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Libya-The Revolution and Social Change

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Libya Index

In their September 1969 revolution, Qadhafi and the young officers who provided most of his support aimed with idealistic fervor at bringing to an end the social inequities that had marked both the colonial periods and the monarchical regime. The new government that resulted was socialist, but Qadhafi stressed that it was to be a kind of socialism inspired by the humanitarian values inherent in Islam. It called for equitable distribution to reduce disparities between classes in a peaceful and affluent society, but in no sense was it to be a stage on the road to communism.

On the eve of the 1969 revolution, the royal family and its most eminent supporters and officeholders, drawn from a restricted circle of wealthy and influential families, dominated Libyan society. These constituted what may be termed the traditional sociopolitical establishment, which rested on patronage, clientage, and dependency. Beneath this top echelon was a small middle class. The Libyan middle class had always been quite small, but it had expanded significantly under the impact of oil wealth. In the mid- l960s, it consisted of several distinct social groupings: salaried religious leaders and bureaucrats, old families engaged in importing and contracting, entrepreneurs in the oil business, shopkeepers, self-employed merchants and artisans and prosperous farmers and beduin. Workers in small industrial workshops, agricultural laborers, and peasant farmers, among others, composed the lower class.

Most of the urban population consisted of the families of first-generation workers, small shopkeepers, and a horde of public workers. Above them were thin layers of the newly rich and of old, prosperous families. An urban working class, however, had largely failed to develop, and the middle class was a feeble one that in no way resembled the counterpart element that had become a vital political force in many other countries of the Arab world.

At the top of the rural social structure, the shaykhs of the major tribes ruled on the basis of inherited status. In the cities, corresponding roles were played by the heads of the wealthy families and by religious figures. These leaders were jealous of their position and, far from concerning themselves with furthering social progress, saw modernization as a threat. In no way, however, did the leaders present a united front.

The development of the petroleum industry was accompanied by profound technical and organizational changes and by the appearance of a younger elite whose outlook had been greatly affected by technological advances: among their number were technocrats, students, and young army officers. Not the least notable of the factors that set this new element apart was age. The civilians of this group, as well as the military officers, were for the most part in their thirties or younger, and their views had little in common with those of the aging authorities who had long controlled a swollen bureaucracy (11 percent of the 1969 labor force). More urbanized and better educated than their elders, this new group entertained hopes and aspirations that had been frustrated by the group surrounding King Idris. In particular, resentment had been aroused by the arbitrariness, corruption, and inefficiency of Idris' government as well as by its questionable probity in the distribution of oil-funded revenues.

The young officers who formed the Free Officers Movement and its political nucleus, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), showed a great deal of dedication to the revolutionary cause and a high degree of uniformity in political and economic outlook (see Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Command Council , ch. 1). In Libya, as in a number of other Arab countries, admission to the military academy and careers as army officers were options available to members of the less privileged economic strata only after national independence was attained. A military career, offering new opportunities for higher education and upward economic and social mobility, was thus a greater attraction for young men from poorer families than for those of the wealthy and the traditional elite. These youthful revolutionaries came from quite modest social backgrounds, representing the oases and the interior as opposed to the coastal cities, and the minor suppressed tribes as opposed to the major aristocratic ones.

The officers of the RCC--all captains and lieutenants-- represented the forefront of a social revolution that saw the middle and lower middle classes assert control over social and political prerogatives heretofore denied them. They quickly displaced the former elite of the Idris era and became themselves the prime movers of the Libyan state. Numbering only about a dozen men, they were gradually joined by sympathetic civilian and military personnel in constituting a new elite.

