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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Libya
Index
Figure 9. Land Use, 1987
Although statistics vary, only a very small percentage of
Libyan land is arable--probably under 2 percent of total land area
(see
fig. 9).
About 4 percent is suitable for grazing livestock and the rest is
agriculturally useless desert. Most arable land lies in two places:
the Jabal al Akhdar region around Benghazi, and the Jifarah Plain
near Tripoli
(see
fig. 4). The highest parts of the Jabal al Akhdar
receive between 400 and 600 millimeters of rain annually, whereas
the immediately adjacent area, sloping north to the Marj Plain,
receives between 200 and f400 millimeters. The central and eastern
parts of the Jifarash Plain and the nearby Jabal Nafusah also
average between 200 and 400 millimeters of rain annually. The
remaining Libyan coastal strip and the areas just to the south of
the sectors described average 100 to 200 millimeters of rain
yearly. In addition, the Jifarah Plain is endowed with an
underground aquifer that has made intensive well-driven irrigation
possible. Between these two areas and for a distance of about 50
kilometers south, there is a narrow strip of land that has enough
scrub vegetation to support livestock. Desert predominates south of
this strip, with only occasional oasis cultivation, such as at Al
Kufrah, Sabha, and Marzuq.
Studies published in the late 1970s indicated that at any given
time, about one-third of the total arable land remained fallow and
that as many as 45 percent of the farms were under 10 hectares. The
average farm size was about 11 hectares, although many were
fragmented into small, noncontiguous plots. Most farms in the
Jifarah Plain were irrigated by individual wells and electric
pumps, although in 1985 only about 1 percent of the arable land was
irrigated.
Since coming to power in 1969, the Qadhafi government has been
very concerned with land reform. Shortly after the revolution, the
government confiscated all Italian-owned farms (about 38,000
hectares) and redistributed much of this land in smaller plots to
Libyans. The state retained some of the confiscated lands for state
farming ventures, but in general the government has not sought to
eliminate the private sector from agriculture as it has with
commerce. It did, however, take the further step in 1971 of
declaring all uncultivated land to be state property. This measure
was aimed mainly at certain powerful conservative tribal groups in
the Jabal al Akhdar, who had laid claim to large tracts of land.
Another law passed in 1977 placed further restriction on tribal
systems of land ownership, emphasizing actual use as the deciding
factor in determining land ownership. Since 1977 an individual
family has been allotted only enough land to satisfy its own
requirements; this policy was designed to prevent the development
of large-scale private sector farms and to end the practice of
using fertile "tribal" lands for grazing rather than cultivation.
Partly as a result of these policies as well as the dictates of
Islamic rules of inheritance, which stipulate that each son should
receive an equal share of family land upon the father's death, in
1986 Libyan farms tended to be fragmented and too small to make
efficient use of water. This problem was especially severe in the
long-settled Jifarah Plain, which has been Libya's single most
productive agricultural region.
The falling water tables in Libya's best agricultural lands
caused by overirrigation posed a severe long-term ecological threat
to agriculture. The government began to recognize this in 1976, and
took measures to discourage citrus and tomato cultivation, both of
which required large amounts of water. However, the more stringent
steps required to save the coastal water resources--principally the
regulation of irrigation and changing the land tenure system to
make it more water-efficient--conflicted with Qadhafi's concept of
economic equity, which favored intensive irrigated cultivation of
small plots for family use.
The government's overall strategy for dealing with the
impending ecological crisis has not been to reform the practices
that brought it about. Rather, the cornerstone of agricultural
policy since 1983 has been to avert disaster by pumping large
quantities of water to the coast from the fossil reserves of the
southern desert. This project, the GMMR, was expected to cost US$5
billion for the first two stages and has largely been spared from
the cuts in development spending that have delayed many other
projects in the 1980s.
The first phase of the GMMR, on which construction began in
1984, called for the construction of a 1,895-kilometer pipeline to
carry water from the Sarir and Tazirbu regions to a holding tank at
Ajdabiya. From there the water will be pumped to Surt and Benghazi
for both agricultural and urban consumption. Planners anticipated
a total cost of about US$3.29 billion for this first phase and a
completion date sometime in 1989. The first stage is projected to
irrigate an area of 20,000 hectares for vegetables, and 50,000
hectares for cereals, and to enable the raising of some 100 head of
cattle. A second stage will connect the fossil reserves at Al
Kufrah to the system. It will also extend the pipelines from
Ajdabiya to Tobruk. Planning for a possible third stage, which
would link Tripoli to the underground reserves of the western
Fezzan region, and would extend the western coastal terminus from
Surt to Tripoli was also under way in 1987.
After completion of the second stage, the GMMR will be capable
of delivering up to 5 million cubic meters of water a day.
According to estimates, this amount would be sufficient to irrigate
180,000 hectares in the Surt area, to provide pasture for 2 million
sheep and 200,000 cattle, and to supply industrial and domestic
needs in Benghazi and Tripoli. According to the project's American
designers, the Al Kufrah and Sarir aquifers could sustain pumping
at this rate for 50 to 100 years without depletion.
Despite planners' optimistic predictions about the benefits of
the GMMR, foreign observers doubt that it will resolve the
difficulties facing agriculture. Whatever the size of the desert
aquifers, they are finite fossil reserves and will not last
indefinitely. Furthermore, the major agricultural developments
planned for the Surt region will do nothing to stop the declining
levels of productivity in the Jifarah Plain. In fact, the choice of
Surt as a site for massive agricultural development may have been
prompted more by Qadhafi's family roots being there than its
suitability for intensive agricultural development. In addition,
urban and industrial demand for water from the south is likely to
increase as the population continues to grow and as various
industrial projects begin operations.
The GMMR's long-term impact on oasis cultivation in the south
is also likely to be negative. Many of Libya's showcase
agricultural projects are located in the southern oases that depend
on the fossil aquifers that the GMMR will tap. Developments at Al
Kufrah and Sarir have used advanced irrigation technology to grow
wheat and fodder crops. The depletion of the fossil reserves on
which these projects depend means that they have little long-term
viability. Given the extremely high cost and low yields achieved as
of the early 1980s, a re-evaluation of the economic viability of
these projects may well occur.
Data as of 1987
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