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North Korea-Inter-Korean Affairs
North Korea
Index
The reunification of the two Koreas is seen as a difficult
goal. Although P'yongyang and Seoul agreed in principle in 1972
that unification should be achieved peacefully and without
foreign interference, they continued to differ substantially on
the practical methods of attaining reunification; this area of
disagreement has not narrowed in subsequent years.
North Korea's goal of unification remains constant, but
tactics have changed depending on the perception of opportunities
and limitations implicit in shifting domestic and external
situations. From the beginning, North Korea has insisted that an
inter-Korean political formula should be based on parity or
coequality, rather than population. Because South Korea has more
than twice the population of North Korea, a supreme Korean
council set up according to a one-person, one-vote formula will
give South Korea a commanding position in that type of
relationship. Another constant is P'yongyang's insistence that
the Korean question be settled as an internal Korean affair
without foreign interference.
P'yongyang's position that unification should be achieved by
peaceful means was belied by circumstances surrounding the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and by subsequent
infiltrations, the digging of tunnels, and other incidents. North
Korea's contention that the conflict was started by South Korea
and the United States failed to impress South Korea's population.
The war, in effect, reinforced the obvious ideological and
systemic incompatibilities that were in place at the time of the
division of the peninsula in 1945. At the Geneva Conference in
mid-1954, North Korea proposed the formation of an all-Korean
commission and a single Korean legislature through elections; the
withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula; and
the formal declaration by outside powers of the need for peaceful
development and unification in Korea. P'yongyang also proposed
that the armies of both countries be reduced to 100,000 persons
each within a year, that neither side enter into any military
alliance, and that measures be taken to facilitate economic and
cultural exchanges. Kim Il Sung urged a mutual reduction of armed
forces and a sharp cutback in the "heavy burden of military
expenditure in South Korea," recognizing that any arms buildup
could lead to a renewed arms race on the Korean Peninsula. Kim
also called on "South Korean authorities, political parties,
social organizations, and individual personages" to have their
representatives meet their northern counterparts in P'yongyang,
Seoul, or P'anmunjm to start negotiations on all "burning issues
awaiting urgent solution."
In mid-1969 Kim signaled the resumption of peaceful gestures
to South Korea. In October 1969, P'yongyang announced that the
policy of peaceful unification would be renewed, adding that this
option had not been stressed "in the last few years" because of
alleged war policies being pursued by the United States and South
Korea. Beginning in August 1970, Seoul proposed that the two
Koreas open "a bona fide competition" to see which side could
better satisfy the various needs of the Korean people. This
development ended P'yongyang's previous monopoly on the rhetoric
of neighborly intentions and peaceful unification.
Inter-Korean affairs became more complex in 1970 and 1971, in
part because of the United States decision to withdraw some of
its troops from South Korea and because of moves by the United
States and China to improve their relations. In August 1971, amid
signs of a thaw in the Cold War and an uncertain international
environment, the Red Cross societies of Seoul and P'yongyang
agreed to open talks aimed at the eventual reunion of dispersed
families. These high-level talks--between Kim Il Sung's brother
and the chief of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency,
were held alternately in the two capitals and paralleled behind-
the-scenes contacts to initiate political negotiations,
reportedly at South Korea's suggestion. The talks continued to
evolve and resulted in a joint communiqué issued on July 4, 1972,
in which the two countries agreed to abide by three principles of
unification. As such, the two Koreas agreed to work towards
reunifying the country independently and without foreign
interference; transcending differences in ideology and political
systems; and unifying the country peacefully without the use of
armed force.
The communiqué also contained an accord designed to ease
tensions and foster mutual trust by instructing the two countries
to refrain from slandering and defaming each other, expediting
the Red Cross talks, installing a hot line between P'yongyang and
Seoul, and establishing a South-North Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) as the machinery for substantive negotiations and for
implementing the points of the agreement. The SNCC met three
times. The first and third meetings were held in Seoul from
November 30 to December 2, 1972, and June 12-14, 1973,
respectively; the second meeting was held in P'yongyang March 14-
16, 1973. At the second meeting, the committee agreed to set up
five subcommittees--political, military, foreign, economic, and
cultural affairs--under joint direction. It was stipulated
however, that subcommittees would be formed only when progress
had been made vis-à-vis SNCC dialogue.
