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Mauritania
Index
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Mauritania, 1987
CONTEMPORARY OBSERVERS OF MAURITANIA, like the French colonizers
of an earlier century, often have described the country as a
bridge linking North Africa and West Africa. Certainly individual
groups within Mauritania have maintained strong cultural and
economic ties with their neighbors--to whom they were often
related--in both regions. Yet although the country served as a
geographical bridge, crisscrossed by merchants transporting gold,
salt, and slaves between the northern and southern edges of the
Sahara, it also marked a cultural boundary between sedentary
farmers of sub-Saharan Africa and the nomadic Arab-Berber herders
from the
Maghrib (see Glossary).
Throughout Mauritania's history,
the interaction between the two cultures has been charged with
social and political conflict that has defined and will continue
to define Mauritanian politics. Even Islam, to which virtually
the entire population adhered after the ninth century, provided
but a veneer of unity
(see Religious Life
, ch. 2).
The character of present-day Mauritania's population
reflected the waves of immigration from north and south that had
begun in the third century A.D. The first wave, Berbers from the
north, migrated into what is now Mauritania in the third and
fourth centuries and later in the seventh and eighth centuries.
Local populations either became vassals in service to the Berbers
or migrated farther south. In the ninth century, three Berber
groups--the Lemtuna, Messufa, and Djodala--formed a loose
confederation in order to better control the easternmost trans-
Saharan trade route. The Sanhadja Confederation, as it came to be
called, monopolized trade between the ancient empire of Ghana and
the city of Sijilmasa. The historically important towns of Koumbi
Saleh, Aoudaghast, Oualâta, Tîchît, and Ouadane flourished during
this epoch.
In the eleventh century, following the breakup of the
Sanhadja Confederation and a period of unrest and warfare among
the Sanhadja Berbers, a small group of Sanhadja zealots
established a religious center from which they preached a
doctrine of Islamic reform and holy war. By 1090 the empire of
the Almoravids--as the fundamentalist revolutionaries came to be
known--extended from Spain to Senegal. Within forty years,
however, the fervor and zeal of the original Almoravid reformers
waned, and, at the same time, their foes to the north and south
grew stronger.
The black Sudanic kingdoms of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai
eventually expanded over the next six centuries into what had
been Berber strongholds and constituted the second wave of
immigration. A third wave, again from the north, saw various
Yemeni Arab groups infiltrating southward, pushing the Berbers
and Africans before them. By the late seventeenth century, one
Yemeni group, the Bani Hassan, came to dominate all of what is
now Mauritania. As the Berbers moved south, they forced the
blacks toward the Senegal River Basin
(see Black Africans
, ch.
2).
Mauritania's social structure in the late twentieth century
dated from the late seventeenth century, when the Bani Hassan
defeated a Berber force seeking to expel them. The nomadic Arab
warrior groups subsequently dominated the Berbers, many of whom
became clerics serving the Arabs. At the bottom of the social
pyramid were the black slaves. All three groups spoke one
language, Hassaniya Arabic, and became known as Maures.
Meanwhile, free blacks, culturally related to Africans in the
south, settled in the Senegal River Basin.
Europeans became interested in Mauritania only in the second
half of the sixteenth century. French traders at Saint Louis in
what is now Senegal purchased
gum arabic (see Glossary)
from
producers in southern Mauritania. Until the mid-nineteenth
century, and then for only a short period when French forces
occupied the Trarza and Brakna regions in southern Mauritania,
Arabs and Berbers paid little heed to the Europeans. At the start
of the twentieth century, French forces under Xavier Cappolani
moved back into Mauritania and through brute force and co-
optation pacified refractory Arab chiefs. But in contrast to its
colonial administration elsewhere in West Africa, the French
administered Mauritania indirectly, relying on existing Arab-
dominated institutions
(see French Colonial Administration
, ch.
1). This laissez-faire attitude persisted until the 1940s.
