MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
|
|
Laos
Index
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Laos, 1994
A LANDLOCKED NATION in the center of the Southeast
Asian
peninsula, the country that is now the Lao People's
Democratic
Republic (LPDR, or Laos), is bordered by Cambodia, China,
Burma,
Thailand, and Vietnam (only Cambodia is smaller),
neighbors which,
to varying degrees, have influenced Laotian historical,
cultural,
and political development. Slightly smaller than the state
of
Oregon, Laos is largely mountainous and forested; only
about 4
percent of its total land area is arable. The tropical
monsoon
climate is a major determining factor in agricultural
productivity
and transportation.
Laos was inhabited five or more millennia ago by
Austroasiatic
peoples. From the first century A.D., princely fiefdoms
based on
wet rice cultivation and associated with the pottery and
bronze
culture of Ban Chiang developed in the middle Mekong
Valley.
Various other kingdoms reflecting the cultures of Cham and
Mon
peoples existed in the region; the fiefdoms were subject
to the
influence of
mandala (see Glossary) in the central
Mekong
region. Migrations in the seventh century continued to
expand both
the various influences and the cultural mix of the region.
By the
eighth century, the Mon mandala were under Khmer
domination.
Beginning in the thirteenth century, Mongols exercised
a
decisive political influence in the middle Mekong Valley;
dynastic
conflicts associated with their intervention led to the
founding of
the Kingdom of Lan Xang (Kingdom of the Million
Elephants). At that
time, the beginnings of a multiethnic state--in the
configuration
of small confederative communities--were evident. The
recorded
history of Laos began in the fourteenth century with Fa
Ngum (r.
1354-73), the first king of Lan Xang. Under Fa Ngum, the
territory
of Lan Xang was extended; it remained in these approximate
borders
for another 300 years.
The reign of King Souligna Vongsa (r. 1633-90)--a time
when the
kingdom was united and ruled by its own king--has been
referred to
as the golden age of Laos. With the death of Souligna
Vongsa,
however, succession struggles led to the division of Lan
Xang.
Conflicts with Burma, Siam, Vietnam, and the Khmer kingdom
continued in the eighteenth century culminating in Siamese
domination.
Early in the nineteenth century, Siam held hegemony
over much
of the territory of contemporary Laos, which then
consisted of the
principalities of Louangphrabang, Vientiane, and
Champasak. Siam
faced contention from France--which had established a
protectorate
over Vietnam--and sought to extend its influence in
Indochina. By
the end of the nineteenth century, France had supplanted
Siam as
the dominant power. Laos was integrated into the French
colonial
empire of Indochina as a group of directly ruled
provinces, except
for Louangphrabang, which was ruled as a protectorate.
Laos remained under French administration from about
1890 until
World War II, when Japan occupied French Indochina.
Japanese
military authorities induced King Sisavong Vong of
Louangphrabang
to declare the independence of his kingdom from France in
April
1945, prior to Japan's surrender in the war. In September
1945, an
"independent" government under the
Lao Issara (see Glossary) defied
the king and declared the union of Vientiane and Champasak
with
Louangphrabang. The following year, French troops
reoccupied the
country, conferring limited autonomy on the unified
Kingdom of Laos
within the French Union. A constitution was promulgated in
1947,
and elections were held for a National Assembly. The
independence
of Laos was formally recognized within the French Union in
1949;
Laos remained a member of the union until 1953.
The 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina provided for
the
cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam--the first
Indochina War--the struggle for independence against
French
colonial forces, and the withdrawal of foreign forces. The
Royal
Lao Government agreed to include the Pathet Lao (Lao
Nation; Pathet
Lao became the generally accepted term for the
communist-led
guerrilla movement) in the government coalition. Phôngsali
and
Houaphan (Sam Neua) provinces were designated areas of
regroupment
for Pathet Lao forces, "pending a political settlement."
Negotiations between the Royal Lao Government and the
Pathet
Lao continued from 1955 to 1957. The Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao
Patriotic
Front; superseded by the Lao Front for National
Construction in
1979), established in 1956, served as a political front
for the
Pathet Lao and was secretly guided by the Lao People's
Party, which
was established in 1955 as part of the Indochinese
Communist Party.
In 1972 the Lao People's Party changed its name to the Lao
People's
Revolutionary Party (LPRP), since 1975 it has been the
ruling
party.