By June 1973, inter-Korean dialogue had become deadlocked.
The fourth meeting was scheduled for August 28, 1973, in
P'yongyang, but North Korea declined to convene it, making it
official that it was no longer interested in participating in
SNCC meetings. No significant agreement has been reached through
the SNCC mechanism.
It quickly became obvious to both sides that they have
fundamentally divergent approaches. North Korea's position
focuses on three major themes: that the inter-Korean armed
confrontation must first be ended; that North Korea's
transitional scheme of coexistence called "confederation" be
recognized as a practical necessity; and that a one-Korea policy
should be pursued under all circumstances. P'yongyang seeks to
settle military questions first, proposing cessation of the
military buildup and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from
South Korea. South Korea's position is one of peaceful
coexistence based on "peace first, unification later." Seoul
seeks recognition of the political systems of the two Koreas,
noninterference in each side's internal affairs, and the
promotion of mutual economic cooperation. South Korean president
Park Chung Hee stressed the importance of preserving peace at all
costs, specifying that each side refrain from invading the other
or interfering in the other's affairs.
The contrast in positions is especially evident in
international relations. South Korea suggested that both Koreas
become members of the United Nations (UN) if it were the wish of
the majority of UN members and if membership would not impede
unification. In reaffirming peace and good-neighborliness as the
basis of its foreign policy, Seoul declared its readiness to
establish formal relations even with those countries whose
ideologies and social institutions were different from South
Korea's. In an obvious allusion to communist states, Seoul called
on these countries to reciprocate by opening their doors.
North Korea began to urge the United States to refrain from
obstructing the dialogue and from giving military aid to South
Korea. In March 1974, P'yongyang proposed direct negotiations to
Washington on the question of replacing the "outdated" Korean
armistice agreement with a peace agreement. Relations between
North Korea and South Korea had, by 1975, become increasingly
complicated because of the ripple effect created by the fall of
the government in Saigon. Following Vietnam's reunification in
mid-1975, the Nixon administration reduced the United States
troop level in South Korea by about one-third. This move, in
conjunction with Nixon's opening to China, worried South Korea.
Leaders in both P'yongyang and Seoul talked increasingly
about the dangers of renewed military conflict on the Korean
Peninsula. North Korea called on South Koreans to overthrow
President Park's government and reiterated its support for what
it called a "massive popular struggle for independence and
democracy" in South Korea. In South Korea, the cry of "threat
from the North" became more shrill after Vietnam's reunification.
In August 1976, against the backdrop of escalating tensions along
the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ--see Glossary),
the telephone hot
line that had linked P'yongyang and Seoul ceased operations and
remained unused until February 1980.
In the late 1970s, North Korea and South Korea attempted to
revive their dialogue. In January 1979, North Korea agreed to
South Korea's proposal to resume talks unconditionally, but
preliminary talks held in February and March failed to narrow the
differences. North Korea maintained that the talks should be
within the framework of a "whole-nation congress" composed of
political and social groups from both sides. South Korea
countered that the talks should be on a government-to-government
basis without participation of nongovernmental mass
organizations.
In February 1980, preparatory talks got under way at
P'anmunjm in the DMZ. Through August 1980, the two sides met ten
times and agreed on several minor procedural and technical
points, even though they were unable to decide on an agenda for
the premiers' conference or on an interpretation of such terms as
"collaboration," "unity," and "peaceful reunification." Another
impediment was disagreement on whether the premiers' talks should
be treated as part of broader North-South contacts involving
various mass organizations--as North Korea contends--or whether
the talks should be on a more manageable government-to-government
basis--as South Korea demands. On September 24, 1980, two days
before the eleventh scheduled meeting, North Korea suspended the
talks, citing "the South Korean military fascist" policy of
seeking confrontation and division. On September 25, P'yongyang
also once again suspended operation of the telephone hot line. In
October 1980, at the Sixth Party Congress, Kim Il Sung proposed
the establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Kory,
a system of unification based on mutual convenience and
toleration. According to the proposal, a single unified state
would be founded on the principle of coexistence, leaving the two
systems intact and federating the two governments. The Democratic
Confederal Republic of Kory, so named after a unified state that
previously existed in Korea (918-1392), is viewed by North Korea
as "the most realistic way of national reunification." A supreme
national assembly with an equal number of representatives from
north and south and an appropriate number of representatives of
overseas Koreans would be formed, with a confederal standing
committee to "guide the regional government of the north and the
south and to administer all the affairs of the confederal state."
