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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Lebanon
Index
As might be expected because of the significance of the family
with its strong father figure and the influential role of the
zaim, Lebanese have come to accept a powerful national
leader. Indeed, the Constitution consigns to the president vast
authority. He is commander in chief of the army and security
forces; he can appoint and dismiss his prime minister and cabinet;
he promulgates laws passed by the Chamber of Deputies and may also
propose laws, enact "urgent" legislation by decree, and veto bills;
he can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies; and he exercises
considerable influence throughout the bureaucracy.
His constitutional powers notwithstanding, the president is
constrained by the necessity of obtaining cooperation from at least
a majority of the zuama of the various confessional
communities. In addition, he must accommodate an array of other
competing interests, including those of religious, business, and
labor leaders. Moreover, the president, who by custom is a
Maronite, must try to work in harmony with the prime minister, who
by custom is a Sunni Muslim. Together, they are the most eminent
members of the executive and wield a direct and personal influence
over the deputies and other political leaders.
The president is elected, by the Chamber of Deputies, not by
the general public. He is selected for a six-year term and may not
succeed himself; he may serve any number of nonsuccessive terms,
however. A sitting president steps down on September 23 of his
sixth year in office. Thirty to sixty days before this, the speaker
of the Chamber of Deputies calls for a special session to elect a
new president. A quorum of two-thirds of the deputies is required
to hold a special session. A two-thirds majority of deputies
attending is needed to be elected on the first ballot; failing
that, a simple majority is required on subsequent ballots.
In theory, anyone who meets the eligibility requirements for
election to the Chamber of Deputies can be elected president; in
reality, before the 1975 Civil War powerful Maronite zuama
usually were elected. Exceptions were Fuad Shihab (also seen as
Chehab) and Charles Hilu (also spelled Helou), leaders who
unsuccessfully sought to diminish the power of the zuama
(see The Rise of Shihabism, 1958-64;
The Hilu Era, 1964-70
, ch. 1).
At times, political maneuvering and interconfessional wrangling
have been intense; nonetheless, the reality has usually been that
no one could be elected president without the support of a wide
spectrum of confessional blocs.
Although the Constitution grants the president wide latitude in
conducting the affairs of state, it is questionable whether the
Lebanese leaders who negotiated the National Pact envisioned the
growth in power that occupants of the office assumed in later
years. For many Lebanese, especially Muslims, the presidency came
to symbolize political tyranny and sectarian hegemony. In domestic
matters involving regional interests, the powers of the local
zuama always held sway. But on broader, national-level
issues, the Maronite presidents tended to safeguard Maronite
interests. This was certainly true with regard to the pan-Arab
question and the events that led to the 1958 Civil War, with
respect to the Palestinian controversy, and in response to any call
for fundamental political reform, especially musharaka,
i.e., a more equitable distribution of power between the president
and prime minister.
Some presidents have viewed the office as a means for
aggrandizement. Sulayman Franjiyah (also cited as Franjieh), for
instance, a zaim from Zgharta who was elected through the
efforts of traditional zuama by the margin of a single vote,
is commonly regarded as having used his office to reward his family
and constituency
(see The Franjiyah Era, 1970-76
, ch. 1). Many
observers believe that nepotism and corruption--routine features of
Lebanese politics--reached an intolerable level under Franjiyah's
tenure.
The 1975 Civil War has left an indelible mark on the
institution of the presidency. In the 1980s, the office no longer
was viewed as a product of intersectarian consensus. The rise in
sectarian consciousness has forced each president (and prime
minister, for that matter) to be more accountable to the demands of
his narrow community. At the same time, as external actors such as
Syria and Israel have influenced elections, and as the power of the
militias has increased, the status of the presidency has declined
at home and abroad. In 1987 the authority of the president did not
extend much farther than the confines of the Presidential Palace at
Babda.
Data as of December 1987
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