By the late 1980s, this governing class consisted of Qadhafi and the half-dozen remaining members of the Free Officers Movement, government ministers and other high state officials and managers, second-echelon officers of the Free Officers Movement, and top officials and activists of local mass organizations and governing councils. Civilian officials and bureaucrats as a whole were considerably better educated than their military colleagues. Many of them possessed college degrees, came from urban middle-class backgrounds, and were indispensable for the administrative functioning of government and the economy. Below this elite was the upper middle class composed of educated technocrats, administrators, and remnants of a wealthy commercial and entrepreneurial class. The lower middle class contained small traders, teachers, successful farmers, and low-level officials and bureaucrats. This new and small revolutionary elite sought to restructure Libyan society. In broad terms, the young officers set off to create an egalitarian society in which class differences would be minimal and the country's oil wealth would be equally shared. Their aim was to curb the power and wealth of the old elite and to build support among the middle and lower middle classes from which they had come and with which they identified. The policies they devised to remold society after 1969 entailed extension of state control over the national economy, creation of a new political structure, and redistribution of wealth and opportunity through such measures as minimum wage laws, state employment, and the welfare state.

The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) created in 1971 was thus intended as a mass mobilization device (see Subnational Government and Administration , ch. 4). Its aim was the peaceful abolition of class differences to avoid the tragedy of a class struggle; the egalitarian nature of its composition was shown by a charter prescribing that, at all levels, 50 percent of its members must be peasants and laborers. At the heart of the cultural revolution of 1973 was the establishment of people's committees (see The Popular Revolution and People's Committee , ch. 4). These were made up of working-level leaders in business and government, who became the local elites in the new society. That same year brought enactment of a law requiring that larger business firms share profits with their personnel, appoint workers to their boards of directors, and establish joint councils composed of workers and managers.

At the same time, the government launched a long-term campaign against a new privileged class pejoratively identified as "bourgeois bureaucrats." Multiple dismissals at this time included top university administrators, hospital directors, and oil-industry officials, as well as numerous lower ranking employees. However, in 1975, public administrators, including educational and public health service, made up nearly 24 percent of the labor force---more than twice the proportion at the time of the monarchy's demise. Late in 1976, a newspaper editorial complained that the labor force still contained tens of thousands of administrators and supervisors--most of them in the public sector---while in other countries this element seldom exceeded 2 percent of the total.

Having attacked the bureaucracy and concentrations of wealth and privilege, the regime in the later 1970s dealt with the entrepreneurial middle class (see Role of the Government , ch. 3). The first restrictions on private traders appeared as early as 1975, but the real blows came a few years later. A 1978 law struck at much-prized investments in private property by limiting ownership of houses and apartments to one per nuclear family, although the government promised compensation to the dispossessed. New restrictions were placed on commercial and industrial establishments, foreign trade became a monopoly of public corporations, workers assumed control of major industrial and commercial enterprises, and private wholesale trade was abolished. Finally, state investments and subsidies were shifted away from small businesspeople.

Although the Libyan middle class was suppressed by the abovementional restrictions in the late 1970s, it was not destroyed. Indeed, a significant number of its members adapted themselves to the social dictates of the revolutionary regime by cooperation with it or by recruitment into the modernizing state apparatus. Its ranks still contained educated technocrats and administrators, without whose talents the state could not function, as well as remnants of the commercial and entrepreneurial class, some of them well-to-do. A separate category of small traders, shopkeepers, and farmers could also be identified. They, too, sought careers in the state sector, although many of them continued to operate small businesses alongside public enterprises. Those who could not adapt or who feared persecution fled abroad in significant numbers (see The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , ch. 1).

In contrast with the old regime, it was now possible for members of the middle and lower classes to seek and gain access to positions of influence and power. The former criteria of high family or tribal status had given way to education to a considerable degree, although patronage and loyalty continued to be rewarded as well. But in general, social mobility was much improved, a product of the revolutionary order that encouraged participation and leadership in such new institutions as the Basic People's Congress and the revolutionary committees (see Glossary; see also Subnational Government and Administration , ch. 4). Only the highest positions occupied by Qadhafi and a small number of his associates were beyond the theoretical reach of the politically ambitious.

