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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Libya
Index
In their September 1969 revolution, Qadhafi and the young
officers who provided most of his support aimed with idealistic
fervor at bringing to an end the social inequities that had marked
both the colonial periods and the monarchical regime. The new
government that resulted was socialist, but Qadhafi stressed that
it was to be a kind of socialism inspired by the humanitarian
values inherent in Islam. It called for equitable distribution to
reduce disparities between classes in a peaceful and affluent
society, but in no sense was it to be a stage on the road to
communism.
On the eve of the 1969 revolution, the royal family and its
most eminent supporters and officeholders, drawn from a restricted
circle of wealthy and influential families, dominated Libyan
society. These constituted what may be termed the traditional
sociopolitical establishment, which rested on patronage, clientage,
and dependency. Beneath this top echelon was a small middle class.
The Libyan middle class had always been quite small, but it had
expanded significantly under the impact of oil wealth. In the mid-
l960s, it consisted of several distinct social groupings: salaried
religious leaders and bureaucrats, old families engaged in
importing and contracting, entrepreneurs in the oil business,
shopkeepers, self-employed merchants and artisans and prosperous
farmers and beduin. Workers in small industrial workshops,
agricultural laborers, and peasant farmers, among others, composed
the lower class.
Most of the urban population consisted of the families of
first-generation workers, small shopkeepers, and a horde of public
workers. Above them were thin layers of the newly rich and of old,
prosperous families. An urban working class, however, had largely
failed to develop, and the middle class was a feeble one that in no
way resembled the counterpart element that had become a vital
political force in many other countries of the Arab world.
At the top of the rural social structure, the shaykhs of the
major tribes ruled on the basis of inherited status. In the cities,
corresponding roles were played by the heads of the wealthy
families and by religious figures. These leaders were jealous of
their position and, far from concerning themselves with furthering
social progress, saw modernization as a threat. In no way, however,
did the leaders present a united front.
The development of the petroleum industry was accompanied by
profound technical and organizational changes and by the appearance
of a younger elite whose outlook had been greatly affected by
technological advances: among their number were technocrats,
students, and young army officers. Not the least notable of the
factors that set this new element apart was age. The civilians of
this group, as well as the military officers, were for the most
part in their thirties or younger, and their views had little in
common with those of the aging authorities who had long controlled
a swollen bureaucracy (11 percent of the 1969 labor force). More
urbanized and better educated than their elders, this new group
entertained hopes and aspirations that had been frustrated by the
group surrounding King Idris. In particular, resentment had been
aroused by the arbitrariness, corruption, and inefficiency of
Idris' government as well as by its questionable probity in the
distribution of oil-funded revenues.
The young officers who formed the Free Officers Movement and
its political nucleus, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),
showed a great deal of dedication to the revolutionary cause and a
high degree of uniformity in political and economic outlook
(see Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Command Council
, ch. 1). In Libya, as
in a number of other Arab countries, admission to the military
academy and careers as army officers were options available to
members of the less privileged economic strata only after national
independence was attained. A military career, offering new
opportunities for higher education and upward economic and social
mobility, was thus a greater attraction for young men from poorer
families than for those of the wealthy and the traditional elite.
These youthful revolutionaries came from quite modest social
backgrounds, representing the oases and the interior as opposed to
the coastal cities, and the minor suppressed tribes as opposed to
the major aristocratic ones.
The officers of the RCC--all captains and lieutenants--
represented the forefront of a social revolution that saw the
middle and lower middle classes assert control over social and
political prerogatives heretofore denied them. They quickly
displaced the former elite of the Idris era and became themselves
the prime movers of the Libyan state. Numbering only about a dozen
men, they were gradually joined by sympathetic civilian and
military personnel in constituting a new elite.