The regional governments of the north and south would have
independent policies--within limits--consistent with the
fundamental interests and demands of the whole nation and strive
to narrow their differences in all areas.
The proposal provided that the supreme national confederal
assembly and the confederal standing committee--its permanent
organ and the de facto central government--would be the unified
government of the confederal state and, as such, would be
responsible for discussing and deciding domestic and foreign
affairs, matters of national defense, and other matters of common
concern related to the interests of the whole country and nation.
Further, the coordinated development of the country and nation
should be promoted. The confederal government would be neutral
and nonaligned. South Korea rejected the confederation as another
propaganda ploy.
No significant dialogue occurred between the two countries
until the middle of 1984, when South Korea suffered a devastating
flood. North Korea proposed to send relief goods to flood victims
in South Korea; the offer was accepted. This occasion provided
the momentum for both sides to resume their suspended dialogue.
In 1985 the two countries exchanged performing arts groups, and
ninety-two members of separated families met. In January 1986,
however, North Korea once again suddenly cut off all talks with
South Korea, blaming "Team Spirit," the annual United States-
South Korean joint military exercise.
After the inauguration of South Korean president Roh Tae Woo
in 1988, a more vigorous dialogue commenced between Seoul and
P'yongyang.
Nordpolitik (see Glossary),
South Korea's efforts
since 1984 to expand ties with the former communist bloc, and the
slowing pace of North Korea's economic development have
contributed to a basic change in P'yongyang's strategy toward
Seoul. Further encouraging this shift were the political upheaval
and demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, one of North Korea's key allies.
Subsequently, North Korea lost its guaranteed access to the
market once provided by the Soviet Union and its satellites. At
the same time, South Korea established commercial and diplomatic
relations with many East European countries. Next, the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council approved the
simultaneous entry of both Koreas into the UN in September 1991.
Five rounds of meetings were held alternately in Seoul and
P'yongyang before the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression,
Exchanges, and Cooperation between the South and the North was
signed on December 13, 1991 (see
table 8, Appendix). The
agreement called for reconciliation and nonaggression on the
Korean Peninsula. Then North Korean premier Yon Hyong-muk called
the agreement "the most valuable achievement ever made between
the South and North Korean authorities." It was agreed that
further meetings would be held to resolve such issues as creating
a nuclear-free Korea, uniting divided families, and discussing
economic cooperation.
For the first time, North Korea "officially recognized" the
existence of South Korea. The accord called for North Korea and
South Korea to formally end the Korean War. Among the terms of
the accord are agreements to issue a joint declaration of
nonaggression, advance warning of troop movements and exercises,
and the installation of a hot line between top military
commanders. The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression,
Exchanges, and Cooperation has led to the establishment of
several joint North-South Korea subcommittees that are to work
out the specifics for implementing the general terms of the
accord. These subcommittees report to the committees that met in
conjunction with the prime ministerial level talks that had began
in September 1990. There are subcommittees on economic
cooperation affairs (concerning South Korea's commercial
investments in North Korea) and on trade and the opening of lines
of travel and communication (including telephonic) between the
two Koreas; cultural exchange, concerning the exchange of
entertainment and athletic groups and the joint sponsorship of
single teams to represent both Koreas in international sports
competitions; political affairs, on working to eliminate mutual
slander in their respective mass media and to abrogate laws
detrimental to improving understanding and cooperation; and
military affairs, on devising ways and means to reduce tensions
and exchange notice of military exercises. Separate from the
prime ministerial dialogue, yet closely associated with it, are
talks held between the North and South Korean Red Cross
organizations about reunification of families.
The two Koreas also agree that their peninsula should be
"free of nuclear weapons." The joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula calls for the
establishment of a Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) to
negotiate a credible and effective bilateral nuclear inspection
regime as called for in the declaration. Although negotiations in
all these areas produced substantive progress toward the drafting
of detailed accords for the terms of implementing the Agreement
on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation,
nothing has been implemented as of mid-1993. As for negotiation
of a bilateral inspection regime, these talks also had not
achieved any significant progress by mid-1993.