The core elite in the 1980s, which consisted of Qadhafi and the few remaining military officers of the RCC, presented a significant contrast of its own with respect to the top political leadership of the Idris era. This was the result of a commitment to national unity and identity, as well as of common social background. Within this small group, the deeply ingrained regional cleavages of the past, particularly that between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, had almost disappeared and were no longer of political significance. Similarly, the ethnic distinction between Arab and Berber within the elite was no longer important. The old urban-rural and center- periphery oppositions, remained very important, but they did not characterize the core elite itself. Rather, they differentiated the core elite from the country's former rulers, because the revolutionary leadership was deeply rooted in the rural periphery, not the Mediterranean coastal centers.

The rest of society, including government officials immediately below Qadhafi, appeared to be a good deal less unified. Despite the exertions of the core elite, a sense of national unity and identity had not yet developed in the late 1980s, and loyalty to region, tribe, and family remained stronger than allegiance to the state. There was much alienation from the regime, often expressed in terms of lethargy and passivity. Incessant pressures on the part of the regime to enlist as many people as possible in running public affairs had provoked much resentment and resistance. Many adults did not participate, despite the exhortations and oversight of the revolutionary committees, themselves a source of uncertainly and anxiety.

All of these pressures applied to the educated middle class, estimated to number perhaps 50,000 out of a total population of 3.6 million. Many were clearly alienated by the shortages of consumer goods, the militarization of society, and the constant demands to participate actively in the institutions of the jamahiriya (see Glossary), sentiments that characterized other social classes as well. Like their fellow citizens, the educated sought refuge in the affairs of their families, demonstrating yet again the strength of traditional values over revolutionary norms, or in foreign travel, especially in Europe.

The country's youth were also pulled in opposite directions. By the mid-1980s, the vast majority knew only the revolutionary era and its achievements. Because these gains were significant, not surprisingly young people were among the most dedicated and visible devotees of the revolution and Qadhafi. They had benefited most from increased educational opportunities, attempted reforms of dowry payments, and the emancipation of young women (see The Family, the Individual, and the Sexes , this ch.). Libyan youth also enjoyed far more promising employment prospects than their counterparts elsewhere in the Maghrib.

With few outlets such as recreation centers or movies for their energies, a large number of the youth were found in the revolutionary committees, where they pursued their task of enforcing political conformity and participation with a vigor that at times approached fanaticism. Others kept watch over the state administration and industry in an attempt to improve efficiency. Not all were so enthusiastic about revolutionary goals, however. For instance, there was distaste for military training among students in schools and universities, especially when it presaged service in the armed forces. In the 1980s, some of this disdain had resulted in demonstrations and even in executions (see Opposition to Qaddafi , ch. 4).

By the late 1980s, Libyan society clearly showed the impact of almost two decades of attempts at restructuring. The country was an army-dominated state under the influence of no particular class or group and was relatively free from the clash of competing interests. Almost all sources of power in traditional life had been eliminated or coopted. Unlike states such as Saudi Arabia that endeavored to develop their societies within the framework of traditional political and economic systems, Libya had discarded most of the traditional trappings and was using its great wealth to transform the country and its people.

With its highly egalitarian socialist regime, Libya differed considerably in its social structure from other oil-rich states. Salaries and wages were high, and social services were extensive and free. There was much less accumulation of private wealth than in other oil states, and social distinction was discouraged as a matter of deliberate public policy. But Libyan society was deeply divided, and entire segments of the population were only superficially committed to the course that the revolutionary regime had outlined. And while the old order was clearly yielding to the new, there was much doubt and unease about where society and state were headed.