Following World War II, at a time when other French colonies were
agitating for independence or at least substantial reform, there
was only minimal political activity in Mauritania. France
nonetheless implemented changes that corresponded to reforms
demanded and accorded elsewhere in francophone West Africa.
The new political freedom touched perhaps 10 percent of the
population; yet even among this group, sharp divisions persisted
and threatened the political independence of the colony. Some
Arabs and Berbers with strong family ties in Morocco favored
union with Morocco, while black Africans in the south wanted to
join the nascent Mali Federation, which joined Senegal and Mali.
Only by co-opting the country's traditional leaders with vague
promises was Mauritania's leading political figure and first
president, Moktar Ould Daddah, able to achieve the pretense of
unity as Mauritania celebrated its independence on November 28,
1960.
During the first decades of independence, Mauritania remained
deeply divided. Southern (non-Maure) blacks resented Maure
domination of the political process, which led, among other
things, to the disproportionate representation of Maures in the
bureaucracy and officer corps of the armed forces, the imbalanced
allocation of development funds, and the imposition of Hassaniya
Arabic as the language of instruction in all secondary schools.
With the support of students, the Mauritanian Workers Union
(Union des Travailleurs Mauritaniens--UTM), Mauritania's first
trade union, protested a salary scale by which some West European
expatriates received wages almost 1,000 times higher than their
Mauritanian counterparts. Finally, Mauritania's costly
involvement in the Western Sahara conflict was part of a Maure
agenda and held little for southern blacks, who made up the bulk
of the fighting force and suffered most of the casualties.
In 1975 Mauritania allied with Morocco against the
Polisario (see Glossary)
guerrillas of the Saharawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR), ostensibly to obtain Tiris al Gharbiyya. But by
1978, after several surprise attacks by the Polisario guerrillas
against Nouakchott and the iron ore mines at Zouîrât, it had
become apparent that Mauritania's military was no match even for
the smaller guerrilla forces
(see Conflict in the Western Sahara
, ch. 1). Nonetheless, the government continued its costly
involvement, in part to stave off a possible invasion by Moroccan
troops should Mauritania curtail its effort and in part to
satisfy the Maures who saw the annexation of Tiris al Gharbiyya
as the first step toward a rejuvenated Greater Mauritania (see Glossary).
Mauritania's blacks in particular opposed the war on
several counts. First, it siphoned off scarce resources that
might otherwise have supported greater agricultural development
in the south; second, it paved the way for military officers,
most of whom were Maures, to insinuate themselves into the
civilian government; and, finally, the majority of the enlisted
men were black, although most officers were Maure.
Pointing to the debilitating costs of the war and the
subsequent political dissension in Mauritania, a group of
military officers staged a coup in July 1978 that brought Colonel
Mustapha Ould Salek to power as prime minister. Salek proved
unable to extricate Mauritania from the conflict, and in April
1979 Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif and Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould
Haidalla seized power. Shortly thereafter, Bouceif was killed in
airplane crash, and Haidalla became prime minister.
Ruling through the Military Committee for National Salvation
(Comité Militaire de Salut National--CMSN), Haidalla arranged a
cease-fire with the guerrillas and pledged to remain neutral in
the Western Sahara conflict, although his government later
accorded diplomatic recognition to the SADR. Meanwhile, Polisario
guerrillas continued to transit Mauritanian territory with
impunity, inviting cross-border reprisals from Moroccan troops.
In response to alleged corruption in government and a
discernible and apparently unwelcome political tilt toward the
SADR, Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Ould Taya staged a palace
coup in December 1984. Proclaiming itself reformist, the Taya
government was as anxious to institute the forms of democracy as
it was to deflect responsibility for its inability to implement
necessary economic and political changes and to defuse ethnic
conflict. Taya pledged to hold elections for municipal offices in
thirteen cities (which he did in December 1987), free political
prisoners, uphold civil rights, and end corruption. A second
round of elections, this time for approximately 500 town
councillors (consillers) across the country, took place in
December 1987 and January 1988. As important as the elections
were to Mauritanians, they did little to reduce the ethnic
tensions interfering with development
(see Political Culture
, ch.