By the late 1980s, this governing class consisted of Qadhafi
and the half-dozen remaining members of the Free Officers Movement,
government ministers and other high state officials and managers,
second-echelon officers of the Free Officers Movement, and top
officials and activists of local mass organizations and governing
councils. Civilian officials and bureaucrats as a whole were
considerably better educated than their military colleagues. Many
of them possessed college degrees, came from urban middle-class
backgrounds, and were indispensable for the administrative
functioning of government and the economy. Below this elite was the
upper middle class composed of educated technocrats,
administrators, and remnants of a wealthy commercial and
entrepreneurial class. The lower middle class contained small
traders, teachers, successful farmers, and low-level officials and
bureaucrats. This new and small revolutionary elite sought to
restructure Libyan society. In broad terms, the young officers set
off to create an egalitarian society in which class differences
would be minimal and the country's oil wealth would be equally
shared. Their aim was to curb the power and wealth of the old elite
and to build support among the middle and lower middle classes from
which they had come and with which they identified. The policies
they devised to remold society after 1969 entailed extension of
state control over the national economy, creation of a new
political structure, and redistribution of wealth and opportunity
through such measures as minimum wage laws, state employment, and
the welfare state.
The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) created in 1971 was thus
intended as a mass mobilization device
(see Subnational Government and Administration
, ch. 4). Its aim was the peaceful abolition of
class differences to avoid the tragedy of a class struggle; the
egalitarian nature of its composition was shown by a charter
prescribing that, at all levels, 50 percent of its members must be
peasants and laborers. At the heart of the cultural revolution of
1973 was the establishment of people's committees
(see
The Popular Revolution and People's Committee
, ch. 4). These were made up of
working-level leaders in business and government, who became the
local elites in the new society. That same year brought enactment
of a law requiring that larger business firms share profits with
their personnel, appoint workers to their boards of directors, and
establish joint councils composed of workers and managers.
At the same time, the government launched a long-term campaign
against a new privileged class pejoratively identified as
"bourgeois bureaucrats." Multiple dismissals at this time included
top university administrators, hospital directors, and oil-industry
officials, as well as numerous lower ranking employees. However, in
1975, public administrators, including educational and public
health service, made up nearly 24 percent of the labor force---more
than twice the proportion at the time of the monarchy's demise.
Late in 1976, a newspaper editorial complained that the labor force
still contained tens of thousands of administrators and
supervisors--most of them in the public sector---while in other
countries this element seldom exceeded 2 percent of the total.
Having attacked the bureaucracy and concentrations of wealth
and privilege, the regime in the later 1970s dealt with the
entrepreneurial middle class
(see Role of the Government
, ch. 3). The
first restrictions on private traders appeared as early as 1975,
but the real blows came a few years later. A 1978 law struck at
much-prized investments in private property by limiting ownership
of houses and apartments to one per nuclear family, although the
government promised compensation to the dispossessed. New
restrictions were placed on commercial and industrial
establishments, foreign trade became a monopoly of public
corporations, workers assumed control of major industrial and
commercial enterprises, and private wholesale trade was abolished.
Finally, state investments and subsidies were shifted away from
small businesspeople.
Although the Libyan middle class was suppressed by the
abovementional restrictions in the late 1970s, it was not
destroyed. Indeed, a significant number of its members adapted
themselves to the social dictates of the revolutionary regime by
cooperation with it or by recruitment into the modernizing state
apparatus. Its ranks still contained educated technocrats and
administrators, without whose talents the state could not function,
as well as remnants of the commercial and entrepreneurial class,
some of them well-to-do. A separate category of small traders,
shopkeepers, and farmers could also be identified. They, too,
sought careers in the state sector, although many of them continued
to operate small businesses alongside public enterprises. Those who
could not adapt or who feared persecution fled abroad in
significant numbers
(see The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
, ch. 1).
In contrast with the old regime, it was now possible for
members of the middle and lower classes to seek and gain access to
positions of influence and power. The former criteria of high
family or tribal status had given way to education to a
considerable degree, although patronage and loyalty continued to be
rewarded as well. But in general, social mobility was much
improved, a product of the revolutionary order that encouraged
participation and leadership in such new institutions
as the Basic People's Congress and the
revolutionary committees
(see Glossary; see also
Subnational Government and Administration
, ch. 4).