Data as of 1987

Background		The Italians supplanted the Ottoman Turks in the area around Tripoli in 1911 and did not relinquish their hold until 1943 when defeated in World War II. Libya then passed to UN administration and achieved independence in 1951. Following a 1969 military coup, Col. Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI began to espouse his own political system, the Third Universal Theory. The system is a combination of socialism and Islam derived in part from tribal practices and is supposed to be implemented by the Libyan people themselves in a unique form of "direct democracy." QADHAFI has always seen himself as a revolutionary and visionary leader. He used oil funds during the 1970s and 1980s to promote his ideology outside Libya, supporting subversives and terrorists abroad to hasten the end of Marxism and capitalism. In addition, beginning in 1973, he engaged in military operations in northern Chad's Aozou Strip - to gain access to minerals and to use as a base of influence in Chadian politics - but was forced to retreat in 1987. UN sanctions in 1992 isolated QADHAFI politically following the downing of Pan AM Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. During the 1990s, QADHAFI began to rebuild his relationships with Europe. UN sanctions were suspended in April 1999 and finally lifted in September 2003 after Libya accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing. In December 2003, Libya announced that it had agreed to reveal and end its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and to renounce terrorism. QADHAFI has made significant strides in normalizing relations with Western nations since then. He has received various Western European leaders as well as many working-level and commercial delegations, and made his first trip to Western Europe in 15 years when he traveled to Brussels in April 2004. The US rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in June 2006. In January 2008, Libya assumed a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2008-09 term. In August 2008, the US and Libya signed a bilateral comprehensive claims settlement agreement to compensate claimants in both countries who allege injury or death at the hands of the other country, including the Lockerbie bombing, the LaBelle disco bombing, and the UTA 772 bombing. In October 2008, the US Government received $1.5 billion pursuant to the agreement to distribute to US national claimants, and as a result effectively normalized its bilateral relationship with Libya. The two countries then exchanged ambassadors for the first time since 1973 in January 2009. QADHAFI in February 2009 took over as chairman of the African Union for the 2009-10 term; in September 2009, a Libyan took over the year-long presidency of UN General Assembly.
Location		Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Egypt and Tunisia
Area(sq km)		total: 1,759,540 sq km land: 1,759,540 sq km water: 0 sq km
Geographic coordinates		25 00 N, 17 00 E
Land boundaries(km)		total: 4,348 km border countries: Algeria 982 km, Chad 1,055 km, Egypt 1,115 km, Niger 354 km, Sudan 383 km, Tunisia 459 km
Coastline(km)		1,770 km
Climate		Mediterranean along coast; dry, extreme desert interior
Elevation extremes(m)		lowest point: Sabkhat Ghuzayyil -47 m highest point: Bikku Bitti 2,267 m
Natural resources		petroleum, natural gas, gypsum
Land use(%)		arable land: 1.03% permanent crops: 0.19% other: 98.78% (2005)
Irrigated land(sq km)		4,700 sq km (2003)
Total renewable water resources(cu km)		0.6 cu km (1997)
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural)		total: 4.27 cu km/yr (14%/3%/83%) per capita: 730 cu m/yr (2000)
Natural hazards		hot, dry, dust-laden ghibli is a southern wind lasting one to four days in spring and fall; dust storms, sandstorms
Environment - current issues		desertification; limited natural fresh water resources; the Great Manmade River Project, the largest water development scheme in the world, is being built to bring water from large aquifers under the Sahara to coastal cities
Environment - international agreements		party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands signed, but not ratified: Law of the Sea
Geography - note		more than 90% of the country is desert or semidesert
Population		6,310,434 note: includes 166,510 non-nationals (July 2009 est.)
Age structure(%)		0-14 years: 33% (male 1,064,866/female 1,019,790) 15-64 years: 62.7% (male 2,033,478/female 1,920,755) 65 years and over: 4.3% (male 133,092/female 138,453) (2009 est.)