A coalition government, including some Pathet Lao
personalities, was formed by Prince Souvanna Phouma in
1957. But,
it collapsed the following year, and rightist politicians
took
over. United States aid increased greatly. The communist
insurgency
resumed in northern Laos in 1959.
In 1960 Kong Le, a young Royalist paratroop captain,
led a coup
d'état to install a Neutralist government under Souvanna
Phouma--
neither rightist nor Pathet Lao--which would end the
fratricidal
fighting. But, within a year, rightist forces under
General Phoumi
Nosavan drove Souvanna Phouma's government from Vientiane.
The
Neutralists then naively allied themselves with the Pathet
Lao and
received airlift support from the Soviet Union. North
Vietnamese
troops intervened in Laos in regular units for the first
time,
inflicting heavy losses on the rightists receiving
military and
economic aid from the United States.
A Second Geneva Conference on Laos was held in 1961-62.
Agreements provided for the independence and neutrality of
Laos--
something realized only on paper. A second coalition
government
formed in July 1962 proved to be equally short-lived. The
civil war
quickly resumed and continued into the 1970s, with each
side--
backed either by the United States or Vietnam (supported
by the
Soviet Union)--trading accusations of violating the
agreements.
Souvanna Phouma, prime minister in the first coalition
government
in 1957, again following Kong Le's coup in 1960, and again
in July
1962 following that year's Geneva agreements, became prime
minister
of a third coalition government, or Provisional Government
of
National Union, with the participation of the Lao
Patriotic Front
in 1974. (He resigned upon the establishment of the LPDR
in 1975.)
The collapse of South Vietnam and Cambodia in mid-1975
played
into the hands of the Lao Patriotic Front and hastened the
decline
of the third coalition government. The LPRP, the
mastermind behind
the Lao Patriotic Front, dismissed the Provisional
Government of
National Union and persuaded King Savang Vatthana to
abdicate.
The Lao People's Democratic Republic was proclaimed on
December
2, 1975, ending the era of a conservative monarchy
dominated by a
few powerful families. Souphanouvong became the first
president of
the LPDR. A half-brother of Souvanna Phouma, cousin of
Savang
Vatthana, one of the original founders of the Neo Lao Hak
Xat, and
the titular head of the Lao Patriotic Front, Souphanouvong
was
known as the "red prince" because of his royal lineage and
communist associations. The LPDR has been a single-party
communist
government since its proclamation.
Ethnically diverse, Laos has more than forty ethnic
groups.
Lao is the distinction for some of the ethnic
groups;
Laotian is the term used to refer to all people of
Laos, or
the national population. The Lao, descendants of the Tai
peoples
who began migrating from China in the first millennium
A.D.,
constitute approximately half the people of Laos. Although
government rhetoric celebrates the multiethnic nature of
the nation
and asserts that it wishes to reduce the favoritism
historically
extended toward the "lowland" Lao Loum and the
discrimination
against the "midland" Lao Theung and "upland" Lao Sung,
the ethnic
minorities are underrepresented in the LPRP Central
Committee, the
National Assembly, and in government offices. (Some of the
ethnic
minorities have populations of only a few hundred
persons.)
Although the different ethnic groups have different
residential
patterns, agricultural practices, and religious beliefs,
for all
groups the village community has a kinship nexus, which
may also
differ in form. The mountainous topography, which has
inhibited
roadbuilding and limited exchanges among villages and
ethnic
groups, has contributed to maintaining distinctions among
ethnic
groups.
Buddhism was the state religion of the Kingdom of Laos;
the
present constitution formally proclaims religious freedom.
Although
many communist nations do not look favorably upon the
practice of
religion--constitutional stipulations
notwithstanding--this is not
necessarily the case in Laos, where approximately 85
percent of
citizens are Buddhist. Theravada Buddhism is predominant
among the
Lao Loum and some Lao Theung groups; animist beliefs are
widespread
among the entire population. The wat, the Buddhist
temple or
monastery complex, is a central fixture of village life,
and the
site of major religious festivals, which occur several
times a
year. Since the LPDR's establishment in 1975, the
government has
attempted to manipulate Buddhism to support its political
goals,
although without provoking a schism in the sangha,
or
clergy.
