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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Libya
Index
Last of the military services to be established, the air force
has been obliged to struggle to develop trained air and ground
crews to match the rapid acquisition of modern planes and weaponry
(see
table 12, Appendix). As a result, in spite of the significant
inventory of combat aircraft, amounting to more than 500 as of
early 1987, Libyan air units have been committed only reluctantly
and have not acquitted themselves impressively in air-to-air
engagements. However, the considerable air transport fleet, has
apparently been employed capably in Chad and elsewhere. Although
the air force has been extensively used in support of Libyan ground
units in the fighting in Chad, it does not seem to have played a
decisive role.
At the time of the overthrow of the monarchy in 1969, the
roster of personnel was only about 400 officers and enlisted men.
A recruitment drive undertaken in 1970 eventually brought a tenfold
increase in the force by 1978. As of 1986, its strength was
estimated at 10,000.
The country's burgeoning inventory of air force weapons
accounted for a considerable share of Libya's procurement efforts.
The hundreds of aircraft acquired since 1969 included American
helicopters and transports (although deliveries of United States
planes were blocked in 1975), later-model French close-air-support
fighters, and up-to-date fighter interceptors from the Soviet
Union. Of the combat aircraft, the United States Department of
State estimated in 1983 that 50 percent remained in storage,
including most of the MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers. According to
another report, the Mirage aircraft were so neglected that only
half were in flying condition, the others being cannibalized for
spare parts. Pilots from Syria and other countries reportedly
helped fly the Libyan planes, and instructors, technical personnel,
and maintenance teams included Soviets, Pakistanis, and Yugoslavs.
With Soviet assistance, the air force was organized into one
medium bomber squadron, three fighter interceptor squadrons, five
forward ground attack squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron,
nine helicopter squadrons, and three air defense brigades deploying
SA-2, SA-3, and Crotale missiles. (The three SA-5 launch sites were
operated by army units.)
The air force's primary installation was the huge Uqba ben Nafi
Air Base (the former Wheelus Air Base) near Tripoli. It had
excellent operational features and contained the service's
headquarters and a large share of its major training facilities.
Both MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers were located there. A large air
base at a site near Benghazi shared with the civil airport also had
some MiG squadrons. Most of the Mirages were located at Gamal Abdul
Nasser Air Base. Two airfields not far from the Egyptian border, at
Al Kufrah Oasis and at Jabal al Uwaynat in the far south, were
among the Libyan installations attacked by Egyptian air crews
during the 1977 border clash. The Soviets have constructed another
base in central Libya at the new army headquarters site of Al
Jufrah near Hun with a runway of over 4,000 meters.
An air force academy established at Az Zawiyah near Misratah in
1975 was reportedly staffed mainly by Yugoslavs. Institutions
referred to as "secondary colleges," possibly technical training
schools, were opened at Sabha and at Uqba ben Nafi Air Base in
1978. Basic pilot training was conducted on Italian-manufactured
SF-260 planes before the students moved on to the Soko G-2AE Galebs
(Yugoslav) and the Aero L-39 Albatros (Czechoslovak) at Az Zawiyah.
Additional training took place outside Libya. Several hundred
Libyan students were reportedly undergoing instruction with the
Dassault firm in France in 1983 as part of the Mirage contract.
This was at a time of confrontation between French and Libyan
forces in Chad.
Information on training programs conducted by the Soviet Union
was scanty but in light of the sophisticated weapons in the air
force inventory, it could be assumed that much time and effort were
invested in producing even a limited number of combat-ready crews,
backed up by ground support personnel. Soviet specialists
reportedly accompanied the Libyans during the 1980 incursion into
Chad and possibly were directly involved in missions of the Tu-22
bombers.
The performance of the Libyan air force in emergency conditions
cannot have been reassuring to Qadhafi. Libyan pilots have
reportedly experienced difficulty in finding and identifying
aircraft they have been ordered to intercept. They have been
reluctant to fly at night for fear of being unable to locate their
bases. To some extent, these problems may reflect outdated
navigation and radar aids in their combat aircraft, which are
mostly older, stripped-down versions of Soviet designs. The two Su22 fighters were handicapped in their engagement with carrier-based
American F-14s in 1981 because the equipment, instruments, and airto -air missiles were outmoded in comparison with those of their
adversaries. In spite of Qadhafi's express warning that his air
force would repel the United States fleet in the Gulf of Sidra in
1986, his planes did not seriously challenge the American naval
units. In addition, Libyan planes did not take off to meet the
American fighter-bombers that attacked targets at Benghazi and
Tripoli in April 1986; consequently many planes were destroyed or
damaged on the ground. In Chad it was reported that many Libyan
bombing raids were carried out at excessively high altitudes when
met with antiaircraft fire.
Data as of 1987
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