Median age(years)		total: 23.9 years male: 24 years female: 23.8 years (2009 est.)
Population growth rate(%)		2.17% (2009 est.)
Birth rate(births/1,000 population)		25.15 births/1,000 population (2009 est.)
Death rate(deaths/1,000 population)		3.45 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.)
Net migration rate(migrant(s)/1,000 population)		NA (2009 est.)
Urbanization(%)		urban population: 78% of total population (2008) rate of urbanization: 2.2% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)
Sex ratio(male(s)/female)		at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.06 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.96 male(s)/female total population: 1.05 male(s)/female (2009 est.)
Infant mortality rate(deaths/1,000 live births)		total: 21.05 deaths/1,000 live births male: 23.21 deaths/1,000 live births female: 18.78 deaths/1,000 live births (2009 est.)
Life expectancy at birth(years)		total population: 77.26 years male: 74.98 years female: 79.65 years (2009 est.)
Total fertility rate(children born/woman)		3.08 children born/woman (2009 est.)
Nationality		noun: Libyan(s) adjective: Libyan
Ethnic groups(%)		Berber and Arab 97%, other 3% (includes Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Turks, Indians, and Tunisians)
Religions(%)		Sunni Muslim 97%, other 3%
Languages(%)		Arabic, Italian, English, all are widely understood in the major cities
Country name		conventional long form: Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya conventional short form: Libya local long form: Al Jamahiriyah al Arabiyah al Libiyah ash Shabiyah al Ishtirakiyah al Uthma local short form: none
Government type		Jamahiriya (a state of the masses) in theory, governed by the populace through local councils; in practice, an authoritarian state
Capital		name: Tripoli (Tarabulus) geographic coordinates: 32 53 N, 13 10 E time difference: UTC+2 (7 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)
Administrative divisions		25 municipalities (baladiyat, singular - baladiyah); Ajdabiya, Al 'Aziziyah, Al Fatih, Al Jabal al Akhdar, Al Jufrah, Al Khums, Al Kufrah, An Nuqat al Khams, Ash Shati', Awbari, Az Zawiyah, Banghazi, Darnah, Ghadamis, Gharyan, Misratah, Murzuq, Sabha, Sawfajjin, Surt, Tarabulus, Tarhunah, Tubruq, Yafran, Zlitan; note - the 25 municipalities may have been replaced by 13 regions
Constitution		none; note - following the September 1969 military overthrow of the Libyan government, the Revolutionary Command Council replaced the existing constitution with the Constitutional Proclamation in December 1969; in March 1977, Libya adopted the Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority
Legal system		based on Italian and French civil law systems and Islamic law; separate religious courts; no constitutional provision for judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Suffrage		18 years of age; universal and technically compulsory
Executive branch		chief of state: Revolutionary Leader Col. Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI (since 1 September 1969); note - holds no official title, but is de facto chief of state head of government: Secretary of the General People's Committee (Prime Minister) al-Baghdadi Ali al-MAHMUDI (since 5 March 2006) cabinet: General People's Committee established by the General People's Congress elections: national elections are indirect through a hierarchy of people's committees; head of government elected by the General People's Congress; election last held March 2009 (next to be held NA) election results: NA
Legislative branch		unicameral General People's Congress (760 seats; members elected indirectly through a hierarchy of people's committees)
Judicial branch		Supreme Court
Political pressure groups and leaders		other: Arab nationalist movements; anti-QADHAFI Libyan exile Movement; Islamic elements
International organization participation		ABEDA, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AMU, AU, CAEU, COMESA, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCL, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)
Flag description		plain green; green is the traditional color of Islam (the state religion)
