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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Mauritania
Index
The military regime that toppled Daddah in 1978 abolished the
Constitution that had been ratified on May 20, 1961. Then in
December 1980, when he unexpectedly announced a return to
civilian rule, Haidalla promulgated a new provisional
constitution. That draft constitution provided for a multiparty
system and freedom of association, provisions Haidalla hoped
would attract support from the labor union movement. Following an
abortive coup attempt in March 1981 by former members of the
military government, however, Haidalla reneged on his intention
of returning Mauritania to civilian rule and scrapped the draft
constitution.
The Constitutional Charter of the CMSN, which was promulgated
on February 9, 1985, served as a de facto constitution in 1987.
The charter unequivocally eliminated any of the pretenses of
democracy embodied in the 1961 constitution. At the same time, it
pledged adherence to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and, in Article 14, presaged a return to democratic
institutions and a new constitution that would bear some
semblance to the 1961 Constitution.
The 1961 Constitution clearly reflected the influence of the
Constitution of the French Fifth Republic in its dedication to
liberal democratic principles and inalienable human rights as
expressed in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In addition, the
Constitution underscored the state's determined quest for
independence and unity by proclaiming Islam the official
religion. Somewhat paradoxically, freedom of religion was also
guaranteed. Strict adherence to both sets of principles would
seemingly have given rise to conflict, especially in the area of
jurisprudence; however, in practice the government sought with
acceptable success to balance the demands of the two.
Under the Constitution, the government was composed of three
branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The executive
branch was headed by the president of the republic and included
ministers whom he appointed and the administrative bureaucracy.
The president was elected by universal suffrage for a five-year
term and could serve an indefinite number of terms. From 1966
until the coup in 1978, all candidates for the office had to be
nominated by the Mauritanian People's Party (Parti du Peuple
Mauritanienne--PPM), be at least thirty-five years old, and have
full exercise of their political and civil rights. In sharp
contrast to its French antecedent, the Mauritanian Constitution
strengthened presidential power by combining it with the function
of prime minister, while making the National Assembly
subordinate. Like a prime minister, the president participated in
legislative processes that would otherwise reside in the domain
of the National Assembly. At the same time, the Constitution
prevented the president from dissolving the National Assembly,
and it also denied the assembly the right to unseat the president
by means of a vote of no confidence.
In its entirety, the Constitution came to resemble those of
other francophone African states that were also adopted under the
influence of General Charles de Gaulle's Fifth Republic and in
response to the perceived need for strong, centralized
leadership. In light of the highly fragmented polities typical of
much of sub-Saharan Africa at that time, however, a system of
checks and balances was thought to be overly cumbersome for the
immediate tasks at hand.
Other presidential powers included commanding the armed
forces; appointing civil servants, military officers, judges, and
ambassadors; ratifying treaties and other international
agreements; initiating or amending legislation; eliciting
advisory opinions on proposed legislation from the Supreme Court;
and exercising a temporary veto over legislation. Perhaps the
president's greatest power lay in his right, in times of peril,
to declare an emergency and exercise extraconstitutional
authority.
The National Assembly was subordinate to the president. At
independence, the assembly numbered forty deputies, all of whom
were elected as a slate by universal suffrage for five-year
terms. By 1971 the number had grown to fifty and by 1975 to
seventy-eight, including the new deputies from the annexed
portion of the Western Sahara, Tiris al Gharbiyya. The presidency
of the assembly was the second highest position in the government
and often the locus of traditionalist opposition to Daddah. Along
with three vice presidents and two secretaries, the president of
the assembly was elected from among the deputies. The assembly's
limited power derived from Article 39 of the Constitution and
included the formulation of broad policies on national defense,
education, labor, and public administration. The assembly also
had responsibility for legislating civil rights and taxation. All
other legislative powers, including the implementation of
specific policy decisions, fell to the president. In general,
Daddah's handling of policy matters underscored the imbalance
between the two branches of government. For example, although the
president was required to present an annual message to the nation
and might also provide supplemental statements to the assembly,
he alone determined what information to share with legislators,
who could not compel him to be more forthcoming. The president
could also bypass the legislature completely by submitting
proposed legislation to a popular referendum. Finally, the
assembly's relatively short session, fixed at four months per
year, limited the amount of legislation it could pass.
Constitutional amendments were permissible if they did not
threaten the state or its republican form of government. Either
the president or the National Assembly could propose an
amendment, which would then require a two-thirds vote in the
legislature in order to become law. If the proposed amendment
received only a simple majority, the president could submit it as
a referendum. In fact, the latter process was never necessary.
Two major amendments were passed in the 1960s, one in 1965
institutionalizing one-party government, and a second in 1968
pertaining to local administration, the status of magistrates,
and the designation of Hassaniya Arabic as an official language.
Although the Constitution did not provide for a system of
checks and balances, the assembly did have three ways to limit
presidential power. First, it could refuse requested budgetary
appropriations, although the president could circumvent the
assembly's budgetary veto by simply promulgating an interim
budget based on total receipts of the previous year. Second, if
able to muster a two-thirds vote, the assembly could impeach the
president or any of his ministers for treason or plotting against
the state. The Supreme Court, a body appointed by the president,
would judge the charges in such cases. Finally, the assembly
could, in effect, override a presidential veto if, after a second
reading, the law received an absolute majority in the assembly
and was declared constitutional by the Supreme Court.
In fact, the assembly's debates and votes were most often
highly symbolic gestures that brought closure to a process
initiated and dominated by the executive. In the early 1960s,
however, the legislature often challenged the executive, only to
be deluged with priority bills that in effect smothered any
legislative initiatives. With the institutionalization of oneparty rule in 1965, engaging debate in the assembly was no longer
possible, and the assembly's role became promotion of political
integration at the expense of individual rights while
strengthening party unity and discipline.
Data as of June 1988
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