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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Mauritania
Index
Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Ould Taya
Courtesy Embassy of Mauritania, Washington
During the late colonial period, Mauritania had few contacts
with the other territories of French West Africa (Afrique
Occidentale Française--AOF). At the time of the independence
referendum in 1958, Mauritania's representatives on the Grand
Council of the AOF remained neutral, while all other AOF members
divided between the African Democratic Rally (Rassemblement
Démocratique Africain--RDA) and the African Regroupment Party
(Parti du Régroupement Africain--PRA). Until Mauritania became
independent and Morocco threatened its security, Mauritania did
not participate in AOF intraterritorial political, labor, or
cultural movements. Only when Mauritania's existence as a state
became problematic did it seek international recognition and
support.
Throughout the 1960s, Mauritania's main foreign policy
objective was preserving its independence in the face of Moroccan
irredentism
(see Regional Security Concerns
, ch. 5). (Morocco
finally recognized Mauritanian independence in 1969.) To that
end, the Daddah government insisted on maintaining close ties
with France, an effort that included allowing France to station
troops on Mauritanian soil
(see The Independence Period and the French Military Legacy
, ch. 5). In Africa, Mauritania established
ties with the more conservative francophone countries because all
the Arab League states (except Tunisia) and the African members
of the Casablanca Group (Ghana, Guinea, and Mali) supported
Morocco's irredentist claims.
Mauritania applied for admission to the UN in 1960, sponsored
by France, but its membership was vetoed by the Soviet Union,
which supported the Arab League. For the most part, black Africa
and the West favored Mauritania's admission, and the Soviet Union
dropped its opposition in 1961 in exchange for a favorable vote
on Mongolia's admission. In a final effort to block Mauritania's
admission, Morocco brought the issue to the General Assembly,
which supported Mauritania's application by a vote of sixty-eight
to thirteen, with twenty abstentions. Mauritania was admitted to
the UN on October 27, 1961. Mali, Guinea, and most Arab states
supported Morocco in the debate.
In January 1962 Mauritania edged away from its previously
conservative, pro-French position by extending recognition to the
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic and refusing to
attend meetings of the French-backed Common Saharan States
Organization. These tentative displays of independence increased
Mauritania's credibility with its more progressive African
neighbors and emphasized the country's role as a bridge between
Arab North Africa and black sub-Saharan Africa. Mauritania and
Mali subsequently achieved a rapprochement with the signing of
the Treaty of Kayes in February 1963. Relations with Algeria
improved when Mauritania supported Algeria in its dispute with
Morocco. Egypt, known at the time as the United Arab Republic
(UAR) and the acknowledged leader of the Arab world, also sided
with Algeria, and on October 21, 1964, the UAR officially
extended recognition to Mauritania. That action encouraged Daddah
to undertake an even bolder foreign policy.
In 1963 Mauritania joined the OAU, whereupon Morocco resigned
in protest. In 1964 Daddah became the first president of the
recently formed Afro-Malagasy Union for Economic Cooperation
(Union Africaine et Malagache de Coopération Economique--UAMCE),
a loose grouping of francophone African countries pledging
technical and cultural cooperation. When the organization was
subsequently upgraded to become a political organization in
defiance of the OAU charter, Mauritania withdrew from all but the
technical committees.
Through the early 1970s, Mauritania continued to play the
role of bridge between the Maghrib and sub-Saharan Africa.
Mauritania also maintained its commitment to nonalignment while
opening relations with Eastern Europe and the radical states of
Africa. In support of Arab League and OAU positions, Mauritania
did not seek ties with Israel, South Africa, or Portugal.
Mauritania finally established diplomatic relations with Morocco
in 1969. Close relations with France, on whom Mauritania
continued to rely for much of its development aid, remained the
cornerstone of Mauritanian foreign policy through the late 1980s.
Spain's withdrawal from the Spanish Sahara and the latter's
partition and annexation by Mauritania and Morocco in 1976
inaugurated an eight-year period of conflict and fighting against
Polisario guerrillas of the SADR, resulting in military setbacks
and stagnating diplomacy for Mauritania
(see Conflict in the Western Sahara
, ch. 1). Upon annexation, Mauritania's former ally
Algeria severed its ties with the Daddah government in support of
the SADR. From 1976 to 1979, Polisario guerrillas increased
pressure on Mauritania and launched commando attacks against
Fdérik and Nouakchott. As a consequence of the economic and
political costs of the fighting, the military successors to
Daddah attempted to disengage Mauritania from the conflict;
nevertheless, Polisario forces penetrated Mauritania's defenses,
often with impunity, to infiltrate fighters into the Western
Sahara. Subsequently, relations with Morocco again deteriorated
and then finally ruptured in 1981 when Mauritania accused Morocco
of backing a coup attempt in Nouakchott. Conversely, relations
with the Polisario and Algeria improved. In December 1983,
Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania signed the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship. The following year Haidalla extended diplomatic
recognition and support to the SADR, an action that ultimately
led to the downfall of his government. President Taya maintained
ties with the SADR, but the link was at best correct and
represented little more than Taya's attempt to appease his more
formidable neighbors.
Mauritania's principal foreign policy objective in the mid1980s has been to ensure its own territorial integrity.
Translated into diplomacy, this has meant pursuing a policy of
strict neutrality in the Western Sahara dispute, improving
relations with Morocco and Algeria, and seeking guarantees of
support from France should ties with Mauritania's northern
neighbors seriously deteriorate. Taya's efforts in that area have
had mixed results. Although Taya insisted that Mauritania would
remain neutral in the conflict over the Western Sahara,
Mauritania faced a mounting threat of greater involvement because
the combatants themselves continued to encroach on Mauritanian
territory. As the Moroccans pushed southward in the Western
Sahara behind their highly effective network of sand walls
(berms--see Glossary)
to within a few kilometers of the
Mauritanian border, Mauritanian armed forces were placed in the
position of confronting either well-equipped Moroccan troops
pursuing Polisario guerrillas, or Polisario commando teams
crossing into and perhaps attacking the berms from Mauritanian
territory. In either case, Mauritania would probably be the
loser.
Taya has also sought to improve ties with other countries to
secure trading partners or find new investors. Mauritania's
principal benefactors have been Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and France.
The list of donors also includes Japan, Iraq, Italy, the Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany), Romania, the United States,
the Persian Gulf states, and China
(see Balance of Payments, Debt, and Foreign Assistance
, ch. 3).
Data as of June 1988
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