MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Libya
Index
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions (as of 1975)
LIBYA'S INTERNATIONAL PROMINENCE in the mid- and latter l980s was
disproportionate to its geographic size or population. The domestic
and international activities of its revolutionary leader Muammar al
Qadhafi, combined with the financial and economic power resulting
from Libya's discovery and exploitation of its significant
petroleum resources, were primarily responsible for propelling
Libya onto the world stage. By the 1980s, Qadhafi's grip on power
was so strong that press commentaries and academic reports
routinely used his name and that of his government interchangeably.
Until the Libyan Revolution in 1969, few Westerners had any
knowledge of Libya beyond an awareness of it as the site of desert
campaigns in World War II, such as Al Alamein, and the ruins of
ancient Carthage and Tripoli. Early Libyan history was influenced
by numerous foreign conquerors, including the Phoenicians, the
Greeks, the Romans, and, most significantly, the Arabs, who
established Islam in the late seventh and early eighth centuries.
The Arab conquest of North Africa left a lasting mark on the Berber
tribes that inhabited the area. North African Islam under various
caliphates took on a distinctive form that incorporated indigenous
religious practices, such as the veneration of holy men
(see The Religious Life
, ch. 2).
Under Ottoman Turkish rule in the nineteenth century, the
Sanusi Islamic religious order became a powerful force with
political overtones, as the Sanusi lodges helped weld together the
rival beduin tribes of Cyrenaica. In the twentieth century, when
Italy sought to conquer Cyrenaica and adjoining Tripolitania, the
Sanusi movement constituted the major source of opposition to
colonial rule. More advanced Italian weaponry prevailed, however,
and Italy gained control of the area following World War I, setting
up a new administrative system joining the two regions, together
with the southern region of Fezzan
(see Italian Rule and Arab Resistance
, ch. l).
The Italians improved the infrastructure of the area, creating
roads, railroads, port facilities, and irrigation projects, but did
little to train the inhabitants in administrative, technical, or
agricultural skills. During World War II, a number of Cyrenaicans
determined that the best route for gaining independence would be to
support the Allied side; accordingly, they fought with the British
in the desert war. This action, coupled with Italy's defeat, led to
a brief period of British administration of the former
Italian-controlled area after the war. Thereafter, under United
Nations auspices, King Idris of the Sanusi family proclaimed the
United Kingdom of Libya in 1951.
The new country faced severe economic problems as well as
political difficulties resulting from its lack of national
cohesion. Economically, Libya was handicapped by its largely desert
terrain and its sparse and unskilled population. To gain a major
source of revenue as well as of military assistance, King Idris
granted base rights to Britain and the United States in 1953 and
1954, respectively. The discovery of oil in commercial quantities
by Esso (later Exxon) in 1959 brought about a substantial increase
in national income as well as growing Western influence. Meanwhile,
in 1963, King Idris sought to change Libya's unwieldy federal
system by creating a unitary state. The latter move encountered
obstacles because the three provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania,
and Fezzan had little in common, and the majority of Libyans did
not identify with the monarchy or have nationalist feelings.
Both the discovery of oil and the rise in Western influence
proved to be divisive elements for the Libyan state. Revenues from
the oil industry benefited relatively few in Libyan society and led
to greater stratification between the small wealthy group and the
large poor one. Furthermore, King Idris's pro-Western
constitutional monarchy had minimal associations with the Arab
states. These two factors contributed to a rising dissatisfaction
with the monarchy. The discontent ultimately led to the seizure of
power by the Free Officers' Movement in 1969 while King Idris was
abroad for medical treatment.
The movement established a Revolutionary Command Council of
twelve members, which formed a new government. Among the members
was Qadhafi, who served both as prime minister and defense
minister. Qadhafi was strongly influenced by the revolutionary
ideas of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser and persuaded his
officer colleagues to adopt a program that reflected a number of
Nasser's concepts.
The new government proclaimed as its watchwords "Freedom,
Socialism, and Unity." Freedom was to be achieved through a program
that had a populist framework to allow maximum direct citizen
participation at the bottom, through "popular committees," whereas
the structure was controlled at the top by handpicked military
officers. Socialism was pursued through various domestic programs
designed to develop Libya's infrastructure and promote
industrialization. Unity entailed Libya's announced intent to
pursue an Arab and Islamic policy as well as attempts by Qadhafi at
various times to achieve union with several Arab states. In line
with its intended populist and socialist character, in 1977 the
official name of the country was changed to "The Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya."
Qadhafi coined the term jamahiriya to mean "power to the
masses," his interpretation of freedom. In theory, the power of the
masses was to be exercised by the popular committees established at
various levels and in different segments of the population--in
localities, government ministries, businesses, and universities. In
practice, elections to such committees and the exercise of
authority were "guided" by the General People's Committee, which
replaced the Council of Ministers
(see The General People's Congress
, ch. 4). Although technically appointed by the General
Popular Congress at its annual meeting, the General People's
Committee was in effect selected by Qadhafi himself. Thus, the
power to implement or initiate measures was strictly limited and
popular participation in government declined during the 1980s,
leading Qadhafi to advocate the creation of a new political party
to energize the socialist system.
To develop this political structure in the early period and to
allow himself more time to serve as theoretician for the new Libyan
experiment in revolutionary socialism, Qadhafi resigned in 1974
from any official government post, while remaining de facto head of
state. In this capacity Qadhafi was referred to as "the leader,"
and he produced three slim parts known as The Green Book, setting
forth his program and its justification. These came to assume a
position for the Libyans comparable to that of the "Little red
book" of Chairman Mao Zedong for the Chinese.
