MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Libya
Index
Figure 14. Principal Military Installations, 1987
In 1973 Qadhafi claimed the Gulf of Sidra to be within Libyan
territorial waters by drawing a straight line between a point near
Benghazi and the western headland of the gulf at Misratah
(see
fig. 14). His claim was not generally accepted, although only the United
States presented a direct challenge by declaring that its ships
would continue to regard all areas beyond a distance of 12 nautical
miles from the coast as international waters. On several occasions,
Libyan fighter planes harassed United States planes from carriers
maneuvering in the area. When the United States Sixth Fleet began
exercises in August 1981, Libyan fighter planes were assembled from
elsewhere in the country to fly patrols near the American ships. On
August 19, two Su-22 fighter-bombers were intercepted by two F-14
Tomcat fighters from the aircraft carrier Nimitz. While
trying to escort the Libyans out of the exercise area, one of the
American planes was the target of an air-to-air Atoll missile but
was able to evade it. Both Libyan planes were then shot down with
Sidewinder missiles launched by the Tomcats. The two Libyan pilots
managed to eject and were rescued from the sea. The ease with which
the American planes disposed of their attackers demonstrated that
the earlier generation Su-22 and its Atoll missile could not
prevail against more sophisticated United States equipment.
Tensions between the two countries mounted after the hijacking
of a TWA airliner at Beirut in July 1985 and bombing attacks at
American airline counters at Rome and Vienna in December of that
year. Qadhafi was implicated in these actions through his patronage
of the alleged perpetrator, the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal
(see International Terrorism and Support for Insurgent Groups
, this
ch.). The Libyans also began installing batteries of SA-5 missiles
acquired from the Soviet Union in late 1985, along with associated
radar, to augment their air defense capabilities. United States
naval vessels continued to challenge Qadhafi's claim to the Gulf of
Sidra, periodically crossing the line of Libyan territorial claim,
which he came to refer to as the "line of death"
(see
fig. 14).
Three carrier task forces of the Sixth Fleet with 225 aircraft
assembled off the Libyan coast for maneuvers in March 1986. On
March 24, six SA-5s were launched from the new missile base at Surt
against American aircraft. None was hit, however, because the SA-5,
with a range of 240 kilometers, could threaten high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra but was relatively
ineffective against high-performance jet fighters. Subsequently,
the missile site was put out of action by carrier-based A-6
Intruders firing High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), that
homed in on the Libyans' radar guidance signals. A second strike
followed the next day to knock out a replacement radar unit.
Although Soviet technicians were believed to be present to oversee
the installation and operation of the SA-5 batteries, none was
reported injured in the exchanges.
At the same time, a French-built Combattante-class missile
attack craft was destroyed when it approached United States Navy
ships protecting the aircraft carriers. The Libyan vessel was hit
by two Harpoon missiles launched from an A-7 Corsair aircraft. The
most serious loss for the Libyans was one of the eight Sovietsupplied Nanuchka-class missile corvettes in an attack by two A-6s
shortly after midnight on March 26. A total of five attacks was
carried out on Libyan ships.
Ten days later, on April 5, 1986, a bomb exploded in a
discotheque in Berlin frequented by United States service
personnel. Of the 200 injured, 63 were American soldiers; one
soldier and one civilian were killed. Messages intercepted by the
United States, including one from the Libyan mission in East
Berlin, furnished what the United States government described as
evidence of Libyan involvement in the bombing, which was probably
carried out by the Abu Nidal organization.
On April 15, the United States retaliated by attacking military
installations in Benghazi and Tripoli. Eighteen FB-111 bombers,
supported by four EF-111 electronic countermeasures aircraft, left
England, refueling several times enroute, and struck the Tripoli
airport, a frogman training center at the naval academy, and the
nearby al Aziziyah barracks, where Qadhafi often resided. The
aircraft carriers Coral Sea and America launched
twenty-four A-6 and F/A-18 Hornet strike aircraft against radar and
antiaircraft sites at Benghazi before hitting the Benina military
airfield and the Jamahiriya barracks. A number of casualties also
occurred in residential areas of Benghazi and several Western
embassies were damaged.
Several transport aircraft and some Soviet-built MiG-23
fighters and helicopters were destroyed on the ground at the two
airfields. The only loss among the American attackers was one FB111 that failed to return to its base in England. Although
retaliation for the Berlin bombing had been anticipated, Libyan air
defenses seemed almost wholly unprepared for the attack. In fact,
it was reported that antiaircraft fire had not begun until after
the American planes had passed over their targets at Tripoli. It
was reported that some Libyan soldiers abandoned their posts in
fright and confusion and officers were slow to give orders. Also,
Libyans fighters failed to get airborne to challenge the attacking
bombers.
Data as of 1987
|
|