Data as of June 1993
- North Korea-THE KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY
- North Korea-Primary and Secondary Education
- North Korea-Military Industry
- North Korea-Contemporary Cultural Expression
- North Korea-The United States
- North Korea-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
- North Korea-The Chosn Dynasty: Florescence
- North Korea-KOREA IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY WORLD ORDER
- North Korea-Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation
- North Korea-Literature, Music, and Film
- North Korea-Civil Aviation
- North Korea-Officer Corps: Recruitment and Education
- North Korea-Confucian and Neo-Confucian Values SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUES
- North Korea-Inter-Korean Affairs
- North Korea-GEOGRAPHY
- North Korea-Population Structure and Projections
- North Korea-Korea under the Japanese Occupation ECONOMIC SETTING
- North Korea-EDUCATION
- North Korea-National Command Authority THE ARMED FORCES
- North Korea-Civil Aviation
- North Korea-Reserves and Paramilitary Forces
- North Korea-Record of Economic Performance
- North Korea-GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES: NEW WORLD ORDER AND NORTH KOREAN SECURITY
- North Korea-Resource Development
- North Korea-Relations with the Third World
- North Korea-THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
- North Korea-Urban Life
- North Korea-Production and Distribution of Crops and Livestock
- North Korea-Village Life
- North Korea-Organization and Disposition
- North Korea-Organization and Disposition
- North Korea-Formulation of National Security Policy
- North Korea-Mining and Metal Processing
- North Korea-Forestry
- North Korea-Historical Influences THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
- North Korea-NORTH KOREA
- North Korea-Postwar Economic Planning
- North Korea-The Korean Language
- North Korea-The Colonial Transformation of Korean Society
- North Korea-GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
- North Korea-Economic Assistance
- North Korea-Relations Between the Military and the Korean Workers' Party
- North Korea-Special Weapons
- North Korea-CORPORATISM AND THE CHUCH'E IDEA
- North Korea-Social Control INTERNAL SECURITY
- North Korea-Military Capability, Readiness, Training, and Recent Trends
- North Korea-Social Education
- North Korea-CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
- North Korea-BUDGET AND FINANCE
- North Korea-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTY
- North Korea-CHAPTER 5 - NATIONAL SECURITY
- North Korea-Adult Education
- North Korea-THE KOREAN WAR
- North Korea-Emergence of the New Doctrine
- North Korea-POPULATION
- North Korea-INDUSTRY
- North Korea-The Period of the Three Kingdoms
- North Korea-NATIONAL SECURITY
- North Korea-The Navy
- North Korea-CHAPTER 2 - THE SOCIETY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
- North Korea-CHAPTER 1 - HISTORICAL SETTING
- North Korea-Koreans Living Overseas
- North Korea-INTRODUCTION
- North Korea-DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
- North Korea-Architecture and City Planning
- North Korea-Developmental Strategy
- North Korea-Tradition and Modernity in North Korea
- North Korea-Dynastic Decline
- North Korea-The Army
- North Korea-Manufacturing
- North Korea-FOREIGN POLICY
- North Korea-INFRASTRUCTURE
- North Korea-MASS ORGANIZATIONS
- North Korea-The Air Force
- North Korea-Role in National Life
- North Korea-Unification by Kory
- North Korea-POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: THE ROLE OF CHUCH'E
- North Korea-Foreign Investment and Joint Ventures
- North Korea-Air Defense
- North Korea-Higher Education
- North Korea -COUNTRY PROFILE
- North Korea-CHAPTER 4 - GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
- North Korea-THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN NATION
- North Korea-Development in Major Sectors
- North Korea-Classes and Social Strata
- North Korea-Transportation and Communications
- North Korea-Special Operations Forces
- North Korea-Energy and Power
- North Korea-Japan
- North Korea-Foreign Trade
- North Korea-PROSPECTS
- North Korea-Weapons and Equipment
- North Korea-Korea under Silla
- North Korea-THE NATIONAL DIVISION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE DPRK
- North Korea-Employment in Offensive Scenario