Economy - overview		The Libyan economy depends primarily upon revenues from the oil sector, which contribute about 95% of export earnings, about one-quarter of GDP, and 60% of public sector wages. The expected weakness in world hydrocarbon prices throughout 2009 will reduce Libyan government tax income and constrain Libyan economic growth in 2009. Substantial revenues from the energy sector coupled with a small population give Libya one of the highest per capita GDPs in Africa, but little of this income flows down to the lower orders of society. Libyan officials in the past five years have made progress on economic reforms as part of a broader campaign to reintegrate the country into the international fold. This effort picked up steam after UN sanctions were lifted in September 2003 and as Libya announced in December 2003 that it would abandon programs to build weapons of mass destruction. UN Sanctions against Libya were lifted in September 2003. The process of lifting US unilateral sanctions began in the spring of 2004; all sanctions were removed by June 2006, helping Libya attract greater foreign direct investment, especially in the energy sector. Libyan oil and gas licensing rounds continue to draw high international interest; the National Oil Company set a goal of nearly doubling oil production to 3 million bbl/day by 2012. Libya faces a long road ahead in liberalizing the socialist-oriented economy, but initial steps - including applying for WTO membership, reducing some subsidies, and announcing plans for privatization - are laying the groundwork for a transition to a more market-based economy. The non-oil manufacturing and construction sectors, which account for more than 20% of GDP, have expanded from processing mostly agricultural products to include the production of petrochemicals, iron, steel, and aluminum. Climatic conditions and poor soils severely limit agricultural output, and Libya imports about 75% of its food. Libya's primary agricultural water source remains the Great Manmade River Project, but significant resources are being invested in desalinization research to meet growing water demands.
GDP (purchasing power parity)		$87.72 billion (2008 est.) $82.83 billion (2007 est.) $78.44 billion (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP (official exchange rate)		$89.92 billion (2008 est.)
GDP - real growth rate(%)		5.9% (2008 est.) 5.6% (2007 est.) 5.9% (2006 est.)
GDP - per capita (PPP)		$14,200 (2008 est.) $13,700 (2007 est.) $13,300 (2006 est.) note: data are in 2008 US dollars
GDP - composition by sector(%)		agriculture: 1.7% industry: 70.9% services: 27.4% (2008 est.)
Labor force		1.64 million (2008 est.)
Labor force - by occupation(%)		agriculture: 17% industry: 23% services: 59% (2004 est.)
Unemployment rate(%)		30% (2004 est.)
Population below poverty line(%)		7.4% (2005 est.)
Household income or consumption by percentage share(%)		lowest 10%: NA% highest 10%: NA%
Investment (gross fixed)(% of GDP)		9.3% of GDP (2008 est.)
Budget		revenues: $58.04 billion expenditures: $35.22 billion (2008 est.)
Inflation rate (consumer prices)(%)		10.4% (2008 est.) 6.3% (2007 est.)
Stock of money		$26.66 billion (31 December 2008) $18.04 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of quasi money		$4.264 billion (31 December 2008) $3.192 billion (31 December 2007)
Stock of domestic credit		$NA (31 December 2008) $NA (31 December 2007)
Market value of publicly traded shares		$NA
Economic aid - recipient		ODA, $24.44 million (2005 est.)
Public debt(% of GDP)		4% of GDP (2008 est.) 8.8% of GDP (2004 est.)
Agriculture - products		wheat, barley, olives, dates, citrus, vegetables, peanuts, soybeans; cattle
Industries		petroleum, iron and steel, food processing, textiles, handicrafts, cement
Industrial production growth rate(%)		6.2% (2008 est.)
Current account balance		$37.39 billion (2008 est.) $28.45 billion (2007 est.)
Exports		$64.5 billion (2008 est.) $46.97 billion (2007 est.)
Exports - commodities(%)		crude oil, refined petroleum products, natural gas, chemicals
Exports - partners(%)		Italy 38%, Germany 12%, France 7.4%, Spain 6.9%, US 6.4%, Switzerland 4.6% (2008)
Imports		$26.55 billion (2008 est.) $17.7 billion (2007 est.)
Imports - commodities(%)		machinery, semi-finished goods, food, transport equipment, consumer products
Imports - partners(%)		Italy 22.2%, China 9.3%, Germany 8.6%, Turkey 6.1%, Tunisia 5.8%, South Korea 4.7%, US 4.1%, France 4.1% (2008)
Reserves of foreign exchange and gold		$92.51 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $79.6 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Debt - external		$6.223 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $4.837 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Stock of direct foreign investment - at home		$11.23 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $8.775 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Stock of direct foreign investment - abroad		$5.15 billion (31 December 2008 est.) $3.7 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Exchange rates		Libyan dinars (LYD) per US dollar - 1.2112 (2008 est.), 1.2604 (2007), 1.3108 (2006), 1.3084 (2005), 1.305 (2004)