Only the highest positions occupied by
Qadhafi and a small number of his associates were beyond the
theoretical reach of the politically ambitious.
The core elite in the 1980s, which consisted of Qadhafi and the
few remaining military officers of the RCC, presented a significant
contrast of its own with respect to the top political leadership of
the Idris era. This was the result of a commitment to national
unity and identity, as well as of common social background. Within
this small group, the deeply ingrained regional cleavages of the
past, particularly that between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, had
almost disappeared and were no longer of political significance.
Similarly, the ethnic distinction between Arab and Berber within
the elite was no longer important. The old urban-rural and center-
periphery oppositions, remained very important, but they did not
characterize the core elite itself. Rather, they differentiated the
core elite from the country's former rulers, because the
revolutionary leadership was deeply rooted in the rural periphery,
not the Mediterranean coastal centers.
The rest of society, including government officials immediately
below Qadhafi, appeared to be a good deal less unified. Despite the
exertions of the core elite, a sense of national unity and identity
had not yet developed in the late 1980s, and loyalty to region,
tribe, and family remained stronger than allegiance to the state.
There was much alienation from the regime, often expressed in terms
of lethargy and passivity. Incessant pressures on the part of the
regime to enlist as many people as possible in running public
affairs had provoked much resentment and resistance. Many adults
did not participate, despite the exhortations and oversight of the
revolutionary committees, themselves a source of uncertainly and
anxiety.
All of these pressures applied to the educated middle class,
estimated to number perhaps 50,000 out of a total population of 3.6
million. Many were clearly alienated by the shortages of consumer
goods, the militarization of society, and the constant demands to
participate actively in the institutions of the
jamahiriya
(see Glossary), sentiments that characterized other social classes
as well. Like their fellow citizens, the educated sought refuge in
the affairs of their families, demonstrating yet again the strength
of traditional values over revolutionary norms, or in foreign
travel, especially in Europe.
The country's youth were also pulled in opposite directions. By
the mid-1980s, the vast majority knew only the revolutionary era
and its achievements. Because these gains were significant, not
surprisingly young people were among the most dedicated and visible
devotees of the revolution and Qadhafi. They had benefited most
from increased educational opportunities, attempted reforms of
dowry payments, and the emancipation of young women
(see The Family, the Individual, and the Sexes
, this ch.). Libyan youth also
enjoyed far more promising employment prospects than their
counterparts elsewhere in the Maghrib.
With few outlets such as recreation centers or movies for their
energies, a large number of the youth were found in the
revolutionary committees, where they pursued their task of
enforcing political conformity and participation with a vigor that
at times approached fanaticism. Others kept watch over the state
administration and industry in an attempt to improve efficiency.
Not all were so enthusiastic about revolutionary goals, however.
For instance, there was distaste for military training among
students in schools and universities, especially when it presaged
service in the armed forces. In the 1980s, some of this disdain had
resulted in demonstrations and even in executions
(see Opposition to Qaddafi
, ch. 4).
By the late 1980s, Libyan society clearly showed the impact of
almost two decades of attempts at restructuring. The country was an
army-dominated state under the influence of no particular class or
group and was relatively free from the clash of competing
interests. Almost all sources of power in traditional life had been
eliminated or coopted. Unlike states such as Saudi Arabia that
endeavored to develop their societies within the framework of
traditional political and economic systems, Libya had discarded
most of the traditional trappings and was using its great wealth to
transform the country and its people.
With its highly egalitarian socialist regime, Libya differed
considerably in its social structure from other oil-rich states.
Salaries and wages were high, and social services were extensive
and free. There was much less accumulation of private wealth than
in other oil states, and social distinction was discouraged as a
matter of deliberate public policy. But Libyan society was deeply
divided, and entire segments of the population were only
superficially committed to the course that the revolutionary regime
had outlined. And while the old order was clearly yielding to the
new, there was much doubt and unease about where society and state
were headed.
Data as of 1987
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