(years)		total: 33.5 years male: 32.1 years female: 34.9 years (2009 est.)
Population growth rate(%)		0.42% (2009 est.)
Birth rate(births/1,000 population)		14.82 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Death rate(deaths/1,000 population)		10.52 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population)		-0.09 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Urbanization(%)		urban population: 63% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 0.9% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
Sex ratio(male(s)/female)		at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.03 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 0.98 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.63 male(s)/female total population: 0.95 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births)		total: 51.34 deaths/1,000 live births male: 58.64 deaths/1,000 live births female: 43.6 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
Life expectancy at birth(years)		total population: 63.81 years male: 61.23 years female: 66.53 years (2009 est.)
Total fertility rate(children born/woman)		1.96 children born/woman (2009 est.)
Nationality		noun: Korean(s) adjective: Korean
Ethnic groups(%)		racially homogeneous; there is a small Chinese community and a few ethnic Japanese
Religions(%)		traditionally Buddhist and Confucianist, some Christian and syncretic Chondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way) note: autonomous religious activities now almost nonexistent; government-sponsored religious groups exist to provide illusion of religious freedom
Languages(%)		Korean
Country name		conventional long form: Democratic People's Republic of Korea conventional short form: North Korea local long form: Choson-minjujuui-inmin-konghwaguk local short form: Choson abbreviation: DPRK
Government type		Communist state one-man dictatorship
Capital		name: Pyongyang geographic coordinates: 39 01 N, 125 45 E time difference: UTC+9 (14 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
Administrative divisions		9 provinces (do, singular and plural) and 2 municipalities (si, singular and plural) provinces: Chagang-do (Chagang), Hamgyong-bukto (North Hamgyong), Hamgyong-namdo (South Hamgyong), Hwanghae-bukto (North Hwanghae), Hwanghae-namdo (South Hwanghae), Kangwon-do (Kangwon), P'yongan-bukto (North P'yongan), P'yongan-namdo (South P'yongan), Yanggang-do (Yanggang) municipalities: Nason-si, P'yongyang-si
Constitution		adopted 1948; revised several times
Legal system		based on Prussian civil law system with Japanese influences and Communist legal theory; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Suffrage		17 years of age; universal
Executive branch		chief of state: KIM Jong Il (since July 1994); note - on 9 April 2009, rubberstamp Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) reelected KIM Jong Il chairman of the National Defense Commission, a position accorded nation's "highest administrative authority"; SPA reelected KIM Yong Nam in 2009 president of its Presidium also with responsibility of representing state and receiving diplomatic credentials head of government: Premier KIM Yong Il (since 11 April 2007); Vice Premier KWAK Pom Gi (since 5 September 1998), Vice Premier O Su Yong (since 13 April 2009), Vice Premier PAK Su Gil (since 18 September 2009), Vice Premier PAK Myong Su (since 4 September 2009), Vice Premier RO Tu Chol (since 3 September 2003) cabinet: Naegak (cabinet) members, except for Minister of People's Armed Forces, are appointed by SPA elections: last held in September 2003; date of next election NA election results: KIM Jong Il and KIM Yong Nam were only nominees for positions and ran unopposed
Legislative branch		unicameral Supreme People's Assembly or Ch'oego Inmin Hoeui (687 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms) elections: last held 8 March 2009 (next due to be held in March 2014) election results: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; ruling party approves a list of candidates who are elected without opposition; a token number of seats are reserved for minor parties
Judicial branch		Central Court (judges are elected by the Supreme People's Assembly)
Political pressure groups and leaders		none
International organization participation		ARF, FAO, G-77, ICAO, ICRM, IFAD, IFRCS, IHO, IMO, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, NAM, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO
Flag description		three horizontal bands of blue (top), red (triple width), and blue; the red band is edged in white; on the hoist side of the red band is a white disk with a red five-pointed star
Economy - overview		North Korea, one of the world's most centrally directed and least open economies, faces chronic economic problems. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and shortages of spare parts. Large-scale military spending draws off resources needed for investment and civilian consumption. Industrial and power output have declined in parallel from pre-1990 levels. Severe flooding in the summer of 2007 aggravated chronic food shortages caused by on-going systemic problems including a lack of arable land, collective farming practices, and persistent shortages of tractors and fuel. Large-scale international food aid deliveries have allowed the people of North Korea to escape widespread starvation since famine threatened in 1995, but the population continues to suffer from prolonged malnutrition and poor living conditions. Since 2002, the government has allowed private "farmers' markets" to begin selling a wider range of goods. It also permitted some private farming - on an experimental basis - in an effort to boost agricultural output. In October 2005, the government tried to reverse some of these policies by forbidding private sales of grains and reinstituting a centralized food rationing system. By December 2005, the government terminated most international humanitarian assistance operations in North Korea (calling instead for developmental assistance only) and restricted the activities of remaining international and non-governmental aid organizations such as the World Food Program. External food aid now comes primarily from China and South Korea in the form of grants and long-term concessional loans. In May 2008, the US agreed to give 500,000 metric tons of food to North Korea via the World Food Program and US nongovernmental organizations; Pyongyang began receiving these shipments in mid-2008. During the October 2007 summit, South Korea also agreed to develop some of North Korea's infrastructure, natural resources, and light industry, but inter-Korean economic cooperation slowed in 2008 as Pyongyang restricted tourism and manufacturing joint ventures in the North, and food aid from South Korea was suspended. Firm political control remains the Communist government's overriding concern, which will likely inhibit the loosening of economic regulations.
