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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Lebanon
Index
In December 1976 Sarkis appointed as prime minister Salim al
Huss (also spelled Hoss), who chose a cabinet of technocrats that
was authorized to rule by decree for six months (later extended).
One of the first tasks this government faced was the reorganization
of the army, most of whose members had deserted during the Civil
War to join one of the various factions. Although the intention of
the Cairo Agreement was to station Lebanese military units in
southern Lebanon, instead the ADF controlled the area only to the
Litani River, leaving the region south of it in the hands of the
Palestinians. So strong was their presence that certain areas
became known as Fatahland, after the main PLO grouping. Relations
with Syria and the problem of the Palestinians in southern Lebanon
remained central concerns for Lebanon throughout the period from
1976 to 1982.
The degree of cooperation between the Sarkis administration and
Syrian authorities varied, depending on external circumstances in
the region. Initially, recognizing its dependence on Syria and
Syrian military forces to preserve the peace, the Lebanese
government generally cooperated. By late 1977, however, as a result
of the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations and Syria's consequent
rapprochement with the PLO, Lebanese-Syrian relations cooled. In
its own role and in its use of the ADF, Syria found itself in an
awkward position because it could not fully exert its authority in
Lebanon unless it succeeded in disarming both the Lebanese
Christian militias and the PLO. However, it was not prepared to pay
the political and military price for doing so and consequently was
obliged to maintain a large army in Lebanon, causing a serious
drain on Syria's economy.
Relations between Lebanon and Syria deteriorated further when
fighting occurred between the ADF and the Lebanese Army in East
Beirut in February 1978, followed by a massive ADF bombardment of
Christian sectors of Beirut in July. President Sarkis resigned in
protest against the latter action but was persuaded to reconsider.
Syrian bombardments of East Beirut ended in October 1978 as a
result of a UN Security Council cease-fire resolution that
indirectly implicated Syria as a party to the Lebanese Civil War.
To strengthen its influence over the Sarkis government, Syria
threatened several times, in late 1978 and early 1979, to withdraw
its forces from Lebanon. But after a relatively cordial meeting
between presidents Sarkis and Assad in Damascus in May 1979, Syria
stated that the ADF--which by then had become a totally Syrian
force--would "remain in Lebanon as long as the Arab interests so
require."
From early 1980 onward, Syria became increasingly preoccupied
with its domestic difficulties, leaving the Sarkis administration
with a freer hand. However, significant ADF action against the
Phalange Party militia, headed by Bashir Jumayyil, took place
around Zahlah (fifty kilometers east of Beirut) in late 1980 and
April 1981. This military threat to its Christian ally caused
Israel to intervene, and it shot down two Syrian helicopters over
Lebanon. Syria, in turn, introduced SA-2 and SA-6 surface-to-air
missiles into Lebanon; the resulting "missile crisis" threatened to
cause a regional war, but this possibility was averted through the
mediation efforts of other Arab nations and the United States
(see The Missile Crisis
, ch. 5).
Relations with the Palestinians were complex and interrelated
with influences in southern Lebanon. In the early days of the Civil
War, the relative peace in southern Lebanon had attracted Lebanese
refugees from other areas. After the Palestinians left the area to
fight elsewhere, Christian militias, led by Lebanese Army officers
supported by Israel, took control of a large part of the south.
Israel had forged this link in 1977 with Lebanese officers as part
of its "Good Fence" policy to prevent a Palestinian presence near
Israel's northern border
(see Operation Litani
, ch. 5).
However, conflicting interests were at work in southern
Lebanon. On the one hand, the Sarkis government saw an opportunity
to regain control of the area. On the other hand, the Palestinians,
who objected to Syrian efforts to confiscate their heavy weapons
and control their activities in the rest of Lebanon, felt they
would have greater freedom to operate in the south. For their part,
the Syrians wished to eliminate Israeli influence there, while the
Israelis wanted direct contact with the population of southern
Lebanon and wished to keep both the Syrians and the Palestinians
out of the area.
As early as 1977, fighting occurred in the south between the
Christian militia under Major Saad Haddad and the Palestinians, who
had reinfiltrated the area and were receiving Syrian assistance.
The resulting large-scale destruction in the southern area, which
Haddad had renamed "Free Lebanon" and which was inhabited mainly by
Shia Muslims and Maronite Christians, caused the migration of
approximately 200,000 people, or one-third of the population.
To clarify the provisions of the October 1976 Cairo Agreement
(preceded by an earlier 1969 agreement) concerning Palestinian
activity in southern Lebanon, representatives of Lebanon, Syria (in
the guise of the ADF), and the Palestinians held a conference at
Shtawrah in July and August 1977. The resulting Shtawrah Accord
basically endorsed the Syrian position, which called for the
Palestinians to withdraw fifteen kilometers from the Israeli
border, with this area to be occupied by the Lebanese Army, and
charged the ADF with protecting the southern coastal area.