The population as of mid-1994 was estimated at
approximately
4.7 million people. The population growth rate is
relatively high--
estimated at approximately 2.9 percent per year. But,
child and
infant mortality rates are also high, and life expectancy
averages
less than fifty-two years. Laos has a relatively low
population
density; more than 85 percent of the population is rural,
living in
small villages of typically less than 1,000 people. Rural
life is
tied to the changing agricultural seasons. Of the "urban"
areas,
most people live in the Mekong River valley towns and
those of its
tributaries. Vientiane, the capital and largest city, is
also the
center of a very limited industrial sector. The reach of
recent
economic reforms--and the change and opportunity they
offer--have
not extended much beyond the Vientiane plain.
Education and social services are rudimentary, although
some
improvements have been made. The LPDR has made a
commitment to five
years of universal primary education, but limited
financial
resources and a lack of trained teachers and teaching
materials
have restricted educational opportunities. Enrollments
have
increased, however. Western health care is largely
confined to the
more "urban" areas, dictated in part by the difficulties
of
transportation. Similarly, improvements in health care are
constrained by finances and the limited numbers of trained
health
care workers.
Presenting a clear quantitative economic profile of
Laos is
complicated by the lack of recent (or other) statistics,
as well as
by reliability, as there are internal contradictions in
many
statistics. Nonetheless, Laos is clearly one of the
poorest
countries in the world, with per capita GNP estimates
ranging from
US$295 to US$350 per annum. A rural, subsistence,
agricultural
economy heavily influenced by weather--that is conditions
of
drought or flood--Laos still has not met self-sufficiency
in food
production. LPDR officials frequently note that Laos
remains
"underdeveloped," has a largely unskilled work force, and
needs
infrastructure development. Such advancements are
recognized as
particularly important in such fields as agro-forestry and
hydropower, two areas with potentially high foreign
exchange
earnings. Imports far outpace exports. Even primary
exports--
hydroelectricity, timber, and coffee--are limited. The
potential
for the exportation of mineral resources, particularly tin
and
gypsum, has not yet been realized.
Centralized economic measures of a command economy were
instituted when the LPDR was proclaimed in 1975. Beginning
with the
New Economic Mechanism in 1986, however, and with various
other
reform measures since then, Laos has opened up to market
forces.
The government has also encouraged both foreign and
domestic
investment--especially for the private sector. Reforms
have
abolished agricultural cooperatives, privatized most state
enterprises while encouraging private-sector initiatives,
and
revised the taxation system. Although still dominated by
the
agricultural sector, the economy has been stimulated and
the
availability of goods has increased. However, Laos remains
dependent on continued foreign aid and concessional loans.
As the LPRP came to power in late 1975 on the coattails
of
communist victories in Vietnam and Cambodia, the LPDR
naturally
turned to the communist bloc for economic support and
received aid
from both the Soviet bloc countries and China. Since the
collapse
of the Soviet Union, however, Soviet bloc aid has halted
and
Vietnamese patronage has diminished, necessitating a
search for
other investors and aid donors.
The situation with regard to economic assistance from
Russia
has begun to change. During 1994 Laos and Russia signed
two
cooperation agreements. In March the Lao National Council
of Trade
and Industry and the Russian Council of Trade and Industry
signed
documents on scientific and technical cooperation. Laos
will
receive technical assistance from Russia and funds from
third
countries, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary), and
interested businessmen for programs to protect the
environment,
conserve and restore forests, raise harvest efficiency,
eradicate
crop pests, and increase mining and exploration efforts.
In August,
Laos signed a trade protocol with Russia for economic and
trade
cooperation. According to its terms, Laos will buy
construction
materials, electric appliances, spare parts for aircraft,
and other
items; Russia will purchase tin, coffee, tropical wood
products,
and clothing from Laos.
In the early 1990s, Laos received increased aid from
Japan and
from Western nations--including Australia, France, and
Sweden--as
well as increased support from international and regional
organizations. Foreign assistance in 1993-94 was estimated
at
US$211.7 million, of which US$141.4 million was gratis aid
and
US$70.3 million was in the form of loans bearing low
interest
rates.
Assistance from the
World Bank (see Glossary), the IMF,
and the
Asian Development Bank has both guided and been predicated
upon
reform measures. Their programs, however, have tended to
be
concentrated in Vientiane and the Mekong Valley centers,
with
improvements in infrastructure thus benefitting only the
urban
areas; rural areas have lagged behind on the developmental
scale.
