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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Libya
Index
It was not surprising that opposition arose to the rapid
radical changes ushered in by the Qadhafi regime. The wealthy, the
privileged, and the traditional tribal and religious elites
resented their postrevolutionary loss of power. The ranks of the
opposition also grew to include sections of the armed forces,
university students, intellectuals and technocrats, and even some
of the new political and tribal leaders who clashed with the core
elite for one reason or another.
For its part, the revolutionary regime made it clear from the
outset that it would brook no opposition. Opposition from political
parties or other interest groups was viewed as harmful to national
unity. Speaking in October 1969, Qadhafi stated that Libya needed
"national unity free of party activities and division" and that "he
who engages in party activities commits treason." The December 1969
Decision on the Protection of the Revolution, the Penal Code, and
Law No. 71 of 1972 rendered political party activities a crime and
formed a strict legal injunction against unauthorized political
activity, particularly if such activity should physically threaten
the state. Insulting the Constitution or popular authorities and
joining a nonpolitical international society without permission
were both punishable by imprisonment. Attempting to change the
government or the Constitution through force, propagandizing
theories or principles aimed at such action, and forming an illegal
group were crimes punishable by death. One of the basic points of
the cultural revolution, declared in April 1973, called for the
repression of communism and conservatism. Also to be repressed were
capitalism, atheism, and the secretive Muslim Brotherhood (see Glossary).
Despite legal strictures and physical attempts to nullify
opposition, there has been resistance to the revolutionary regime.
The discovery of a plot involving two cabinet ministers (lieutenant
colonels who were not RCC members) was announced in December 1969.
A second plot, allegedly based in Fezzan and involving a distant
cousin of former King Idris, was discovered in July 1970.
Participation of foreign mercenaries was alleged in both cases
(see Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Command Council
, ch. 1). Other
resistance has been encountered from traditional tribal leaders who
have not welcomed their own displacement by modernizing
technocrats, government administrators, people's committees, and
popular congresses. Numerous technocrats and other elements of the
urban population opposed Qadhafi's emphasis on religion.
Traditional Islamic religious leaders also opposed Qadhafi's
approach to Islam because its uniquely personal and fundamentalist
nature superseded their intermediary position and interpretive
function. As in many other developing countries, aspects of the
modernization process--such as education and mass communications--
also result in impatience and dissatisfaction with the ruling
regime. Increased education and exposure to the mass media were
intended to inculcate Libyan citizens with patriotism and loyalty
to the regime; however, through education and the media, Libyans
also were informed of standards of living and political freedoms
enjoyed elsewhere in the world. Exposure to the media created
rising expectations that probably increased demands on the
government rather than increasing support for it through
propaganda.
Data as of 1987
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