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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Lebanon
Index
In pluralistic societies, patronage is often a common feature
of the political process; the promotion of the interests of a
particular sect is frequently widespread. Although patronage is
prevalent in developed and lesser developed countries alike,
clientelism may be more entrenched in Lebanon than in most other
nations. The pervasiveness of this system in Lebanon is easily
traced to feudal times, wherein the overlord allowed peasants and
their families the use of land in exchange for unquestioned
loyalty. In more recent times, this social system has been
translated into a political system; the overlord has become a
political leader, or zaim, the peasants have become his
constituents, and, instead of land, favors are exchanged for
electoral loyalty. And although clientelism has its roots in the
rural areas, it now pervades towns and large citites down to the
neighborhood level.
A zaim is a political leader, and rather than being
exclusively an officeholder, he may be a power broker with the
ability to manipulate elections and the officials he helps elect.
Accordingly, wastah-- the ability to attain access to a
power broker--is widely sought, but only achieved at some price.
There are those who believe that at the local level
zuama clientelism may have reduced sectarian strife. Often,
political competition was intrasectarian, rather than with members
of different groups. And because only some of Lebanon's electoral
districts were confessionally homogeneous (although most had a
certain sectarian preponderance), a candidate often could not be
elected unless he were supported by other confessional groups
within his district. Once elected, however, the opportunity to
augment his power was great. To ensure that constituents continued
their support, zuama have been known to employ
qabadayat, or enforcers, whose job it was to see that their
chiefs were warmly supported at the polls or to discourage
opponents from voting. In fact, in the post-World War II years,
many zuama developed their own militias to safeguard their
interests, often against rivals within their own sect. The
development of these militias led to tragedy during the 1975 Civil
War when these private armies were turned loose on members of
opposing sects.
Another component of the Lebanese patronage system is the
important role of family. The position of zaim is frequently
hereditary, and politics is often treated like a family business.
For example, almost one-fourth of the members of the 1960 Chamber
of Deputies were the descendants of men who had been appointed to
the legislative assemblies under the French Mandate. Furthermore,
it was not uncommon for more than one member of the same family to
hold office in the same government; for example, four different
members of the Sulh family have held the position of prime
minister. In the 1970s and 1980s, Amin Jumayyil (the
Phalange Party--see Glossary),
Dani Shamun (the National Liberal Party), and
Walid Jumblatt (the Progressive Socialist Party) inherited their
fathers' political mantles. Occasionally, the family of a
zaim would control an entire sect, as the Asad clan did over
the Shias of southern Lebanon in the first half of the twentieth
century.
Thus, in 1987 Lebanon's constitutionally based political system
had to be viewed through the overlay of clientelism, a system that
had persisted in one form or another for over a hundred years. Even
so, this system, although unlikely to disappear in the near term,
perhaps was being challenged by a post-1975 Civil War development:
the rise of the militias. Although some militias were still
controlled by descendants of traditional zuama, others, like
Amal, Hizballah (Party of God), and the Lebanese Forces, were led
by figures who had arrived relatively late on the political scene
(see Political Parties and Groupings
, this ch.). These militias
were not just military organizations; through military force they
often gained control of revenues that formerly went to government
coffers
(see The Budget
, ch. 3). In this way, by controlling armed
might and the purse, the militias were appropriating the basic
stock-in-trade of the traditional zaim system. The patronclient relationship, therefore, rather than dying out may merely
have taken one more turn along an evolutionary track.
Data as of December 1987
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