The LPDR's Socio-economic Development Plan 1993-2000
emphasizes
the production of foodstuffs, commercial products, rural
development, human resources development, and the
exploitation of
natural resources in conjunction with concerted efforts to
protect
the environment. It also calls for an expansion of
economic
relations and cooperation with the outside world. The
importance of
infrastructure development is also recognized.
Roadbuilding is seen
as strategically important for socioeconomic development--
especially with regard to programs for public health and
education-
-particularly for rural areas and areas inhabited by
ethnic
minorities. The Public Investment Programme (PIP), a part
of the
plan, is to be supported by donors for as much as US$1.4
billion.
PIP targets include irrigating unused land, planting
forests, and
moving away from subsistence production and slash-and-burn
agriculture toward sedentary market agriculture and a more
diversified economy.
As elsewhere, foreign and economic relations are
linked; for
Laos, this is particularly true with regard to Thailand,
its
primary trading and investment partner. Laos and Thailand
must
constantly negotiate a variety of political and economic
issues,
including the status of Lao refugees and refugee camps in
Thailand
as well as LPDR claims that Thailand is sheltering Lao
insurgents.
Laos has pressed for additional border crossing points and
clearer
border demarcation; free and fair competition in providing
transport services for cross-border trade; cooperation in
various
economic and technical projects and joint trade and
investment
enterprises; and cooperation between banks and customs
services.
Thailand is the primary purchaser of timber and
hydroelectricity
from the LPDR; the export of hydroelectric power is
paradoxical
given the low level of electrification in Laotian
villages.
Notwithstanding several border incidents in the late
1980s,
relations between Laos and Thailand have improved over the
past
decade. More recently, the April 1994 opening of the
Friendship
Bridge linking the two countries has provided for greater
commercial potential--increased trade, tourism, and
transit. And,
in July 1994, a joint venture agreement was signed to
allow a Thai
company to build and develop a special economic zone--with
nine
projects--in Vientiane Municipality. The two countries
have also
agreed in principle to establish consular missions outside
each
others' capitals. Insurgent raids in rural areas,
primarily from
the Hmong, but also from smaller Lao resistance groups
based in
Thailand, complicate Lao-Thai relations and are an
annoyance, but
not a threat, to the stability of Laos.
The improved investment climate in Laos has also raised
the
possibility of building a rail line; currently there is
none. In
November 1994, Thailand was granted permission to conduct
a six-
month feasibility study on a railway line between
Vientiane and
Nong Khai, Thailand, via the Friendship Bridge. Forty-two
percent
of the cost of the survey will be paid by the British
government,
the remainder by a Thai company. If it is found
economically
feasible to develop a railway, and the Thai company
decides to
invest in its construction, the National Railway Company,
Limited
of Laos will be established. The LPDR will hold 25 percent
of the
railroad company, the Thai company the remaining 75
percent.
As noted, the LPDR was established following communist
party
victories in Vietnam and Cambodia. Similarities with other
one-
party communist states exist. The party dominates the
government
and still operates under relative secrecy. High-ranking
party
members occupy high-level posts in the government,
military, and
mass organizations, and there is a distinct overlap of
military
personnel. In fact, the ministers of interior, agriculture
and
forestry, and national defense are army generals, as is
the prime
minister. At the third congress of the Lao People's
Revolutionary
Youth Union held in May 1994, 214 of 247 delegates were
LPRP
members.
Even though the party's role and powers are scarcely
mentioned
in the constitution, the LPRP determines national policies
through
its nine-member Political Bureau (Politburo) and
fifty-two-member
Central Committee. A constitution was not adopted until
1991--
sixteen years after the LPDR's founding. The executive
branch
retains the authority to issue binding decrees, but the
party
retains the power to make critical decisions.
The legislative branch is by constitutional provision
the
highest organ of state. Elections are held by secret
ballot. The
first elections to the Supreme People's Assembly were held
in March
1989, almost fourteen years after the LPDR's proclamation;
the
opening session was in May-June. Elections to the National
Assembly
(the renamed Supreme People's Assembly) for five-year
terms were
held in December 1992; the first session did not convene
until
February 1993. Although more than 150 candidates vied for
eighty-
five seats in the assembly, most candidates belong to the
LPRP--as
it is the only legal party--and most are approved by the
LPRP prior
to the elections. Although the National Assembly seemed to
be
playing a larger role in the passage of legislation in the
early
1990s, in reality the assembly merely "discusses and
endorses" all
laws in controlled policy debates during the twice-yearly
plenary
sessions.