4).
In the late 1980s, Mauritania had six major ethnic groups:
Maure, Toucouleur, Fulbe, Soninké, Wolof, and Bambara. The Maures
included the white Arab-Berber descendants of the original
Maghribi immigrants and blacks called harratin (sing.,
hartani--see Glossary),
former slaves of white Maures who
had assimilated Maure culture. The other ethnic groups consisted
of black Africans, who lived in the south along the Senegal River
or in cities. Given the large number of black Maures, the
significant cultural distinction in Mauritania was not white
versus black but rather Maure (white and black) versus black. But
even black Africans had divergent responses, often class linked,
to Maure hegemony.
The relative size of each group was in dispute both because
census data were deficient and because the Maure-dominated
government, to preserve its prerogatives, pretended to eschew
ethnic labeling. According to Mauritanian government figures,
however, Maures constituted 70 percent of the population, while
blacks were said to be overrepresented in the bureaucracy and
schooling. Others reported that blacks formed at least half the
population but were intentionally undercounted and were
underrepresented in high-level positions in the government. In
any case, Maures openly discriminated against the black
population, which, well into the twentieth century, was
considered a source of slaves.
The most outspoken and resentful opponents of the Maure-
dominated government were the Toucouleur. They constituted the
leadership of the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (Forces
de Libération Africaine de Mauritanie--FLAM), an outlawed
antigovernment organization based in Dakar, Senegal. In September
and October 1986, the government arrested between thirty and
forty suspected FLAM members, including thirteen prominent
Toucouleur who were charged with sowing "hatred and confusion"
and thereby "undermining the values and foundations of . . .
society." Partly to protest those arrests as well as continued
Maure domination of the government, a group of Toucouleur, some
of whom had high-ranking positions in the military, reportedly
plotted to overthrow the Taya government in October 1987. In all,
51 persons were brought to trial for the plot, although FLAM
claimed that the government detained more than 1,000 people.
Three of the defendants, all army lieutenants, were found guilty
of attempting to overthrow the government and were executed on
December 3, 1987. Subsequently, students in Nouakchott reportedly
demonstrated to protest government racism, and violent clashes
between supporters and foes of the government occurred in the
capital and in Kaédi and Bogué.
A more immediate cause of the disturbances concerned
landownership along the Senegal River. By permitting the
government to cede otherwise fallow land to those committed to
improving it, the 1983 Land Reform Act seemingly accorded Maures
preference in acquiring irrigated land
(see Political Power in the Mid-1980s
, ch. 4). Most blacks, and especially the
Toucouleur, believed that wealthy Maures from Nouakchott or
Nouadhibou would appropriate land along the river, displacing
blacks whose families had lived in the area for generations.
Complicating the issue was the fact that some wealthy black
landowners living near the river supported the government's
attempts to assemble large tracts of land for capital-intensive
farming, even if the reforms dispossessed less fortunate blacks.
In the late 1980s, as other sectors of the economy stagnated
or faded, irrigated agricultural land became extremely valuable.
World prices for iron ore, long Mauritania's principal export,
remained low. Fishing, which by 1983 had supplanted iron ore as
the chief foreign exchange earner, appeared to be tapering off
following years of overfishing by foreign fleets. Finally, as the
worst effects of the drought attenuated, the government targeted
agriculture for development. With encouragement and support from
the
World Bank (see Glossary)
and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary),
the government raised producer prices by 40
percent and then expanded irrigation and flood control programs
to bring more marginal land into production.