Qadhafi's pursuit of socialism as set in The Green Book entailed
the development of Libya's infrastructure in transportation and
communications, utilities, and basic services
(see Role of the Government
, ch. 3). To accomplish this development, revenues and
manpower were necessary. Substantial domestic revenues resulted
from oil production in the years following the Revolution and
transformed Libya from a leading have-not state into a major oil
exporter. Because of Libya's severe shortage of manpower,
particularly skilled labor, thousands of foreign workers were
required. These workers came mainly from other North African and
from sub-Saharan states. When oil revenues began to decline in the
early 1980s, and in view of the internal security threat the
laborers represented, Qadhafi terminated the services of thousands
of them in 1982-83, exacerbating Libya's relations with neighboring
states.
Another part of Qadhafi's socialist scheme was the
establishment of industries and the improvement of agriculture
through irrigation projects. A keystone of the latter was the Great
Man- Made River project, underway in 1987, to bring water from
oases in the south and southeast to the cities on the
Mediterranean. The total estimated cost for the two stages of the
1,900 kilometer-long pipeline was US$5 billion.
The third element of Libya's program was support for Arab
unity. In pursuit of this goal, Qadhafi capitalized on
opportunities for union with various Arab states. At different
times such unification attempts included unions with Egypt, Sudan,
Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco. These efforts were designed to
strengthen Qadhafi's personal leadership role in as well as Libya's
position in African and Middle Eastern politics, and to act as a
counterbalance to neighboring states perceived as hostile. For
example, when Egypt was viewed as a threat, Qadhafi initiated a
1984 union with Morocco, the only one of his unions that as of
early 1988 had achieved a semblance of implementation (1984-86).
Qadhafi also saw himself both as a leader of the Nonaligned
Movement and as a key instrument in furthering the spread of Islam,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. To these ends he sought
unsuccessfully several times in the early l980s to be elected
chairman of the Organization for African Unity and proposed a
Sahelian empire to include Libya and other African states whose
populations contained significant percentages of Muslims. Qadhafi
used Libya's oil revenues both to spread Islam and to extend Libyan
influence in developing countries, especially in Africa, seeing
this two-pronged campaign as a means of countering colonialism and
Western influences
(see Foreign Relations
, ch. 4). This policy
resulted from Qadhafi's advocacy in The Green Book of a stance that
supported "neither East nor West," indicating that the Jamahiriya
rejected both communism, with its atheistic ideology, and Western
capitalism, with its association with colonialism and
"imperialism." This stance led to a strong opposition to the
Western powers, particularly the United States, because of the
latter's identification with Israel.
Qadhafi's stand against colonialism led him to support
dissident or revolutionary movements, particularly Muslim ones,
that were fighting against established regimes viewed as
reactionary, e.g., the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and
the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines. In so doing,
he provided weapons, funds, and training as deemed appropriate.
Qadhafi has also been charged with training and equipping terrorist
groups of various kinds, including Palestinians and the Irish
Republican Army, who have launched attacks against Westerners,
including Americans
(see International Terrorism and Support for Insurgent Groups
, ch. 5). In retaliation for such incidents,
specifically the bombing of a Berlin club in which Americans were
killed or wounded and in which Libya was implicated, the United
States launched air strikes in March 1987 against targets in
several Libyan cities. This retaliation appeared to have served as
a deterrent to Libyan terrorist activity in that as of early 1988
Libyan-sponsored terrorist incidents had decreased markedly.
Qadhafi's avowed anticommunist stance was pragmatic, however.
Although he refused to grant bases to the Soviet Union, he viewed
the latter as an excellent source of sophisticated weaponry. He
also relied upon the countries of Eastern Europe for military and
technical advisers and especially for assistance in the field of
internal security. He used severe measures, however, in suppressing
domestic communism.
The major source of support for Qadhafi's domestic and foreign
programs has always been the army. Recognizing this, Qadhafi took
pains to see that military salaries and perquisites were generous
and that the armed forces were equipped with the latest military
arms and technology. His purchases of weaponry, particularly from
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, were of such magnitude that
Libya was unable to deploy all its equipment
(see Foreign Military Assistance
, ch. 5). Qadhafi also took precautions against potential
coups directed at him that might originate in the military by using
East European security personnel to protect himself and by
frequently rotating individuals in key military positions.
In 1988 Qadhafi had had one of the longest tenures of office of
any African leader. But, in the course of his rule, opposition
elements within and outside Libya had increased. Internal
opposition resulted partly from Qadhafi's socialist measures, which
had confiscated property belonging to wealthy citizens, partly from
his increasingly authoritarian style of rule, such as his imperious
suppression of opposition among university students, and partly
from Qadhafi's military ventures abroad. In the mid- and latter
l980s, Qadhafi's campaign against internal opposition elements had
become increasingly harsh, leading to the assassination of various
individuals in exile abroad as well as actual or potential
dissidents within Libya. Qadhafi's involvement in the ongoing war
with Chad and his support of rebel forces in Sudan also contributed
to reported rising discontent within the army.
In the realm of external opposition, Qadhafi's relations with
the moderate Arab states, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the
Persian Gulf states, were strained at best. He was also frequently
at odds with his North African neighbors, whom he had antagonized
by supporting opposition elements or by direct military action.
Despite these sources of domestic and foreign opposition, foreign
observers doubted that Qadhafi would be ousted from his pivotal
position in the Libyan Jamahiriya, short of a successful military
coup.
Data as of 1987
|
|