The LPRP has grown from approximately 25,000 members at
the
inception of the LPDR in 1975 to approximately 60,000
members at
the time of the Fifth Party Congress in March 1991. (By
contrast,
in 1993, there were more than 70,000 Lao Federation of
Trade Union
members.) During the Fifth Party Congress, the LPRP
removed several
elder statesmen from the Politburo and elected some
slightly
younger cadres to a new Central Committee. The party is
not immune
to internal criticism and has acknowledged official
corruption (and
nepotism) as a serious and continuing problem.
Formal avenues of information and communication have
been
limited by lack of funds since French colonial rule and
are now
tightly controlled. Dissemination of information is
sporadic and
further restricted by controls on the distribution of
printing
materials. Radio and television services are also
monopolized by
the party. Broadcasts from Thailand, however, have a large
audience
in Laos.
Broad security measures limit freedoms as under other
communist
regimes; freedoms may be guaranteed in the constitution,
but in
reality they are quite restricted. After the communist
victory in
1975, many members of the previous Royal Lao Government
and
military who had remained in the country instead of
fleeing were
placed in reeducation centers or "seminar camps." "Social
deviants"
as well as political opponents were held in these centers;
these
camps have been closed and most "political prisoners" have
since
been released. However, Amnesty International continues to
press
for the release of persons still in detention.
After the LPRP seized power, and during its
consolidation of
the government, some 350,000 persons--of whom many were
Hmong
belonging to Vang Pao's United States-funded
irregulars--fled the
country. Many persons remained in refugee camps in
Thailand; some
departed from there to third countries; still others
resided in
southern China. The refugee situation has recently changed
significantly.
Although there are variations in the numbers of
refugees
repatriated and/or remaining in the camps according to the
sources
reporting, it can be said that a significantly larger
number of
refugees have been repatriated or resettled in a third
country
compared with those who remain in Thailand. The United
Nations
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began
a
voluntary repatriation program in 1980. Ten years later,
fewer than
6,000 refugees had been repatriated under UNHCR
supervision.
Approximately 15,000 refugees had returned to Laos
independently,
and the vast majority--approximately 300,000--had
resettled abroad.
In 1989 there were an estimated 90,000 Lao refugees in
Thailand; as
of June 1991, an estimated 60,000 refugees remained. This
number
was further reduced by half at the end of 1993. As of
January 1995,
UNHCR estimates were that only 9,000 refugees, mainly
Hmong,
remained in Thai camps. Vientiane estimated that the more
than
8,000 refugees remaining in Thailand at the end of 1994
would be
repatriated by the end of 1995. Laos, Thailand, and the
UNHCR have
agreed to resettle or repatriate all remaining Lao
refugees by the
end of 1995.
The foreign relations of Laos have in large part been
determined by the country's physical location and its
desire to
maintain national security. During the communist
revolutionary
struggle in Indochina, Laos had close ties with Vietnam--a
"special
relationship"--which was formalized by a twenty-five-year
treaty of
friendship and cooperation signed in 1977. More recently,
Laos has
sought to improve relations with China, an ally during the
Indochina Wars, but with whom relations deteriorated
following the
1979 China-Vietnam conflict. Trade between the two
countries has
increased, and Laos has received some economic and
military aid. In
May 1994, a high-level LPDR military delegation paid an
official
visit to China to promote relations of friendship and
"all-around
solidarity between the two armies."
The end of the Cold War, concomitant with the limited
ability
of the former Soviet bloc and Vietnam to offer economic
assistance,
has influenced the LPDR to become more flexible in its
foreign
policy in the 1990s. Since 1992 Laos has held observer
status with
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); this
has been
viewed as a likely precursor to membership in that
organization.
And, despite various cooperation projects with the
Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) during the 1980s,
in
January 1994 Laos contracted with a Republic of Korea
(South Korea)
construction company to build a hydropower dam on the Ho
River in
Champasak Province. Laos resumed diplomatic relations with
Israel
in December 1993. The LPDR minister of foreign affairs
visited
Israel in August 1994; and Israel has agreed to provide
training
grants to LPDR officials. In September 1994, Laos
established
diplomatic relations with South Africa and Lithuania.
