MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Mauritania
Index
In Mauritania, Haidalla was faced with the daunting task of
consolidating power. To his credit, in January 1980 he proclaimed
Mauritanian neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict and
convinced Morocco to evacuate all its troops from Mauritanian
soil. From the beginning of his regime, however, Haidalla was
viewed with hostility by the southern black population; a native
of the Western Sahara, he was perceived by the blacks as an Arab
and a northerner. He was also mistrusted by pro-Moroccan
political groups because he had signed the peace treaty with the
Polisario. To ensure strict Mauritanian neutrality in the ongoing
conflict, he reshuffled the top echelons of the government,
removing both pro-Moroccan and staunchly pro-Polisario factions.
He also assumed the title of president and removed Louly and CMSN
vice president Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi from office, thereby
eliminating all serious political competitors.
Haidalla initiated several important policy changes to
broaden his base of support. In 1980, to further strengthen his
position with Mauritania's blacks and to undercut black
opposition groups in Senegal, he officially abolished slavery. In
December 1980, in the face of growing apprehension among CMSN
members, he formed a civilian government, naming Ahmed Ould
Bneijara prime minister. He also initiated steps to draft a
constitution establishing a multiparty, democratic state.
Among Mauritanians both inside and outside the country,
however, political opposition to Haidalla grew. In May 1980,
following Haidalla's dismissal of Louly and Sidi, a number of
foreign-based opposition movements joined together in France to
form an opposition group called the Alliance for a Democratic
Mauritania (Alliance pour une Mauritanie Démocratique--AMD). The
AMD wanted to restore civilian rule and introduce a multiparty
democracy in Mauritania. Its principal political supporter was
former President Daddah, who as a result of French pressure had
been released from prison in August 1979. Also joining the AMD
was former Vice President Sidi. The AMD received financial
support from those Arab states of the Persian Gulf that opposed
Haidalla's anti-Moroccan leanings--he had moved to eliminate proMoroccan members of the CMSN--and his support of selfdetermination for the radical SADR. The same Arab states also
reduced their aid to Mauritania, which only encouraged Haidalla
to strengthen ties to more radical Arab countries like Libya and
Iraq.
Meanwhile, relations with Morocco continued to deteriorate
(see Relations with Morocco
, ch. 4). Discord between the two
countries had been mounting since early 1981, when Morocco
accused Mauritania of sympathizing with the Polisario and
harboring its fighters. Morocco was also responsible for rumors
suggesting that Libya was shipping arms to the guerrillas via a
landing strip at Chegga in northeastern Mauritania. On March 18,
1981, pro-Moroccan members of the AMD led by Sidi and former air
force commander Mohamed Abdelkader attempted to topple the
government. The coup failed, and both were subsequently executed.
In April, following the attempt, Haidalla and the CMSN decided to
abandon civilian rule and replaced the fledgling constitutional
government with a six-member military government headed by
Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Ould Taya.
As Mauritania's relations with Morocco worsened, its ties
with Algeria improved
(see Relations with Other States of the Maghrib
, ch. 4). Algeria cultivated a friendship with Haidalla
and supplied him with sophisticated military equipment,
ostensibly to deter invasion from Morocco. In June 1981, in an
effort to restore diplomatic relations with Morocco, Haidalla
agreed to a summit meeting to be arranged and hosted by Saudi
Arabia, one of Mauritania's largest aid donors. At the summit,
Morocco's King Hassan II and Haidalla signed an agreement
restoring diplomatic relations and prohibiting the transit
through either country of forces hostile to the other. This last
provision alluded to both the Polisario and the Moroccan branch
of the AMD. The reconciliation, however, was short lived. On the
one hand, Morocco refused to expel AMD members, and on the other
hand King Hassan accused Mauritania of allowing Polisario
guerrillas to launch attacks against Morocco from Mauritanian
base camps. Subsequently, Moroccan aircraft bombed the
Mauritanian city of Bir Aidiat near the border with the Western
Sahara, where Polisario guerrillas had taken refuge, and
threatened further reprisals against Mauritania.
In February 1982, former CMSN president Salek and former
Prime Minister Bneijara, among others, tried unsuccessfully to
oust Haidalla. Having survived a second coup attempt, Haidalla
relied on his forceful personality, self-discipline, and
integrity to gain the respect of many of his countrymen. The
eleven-month period between February 1982 and January 1983 gave
the regime the opportunity to politicize the population. Haidalla
hoped that by establishing a working foundation of civilian
politics he could abolish the military regime and be elected to
office as a civilian. Accordingly, in 1982 the government
organized what were labeled Structures for Educating the Masses
(Structures pour l'Education des Masses--SEM), which acted on a
range of public issues through elected delegates. Haidalla also
pursued his goal of national reconciliation by releasing some of
the political prisoners incarcerated since the overthrow of the
Daddah regime.
Domestic peace was shattered briefly in January 1983, first
when Haidalla discovered a coup plot supported by Libya and,
later, when a Moroccan gunboat attacked a Mauritanian garrison
near La Guera, the only Western Sahara territory still occupied
by Mauritania
(see
fig. 11). Although neither incident caused any
casualties or serious diplomatic repercussions, the Moroccan
attack demonstrated Mauritania's continuing vulnerability
(see Relations with Other States of the Maghrib
, ch. 4). Haidalla
responded to these incidents by strengthening relations with
France; the latter had already been instrumental in
reestablishing communication between the Mauritanian and Moroccan
governments following their 1981 break
(see Regional Security Concerns
, ch. 5). The more significant diplomatic movement,
however, saw Haidalla develop warmer relations with Algeria and
the SADR. During the June 1983 summit meeting of the Organization
of African Unity in Ethiopia, Haidalla joined Senegalese
president Abdou Diouf and Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam
in drafting a resolution calling for a cease-fire and peace
negotiations in the Western Sahara. Morocco failed to comply with
the resolution by the end of the year, and Haidalla recognized
the SADR in February 1984.
The January 1983 Libyan-supported coup plot had soured
relations between Mauritania and Libya; however, Libyan leader
Muammar al Qadhaafi, a strong supporter of the Polisario, took
advantage of Mauritania's break with Morocco and began a new
campaign to reestablish cordial ties with Haidalla. Haidalla's
warming relations with Libya, Algeria, and the Polisario,
however, alienated the conservative Arab countries on which
Mauritania depended for most of its economic aid and also
factions in his own government, which favored ties to Morocco,
and those who opposed the existence of the SADR. Moreover,
Haidalla angered many CMSN members by his decision to recognize
the SADR without consulting them.
More ominous was Morocco is movement of troops toward
Mauritania's northern border in the aftermath of Mauritania's
recognition of the SADR. The presence of thousands of Moroccan
soldiers on the Mauritanian border, only four kilometers from
Mauritania's key economic center at Nouadhibou, again raised the
possibility of another Moroccan attack on La Guera. In addition,
Morocco had begun to construct a
berm (see Glossary)
near the
Mauritanian border that would restrict Polisario guerrillas to
Mauritanian territory for their rear bases, thus providing
Morocco with justification for attacking northern Mauritania.
Data as of June 1988
|
|