MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Libya
Index
The national emblem of Libya
SWEEPING AND FUNDAMENTAL changes were introduced in Libya after
Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi and his Free Officers Movement overthrew
the Sanusi monarchy on September 1, 1969, and proclaimed the "Green
Revolution." Because of the many radical and experimental policies
that Qadhafi has tried to implement in Libya, he has been described
frequently as a mercurial and quixotic leader. But while Qadhafi's
policy making has been unpredictable, it has not been random or
capricious. Rather, Qadhafi's political behavior has been dictated
by his own elaborate and evolving normative political ideology,
which he set forth in his three-volume The Green Book.
The essence of Qadhafi's philosophy is the Third Universal
Theory, so-called because it is intended to be an alternative to
capitalism and Marxism. The theory calls for the institution in
Libya of what Qadhafi calls "direct democracy." In a direct
democracy, as envisaged by Qadhafi, citizens govern themselves
through grass-roots activism without the mediation or intervention
of state institutions or other organizational hierarchies in the
military, tribes, ulama, or intelligentsia. In an effort to
implement direct democracy, Qadhafi altered or dismantled
governmental and social structures. He launched a Cultural
Revolution in 1973, instituted "people's power" in 1975, and
proclaimed that Libya was a "state of the masses" in 1977. Finally,
to emphasize his policy of decentralization, Qadhafi relinquished
his own formal governmental position in 1979 and insisted he be
referred to simply as "Leader of the Revolution."
The striking innovation in the Libyan political system since
Qadhafi came to power resulted from his desire to replace
subnational traditional leaders with administrators with the skills
needed to modernize the country. The changes were also ostensibly
intended to foster egalitarianism, mass mobilization, revolutionary
commitment, public participation, and self-determination among
Libyan citizens. From a pragmatic perspective, however, the changes
served primarily to undermine the authority of traditional or
alternate elite groups that posed a potential challenge to
Qadhafi's leadership.
It is ironic, then, that the changes intended to enfranchise
the citizenry have instead served primarily to bolster Qadhafi's
personal power by diminishing governmental checks and balances on
his executive power and eliminating all other power bases. In 1987
there was little doubt that Qadhafi remained the country's
strongman, the fulcrum of power, and the single most important
figure in Libya.
Although Qadhafi in theory advocated dismantling the structure
of government, in reality Libya in 1987 had an elaborate and
complex bureaucratic structure because the new organizations
Qadhafi created had been superimposed upon existing institutions.
In 1987 the primary formal instrument of government was the General
People's Congress (GPC), both an executive and legislative body,
which convened three times annually. The GPC was headed by a small
General Secretariat composed primarily of members of the former
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which was abolished in 1977.
A General People's Committee performed the function of a cabinet,
replacing the old Council of Ministers. Subnational representation
and participation were accomplished through three roughly parallel
and overlapping structures: people's committees that were organized
at the basic (urban ward or rural village) and municipal levels,
Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the only authorized political mass
organization; Basic Popular Congress (BPC); and
revolutionary committees (see Glossary)
organized both geographically and
functionally. The lines of authority and responsibility among these
four bodies were unclear, which occasionally caused intense
competition and rivalry within the government. Moreover, in 1987
there were indications that Qadhafi intended to introduce a fifth
similar organizational structure in the form of a new political
party.
On the international level, Libya sought to foster pan-Arabism
and Islamic and Third World solidarity. Initially, Libya advocated
positive neutrality, but for pragmatic reasons, soon gravitated
toward a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Concurrently,
Libya's interpretation of the North-South dimension of global
politics emphasized the division between industrialized, resourceconsuming nations and underdeveloped resource producers, a division
that, in Qadhafi's view, overshadowed the East-West dichotomy.
Libya under Qadhafi played a leading role in the efforts among
producing countries to gain full control of petroleum production
and to use that production for internal development and as a
political weapon with which to reward friendly nations and punish
opponents.
Qadhafi is hostile toward the United States and other Western
countries because these countries generally support Israel. Because
of its anti-Western stance, the Libyan regime gained a reputation
for conducting unconventional, belligerent, and aggressive foreign
relations. There were frequent and widespread allegations that
Libya sponsored transnational terrorist activities, supported
dozens of insurrectionary movements worldwide, and assassinated
exiled opponents. Just as Libya's domestic policies had resulted in
a situation contrary to what Qadhafi claimed he desired, so too had
its foreign policy. Qadhafi's maverick foreign policy not only
angered Western countries, but it also alienated many of Libya's
erstwhile or potential allies in the Third World that were the
intended audience of the Third Universal Theory.
Because of the precipitous decline of the oil revenues that had
funded Qadhafi's foreign and domestic policies, the dizzying pace
of internal change, and the country's image as an international
pariah, the regime's viability and durability were questioned.
Nevertheless, in late 1987, most foreign observers doubted that a
coup d'état was imminent.
Data as of 1987
|
|