- North Korea-Telecommunications
- North Korea-The Supreme People's Assembly ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
- North Korea-The Role of Religion
- North Korea-Services and Marketing
- North Korea-Weapons and Equipment
- North Korea-ETHNICITY, CULTURE, AND LANGUAGE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
- North Korea-HISTORICAL SETTING
- North Korea-Educational Themes and Methods
- North Korea-Organization and Management
- North Korea-Chuch'e and Contemporary Social Values
- North Korea-LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION
- North Korea-The Executive Branch
- North Korea-FOREWORD
- North Korea-The Traditional Family and Kinship
- North Korea-AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHERIES
- North Korea-Party Cadres
- North Korea-Environmental Protection
- North Korea-Weapons and Equipment
- North Korea-MILITARY HERITAGE
- North Korea-THE MEDIA
- North Korea
- North Korea-THE RISE OF KOREAN NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM
- North Korea-The Central People's Committee
- North Korea
- North Korea-China and the Soviet Union
- North Korea-FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
- North Korea
- North Korea-PROSPECTS
- North Korea-The Taean Work System
- North Korea-The Public Security Apparatus
- North Korea-Roads
- North Korea-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
- North Korea
- North Korea-Local Government
- North Korea
- North Korea-Fisheries
- North Korea-The Evolution of North Korean Military Thought
- North Korea
- North Korea-PUBLIC HEALTH
- North Korea-Military Conscription and Terms of Service
- North Korea-The Ruling Elite
- North Korea-The Nuclear Option
- North Korea-The Ch'ongsan-ni Method
- North Korea-Organization and Management of the Economy
- North Korea-MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY
- North Korea-Climate
- North Korea-Family Life
- North Korea-ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
- North Korea-Mass Production Campaigns
- North Korea-Operational Practice in the 1980s and 1990s
- North Korea-Chosn Dynasty Social Structure
- North Korea-SOCIETY
- North Korea-ECONOMY
- North Korea
- North Korea-The Judiciary
- North Korea-The Judiciary
- North Korea-The State Administration Council
- North Korea-PARTY LEADERSHIP AND ELITE RECRUITMENT
- North Korea
- North Korea-Relations with China and the Soviet Union FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS
- North Korea-Trends, Training, Readiness, and Military Capability
- North Korea
- North Korea-Military Capability and Coastal Defense
- North Korea-TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
- North Korea-PREFACE
- North Korea-Missile Developments
- North Korea-The Role of Women
- North Korea-THE LEGACY OF JAPANESE COLONIALISM
- North Korea
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Background | | An independent kingdom for much of its long history, Korea was occupied by Japan beginning in 1905 following the Russo-Japanese War. Five years later, Japan formally annexed the entire peninsula. Following World War II, Korea was split with the northern half coming under Soviet-sponsored Communist control. After failing in the Korean War (1950-53) to conquer the US-backed Republic of Korea (ROK) in the southern portion by force, North Korea (DPRK), under its founder President KIM Il Sung, adopted a policy of ostensible diplomatic and economic "self-reliance" as a check against outside influence. The DPRK demonized the US as the ultimate threat to its social system through state-funded propaganda, and molded political, economic, and military policies around the core ideological objective of eventual unification of Korea under Pyongyang's control. KIM's son, the current ruler KIM Jong Il, was officially designated as his father's successor in 1980, assuming a growing political and managerial role until the elder KIM's death in 1994. After decades of economic mismanagement and resource misallocation, the DPRK since the mid-1990s has relied heavily on international aid to feed its population. North Korea's history of regional military provocations, proliferation of military-related items, long-range missile development, WMD programs including nuclear weapons test in 2006 and 2009, and massive conventional armed forces are of major concern to the international community.