GDP (purchasing power parity)		$40 billion (2008 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP (official exchange rate)		$26.2 billion (2008 est.)
GDP - real growth rate(%)		3.7% (2008 est.)
GDP - per capita (PPP)		$1,800 (2008 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP - composition by sector(%)		agriculture: 23.3% industry: 43.1% services: 33.6% (2002 est.)
Labor force		20 million note: estimates vary widely (2004 est.)
Labor force - by occupation(%)		agriculture: 37% industry and services: 63% (2004 est.)
Unemployment rate(%)		NA%
Population below poverty line(%)		NA%
Household income or consumption by percentage share(%)		lowest 10%: NA% highest 10%: NA%
Budget		revenues: $2.88 billion expenditures: $2.98 billion (2005)
Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%)		NA%
Economic aid - recipient		$372 million note: approximately 65,000 metric tons in food aid through the World Food Program appeals in 2007, plus additional aid from bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations (2007 est.)
Agriculture - products		rice, corn, potatoes, soybeans, pulses; cattle, pigs, pork, eggs
Industries		military products; machine building, electric power, chemicals; mining (coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, graphite, copper, zinc, lead, and precious metals), metallurgy; textiles, food processing; tourism
Industrial production growth rate(%)		NA%
Exports		$1.684 billion (2007)
Exports - commodities(%)		minerals, metallurgical products, manufactures (including armaments), textiles, agricultural and fishery products
Exports - partners(%)		South Korea 45%, China 35%, India 5% (2007)
Imports		$3.055 billion (2007) $2.879 billion (2006)
Imports - commodities(%)		petroleum, coking coal, machinery and equipment, textiles, grain
Imports - partners(%)		China 46%, South Korea 34%, Thailand 6%, Russia 4% (2007)
Debt - external		$12.5 billion (2001 est.)
Exchange rates		North Korean won (KPW) per US dollar - 140 (2007), 141 (2006), 170 (December 2004), market rate: North Korean won per US dollar - 3,400 (October 2008)
Currency (code)		North Korean won (KPW)
Telephones - main lines in use		1.18 million (2008)
Telephone system		general assessment: inadequate system; currently mobile cellular telephone services are available in Pyongyang only domestic: fiber-optic links installed between cities; telephone directories unavailable; mobile cellular service, initiated in 2002, suspended in 2004; Orascom Telecom, an Egyptian company, launched mobile service on December 15, 2008 for the Pyongyang area only international: country code - 850; satellite earth stations - 2 (1 Intelsat - Indian Ocean, 1 Russian - Indian Ocean region); other international connections through Moscow and Beijing (2008)
Internet country code		.kp
Airports		79 (2009)
Pipelines(km)		oil 154 km (2008)
Roadways(km)		total: 25,554 km paved: 724 km unpaved: 24,830 km (2006)
Ports and terminals		Ch'ongjin, Haeju, Hungnam (Hamhung), Kimch'aek, Kosong, Najin, Namp'o, Sinuiju, Songnim, Sonbong (formerly Unggi), Ungsang, Wonsan
Military branches		North Korean People's Army: Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force; civil security forces (2005)
Military service age and obligation(years of age)		17 years of age (2004)
Manpower available for military service		males age 16-49: 6,225,747 females age 16-49: 6,188,270 (2008 est.)
Manpower fit for military service		males age 16-49: 4,104,964 females age 16-49: 4,492,374 (2009 est.)
Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually		male: 191,759 female: 184,641 (2009 est.)
Military expenditures(% of GDP)		NA
Disputes - international		risking arrest, imprisonment, and deportation, tens of thousands of North Koreans cross into China to escape famine, economic privation, and political oppression; North Korea and China dispute the sovereignty of certain islands in Yalu and Tumen rivers; Military Demarcation Line within the 4-km wide Demilitarized Zone has separated North from South Korea since 1953; periodic incidents in the Yellow Sea with South Korea which claims the Northern Limiting Line as a maritime boundary; North Korea supports South Korea in rejecting Japan's claim to Liancourt Rocks (Tok-do/Take-shima)
Refugees and internally displaced persons		IDPs: undetermined (flooding in mid-2007 and famine during mid-1990s) (2007)
Trafficking in persons		current situation: North Korea is a source country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation; the most common form of trafficking involves North Korean women and girls who cross the border into China voluntarily; additionally, North Korean women and girls are lured out of North Korea to escape poor social and economic conditions by the promise of food, jobs, and freedom, only to be forced into prostitution, marriage, or exploitative labor arrangements once in China tier rating: Tier 3 - North Korea does not fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government does not acknowledge the existence of human rights abuses in the country or recognize trafficking, either within the country or transnationally; North Korea has not ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol (2008)
Electricity - production(kWh)		20.9 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - production by source(%)		fossil fuel: 29% hydro: 71% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
Electricity - consumption(kWh)		17.49 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - exports(kWh)		0 kWh (2008 est.)
Electricity - imports(kWh)		0 kWh (2008 est.)
Oil - production(bbl/day)		120.7 bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - consumption(bbl/day)		16,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - exports(bbl/day)		0 bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - imports(bbl/day)		13,890 bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - proved reserves(bbl)		0 bbl
Natural gas - production(cu m)		0 cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - consumption(cu m)		0 cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - exports(cu m)		0 cu m (2008)
Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m)		0 cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%)		NA
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS		NA
HIV/AIDS - deaths		NA
Literacy(%)		definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 99% male: 99% female: 99%
Education expenditures(% of GDP)		NA

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