MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Libya
Index
The roots of the contemporary Libyan army can be traced to the
Libyan Arab Force (popularly known as the Sanusi Army) of World War
II. Shortly after Italy entered the war, a number of Libyan leaders
living in exile in Egypt called on their compatriots to organize
themselves into military units and join the British in the war
against the Axis powers. Five battalions, which were initially
designed for guerrilla warfare in the Jabal al Akhdar region of
Cyrenaica, were established under British command. Because the high
mobility of the desert campaigns required a considerable degree of
technical and mechanical expertise, the Libyan forces were used
primarily as auxiliaries, guarding military installations and
prisoners. One battalion, however, participated in the fighting at
Tobruk.
After Britain succeeded in occupying the Libyan territories,
the need for the British-trained and -equipped Sanusi troops
appeared to be over. The Sanusi Army was reluctant to disband,
however, and the majority of its members arranged to be transferred
to the local police force in Cyrenaica under the British military
administration. When Libya gained its independence in 1951,
veterans of the original Sanusi Army formed the nucleus of the
Royal Libyan Army.
Until the discovery and exploitation of oil, beginning in the
late 1950s, Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world.
Limited available natural resources and a small population provided
little basis for viable defensive strength, and the new state was
militarily insignificant during its early years. King Idris
deliberately divided the security forces into a regular army and a
variety of armed police forces. The primary mission of the armed
police was to counterbalance dissidents within the faction-torn
armed forces and thus preclude a coup against the monarchy.
With substantial British assistance, the army was slowly
enlarged, and by September 1969 its strength was estimated at
roughly 6,500--about half the size of the armed police. The police
forces, composed mainly of conservative tribal elements that the
king considered more reliable than the regular army, were extremely
diverse. They ranged from several lightly armed territorial forces
to the mobile National Security Force, which was equipped with
helicopters and armored cars. Units of the prestigious Cyrenaican
Defense Force, assisted and advised by British military
specialists, were garrisoned at several places in Cyrenaica.
The small naval and air components were not developed until
later. The air force was formed in August 1963, and the navy was
established in November 1962. Consisting initially of only a few
aircraft and two pilots, by 1967 the air force had increased to
about 250 American-trained personnel and a few jet trainers and
piston-engine transports. After the June 1967 War, demand for more
sophisticated aircraft resulted in the purchase of ten American F-5
fighter-bombers in 1968 and 1969. Throughout this early period, the
British were influential in the development of the Libyan navy,
which, however, grew extremely slowly and even by the time of
Qadhafi's coup in 1969 consisted of just over 200 men.
Partly because of the limited resources in trained personnel
locally and partly because the monarchy was suspicious of the
professional military, the idea of purchasing a sophisticated air
defense missile system and training a few specialists in its
operation gained popularity among the king's nonmilitary advisers.
In 1968 the government entered into a contract with Britain for the
installation of an air defense system to be delivered over five
years at a cost of almost US$300 million. Under the contract, the
British agreed to supply a complex antiaircraft missile system and
radar detection and control equipment and to train Libyans to
operate them. The high priority assigned to this project and the
unprecedented expense involved were reflected in an accompanying
decision to postpone the introduction of the monarchy's second
five-year development plan until April 1969. Idris, however was
unwilling to disrupt the balance between the army and the police by
providing the military element with tanks, artillery, and armored
personnel carriers, recognizing that such equipment could be
employed against his regime as easily as against a hostile external
force. Ironically, when Qadhafi and his Free Officers Movement
mounted their overthrow of the monarchy, the ostensibly reliable
police did not interfere.
Assuming power after the 1969 coup, the new Qadhafi regime
integrated major elements of the police into the army. Although he
cancelled the British air defense project, Qadhafi began to build
up the country's military strength through large equipment
purchases from foreign suppliers. In 1970 the government contracted
to buy 110 Mirage jet fighters from France. Thereafter, the air
force grew rapidly and became an important component of the armed
forces. Similar purchases provided tanks and artillery for the army
and vessels for the navy.
Within a year after the coup, the size of the military
establishment was estimated at about 22,000 men--over three times
the figure immediately before the coup. Although this increase
followed a major recruitment effort, it was primarily the result of
the merger of the regular army with most of the former National
Security Force and the Cyrenaican Defense Force, which between them
had comprised about 14,000 troops.
In 1971 the government announced the creation of the Popular
Resistance Force, a militia that was under the operational control
of the chief of staff of the Libyan armed forces. Initially, the
primary mission of the force was to guard government buildings, oil
installations, and other important facilities in the event of war
or internal disorders.
Less than a year after the 1969 coup, Qadhafi and his fellow
Free Officers assumed control of British and United States bases in
Libya and began to sever military supply links with those
countries. France, politically less objectionable to Qadhafi,
became the leading source of arms but, in 1974, Libya reached
agreement with the Soviet Union for the purchase of equipment on a
scale well in excess of France's production capacity, even if
France had not been deterred by Qadhafi's increasingly radical and
irrational behavior. Tremendous quantities of modern Soviet
armaments were delivered beginning in 1975, and the flow was
continuing in 1987. In spite of the fact that thousands of advisers
from the Soviet Union and other communist countries helped with
manning, maintenance, and training in the use of the new equipment,
the sheer quantity overwhelmed the ability of the Libyan armed
forces to introduce it into operational units.
Prodigious importation of new weapons systems was accompanied
by a rapid buildup of manpower. When voluntary enlistments proved
inadequate, the government invoked a conscription law calling for
three to four years service for all males between the ages of
seventeen and thirty-five. Consequently, the armed forces more than
doubled in strength between 1974, when the first arms agreement
with the Soviet Union was concluded, and 1986, when the total
manpower of the three services was estimated at over 90,000. In
addition to creating the most highly mechanized army among the Arab
nations, by the late 1980s Qadhafi had procured a fleet of
submarines, corvettes, and missile boats that constituted a
significant new naval force in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union
had also supplied Libya with modern fighter aircraft, a bomber and
transport force, and a sophisticated air defense system.
Data as of 1987
|
|