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Location | | Eastern Asia, northern half of the Korean Peninsula bordering the Korea Bay and the Sea of Japan, between China and South Korea
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Area(sq km) | | total: 120,538 sq km land: 120,408 sq km water: 130 sq km
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Geographic coordinates | | 40 00 N, 127 00 E
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Land boundaries(km) | | total: 1,673 km border countries: China 1,416 km, South Korea 238 km, Russia 19 km
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Coastline(km) | | 2,495 km
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Climate | | temperate with rainfall concentrated in summer
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Elevation extremes(m) | | lowest point: Sea of Japan 0 m highest point: Paektu-san 2,744 m
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Natural resources | | coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnesite, iron ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salt, fluorspar, hydropower
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Land use(%) | | arable land: 22.4% permanent crops: 1.66% other: 75.94% (2005)
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Irrigated land(sq km) | | 14,600 sq km (2003)
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Total renewable water resources(cu km) | | 77.1 cu km (1999)
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Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural) | | total: 9.02 cu km/yr (20%/25%/55%) per capita: 401 cu m/yr (2000)
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Natural hazards | | late spring droughts often followed by severe flooding; occasional typhoons during the early fall
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Environment - current issues | | water pollution; inadequate supplies of potable water; waterborne disease; deforestation; soil erosion and degradation
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Environment - international agreements | | party to: Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution signed, but not ratified: Law of the Sea
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Geography - note | | strategic location bordering China, South Korea, and Russia; mountainous interior is isolated and sparsely populated
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Population | | 22,665,345 (July 2009 est.)
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Age structure(%) | | 0-14 years: 21.3% (male 2,440,439/female 2,376,557) 15-64 years: 69.4% (male 7,776,889/female 7,945,399) 65 years and over: 9.4% (male 820,504/female 1,305,557) (2009 est.)
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Median age(years) | | total: 33.5 years male: 32.1 years female: 34.9 years (2009 est.)
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Population growth rate(%) | | 0.42% (2009 est.)
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Birth rate(births/1,000 population) | | 14.82 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Death rate(deaths/1,000 population) | | 10.52 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
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Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population) | | -0.09 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.)
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Urbanization(%) | | urban population: 63% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 0.9% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
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Sex ratio(male(s)/female) | | at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.03 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 0.98 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.63 male(s)/female total population: 0.95 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
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Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births) | | total: 51.34 deaths/1,000 live births male: 58.64 deaths/1,000 live births female: 43.6 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
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Life expectancy at birth(years) | | total population: 63.81 years male: 61.23 years female: 66.53 years (2009 est.)
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Total fertility rate(children born/woman) | | 1.96 children born/woman (2009 est.)
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Nationality | | noun: Korean(s) adjective: Korean
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Ethnic groups(%) | | racially homogeneous; there is a small Chinese community and a few ethnic Japanese
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Religions(%) | | traditionally Buddhist and Confucianist, some Christian and syncretic Chondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way) note: autonomous religious activities now almost nonexistent; government-sponsored religious groups exist to provide illusion of religious freedom
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Languages(%) | | Korean
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Country name | | conventional long form: Democratic People's Republic of Korea conventional short form: North Korea local long form: Choson-minjujuui-inmin-konghwaguk local short form: Choson abbreviation: DPRK
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Government type | | Communist state one-man dictatorship
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Capital | | name: Pyongyang geographic coordinates: 39 01 N, 125 45 E time difference: UTC+9 (14 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
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Administrative divisions | | 9 provinces (do, singular and plural) and 2 municipalities (si, singular and plural) provinces: Chagang-do (Chagang), Hamgyong-bukto (North Hamgyong), Hamgyong-namdo (South Hamgyong), Hwanghae-bukto (North Hwanghae), Hwanghae-namdo (South Hwanghae), Kangwon-do (Kangwon), P'yongan-bukto (North P'yongan), P'yongan-namdo (South P'yongan), Yanggang-do (Yanggang) municipalities: Nason-si, P'yongyang-si
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Constitution | | adopted 1948; revised several times
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Legal system | | based on Prussian civil law system with Japanese influences and Communist legal theory; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
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Suffrage | | 17 years of age; universal
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Executive branch | | chief of state: KIM Jong Il (since July 1994); note - on 9 April 2009, rubberstamp Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) reelected KIM Jong Il chairman of the National Defense Commission, a position accorded nation's "highest administrative authority"; SPA reelected KIM Yong Nam in 2009 president of its Presidium also with responsibility of representing state and receiving diplomatic credentials head of government: Premier KIM Yong Il (since 11 April 2007); Vice Premier KWAK Pom Gi (since 5 September 1998), Vice Premier O Su Yong (since 13 April 2009), Vice Premier PAK Su Gil (since 18 September 2009), Vice Premier PAK Myong Su (since 4 September 2009), Vice Premier RO Tu Chol (since 3 September 2003) cabinet: Naegak (cabinet) members, except for Minister of People's Armed Forces, are appointed by SPA elections: last held in September 2003; date of next election NA election results: KIM Jong Il and KIM Yong Nam were only nominees for positions and ran unopposed