Diplomatic relations between the United States and Laos
were
maintained upon the proclamation of the LPDR in 1975, and
the two
countries have seen a slow, but steady, improvement in
relations
since 1982. Two key--and intertwining--components have
dominated
the United States relationship with Laos: accounting for
those
Americans classified as prisoners of war (POW) or missing
in action
(MIA) at the end of the Indochina Wars, and controlling
the growth
of, and trafficking in, narcotics. Cooperation in one area
begets
cooperation in the other. As a measure of sincerity for
improving
relations, the United States has sought greater LPDR
cooperation in
providing information on the fate of POW/MIAs and in
searching for
their remains. As of September 1994, thirty-three joint
missions of
field searches and excavations of crash sites had been
conducted.
In August 1994, the two sides agreed to carry out six
joint field
activities in the future, and the United States was
permitted to
increase the number of personnel on its teams. In
counternarcotics
cooperation, Laos agreed to step up its efforts to combat
the
cultivation, production, and transshipment of opium,
heroin, and
marijuana. Crop substitution programs in conjunction with
the
United States and the United Nations Development
Programme, as well
as narcotics training programs and improved law
enforcement
measures, have been instituted. In 1994, after four years
of United
States certification (with explanation) for
counternarcotics
cooperation, Laos was granted a national interest waiver
in lieu of
full certification because of poor counternarcotics
performance.
(Certification is dependent on counternarcotics
cooperation either
with the United States or with the LPDR taking steps on
its own to
achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives of
the 1988
United Nations Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances). In 1995 Laos was again certified
as
cooperating fully. If the United States were to deny
certification,
continued efforts in counternarcotics cooperation and
cooperation
in POW/MIA accounting would be jeopardized.
Counternarcotics
efforts have made limited progress, constrained in part by
limited
training, management and administrative skills, and law
enforcement, as well as by LPDR finances and higher
priorities. A
decline in opium production in the 1993-94 growing season
was a
result of adverse weather rather than decreased areas
under
cultivation.
The LPDR is poorly equipped in the national security
arena, and
the need for modernization is evident. Constrained by its
economic
limitations and foreign assistance geared toward economic
(primarily infrastructure) improvements, the Lao People's
Army has
been unable either to modernize its outdated equipment or
to
elevate the level of training.
The primary mission of the armed forces has been to
maintain
national defense and public security, political stability,
and
social order. However, national defense objectives and the
security
environment have changed. The armed forces are no longer
fighting
a war of national liberation, although their wartime
exploits are
still extolled in the official media. Domestic opposition
is
contained by the police and a system of party control.
External
opposition, in particular resistance elements based in
Thailand, is
limited. Each of these factors has contributed to a
reduction in
the size of the armed forces in the 1990s. In 1991 there
were
approximately 55,000 persons in the armed forces; by 1994
armed
forces personnel reportedly totaled 37,000.
The armed forces now have the additional assignment of
contributing to socioeconomic and rural development, with
the aim
of achieving greater self-sufficiency. Thus, the military
is
ordered to check and boost crop cultivation and monitor
livestock
transport; grow vegetables for daily meals; and create
favorable
conditions for promoting poultry and fish breeding. In
1989 the
Corporation for Agro-Forestry Development and Service was
established. Connected to the Ministry of National
Defense, the
corporation is responsible for improving and building the
agricultural base and engaging in public security
activities in
three southern districts of Xaignabouri Province. In the
five years
since its establishment, the corporation has repaired and
paved
roads and built irrigation systems. In another venue, the
Lao
People's Army began a joint venture in 1994 with the
Chinese
People's Liberation Army to produce pharmaceuticals for
the Lao
People's Army as well as for domestic and foreign markets.
The military relationship with Vietnam has also
evolved. In
July 1994, it was noted that the Political and Military
Institute
of the People's Army of Vietnam had accepted more than 400
students
from the LPDR since 1978. Nonetheless, Laos cannot rely on
Vietnam
for military assistance and equipment to the extent it had
previously.
Since its inception in December 1975, the LPDR has been
notable
for its remarkable stability and continuity. For almost
twenty
years, the same few men have been in power. The leadership
core, an
elite group of founding members of the LPRP, hold key
positions in
the party, government, and military organs. The majority
of the
members of the Politburo and the Central Committee are
people who
participated in the revolutionary struggle.