Execution of the agreement, however, was difficult because neither
the Palestinians nor the Lebanese Army wished to make the first
move, and Israel was apprehensive of increased Syrian influence in
the area.
The situation in the south was exacerbated by the entry of the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) into southern Lebanon in retaliation
for a March 11, 1978, Palestinian guerrilla attack on an Israeli
bus near Tel Aviv, in which several people were killed. The IDF
staged an all-out attack, and over 25,000 troops occupied positions
as far north as the Litani River and remained in Lebanon for three
months. The UN called on Israel to withdraw, and the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon was sent to replace the Israelis, who
withdrew in stages. When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in
June, Haddad's South Lebanon Army (SLA--formerly the Free Lebanon
Army) took over most of the areas Israel previously controlled.
Throughout the Sarkis administration, various shifts were also
occurring in domestic politics. Prime Minister Huss, a moderate
Sunni Muslim, was unable to form a national unity government, as
requested by Sarkis in the spring of 1978, but remained in office
for two more years. In October 1980, Shafiq al Wazzan, another
moderate Sunni and chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council, became
prime minister. His government experienced even greater
difficulties in holding office, with more than half of the Chamber
of Deputies refusing to endorse his cabinet. The inability of the
Lebanese Army to maintain any effective control over the country
was a major factor contributing to the weakness of these Lebanese
governments.
Additional shifts occurred among Lebanese military and
political groups. The Shias continued to grow in importance, and in
1980 clashes broke out in the south between Amal, the Shia military
arm, which was becoming increasingly a political instrument, and
Fatah, a part of the PLO
(see Sectarian Groups
, ch. 4). On the
Christian side, the Lebanese Front experienced severe internal
disagreements. In July 1980 Bashir Jumayyil and his Phalangist
militia scored a resounding triumph over the Tigers, the militia of
the National Liberals under Camille Shamun and his son Dani. This
victory paved the way for Jumayyil's subsequent prominence. Israeli
support of the Lebanese Front was curtailed in 1981, as a condition
set by the Lebanese National Movement and by Syria for any attempt
at an overall resolution of the Lebanese situation.
Lebanon's security deteriorated significantly in late 1981 and
the first half of 1982. There were continuous clashes in West
Beirut, Tripoli, and southern Lebanon during this period. In
September automible bombings occurred in West Beirut, Sidon, and
Tripoli, along with a campaign of terror against foreign diplomats.
These violent incidents were followed by terrorist attacks against
Muslim and Christian religious leaders in April 1982. The result of
these large-scale breaches of the peace was a growing
disillusionment on the part of Lebanese Muslims with the ability of
the Lebanese National Movement, the PLO, or Syria (through the ADF)
to control matters in areas where they were nominally in charge. As
a consequence, more moderate and conservative Sunni and Shia
figures gained leadership opportunities; a number of them overtly
favored the Lebanese government's reestablishing its authority over
the country. Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad Din (also seen as
Chamseddine), vice chairman of the Higher Shia Islamic Council, for
example, requested that the Lebanese Army be sent in to quell
fighting between the Shia Amal and the PLO in the south, the Biqa
Valley, and parts of West Beirut. Clashes in Tripoli, the largest
Sunni city, during this period also resulted in requests that the
Lebanese Army enter the area.
The general discontent with the situation on the part of
various elements of the population provided a favorable opportunity
for the Phalange Party's efforts in the 1982 presidential campaign.
Bashir Jumayyil saw himself as a leading candidate because the
Phalange Party had established its political power by overwhelming
the Shamun militia in 1980 and had the largest Lebanese militia, by
that time called the Lebanese Forces
(see Sectarian Groups
, ch. 4).
However, Bashir's close ties to Israel and his proposals for
eliminating both the ADF and the PLA from the Lebanese scene
understandably met with sharp opposition from Assad and Arafat,
both of whom considered Jumayyil's brother Amin more acceptable.
This, then, was the situation in Lebanon when Israel invaded on
June 6, 1982, in retaliation for the assassination attempt on the
Israeli ambassador to London
(see The 1982 Israeli Invasion and Its Aftermath
, ch. 5).
* * *
There are several important scholarly works on Lebanon. Philip
K. Hitti's Lebanon in History remains the best single source
for the ancient and medieval periods. The modern period is well
covered in David C. Gordon's The Republic of Lebanon, John
B. Christopher's Lebanon: Yesterday and Today, Don Peretz's
The Middle East Today, and Middle East Contemporary
Survey (Volumes 1-7). An excellent account of the Mandate
period is found in Stephen H. Longrigg's Syria and Lebanon under
French Mandate. The latest unrest and civil war in Lebanon is
covered in David Gilmour's Lebanon: The Fractured Country,
Helena Cobban's The Making of Modern Lebanon, and Itamar
Rabinovch's The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983. (For further
information and complete citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of December 1987
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