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Legislative branch | | unicameral Supreme People's Assembly or Ch'oego Inmin Hoeui (687 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms) elections: last held 8 March 2009 (next due to be held in March 2014) election results: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; ruling party approves a list of candidates who are elected without opposition; a token number of seats are reserved for minor parties
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Judicial branch | | Central Court (judges are elected by the Supreme People's Assembly)
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Political pressure groups and leaders | | none
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International organization participation | | ARF, FAO, G-77, ICAO, ICRM, IFAD, IFRCS, IHO, IMO, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, NAM, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO
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Flag description | | three horizontal bands of blue (top), red (triple width), and blue; the red band is edged in white; on the hoist side of the red band is a white disk with a red five-pointed star
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Economy - overview | | North Korea, one of the world's most centrally directed and least open economies, faces chronic economic problems. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and shortages of spare parts. Large-scale military spending draws off resources needed for investment and civilian consumption. Industrial and power output have declined in parallel from pre-1990 levels. Severe flooding in the summer of 2007 aggravated chronic food shortages caused by on-going systemic problems including a lack of arable land, collective farming practices, and persistent shortages of tractors and fuel. Large-scale international food aid deliveries have allowed the people of North Korea to escape widespread starvation since famine threatened in 1995, but the population continues to suffer from prolonged malnutrition and poor living conditions. Since 2002, the government has allowed private "farmers' markets" to begin selling a wider range of goods. It also permitted some private farming - on an experimental basis - in an effort to boost agricultural output. In October 2005, the government tried to reverse some of these policies by forbidding private sales of grains and reinstituting a centralized food rationing system. By December 2005, the government terminated most international humanitarian assistance operations in North Korea (calling instead for developmental assistance only) and restricted the activities of remaining international and non-governmental aid organizations such as the World Food Program. External food aid now comes primarily from China and South Korea in the form of grants and long-term concessional loans. In May 2008, the US agreed to give 500,000 metric tons of food to North Korea via the World Food Program and US nongovernmental organizations; Pyongyang began receiving these shipments in mid-2008. During the October 2007 summit, South Korea also agreed to develop some of North Korea's infrastructure, natural resources, and light industry, but inter-Korean economic cooperation slowed in 2008 as Pyongyang restricted tourism and manufacturing joint ventures in the North, and food aid from South Korea was suspended. Firm political control remains the Communist government's overriding concern, which will likely inhibit the loosening of economic regulations.
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GDP (purchasing power parity) | | $40 billion (2008 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP (official exchange rate) | | $26.2 billion (2008 est.)
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GDP - real growth rate(%) | | 3.7% (2008 est.)
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GDP - per capita (PPP) | | $1,800 (2008 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
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GDP - composition by sector(%) | | agriculture: 23.3% industry: 43.1% services: 33.6% (2002 est.)
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Labor force | | 20 million note: estimates vary widely (2004 est.)
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Labor force - by occupation(%) | | agriculture: 37% industry and services: 63% (2004 est.)
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Unemployment rate(%) | | NA%
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Population below poverty line(%) | | NA%
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Household income or consumption by percentage share(%) | | lowest 10%: NA% highest 10%: NA%
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Budget | | revenues: $2.88 billion expenditures: $2.98 billion (2005)
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Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%) | | NA%
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Economic aid - recipient | | $372 million note: approximately 65,000 metric tons in food aid through the World Food Program appeals in 2007, plus additional aid from bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations (2007 est.)
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Agriculture - products | | rice, corn, potatoes, soybeans, pulses; cattle, pigs, pork, eggs
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Industries | | military products; machine building, electric power, chemicals; mining (coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, graphite, copper, zinc, lead, and precious metals), metallurgy; textiles, food processing; tourism
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Industrial production growth rate(%) | | NA%
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Exports | | $1.684 billion (2007)
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Exports - commodities(%) | | minerals, metallurgical products, manufactures (including armaments), textiles, agricultural and fishery products
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Exports - partners(%) | | South Korea 45%, China 35%, India 5% (2007)
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Imports | | $3.055 billion (2007) $2.879 billion (2006)
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Imports - commodities(%) | | petroleum, coking coal, machinery and equipment, textiles, grain
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Imports - partners(%) | | China 46%, South Korea 34%, Thailand 6%, Russia 4% (2007)
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Debt - external | | $12.5 billion (2001 est.)
