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WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
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Lebanon
Index
Like most of the Middle East, Lebanon has a long history of
conflict and conquest. Unlike other Middle Eastern nations,
however, Lebanon also has a long history of inviting, or at the
least acquiescing in, foreign military intervention. Lebanese
leaders have traditionally traded sovereignty for security.
Prior to its establishment as a sovereign and independent state
shortly after World War II, Lebanon had existed under centuries of
foreign domination. Many Lebanese cities capitulated to the
invasions of the Crusader's, in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, and Lebanon's Christians collaborated with the French
Crusaders. In the early seventeenth century, the
Druze (see Glossary)
ruler Fakhr ad Din II concluded a secret treaty with
Ferdinand I, duke of Tuscany in Italy, to oppose the Ottomans.
Italian mercenaries helped to organize and equip his army on the
European model. In 1840 the British and the Ottoman Turks bombarded
Beirut at the behest of the
Maronites (see Glossary) and the
Druzes, who had united to fight the invasion of the Egyptian
Muhammad Ali. In the 1850s, the Druzes cultivated a special
relationship with the British, while the French maintained their
traditional role as protectors of the Maronites. In 1860 European
nations landed troops in Beirut to protect Christians and to end a
massacre by the Druzes that had claimed over 10,000 Christian
lives. And after World War I, Lebanese Christians supported the
French Mandate.
The Ottoman Empire ruled Lebanon indirectly for almost 400
years (beginning in 1516) by delegating authority to local amirs
(princes), who raised feudal armies consisting mainly of nonLebanese mercenaries and some Lebanese conscripts. During this
period, the amirs intentionally integrated their militia, and
Christian Maronites and Druzes served side by side. In the
settlement that followed the Druze massacre of Christians in 1860,
Lebanon was made an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire ruled
by a Christian mutasarrif (governor) appointed by the
Sublime Porte, i.e., the imperial ruler, but subject to the
approval of the European powers that had intervened to help
stabilize the area
(see Religious Conflicts
, ch. 1). The
mutasarrif was empowered to establish a small local militia,
whose officers were apportioned from religious groups in the area.
The provincial militia was a voluntary organization, and it
disintegrated with the advent of World War I.
After the establishment of the League of Nations mandate over
Lebanon in April 1920, France formed the Troupes Spéciales du
Levant (Levantine Special Forces), which were composed of Lebanese
and Syrian enlisted personnel but commanded predominantly by French
officers. The percentage of Lebanese and Syrian officers in the
force increased gradually, however, especially after the outbreak
of World War II. By 1945 approximately 90 percent of the officers
in the Troupes Spéciales du Levant were Arabs, and the force had
attained its maximum strength of about 14,000.
During World War II, Lebanese troops fought effectively in
Lebanon with the Vichy French forces against British and Free
French forces. After the surrender of Vichy forces in the Middle
East in July 1941, volunteers from the Troupes Spéciales du Levant
were enlisted in the Free French forces and participated in combat
in North Africa, Italy, and southern France.
In June 1943, the French reconstituted units of the Troupes
Spéciales du Levant, which were then attached to the British forces
in the Middle East. In 1945, as the result of continuing pressure
by Lebanese leaders for control of their own forces, the French
turned over to them the Lebanese units of the Troupes Spéciales du
Levant. These units totaled about 3,000 men and became the nucleus
of the Lebanese Army.
Following independence, the government of Lebanon intentionally
kept its armed forces small and weak--a "toy army," as one expert
described it. Christian politicians, aware of the ubiquity of
military dictatorships in Arab nations, feared that Muslims might
use the armed forces as a vehicle for seizing power in a military
coup d'état. Furthermore, as laissez-faire businessmen, the
Christians appeared unwilling to incur the cost of maintaining a
large standing army. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Lebanon never
spent more than 4 percent of its gross national product on the
military budget. Furthermore, many Christian Lebanese feared that
a large army would inevitably embroil Lebanon in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Muslim politicians, on the other hand, were wary that a
strong army, because it would be commandedby Christians, be used
prejudicially against Muslim interests. At the same time, however,
they tended to feel that the military should be strong enough to
play a part in the Arab-Israeli struggle. Finally, prominent
politicians of all religious denominations have tended also to be
feudal warlords commanding their own private militias and fearing
that a strong army would erode their personal power.
Because of this disagreement over its role, the Lebanese Army
has played little part in Lebanese politics. Furthermore, it has
remained on the sidelines even with regard to issues within the
scope of its mandate to preserve security. Consistent with this
circumscribed role, the Lebanese Army's most salient mission has
been to supervise and referee Lebanon's traditionally violent
elections, which even in relatively peaceful times have been a
volatile mixture of ballots and bullets.
Data as of December 1987
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