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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Libya
Index
In little more than a decade, Qadhafi effected a transformation
of Libya into a militarized nation. The armed forces were rapidly
expanded, acquiring greatly enhanced firepower and mobility. The
able-bodied civilian population was formed in well-equipped militia
units. Libya's new military establishment and arsenal have enabled
Qadhafi to project his radical vision and ambitions beyond the
country's borders. In spite of frequently irrational and
inconsistent behavior, he has advanced Libya to the forefront of
politics in North Africa and thrown its weight against peaceful
settlement in the Middle East.
As affirmed by Qadhafi's public statements, his primary purpose
in the Libyan arms buildup is destruction of Israel. The armed
forces, however, have not been shaped to confront Israel directly
nor has Qadhafi been eager to commit Libya to battle with Israel in
alliance with other Arab powers. To a limited extent, he has used
his arms inventory as a stockpile, supplying weapons selectively to
those countries and groups most opposed to Israel's existence. His
rhetoric has been devoted to appeals to develop a combined Arab and
Islamic force strong enough to wage a successful "holy war" against
Israel.
In 1987 most observers doubted that either the Libyans or the
Soviets viewed the stored Soviet equipment as an arms depot
prepositioned for eventual use by Soviet forces in action in North
Africa. The matériel has been purchased outright by Libya at a
considerable sacrifice to the country's economy. In spite of large
numbers of Soviet advisers and support personnel, the unused
equipment reportedly has not been maintained in an adequate state
of readiness to be employed at short notice. Anticipated use by the
Soviet forces presupposes close cooperation and approval by Qadhafi
of Soviet operations in North Africa, but other evidence suggested
that he was far from willing to agree to a more active Soviet role
in the area.
The traditional mission of Libyan armed forces has been to
protect Libya's territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
Normally, the limited capability of neighboring states to threaten
Libya's borders would not justify a primed and powerful defense arm
(see
fig. 12). Qadhafi, however, has inflamed relations with all of
his neighbors on one or more occasions. In the late 1980s, the
military remained ready for possible open conflict with Egypt,
whose moderate policy toward Israel Qadhafi viewed as a
provocation. Libya's buildup of naval and air strength helped to
protect the country's exposed Mediterranean coastline against
attack and gave Qadhafi a tangible means for enforcing Libya's
claim to the Gulf of Sidra and its natural resources as Libyan
territorial waters. Moreover, submarines and fast-attack craft with
missiles gave Libya a potential striking power that even major
naval forces in the Mediterranean were forced to heed.
Libya's arms buildup and demonstrated mobility provided the
indispensable underpinning to Qadhafi's efforts to play a leading
role in African politics by extending his influence, particularly
to the Sahelian nations to the south. Libyan involvement has taken
the form of subversion, military assistance, and direct military
intervention aimed at winning other countries to support Qadhafi's
radical policies or supplanting existing governments with others
more amenable to him. Libya's efforts to dominate the Sahel
presented a more imminent threat because of the military weakness,
poverty, and unstable government in the area. In addition,
territorial claims have been advanced against Chad, Niger, and
Algeria.
Data as of 1987
Figure 12. Balance of Power in North Africa, 1986
Source: Based on information from The Military Balance,
1986-87, London, 1987, 102-04.
Libyan Security Concerns
In little more than a decade, Qadhafi effected a transformation
of Libya into a militarized nation. The armed forces were rapidly
expanded, acquiring greatly enhanced firepower and mobility. The
able-bodied civilian population was formed in well-equipped militia
units. Libya's new military establishment and arsenal have enabled
Qadhafi to project his radical vision and ambitions beyond the
country's borders. In spite of frequently irrational and
inconsistent behavior, he has advanced Libya to the forefront of
politics in North Africa and thrown its weight against peaceful
settlement in the Middle East.
As affirmed by Qadhafi's public statements, his primary purpose
in the Libyan arms buildup is destruction of Israel. The armed
forces, however, have not been shaped to confront Israel directly
nor has Qadhafi been eager to commit Libya to battle with Israel in
alliance with other Arab powers. To a limited extent, he has used
his arms inventory as a stockpile, supplying weapons selectively to
those countries and groups most opposed to Israel's existence. His
rhetoric has been devoted to appeals to develop a combined Arab and
Islamic force strong enough to wage a successful "holy war" against
Israel.
In 1987 most observers doubted that either the Libyans or the
Soviets viewed the stored Soviet equipment as an arms depot
prepositioned for eventual use by Soviet forces in action in North
Africa. The matériel has been purchased outright by Libya at a
considerable sacrifice to the country's economy. In spite of large
numbers of Soviet advisers and support personnel, the unused
equipment reportedly has not been maintained in an adequate state
of readiness to be employed at short notice. Anticipated use by the
Soviet forces presupposes close cooperation and approval by Qadhafi
of Soviet operations in North Africa, but other evidence suggested
that he was far from willing to agree to a more active Soviet role
in the area.
The traditional mission of Libyan armed forces has been to
protect Libya's territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
Normally, the limited capability of neighboring states to threaten
Libya's borders would not justify a primed and powerful defense arm
(see
fig. 12). Qadhafi, however, has inflamed relations with all of
his neighbors on one or more occasions. In the late 1980s, the
military remained ready for possible open conflict with Egypt,
whose moderate policy toward Israel Qadhafi viewed as a
provocation. Libya's buildup of naval and air strength helped to
protect the country's exposed Mediterranean coastline against
attack and gave Qadhafi a tangible means for enforcing Libya's
claim to the Gulf of Sidra and its natural resources as Libyan
territorial waters. Moreover, submarines and fast-attack craft with
missiles gave Libya a potential striking power that even major
naval forces in the Mediterranean were forced to heed.
Libya's arms buildup and demonstrated mobility provided the
indispensable underpinning to Qadhafi's efforts to play a leading
role in African politics by extending his influence, particularly
to the Sahelian nations to the south. Libyan involvement has taken
the form of subversion, military assistance, and direct military
intervention aimed at winning other countries to support Qadhafi's
radical policies or supplanting existing governments with others
more amenable to him. Libya's efforts to dominate the Sahel
presented a more imminent threat because of the military weakness,
poverty, and unstable government in the area. In addition,
territorial claims have been advanced against Chad, Niger, and
Algeria.
Data as of 1987
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