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Exchange rates | | North Korean won (KPW) per US dollar - 140 (2007), 141 (2006), 170 (December 2004), market rate: North Korean won per US dollar - 3,400 (October 2008)
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Currency (code) | | North Korean won (KPW)
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Telephones - main lines in use | | 1.18 million (2008)
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Telephone system | | general assessment: inadequate system; currently mobile cellular telephone services are available in Pyongyang only domestic: fiber-optic links installed between cities; telephone directories unavailable; mobile cellular service, initiated in 2002, suspended in 2004; Orascom Telecom, an Egyptian company, launched mobile service on December 15, 2008 for the Pyongyang area only international: country code - 850; satellite earth stations - 2 (1 Intelsat - Indian Ocean, 1 Russian - Indian Ocean region); other international connections through Moscow and Beijing (2008)
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Internet country code | | .kp
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Airports | | 79 (2009)
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Pipelines(km) | | oil 154 km (2008)
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Roadways(km) | | total: 25,554 km paved: 724 km unpaved: 24,830 km (2006)
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Ports and terminals | | Ch'ongjin, Haeju, Hungnam (Hamhung), Kimch'aek, Kosong, Najin, Namp'o, Sinuiju, Songnim, Sonbong (formerly Unggi), Ungsang, Wonsan
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Military branches | | North Korean People's Army: Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force; civil security forces (2005)
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Military service age and obligation(years of age) | | 17 years of age (2004)
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Manpower available for military service | | males age 16-49: 6,225,747 females age 16-49: 6,188,270 (2008 est.)
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Manpower fit for military service | | males age 16-49: 4,104,964 females age 16-49: 4,492,374 (2009 est.)
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Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually | | male: 191,759 female: 184,641 (2009 est.)
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Military expenditures(% of GDP) | | NA
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Disputes - international | | risking arrest, imprisonment, and deportation, tens of thousands of North Koreans cross into China to escape famine, economic privation, and political oppression; North Korea and China dispute the sovereignty of certain islands in Yalu and Tumen rivers; Military Demarcation Line within the 4-km wide Demilitarized Zone has separated North from South Korea since 1953; periodic incidents in the Yellow Sea with South Korea which claims the Northern Limiting Line as a maritime boundary; North Korea supports South Korea in rejecting Japan's claim to Liancourt Rocks (Tok-do/Take-shima)
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Refugees and internally displaced persons | | IDPs: undetermined (flooding in mid-2007 and famine during mid-1990s) (2007)
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Trafficking in persons | | current situation: North Korea is a source country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation; the most common form of trafficking involves North Korean women and girls who cross the border into China voluntarily; additionally, North Korean women and girls are lured out of North Korea to escape poor social and economic conditions by the promise of food, jobs, and freedom, only to be forced into prostitution, marriage, or exploitative labor arrangements once in China tier rating: Tier 3 - North Korea does not fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government does not acknowledge the existence of human rights abuses in the country or recognize trafficking, either within the country or transnationally; North Korea has not ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol (2008)
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Electricity - production(kWh) | | 20.9 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - production by source(%) | | fossil fuel: 29% hydro: 71% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
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Electricity - consumption(kWh) | | 17.49 billion kWh (2007 est.)
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Electricity - exports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Electricity - imports(kWh) | | 0 kWh (2008 est.)
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Oil - production(bbl/day) | | 120.7 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - consumption(bbl/day) | | 16,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
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Oil - exports(bbl/day) | | 0 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - imports(bbl/day) | | 13,890 bbl/day (2007 est.)
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Oil - proved reserves(bbl) | | 0 bbl
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Natural gas - production(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - consumption(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008 est.)
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Natural gas - exports(cu m) | | 0 cu m (2008)
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Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m) | | 0 cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
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HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%) | | NA
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HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS | | NA
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HIV/AIDS - deaths | | NA
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Literacy(%) | | definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 99% male: 99% female: 99%
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Education expenditures(% of GDP) | | NA
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