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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Libya
Index
Qadhafi has been a leading proponent of Arab unity
(qawmiya), calling for a union that would stretch from the
Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. He believes that the members of
such a union would have complementary resources: oil and other
minerals, manpower, and space for population expansion. Apparently,
Qadhafi views this union as taking the form of a strong federation,
similar to those of the United States and the Soviet Union, rather
than as a unitary state. Qadhafi has said that "it is ironic to see
that Americans and Soviets, who are not of the same origin, have
come together to create united federations, while the Arabs, who
are of the same race and religion, have so far failed to realize
the most cherished goal of the present Arab generation." Whether
each Arab country's borders are considered sacrosanct or "natural"
in some historical sense, over time, particularistic nationalisms
have proved too powerful to be superseded by Arab unity.
Pursuing unity on a step-by-step basis, Qadhafi has sponsored
or joined ill-fated mergers with Egypt, Syria, and, most recently,
Morocco. He also has called on Sudan, Algeria, and other countries
to participate in unity schemes. Since 1969 there have been seven
unity attempts, all except one initiated by Libya. Less than four
months after Qadhafi's coup d'état, Libya joined Egypt and Sudan in
signing on December 27, 1969, the Tripoli Charter, which called for
the formation of a "flexible federation." On January 1, 1972, the
Federation of Arab Republics, consisting of Egypt, Syria, and Libya
came into existence. Yet another merger, accepted in principle in
August 1972, between Egypt and Libya theoretically took effect on
September 1, 1973. The union failed, however, because of
disagreements over the timing and objectives of war and diplomatic
alternatives to the conflict with Israel. In early 1974, a merger
of Libya and Tunisia was proclaimed, only to be repudiated two days
later by President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia. Looking once again
toward the
Mashriq (see Glossary),
Qadhafi and President Hafiz al
Assad of Syria proclaimed a unity of their two countries on
September 10, 1980. In 1987, however, the unity provisions existed
only on paper because neither side was willing to surrender its
sovereignty.
Turning his attention to his weak neighbor to the south,
Qadhafi in 1981 proposed a merger plan with Chad. Goukouni Oueddei,
then in power in N'Djamena, rejected the proposal and this merger
plan, like all previous plans, failed to materialize. Since then,
Libya's involvement in the Chadian civil war has deepened
(see Invasion of Chad
, ch. 5).
Obsessed by the goal of pan-Arab unity, Qadhafi tirelessly,
albeit thus far ineffectively, continued to seek partners. On
August 13, 1984, a marriage of convenience between Libya and
Morocco was consummated with the signing of the Oujda treaty. At
the time of the treaty, Qadhafi was at odds with all the Arab
states except Syria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
(South Yemen), so the agreement signaled an end to Libyan isolation
and revived Qadhafi's ambitions of pan-Arab leadership. The treaty
also restored Qadhafi's hope of extending the union to include
Algeria and Tunisia as well as Syria. Such a scheme, he thought,
could be the nucleus of a more complete pan-Arab union. Not
surprisingly, dissolution of this union came as abruptly as its
formation. The visit of Shimon Peres, Israel's prime minister, to
Morocco in July 1986 provided the main reason for the estrangement
(also see
Maghrib Relations
, this ch.).
Despite the failure of unification attempts, Qadhafi condemn
Arab leaders who for various reasons opposed such schemes. Because
they worked against his purported goal of achieving unity,
Qadhafi's resorts to subversion, threats, and meddling in the
internal affairs of others proved unsuccessful and costly.
Qadhafi's methods have alienated potential cooperators, frightened
possible Arab union candidates, and, in the last analysis, isolated
Libya in regional affairs. With ambitions of their own, and with
differing agendas and priorities, Arab governments have learned, at
best, to tolerate the Libyan leader. Many resent his self-appointed
role as philosopher-leader of all Arabs. Few, if any, are by
temperament given to impetuousness; therefore, they oppose
Qadhafi's sudden radical policy shifts. Nevertheless, the pan-Arab
thesis championed by Qadhafi, that strength increases with unity,
is still valid. It is also widely shared as a goal among Arabs,
notwithstanding the aforementioned difficulties.
Data as of 1987
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