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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Libya
Index
A Soviet-supplied Su-22 fighter of the Libyan Air Force
Courtesy United States Department of Defense
Because of Libya's forcing the evacuation from Libya of British
and United States military personnel in 1970, the Libyans were
rebuffed in a renewed effort to obtain military equipment from the
West, except for limited British help with the developing navy.
Therefore, Libya turned elsewhere for aid. In December 1974, Libya
disclosed a large-scale arms purchase agreement with the Soviet
Union, involving Tu-22 bombers, MiG-23 fighters, helicopters, T-62
tanks, and antitank and antiaircraft missiles. A second agreement
in May 1975 heralded an even greater flow of Soviet arms and
military advisers to Libya throughout the 1970s. Included in the
agreement were submarines, of which a total of six were eventually
transferred. Subsequent agreements followed in 1977, 1978, and
1980. The value of these transactions was estimated at over US$20
billion between 1973 and 1985.
The new round of arms purchases in 1978, precipitated by the
clashes with Egypt in the preceding year, included the MiG-25
Foxbat in its fighter, reconnaissance, and training configurations.
This sale to Libya was the first recorded time the Soviet Union
furnished the MiG-25 to any country not participating the Warsaw
Pact. Deliveries of sophisticated military hardware were
accompanied by Soviet and East European technicians estimated by
the United States Department of State to have numbered 2,600 in
1984. In late 1985, these technicians were augmented by a
considerable number of specialists to install and help operate the
new SA-5 missiles. Approximately 7,600 Libyan military personnel
had received training in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe by
1984.
Deliveries of modern Soviet armaments continued during the
early 1980s, although they tapered off markedly between 1983
(US$2.9 billion) and 1985 (US$1.3 billion), according to estimates
compiled by ACDA. Libya was the first non-Warsaw Pact recipient of
Haze antisubmarine helicopters. Natya-class minesweepers and
Nanuchka-class fast-missile corvettes helped expand the navy. The
three batteries of SA-5 missile launchers, including early warning
and surveillance radar, delivered toward the close of 1985 failed
in their purpose of deterring maneuvers by United States naval
elements in the Gulf of Sidra. Nonetheless, when Jallud visited
Moscow several months later, it was officially announced that the
Soviets had agreed to a new request for aid. Included were an
improved version of the SA-5, new monitoring and early warning
radar, antijamming devices, M-24 helicopters, and additional
gunboats and fighter planes. By early 1987, major arms shipments
reportedly had been cut off, either because of Qadhafi's failure to
make promised oil deliveries or because of Soviet disillusionment
over Libyan performance against United States planes and the
abandonment of vast amounts of modern equipment in Chad.
The massive Libyan purchases brought the Soviet Union economic
gains and enabled the Soviets to extend their strategic influence
farther into the Mediterranean while appearing to reward the antiimperialist and Arab unity stance of the Libyan regime.
Nevertheless, Qadhafi's increasingly undependable behavior, his
estrangement from other Arab and African nations, and his setbacks
in employing modern Soviet weaponry apparently made the Soviets
skeptical of Qadhafi and reluctant to be closely identified with
him. Although in 1984 the two countries issued a joint declaration
in principle to enter into a treaty of friendship and cooperation
and confirmed their intention in 1986, such an agreement, which
would obligate the Soviet Union to come to Qadhafi's aid if
attacked, had not been concluded by early 1987.
As of early 1987, Qadhafi had refrained from granting the
Soviets permanent shore facilities or air bases on Libyan
territory; Soviet combatant ships had paid frequent port calls, and
antisubmarine planes of the Soviet naval aviation branch had
occasionally been rotated to Libyan airfields.
Data as of 1987
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