To finance its domestic investment, Mauritania relied on
foreign assistance, which between 1980 and 1985 amounted to
approximately US$170 per capita. Mauritania's principal
benefactors included wealthy Arab states, France, and Japan. By
1985 Mauritania's foreign debt amounted to US$1.8 billion, or
nearly 250 percent of its gross domestic product
(GDP--see Glossary),
making Mauritania one of the most deeply indebted
nations in the world
(see Balance of Payments, Debt, and Foreign Assistance
, ch. 3).
One of the reasons for its dependence on foreign funding was
the size of the military budget. As in many other Third World
countries experiencing domestic turmoil, the military absorbed a
disproportionate share of the budget--25 percent in 1985.
Military spending distorted the economy by diverting funds from
economic development. At the same time, however, the military
provided personnel with technical and administrative expertise
that could be transferred elsewhere within the government. The
military also participated in road building, public health
campaigns, and disaster relief. Meanwhile, the hope that the
armed forces might foster a sense of national unity transcending
ethnic peculiarities proved illusory because most of the officers
were Maure, whereas most recruits were black. The attempted coup
in October 1987 aggravated that disparity; in its aftermath,
approximately 500 noncommissioned officers, most of whom were
blacks, were dismissed from the army
(see The Armed Forces
, ch.
5).
Mauritania in the late 1980s held little promise for its
citizens. By 1987 desertification, perhaps Mauritania's greatest
enemy, had claimed over 90 percent of the land that had been
arable at independence. Competition for increasingly scarce
resources--which might include land, education, or slots in the
bureaucracy--intensified, pitting Mauritania's non-Maure blacks
against Maures. In spite of its reformist intentions, the Taya
regime perforce relied increasingly on coercion to maintain
order. Only the prospect for a negotiated settlement between
Algeria and Morocco in the Western Sahara afforded even the
possibility of positive economic change. The redeployment of
Moroccan troops from positions just north of Mauritania's border
with the Western Sahara and the removal of SADR refugee camps
from Tindouf in extreme western Algeria would allow Mauritania to
reduce the size and cost of its military, thereby freeing
additional funds for economic development. The savings would
probably be slight, however, and the net effect unimportant. Only
an end to desertification, over which Mauritania had little
control, would allow resources to expand to meet the needs of all
Mauritanians, both Maures and blacks.
November 16, 1988
* * *
In early April 1989, a minor border dispute involving
Senegalese
farmers and Mauritanian herders escalated by the end of the month
into the slaughter in Nouakchott and Dakar of hundreds of
citizens. The rioting in Senegal, in which hundreds of small
neighborhood shops belonging to Mauritanian retailers were also
looted, followed a period of inflation, rising unemployment, and
strikes, all of which aggravated discontent. The violence in
Mauritania appeared to be one more chapter in the longstanding
conflict between Maures and black Africans, many of whom farmed
in the valuable irrigated lands along the Senegal River. To quell
the violence, several countries, including France and Morocco,
arranged an airlift to repatriate nationals from the two
countries back across their respective borders.
Subsequently, Mauritania repatriated or expelled as many as
100,000 people, many of whom had been born in Mauritania and had
never lived in Senegal; Senegal repatriated a similar number that
also included Maures, mainly the small shopkeepers, who had never
lived in Mauritania. The elimination of the mauritanian retailers
was expected to exacerbate economic hardship among poorer
Senegalese. Among those leaving Mauritania were perhaps, 5,000 or
more farmers and herders, all nominally Senegalese, who had been
living for generations on the flood plain on the Mauritanian side
of the river (which, according to a French colonial document
dating from 1933, belonged to Senegal). According to reports,
their villages were burned and their assets confiscated.
Presumably their lands will be appropriated by Maures. Observers
speculated that the government of Mauritania--or elements within
the government--were taking advantage of the situation to expel
blacks, Toucouleur in particular, in order to obtain valuable
agricultural land and at the same time eliminate the clamor of
those seeking equal rights for blacks. It was all the more ironic
that the government used
harratine (see Glossary)
to carry out
operations against the southern blacks.
August 30, 1989
Robert E. Handloff
Data as of June 1988
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