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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Libya
Index
In the late 1980s, many segments of Libyan society deeply
resented the authoritarian nature of the Libyan government under
Qadhafi. The extent of silent opposition could not be assessed with
certainty but has been estimated at more than 50 percent by outside
observers. Dissent was hard to measure because all news media were
strictly controlled to serve as instruments of the state, and no
forms of association were permitted without the endorsement of the
regime. Citizens were fearful of voicing discontent or uttering
critical opinions that might be reported by a widespread informer
network. Punishment for open dissent was arbitrary and could be
extraordinarily severe.
Internal security mechanisms reaching into every corner of
Libyan society, and fears of harsh retribution have successfully
prevented antipathy to Qadhafi's actions from reaching a stage of
public demonstrations or open questioning. As many as 50,000
Libyans--mostly from the more prosperous classes--have taken up
residence abroad, but the opposition groups that have sprung up
among the exiles have not presented a convincing threat to the
regime
(see Opposition to Qaddafi
, ch. 4).
Numerous attempts have been launched to overturn Qadhafi's
rule. In most instances, these attempts have originated among
military officers who have access to weapons and the necessary
communications and organizational networks. In no case, however,
did they appear to come near to achieving their goal. The
effectiveness of the internal security apparatus and the
infiltration of officers loyal to Qadhafi have frustrated most
plots before they could develop sufficiently to have a chance of
success.
Among the reported coup attempts, possibly the most widespread
was uncovered among disaffected officers of the RCC in 1975. A
large number of personnel were tried in secret by a military court,
with many sentenced to death and hundreds condemned to long prison
terms. An undisclosed number of officers and civilians were
arrested in an abortive coup in January 1983; five officers were
executed, including the deputy commander of the People's Militia.
A coup attempt, reportedly involving bloody fighting in front of
the fortified barracks where Qadhafi resides in a Tripoli suburb,
occurred in May 1984. According to the United States Department of
State, over 5,000 were arrested, many tortured, and perhaps more
than 100 executed. A leading opposition group, the National Front
for the Salvation of Libya, took credit for this failed operation,
although Qadhafi blamed the Muslim Brotherhood.
Another reported plot in March 1985 was said to have been
foiled when it was infiltrated by persons loyal to Qadhafi. Some
sixty military officers, disgruntled over the country's economic
mismanagement and extravagance, were said to have been arrested.
A further instance of disaffection occurred in November 1985.
Colonel Hassan Ishkal, a senior officer and military governor of
Surt, was reportedly summarily executed after being summoned to
Qadhafi's headquarters. It was believed that he had broken with
Qadhafi over the interference of revolutionary guards in the
military and over Qadhafi's adventurist foreign policies.
Because of these coup attempts, protective security surrounding
Qadhafi was carried to unusual lengths. His travel plans were
concealed and changed abruptly, his patterns of residence were
disguised, and he moved about in a heavily armored convoy. His
personal bodyguard was composed of a Presidential Guard, drawn from
his own tribal group. Moreover, there were reports that Qadhafi
constantly moved senior military officers from one command to
another so that no officer could develop a unified command capable
of threatening the regime.
The major instrument used by Qadhafi to detect and avert coup
attempts was an extensive internal security apparatus. As of early
1987, details of the salient features of the security organization
were generally lacking. The system installed in the early 1970s
with Egyptian help was modeled on its Egyptian counterpart and was
once described as "composed of several overlapping but autonomously
directed intelligence machines." As it further evolved, internal
security functioned on several levels, beginning with Qadhafi's
personal bodyguard unit (reportedly given technical assistance by
East German advisers). The secret service and, at a lower level,
the police were constantly on the alert for suspicious conduct, as
were the revolutionary committees and the Basic People's
Congresses. The committees constituted an effective informer
network and may also act independently of other security agencies
when authorized and encouraged by Qadhafi. This multilayered
complex assured tight control over the activity of individuals in
virtually every community.
* * *
Although published data on the Libyan armed forces is limited
and often contradictory, some details can be found in the article
on Libya by Gwynne Dyer in the compendium, World Armies.
Additionally, assessments of Libyan military capabilities in
relation to other armies of the Middle East are available in The
Middle East Military Balance (ed. Mark Heller). A number of
aspects of the role of military power in Qadhafi's regime are
treated in Richard B. Parker's North Africa: Regional Tensions
and Strategic Concerns. Reports by the United States Department
of State, The Libyan Problem (1983) and Libya Under
Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression (1986) summarize much of what
is known of Libya's attempts to subvert other governments, to
assassinate its opponents in exile, and to support international
terrorism. Libyan relations with the Soviet Union are analyzed in
Lisa Anderson's "Qadhafi and the Kremlin." Events in Chad and other
developments involving the Libyan military are reviewed in the
monthly Africa Research Bulletin and in Keesing's
Contemporary Archives. (For further information and complete
citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of 1987
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