In the early 1990s, the deaths of high-ranking
leaders--a
natural consequence of an aging leadership--have meant a
reshuffling of positions. Of note is the fact that no
power
struggles were in evidence. Rather, leaders simply moved
up in
rank. The death in November 1992 of Kaysone Phomvihan, who
had been
active since the 1940s in the resistance forces, then
proclaimed
the LPDR's first prime minister, and finally elected
president in
1991, left no gap in the leadership. Nouhak Phomsavan was
elected
to the largely ceremonial position of president. A close
comrade of
Kaysone, and similarly a veteran of the revolution, Nouhak
was a
former minister of finance and a deputy prime minister.
Nouhak will
be eighty-one years old in April 1995. Khamtai Siphandon,
another
leader in the early resistance efforts, and a former
minister of
national defense (1975-91) and deputy prime minister,
moved up to
the prime minister's post in 1991. Supposedly ten years
younger
than Nouhak, Khamtai's "youth" was seen by some as the
reason for
his appointment to the more active role of prime minister.
Other elder statesmen also have died in the early
1990s. Former
Politburo member Phoumi Vongvichit, acting president of
the LPDR
from the retirement of Souphanouvong in 1986--until his
own
retirement in 1991--died in January 1994. Among other
Politburo
members who have died are deputy prime minister Phoun
Sipraseut,
who was also chief of the Foreign Relations Committee,
LPRP Central
Committee, and "official in charge of guiding foreign
affairs" (and
former minister of foreign affairs), who died in December
1994;
Somlat Chanthamat, who died in 1993; Sisomphon Lovansai,
who died
in 1993; and Sali Vongkhamsao, who died in 1991. Some of
these
leaders had already retired and held largely ceremonial
posts at
the time of their death.
Coming full circle with a royalist heritage but
communist
sympathies, was Prince Souphanouvong. President from the
founding
of the LPDR until he withdrew for health reasons in 1986,
his
position was not officially relinquished until March 1991
at the
Fifth Party Congress, when he was also removed from the
Politburo.
His death in January 1995 ended the last direct link
between the
monarchy established in the mid-fourteenth century by Fa
Ngum and
the single-party communist regime, that is the LPDR. (Two
of
Souphanouvong's sons, however, are active in the
government, one in
the Ministry of Finance, the other in the Social Science
Commission.)
Almost twenty years after its founding, Laos is, once
again, as
during many prior kingdoms, dominated by a small and
powerful elite
marked by nepotism. The country will have to deal with
several
significant issues in the years ahead even as the
remaining aging
leaders continued to govern in early 1995 as a cohesive
group
without active opposition. These issues include: How
effectively
will the LPDR use the assistance proffered by various
international
banks, friendly aid donors, and foreign investors? How
will Laos
deal with its considerable economic potential but also
considerable
educational deficits? When will students begin to seek
greater
opportunities for advancement outside the single- party
system?
Will the party remain in full control and will there be a
regularized political succession? These are but some of
the issues
regarding the future direction of Laos as the nation
responds to
the challenges presented by economic reform and progress.
March 1, 1995
* * * *
Since the Introduction was written, the work of the
party and
government have continued as usual. The sixth ordinary
session of
the National Assembly closed and the tenth plenary session
of the
LPRP's Fifth Central Committee was held. The National
Assembly
endorsed a ministerial reshuffle involving lateral
personnel
changes. Meetings between the foreign ministers of Laos
and
Thailand discussed the need to resolve the still unsettled
1987
border dispute.
Of economic significance, was the April 5 signing of
the
Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development
of the
Mekong River Basin. The agreement, supported by the United
Nations
Development Programme, replaces a 1957 pact between Laos,
Cambodia,
Thailand, and Vietnam, and took two years to negotiate.
The
agreement establishes the Mekong River Commission as an
institutional body and legal framework with which to
promote basin-
wide studies and joint development projects in the lower
Mekong
River basin; China and Burma are expected to join the
commission at
some point. Five areas of cooperation have been
delineated:
hydropower generation, irrigation, fisheries, navigation,
and
tourism. Plans for a series of dams on the Mekong,
however, have
been contested by various environmental groups although
the
agreement purportedly takes environmental protection into
account.
April 26, 1995
* * *
On May 12, 1995, the United States removed Laos from
its list
of countries prohibited from receiving foreign assistance
funds for
reasons of national interest, making development aid an
option.
June 22, 1995
Andrea Matles Savada
Data as of July 1994
|
|