Currency (code)		Libyan dinar (LYD)
Telephones - main lines in use		1.033 million (2008)
Telephones - mobile cellular		4.828 million (2008)
Telephone system		general assessment: telecommunications system is state-owned and service is poor, but investment is being made to upgrade; state retains monopoly in fixed-line services; mobile cellular telephone system became operational in 1996; multiple providers for a mobile telephone system that is growing rapidly; combined fixed line and mobile telephone density is approaching 100 telephones per 100 persons domestic: microwave radio relay, coaxial cable, cellular, tropospheric scatter, and a domestic satellite system with 14 earth stations international: country code - 218; satellite earth stations - 4 Intelsat, NA Arabsat, and NA Intersputnik; submarine cables to France and Italy; microwave radio relay to Tunisia and Egypt; tropospheric scatter to Greece; participant in Medarabtel (2008)
Internet country code		.ly
Internet users		323,000 (2008)
Airports		137 (2009)
Pipelines(km)		condensate 776 km; gas 2,860 km; oil 6,987 km (2008)
Roadways(km)		total: 100,024 km paved: 57,214 km unpaved: 42,810 km (2003)
Ports and terminals		As Sidrah, Az Zuwaytinah, Marsa al Burayqah, Ra's Lanuf, Tripoli, Zawiyah
Military branches		Armed Peoples on Duty (APOD, Army), Libyan Arab Navy, Libyan Arab Air Force (Al-Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Jamahiriya al-Arabia al-Libyya, LAAF), Libyan Coast Guard (2008)
Military service age and obligation(years of age)		17 years of age (2004)
Manpower available for military service		males age 16-49: 1,682,183 females age 16-49: 1,611,001 (2008 est.)
Manpower fit for military service		males age 16-49: 1,466,578 females age 16-49: 1,409,684 (2009 est.)
Manpower reaching militarily significant age annually		male: 60,710 female: 58,219 (2009 est.)
Military expenditures(% of GDP)		3.9% of GDP (2005 est.)
Disputes - international		Libya has claimed more than 32,000 sq km in southeastern Algeria and about 25,000 sq km in the Tommo region of Niger in a currently dormant dispute; various Chadian rebels from the Aozou region reside in southern Libya
Refugees and internally displaced persons		refugees (country of origin): 8,000 (Palestinian Territories) (2007)
Trafficking in persons		current situation: Libya is a transit and destination country for men and women from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation tier rating: Tier 2 Watch List - Libya is on the Tier 2 Watch List for its failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to address trafficking in persons in 2007 when compared to 2006, particularly in the area of investigating and prosecuting trafficking offenses; Libya did not publicly release any data on investigations or punishment of any trafficking offenses (2008)
Electricity - production(kWh)		23.98 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - production by source(%)		fossil fuel: 100% hydro: 0% nuclear: 0% other: 0% (2001)
Electricity - consumption(kWh)		22.17 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - exports(kWh)		104 million kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - imports(kWh)		77 million kWh (2007 est.)
Oil - production(bbl/day)		1.875 million bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - consumption(bbl/day)		273,000 bbl/day (2008 est.)
Oil - exports(bbl/day)		1.542 million bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - imports(bbl/day)		575.3 bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - proved reserves(bbl)		43.66 billion bbl (1 January 2009 est.)
Natural gas - production(cu m)		15.9 billion cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - consumption(cu m)		5.5 billion cu m (2008 est.)
Natural gas - exports(cu m)		10.4 billion cu m (2008)
Natural gas - proved reserves(cu m)		1.54 trillion cu m (1 January 2009 est.)
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate(%)		0.3% (2001 est.)
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS		10,000 (2001 est.)
HIV/AIDS - deaths		NA
Literacy(%)		definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 82.6% male: 92.4% female: 72% (2003 est.)
School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)(years)		total: 17 years male: 16 years female: 17 years (2003)
Education expenditures(% of GDP)		2.7% of GDP (1999)