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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Libya
Index
The pattern of defense spending has been difficult to appraise
with any exactitude since the mid-1970s, when government
restrictions on the publication of military information were
imposed. Detailed budgets, once available, have not been disclosed
since the mid-1970s. Total amounts allocated to defense in the
national budget were available, but apportionments to individual
service components or specific programs were impossible to
ascertain. Moreover, the figures published for the defense budget
clearly fell far short of actual expenditures. In all likelihood,
many military outlays were hidden under other budget items or
obscured by manipulation of prices or exchange rates. The value of
imported military equipment alone has generally been far in excess
of the allocations to defense as recorded in the budget. The
massive purchases from the Soviet Union, estimated at over US$1
billion annually since the mid-1970s, do not appear in the budget
either as payments or amortization of military credit.
Increased spending for military improvements and other defense
needs was made possible by the vast revenues from petroleum--
particularly after the government nationalized the industry. Even
during the monarchy, a doubling of military expenditures between
1964 and 1968 demonstrated that this new source of revenue
permitted an upgrading of the military that was previously
unattainable. Nonetheless, defense expenditures under the monarchy
continued to be relatively modest. As one specialist wrote just
before the 1969 coup, "thus far Libya has avoided succumbing to the
lure of the arms race or procurement of nonessential prestige
military forces."
Within a few years after the assumption of power by the Qadhafi
regime, defense spending accelerated dramatically. It continued to
rise nearly every year, although at a somewhat reduced rate after
1978. Arms imports ordinarily formed more than half of total
defense expenditures. However, some slackening in the value of
imported equipment has occurred since 1982. This is attributed in
part to the saturation of the Libyan defense forces and in part to
financial strains on the government arising from the sharp decline
in oil prices.
The limited official data published by Libya offer a completely
different picture from the estimates compiled by non-Libyan
sources. In the administrative budget for 1984, the amount shown
for the armed forces is LD340 million (for value of the
Libyan dinar, see Glossary),
which constituted 23.6 percent of the budget.
This represented a substantial increase over the LD300 million
shown for 1983, composing 19.7 percent of the administrative
budget. Defense expenditures were omitted from the budget published
for 1985, and no explanation was supplied of the component items in
the ostensible disbursements for defense in 1983 or 1984.
According to estimates compiled by ACDA, Libyan military
expenditures rose eightfold between 1973 and 1979, when a peak of
US$3 billion annually was reached. Spending then remained fairly
level until a new upswing in spending began by 1983. By 1984,
annual outlays on defense were estimated at US$5.1 billion. The
1979 figure represented 12.4 percent of gross national product
(GNP), whereas the 1984 figure represented 17.8 percent of GNP and
an exceptionally high 40 percent of total government expenditures.
On the basis of the ACDA estimate, military spending would have
amounted to US$1360 per capita in 1984. This compared to a figure
of US$34 per capita for Africa as a whole and was about twice the
level of average per capita spending on defense of the average
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Only Israel,
Saudi Arabia, and several smaller states of the Arabian Peninsula
had military outlays on a scale comparable to those of Libya.
Data as of 1987
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